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ELEMENTS

OF

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THE SEVENTH EDITION.

WITH THE

AUTHOR's LAST CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS.

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ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM.

CHAP. XVIII.

Beauty of Language.

OF all the fine arts, painting only and ſculpture are in their nature imitative. An ornamented field is not a copy or imitation of nature, but nature itſelf embelliſhed. Architecture is productive of originals, and copies not from nature. Sound and motion may in ſome meaſure be imitated by muſic; but for the moſt part muſic, like architecture, is productive of originals. Language copies not from nature, more than muſic or architecture; unleſs, where, like muſic, it is imitative of ſound or motion. Thus, in the deſcription of particular ſounds, language ſometimes furniſheth words, which, beſide their cuſtomary power of

exciting ideas, reſemble by their ſoftneſs or harſhneſs the ſounds deſcribed; and there are words which, by the celerity or ſlowneſs of pronunciation, have ſome reſemblance to the motion they ſignify. The imitative power of words goes one ſtep farther: the loftineſs of ſome words makes them proper ſymbols of lofty ideas; a rough ſubject is imitated by harſh-ſounding words; and words of many ſyllables pronounced ſlow and ſmooth, are expreſſive of grief and melancholy. Words have a ſeparate effect on the mind, abſtracting from their ſignification and from their imitative power: they are more or leſs agreeable to the ear, by the fulneſs, ſweetneſs, faintneſs, or roughneſs of their tones.

Theſe are but faint beauties, being known to thoſe only who have more than ordinary acuteneſs of perception. Language poſſeſſeth a beauty ſuperior greatly in degree, of which we are eminently ſenſible when a thought is communicated with perſpicuity and ſprightlineſs. This beauty of language, ariſing from its power of expreſſing thought, is apt to be confounded with the beauty of the thought itſelf: the beauty of thought, tranſferred to the expreſſion, makes it appear more beautiful *. But theſe beauties, if we wiſh to think

* Chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 5. Demetrius Phalereus (of Elocution, ſect. 75.) makes the ſame obſervation. We are apt, ſays that author, to confound the language with the ſubject; and if the latter be nervous, we judge the ſame of

think accurately, muſt be diſtinguiſhed from each other. They are in reality ſo diſtinct, that we ſometimes are conſcious of the higheſt pleaſure language can afford, when the ſubject expreſſed is diſagreeable: a thing that is loathſome, or a ſcene of horror to make one's hair ſtand on end, may be deſcribed in a manner ſo lively, as that the diſagreeableneſs of the ſubject ſhall not even obſcure the agreeableneſs of the deſcription. The cauſes of the original beauty of language, conſidered as ſignificant, which is a branch of the preſent ſubject, will be explained in their order. I ſhall only at preſent obſerve, that this beauty is the beauty of means fitted to an end, that of communicating thought: and hence it evidently appears, that of ſeveral expreſſions all conveying the ſame thought, the moſt beautiful, in the ſenſe now mentioned, is that which in the moſt perfect manner anſwers its end.

The ſeveral beauties of language above mentioned, being of different kinds, ought to be handled ſeparately. I ſhall begin with thoſe beauties of language that ariſe from ſound; after which will follow the beauties of language conſidered as ſignificant: this order appears natural; for the ſound

of the former. But they are clearly diſtinguiſhable; and it is not uncommon to find ſubjects of great dignity dreſſed in mean language. Theopompus is celebrated for the force of his diction; but erroneouſly: his ſubject indeed has great force, but his ſtyle very little.

ſound of a word is attended to, before we conſider its ſignification. In a third ſection come thoſe ſingular beauties of language that are derived from a reſemblance between ſound and ſignification. The beauties of verſe are handled in the laſt ſection: for though the foregoing beauties are found in verſe as well as in proſe, yet verſe has many peculiar beauties, which for the ſake of connection muſt be brought under one view; and verſification, at any rate, is a ſubject of ſo great importance as to deſerve a place by itſelf.

SECT. I.

Beauty of Language with reſpect to Sound.

THIS ſubject requires the following order. The ſounds of the different letters come firſt: next, theſe ſounds as united in ſyllables: third, ſyllables united in words: fourth, words united in a period: and in the laſt place, periods united in a diſcourſe.

With reſpect to the firſt article, every vowel is ſounded with a ſingle expiration of air from the wind-pipe, through the cavity of the mouth. By varying this cavity, the different vowels are ſounded: for the air in paſſing through cavities differing in ſize, produceth various ſounds, ſome high or ſharp,

ſharp, ſome low or flat: a ſmall cavity occaſions a high ſound, a large cavity a low ſound. The five vowels accordingly, pronounced with the ſame extenſion of the wind-pipe, but with different openings of the mouth, form a regular ſeries of ſounds, deſcending from high to low, in the following order, *i*, *e*, *a*, *o*, *u**. Each of theſe ſounds is agreeable to the ear: and if it be required which of them is the moſt agreeable, it is perhaps ſafeſt to hold, that thoſe vowels which are the fartheſt removed from the extremes, will be the moſt reliſhed. This is all I have to remark upon the firſt article: for conſonants being letters that of themſelves have no ſound, ſerve only in conjunction with vowels to form articulate ſounds; and as every articulate ſound makes a ſyllable, conſonants come naturally under the ſecond article; to which we proceed.

A conſonant is pronounced with a leſs cavity than any vowel; and conſequently every ſyllable into which a conſonant enters, muſt have more than one ſound, though pronounced with one expiration of air, or with one breath as commonly expreſſed: for however readily two ſounds may unite, yet where they differ in tone, both of them muſt be

* In this ſcale of ſounds, the letter *i* muſt be pronounced as in the word *intereſt*, and as in other words beginning with the ſyllable *in*; the letter *e* as in *perſuaſion*; the letter *a* as in *bat*; and the letter *u* as in *number*.

be heard if neither of them be ſuppreſſed. For the ſame reaſon, every ſyllable muſt be compoſed of as many ſounds as there are letters, ſuppoſing every letter to be diſtinctly pronounced.

We next enquire, how far ſyllables are agreeable to the ear. Few tongues are ſo poliſhed, as entirely to have rejected ſounds that are pronounced with difficulty; and it is a noted obſervation, That ſuch ſounds are to the ear harſh and diſagreeable. But with reſpect to agreeable ſounds, it appears, that a double ſound is always more agreeable than a ſingle ſound: every one who has an ear muſt be ſenſible, that the dipththong *oi* or *ai* is more agreeable than any of theſe vowels pronounced ſingly: the ſame holds where a conſonant enters into the double ſound; the ſyllable *le* has a more agreeable ſound than the vowel *e*, or than any vowel. And in ſupport of experience, a ſatisfactory argument may be drawn from the wiſdom of Providence: ſpeech is beſtowed on man, to qualify him for ſociety; and his proviſion of articulate ſounds is proportioned to the uſe he hath for them; but if ſounds that are agreeable ſingly were not alſo agreeable in conjunction, the neceſſity of a painful ſelection would render language intricate and difficult to be attained in any perfection; and this ſelection, at the ſame time, would abridge the number of uſeful ſounds, ſo as perhaps not to leave ſufficient for anſwering the different ends of language.

In

In this view, the harmony of pronunciation differs widely from that of muſic properly ſo called. In the latter are diſcovered many ſounds ſingly agreeable, which in conjunction are extremely diſagreeable; none but what are called *concordant ſounds* having a good effect in conjunction. In the former, all ſounds, ſingly agreeable, are in conjunction concordant; and ought to be, in order to fulfil the purpoſes of language.

Having diſcuſſed ſyllables, we proceed to words; which make the third article. Monoſyllables belong to the former head: polyſyllables open a different ſcene. In a curſory view, one would imagine, that the agreeableneſs or diſagreeableneſs of a word with reſpect to its ſound, ſhould depend upon the agreeableneſs or diſagreeableneſs of its component ſyllables: which is true in part, but not entirely; for we muſt alſo take under conſideration, the effect of ſyllables in ſucceſſion. In the firſt place, ſyllables in immediate ſucceſſion, pronounced, each of them, with the ſame, or nearly the ſame aperture of the mouth, produce a ſucceſſion of weak and feeble ſounds; witneſs the French words *dit-il, pathetique:* on the other hand, a ſyllable of the greateſt aperture ſucceeding one of the ſmalleſt, or the contrary, makes a ſucceſſion, which, becauſe of its remarkable diſagreeableneſs, is diſtinguiſhed by a proper name, *hiatus*. The moſt agreeable ſucceſſion is, where the cavity is increaſed and diminiſhed alternately

within moderate limits. Examples, *alternative*, *longevity*, *puſillanimous*. Secondly, words conſiſting wholly of ſyllables pronounced ſlow, or of ſyllables pronounced quick, commonly called *long* and *ſhort ſyllables*, have little melody in them; witneſs the words *petitioner*, *fruiterer*, *dizzineſs*: on the other hand, the intermixture of long and ſhort ſyllables is remarkably agreeable; for example, *degree*, *repent*, *wonderful*, *altitude*, *rapidity*, *independent*, *impetuoſity* *. The cauſe will be explained afterward, in treating of verſification.

Diſtinguiſhable from the beauties above mentioned, there is a beauty of ſome words which ariſes from their ſignification: when the emotion raiſed by the length or ſhortneſs, the roughneſs or ſmoothneſs, of the ſound, reſembles in any degree what is raiſed by the ſenſe, we feel a very remarkable pleaſure. But this ſubject belongs to the third ſection.

The foregoing obſervations afford a ſtandard to every nation, for eſtimating, pretty accurately, the comparative merit of the words that enter into their own language: but they are not equally uſe-

* Italian words, like thoſe of Latin and Greek, have this property almoſt univerſally: Engliſh and French words are generally deficient. In the former, the long ſyllable is removed from the end, as far as the ſound will permit; and in the latter, the laſt ſyllable is generally long. For example, Sēnator in Engliſh, Senātor in Latin, and Senatēur in French.

ful

ful in comparing the words of different languages; which will thus appear. Different nations judge differently of the harſhneſs or ſmoothneſs of articulate ſounds; a ſound, for example, harſh and diſagreeable to an Italian, may be abundantly ſmooth to a northern ear: here every nation muſt judge for itſelf; nor can there be any ſolid ground for a preference, when there is no common ſtandard to which we can appeal. The caſe is preciſely the ſame as in behaviour and manners: plain-dealing and ſincerity, liberty in words and actions, form the character of one people; politeneſs, reſerve, and a total diſguiſe of every ſentiment that can give offence, form the character of another people: to each the manners of the other are diſagreeable. An effeminate mind cannot bear the leaſt of that roughneſs and ſeverity which is generally eſteemed manly, when exerted upon proper occaſions: neither can an effeminate ear bear the harſhneſs of certain words, that are deemed nervous and ſounding by thoſe accuſtomed to a rougher tone of ſpeech. Muſt we then relinquiſh all thoughts of comparing languages in point of roughneſs and ſmoothneſs, as a fruitleſs inquiry? Not altogether; for we may proceed a certain length, though without hope of an ultimate deciſion. A language pronounced with difficulty even by natives, muſt yield to a ſmoother language: and ſuppoſing two languages pronounced with equal facility by natives, the rougher lan-

guage, in my judgment, ought to be preferred, provided it be alſo ſtored with a competent ſhare of more mellow ſounds; which will be evident from attending to the different effects that articulate ſound hath on the mind. A ſmooth gliding ſound is agreeable, by calming the mind, and lulling it to reſt: a rough bold ſound, on the contrary, animates the mind; the effort perceived in pronouncing, is communicated to the hearers, who feel in their own minds a ſimilar effort, rouſing their attention, and diſpoſing them to action. I add another conſideration: the agreeableneſs of contraſt in the rougher language, for which the great variety of ſounds gives ample opportunity, muſt, even in an effeminate ear, prevail over the more uniform ſounds of the ſmoother language *. This appears all that can be ſafely determined upon the preſent point. With reſpect to the other circumſtances that conſtitute the beauty of words, the ſtandard above mentioned is infallible when apply'd to foreign languages as well as to our own: for every man, whatever be his mother-tongue, is equally capable to judge of the length or ſhortneſs of words, of the alternate opening and cloſing of the mouth in ſpeaking, and of the relation that the ſound bears to the ſenſe: in

* That the Italian tongue is too ſmooth, ſeems probable, from conſidering, that in verſification, vowels are frequently ſuppreſſed, in order to produce a rougher and bolder tone.

theſe

theſe particulars, the judgment is ſuſceptible of no prejudice from cuſtom, at leaſt of no invincible prejudice.

That the Engliſh tongue, originally harſh, is at preſent much ſoftened by dropping in the pronunciation many redundant conſonants, is undoubtedly true: that it is not capable of being further mellowed without ſuffering in its force and energy, will ſcarce be thought by any one who poſſeſſes an ear; and yet ſuch in Britain is the propenſity for diſpatch, that, overlooking the majeſty of words compoſed of many ſyllables aptly connected, the prevailing taſte is to ſhorten words, even at the expence of making them diſagreeable to the ear, and harſh in the pronunciation. But I have no occaſion to inſiſt upon this article, being prevented by an excellent writer, who poſſeſſed, if any man ever did, the true genius of the Engliſh tongue *. I cannot however forbear urging one obſervation, borrowed from that author: ſeveral tenſes of our verbs are formed by adding the final ſyllable *ed*, which, being a weak ſound, has remarkably the worſe effect by poſſeſſing the moſt conſpicuous place in the word: upon which account, the vowel in common ſpeech is generally ſuppreſſed, and the conſonant added to the foregoing ſyllable; whence the following rugged ſounds,

* See Swift's propoſal for correcting the Engliſh tongue, in a letter to the Earl of Oxford.

drudg'd, *diſturb'd*, *rebuk'd*, *fledg'd*. It is ſtill leſs excuſable to follow this practice in writing; for the hurry of ſpeaking may excuſe what would be altogether improper in compoſition: the ſyllable *ed*, it is true, ſounds poorly at the end of a word; but rather that defect, than multiply the number of harſh words, which, after all, bear an over-proportion in our tongue. The author above mentioned, by ſhowing a good example, did all in his power to reſtore that ſyllable; and he well deſerves to be imitated. Some exceptions however I would make. A word that ſignifies labour or any thing harſh or rugged, ought not to be ſmooth; therefore *forc'd*, with an apoſtrophe, is better than *forced*, without it. Another exception is where the penult ſyllable ends with a vowel; in that caſe the final ſyllable *ed* may be apoſtrophized without making the word harſh: examples, *betray'd*, *carry'd*, *deſtroy'd*, *employ'd*.

The article next in order, is the muſic of words as united in a period. And as the arrangement of words in ſucceſſion ſo as to afford the greateſt pleaſure to the ear, depends on principles remote from common view, it will be neceſſary to premiſe ſome general obſervations upon the appearance that objects make, when placed in an increaſing or decreaſing ſeries. Where the objects vary by ſmall differences, ſo as to have a mutual reſemblance, we in aſcending conceive the

the ſecond object of no greater ſize than the firſt, the third of no greater ſize than the ſecond, and ſo of the reſt; which diminiſheth in appearance the ſize of every object except the firſt: but when, beginning at the greateſt object, we proceed gradually to the leaſt, reſemblance makes us imagine the ſecond as great as the firſt, and the third as great as the ſecond; which in appearance magnifies every object except the firſt. On the other hand, in a ſeries varying by large differences, where contraſt prevails, the effects are directly oppoſite: a great object ſucceeding a ſmall one of the ſame kind, appears greater than uſual; and a little object ſucceeding one that is great, appears leſs than uſual*. Hence a remarkable pleaſure in viewing a ſeries aſcending by large differences; directly oppoſite to what we feel when the differences are ſmall. The leaſt object of a ſeries aſcending by large differences has the ſame effect upon the mind, as if it ſtood ſingle without making a part of the ſeries: but the ſecond object, by means of contraſt, appears greater than when view'd ſingly and apart; and the ſame effect is perceived in aſcending progreſſively, till we arrive at the laſt object. The oppoſite effect is produced in deſcending; for in this direction, every object, except the firſt, appears leſs than when view'd ſeparately and independent of the ſeries. We may

* See the reaſon, chap. 8.

then aſſume as a maxim, which will hold in the compoſition of language as well as of other ſubjects, That a ſtrong impulſe ſucceeding a weak, makes double impreſſion on the mind; and that a weak impulſe ſucceeding a ſtrong, makes ſcarce any impreſſion.

After eſtabliſhing this maxim, we can be at no loſs about its application to the ſubject in hand. The following rule is laid down by Diomedes*. "In verbis obſervandum eſt, ne a majoribus ad "minora deſcendat oratio; melius enim dicitur, "*Vir eſt optimus*, quam, *Vir optimus eſt*." This rule is alſo applicable to entire members of a period, which, according to our author's expreſſion, ought not, more than ſingle words, to proceed from the greater to the leſs, but from the leſs to the greater†. In arranging the members of a period, no writer equals Cicero: the beauty of the following examples out of many, will not ſuffer me to ſlur them over by a reference.

Quicum quæſtor fueram,
Quicum me ſors conſuetudoque majorum,
Quicum me deorum hominumque judicium conjunxerat.

Again:

Habet honorem quem petimus,
Habet ſpem quam præpoſitam nobis habemus,

* De ſtructura perfectæ orationis, l. 2.

† See Demetrius Phalereus of Elocution, ſect. 18.

Habet

Habet exiſtimationem, multo ſudore, labore, vigiliiſque, collectam.

Again:

Eripite nos ex miſeriis,
Eripite nos ex faucibus eorum,
Quorum crudelitas noſtro ſanguine non poteſt expleri.
De oratore, l. 1. § 52.

This order of words or members gradually increaſing in length, may, as far as concerns the pleaſure of ſound, be denominated *a climax in ſound.*

The laſt article is the muſic of periods as united in a diſcourſe; which ſhall be diſpatched in a very few words. By no other human means is it poſſible to preſent to the mind, ſuch a number of objects, and in ſo ſwift a ſucceſſion, as by ſpeaking or writing: and for that reaſon, variety ought more to be ſtudied in theſe, than in any other ſort of compoſition. Hence a rule for arranging the members of different periods with relation to each other, That to avoid a tedious uniformity of ſound and cadence, the arrangement, the cadence, and the length of the members, ought to be diverſified as much as poſſible: and if the members of different periods be ſufficiently diverſified, the periods themſelves will be equally ſo.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Beauty of Language with reſpect to Signification.

IT is well ſaid by a noted writer*, "That by "means of ſpeech we can divert our ſorrows, "mingle our mirth, impart our ſecrets, commu- "nicate our counſels, and make mutual compacts "and agreements to ſupply and aſſiſt each other." Conſidering ſpeech as contributing to ſo many good purpoſes, words that convey clear and diſtinct ideas, muſt be one of its capital beauties. This cauſe of beauty, is too extenſive to be handled as a branch of any other ſubject: for to aſcertain with accuracy even the proper meaning of words, not to talk of their figurative power, would require a large volume; an uſeful work indeed, but not to be attempted without a large ſtock of time, ſtudy, and reflection. This branch therefore of the ſubject I humbly decline. Nor do I propoſe to exhauſt all the other beauties of language that relate to ſignification: the reader, in a work like the preſent, cannot fairly expect more than a ſlight ſketch of thoſe that make the greateſt figure. This taſk is the more to my taſte, as being connected with certain natural principles; and the

* Scot's Chriſtian life.

rules

rules I ſhall have occaſion to lay down, will, if I judge rightly, be agreeable illuſtrations of theſe principles. Every ſubject muſt be of importance that tends to unfold the human heart; for what other ſcience is of greater uſe to human beings?

The preſent ſubject is too extenſive to be diſcuſſed without dividing it into parts; and what follows ſuggeſts a diviſion into two parts. In every period, two things are to be regarded: firſt, the words of which it is compoſed; next, the arrangement of theſe words; the former reſembling the ſtones that compoſe a building, and the latter reſembling the order in which they are placed. Hence the beauties of language with reſpect to ſignification, may not improperly be diſtinguiſhed into two kinds: firſt, the beauties that ariſe from a right choice of words or materials for conſtructing the period; and next, the beauties that ariſe from a due arrangement of theſe words or materials. I begin with rules that direct us to a right choice of words, and then proceed to rules that concern their arrangement.

And with reſpect to the former, communication of thought being the chief end of language, it is a rule, That perſpicuity ought not to be ſacrificed to any other beauty whatever: if it ſhould be doubted whether perſpicuity be a poſitive beauty, it cannot be doubted that the want of it is the greateſt defect. Nothing therefore in language ought more to be ſtudied, than to prevent all obſcurity

ſcurity in the expreſſion; for to have no meaning, is but one degree worſe, than to have a meaning that is not underſtood. Want of perſpicuity from a wrong arrangement, belongs to the next branch. I ſhall here give a few examples where the obſcurity ariſes from a wrong choice of words; and as this defect is too common in the ordinary herd of writers to make examples from them neceſſary, I confine myſelf to the moſt celebrated authors.

Livy, ſpeaking of a rout after a battle,

Multique in ruina *majore* quam fuga oppreſſi obtruncatique.

L. 4. § 46.

This author is frequently obſcure, by expreſſing but part of his thought, leaving it to be completed by his reader. His deſcription of the ſea-fight, *l.* 28. *cap.* 30. is extremely perplexed.

Unde tibi reditum *certo ſubtemine* Parcæ
Rupere.

Horace, epod. xiii. 22.

Qui perſæpe cava teſtudine flevit amorem,
Non elaboratum ad pedem.

Horace, epod. xiv. 11.

Me fabuloſæ Vulture in Appulo,
Altricis extra limen Apuliæ,
Ludo, fatigatumque *ſomno*,

Fronde

Fronde nova puerum palumbes
Texere.

Horace, Carm. l. 3. *ode* 4.

Puræ rivus aquæ, ſilvaque jugerum
Paucorum, et ſegetis certa fides meæ,
Fulgentum imperio fertilis Africæ
Fallit ſorte beatior.

Horace, Carm. l. 3. *ode* 16.

Cum fas atque nefas exiguo *fine* libidinum
Diſcernunt avidi.

Horace, Carm. l. 1. *ode* 18.

Ac ſpem fronte ſerenat.

Æneid. iv. 477.

I am in greater pain about the foregoing paſſages, than about any I have ventured to criticiſe, being aware that a vague or obſcure expreſſion, is apt to gain favour with thoſe who neglect to examine it with a critical eye. To ſome it carries the ſenſe that they reliſh the moſt; and by ſuggeſting various meanings at once, it is admired by others as conciſe and comprehenſive: which by the way fairly accounts for the opinion generally entertained with reſpect to moſt languages in their infant ſtate, of expreſſing much in few words. This obſervation may be illuſtrated by a paſſage from Quintilian, quoted in the firſt volume for a different purpoſe.

At

At quæ Polycleto defuerunt, Phidiæ atque Alcameni dantur. Phidias tamen diis quam hominibus efficiendis melior artifex traditur: in ebore vero, longe citra æmulum, vel ſi nihil niſi Minervam Athenis, aut Olympium in Elide Jovem feciſſet, *cujus pulchritudo adjeciſſe aliquid etiam receptæ religioni videtur; adeo majeſtas operis Deum æquavit.*

The ſentence in the Italic characters appeared to me abundantly perſpicuous, before I gave it peculiar attention. And yet to examine it independent of the context, its proper meaning is not what is intended: the words naturally import, that the beauty of the ſtatues mentioned, appears to add ſome new tenet or rite to the eſtabliſhed religion, or appears to add new dignity to it; and we muſt conſult the context before we can gather the true meaning; which is, that the Greeks were confirmed in the belief of their eſtabliſhed religion by theſe majeſtic ſtatues, ſo like real divinities.

There may be a defect in perſpicuity proceeding even from the ſlighteſt ambiguity in conſtruction; as where the period commences with a member conceived to be in the nominative caſe, which afterward is found to be in the accuſative. Example: "Some emotions more peculiarly con-"nected with the fine arts, I propoſe to handle "in ſeparate chapters *." Better thus: "Some

* Elements of Criticiſm, vol. i. p. 43. edit. 1.

"emotions

" emotions more peculiarly connected with the " fine arts, are propoſed to be handled in ſepa- " rate chapters."

I add another error againſt perſpicuity; which I mention the rather becauſe with ſome writers it paſſes for a beauty. It is the giving different names to the ſame object, mentioned oftener than once in the ſame period. Example: Speaking of the Engliſh adventurers who firſt attempted the conqueſt of Ireland, " and inſtead of reclaiming " the natives from their uncultivated manners, " they were gradually aſſimilated to the ancient " inhabitants, and degenerated from the cuſtoms " of their own nation." From this mode of expreſſion, one would think the author meant to diſtinguiſh *the ancient inhabitants* from *the natives;* and we cannot diſcover otherwiſe than from the ſenſe, that theſe are only different names given to the ſame object for the ſake of variety. But perſpicuity ought never to be ſacrificed to any other beauty, which leads me to think that the paſſage may be improved as follows: " and dege- " nerating from the cuſtoms of their own nation, " they were gradually aſſimilated to the natives, " inſtead of reclaiming them from their uncultivated manners."

The next rule in order, becauſe next in importance, is, That the language ought to correſpond to the ſubject: heroic actions or ſentiments require

quire elevated language; tender ſentiments ought to be expreſſed in words ſoft and flowing; and plain language void of ornament, is adapted to ſubjects grave and didactic. Language may be conſidered as the dreſs of thought; and where the one is not ſuited to the other, we are ſenſible of incongruity, in the ſame manner as where a judge is dreſſed like a fop, or a peaſant like a man of quality. Where the impreſſion made by the words reſembles the impreſſion made by the thought, the ſimilar emotions mix ſweetly in the mind, and double the pleaſure *; but where the impreſſions made by the thought and the words are diſſimilar, the unnatural union they are forced into is diſagreeable †.

This concordance between the thought and the words has been obſerved by every critic, and is ſo well underſtood as not to require any illuſtration. But there is a concordance of a peculiar kind, that has ſcarcely been touched in works of criticiſm, though it contributes to neatneſs of compoſition. It is what follows. In a thought of any extent, we commonly find ſome parts intimately united, ſome ſlightly, ſome disjoined, and ſome directly oppoſed to each other. To find theſe conjunctions and disjunctions imitated in the expreſſion, is a beauty; becauſe ſuch imitation makes the words concordant with the ſenſe.

* Chap. 2. part 4. † Ibid.

This

This doctrine may be illuſtrated by a familiar example. When we have occaſion to mention the intimate connection that the ſoul hath with the body, the expreſſion ought to be, *the ſoul and body;* becauſe the particle *the*, relative to both, makes a connection in the expreſſion, reſembling in ſome degree the connection in the thought: but when the ſoul is diſtinguiſhed from the body, it is better to ſay *the ſoul and the body;* becauſe the disjunction in the words reſembles the diſjunction in the thought. I proceed to other examples, beginning with conjunctions.

Conſtituit agmen; et expedire tela animoſque, equitibus juſſis, *&c.*

Livy, l. 38. §. 25.

Here the words that expreſs the connected ideas are artificially connected by ſubjecting them both to the regimen of one verb. And the two following are of the ſame kind.

Quum ex paucis quotidie aliqui eorum caderent aut vulnerarentur, et qui ſuperarent, feſſi et corporibus et animis eſſent, *&c.*

Livy, l. 38. § 29.

Poſt acer Mneſtheus adducto conſtitit arcu,
Alta petens, pariterque oculos telumque tetendit.

Æneid, v. 507.

But to juſtify this artificial connection among the

words, the ideas they expreſs ought to be intimately connected; for otherwiſe that concordance which is required between the ſenſe and the expreſſion will be impaired. In that view, a paſſage from Tacitus is exceptionable; where words that ſignify ideas very little connected, are however forc'd into an artificial union. Here is the paſſage:

Germania omnis a Galliis, Rhætiiſque, et Pannoniis, Rheno et Danubio fluminibus; a Sarmatis Daciſque, mutuo metu aut montibus ſeparatur.

De moribus Germanorum.

Upon the ſame account, I eſteem the following paſſage equally exceptionable.

——— The fiend look'd up, and knew
His mounted ſcale aloft; nor more, but fled
Murm'ring, and with him fled the ſhades of night.

Paradiſe Loſt, b. 4. at the end.

There is no natural connection between a perſon's flying or retiring, and the ſucceſſion of day-light to darkneſs; and therefore to connect artificially the terms that ſignify theſe things cannot have a ſweet effect.

Two members of a thought connected by their relation to the ſame action, will naturally be expreſſed by two members of the period governed by the ſame verb; in which caſe theſe members, in

in order to improve their connection, ought to be conſtructed in the ſame manner. This beauty is ſo common among good writers, as to have been little attended to; but the neglect of it is remarkably diſagreeable: For example, "He did not "mention Leonora, nor that her father was dead." Better thus: "He did not mention Leonora, nor "her father's death."

Where two ideas are ſo connected as to require but a copulative, it is pleaſant to find a connection in the words that expreſs theſe ideas, were it even ſo ſlight as where both begin with the ſame letter:

The peacock, in all his pride, does not diſplay half the colour that appears in the garments of a Britiſh lady, when ſhe is either dreſſed for a ball or a birth-day.

Spectator, N° 265.

Had not my dog of a ſteward run away as he did, without making up his accounts, I had ſtill been immerſed in ſin and ſea-coal.

Ibid. N° 530.

My life's companion, and my boſom-friend,
One faith, one fame, one fate ſhall both attend,

Dryden, Tranſlation of Æneid.

There is ſenſibly a defect in neatneſs when uniformity in this caſe is totally neglected *; witneſs the following example, where the conſtruction of

* See Girard's French Grammar, diſcourſe 12.

two members connected by a copulative is unneceſſarily varied.

For it is confidently reported, that two young gentlemen of real hopes, bright wit, and profound judgment, who upon a thorough examination of cauſes and effects, and by the mere force of natural abilities, without the leaſt tincture of learning, have made a diſcovery that there was no God, and *generouſly communicating* their thoughts for the good of the public, were ſome time ago, by an unparallelled ſeverity, and upon I know not what obſolete law, broke for blaſphemy *. [Better thus]:—having made a diſcovery that there was no God, and having generouſly communicated their thoughts for the good of the public, were ſome time ago, *&c.*

He had been guilty of a fault, for which his maſter would have put him to death, had he not found an opportunity to eſcape out of his hands, and *fled* into the deſerts of Numidia.

Guardian, N° 139.

If all the ends of the Revolution are already obtained, it is not only impertinent to argue for obtaining any of them, but *factious deſigns might be imputed*, and the name of incendiary be applied with ſome colour, perhaps, to any one who ſhould perſiſt in preſſing this point.

Diſſertation upon parties, Dedication.

* An argument againſt aboliſhing Chriſtianity. *Swift.*

Next as to examples of disjunction and oppoſition in the parts of the thought, imitated in the expreſſion; an imitation that is diſtinguiſhed by the name of *antitheſis*.

Speaking of Coriolanus ſoliciting the people to be made conſul:

With a proud heart he wore his humble weeds.

Coriolanus.

Had you rather Cæſar were living, and die all ſlaves, than that Cæſar were dead, to live all free men?

Julius Cæſar.

He hath cool'd my friends and heated mine enemies.

Shakeſpear.

An artificial connection among the words, is undoubtedly a beauty when it repreſents any peculiar connection among the conſtituent parts of the thought; but where there is no ſuch connection, it is a poſitive deformity, as above obſerved, becauſe it makes a diſcordance between the thought and expreſſion. For the ſame reaſon, we ought alſo to avoid every artificial oppoſition of words where there is none in the thought. This laſt, termed *verbal antitheſis*, is ſtudied by low writers, becauſe of a certain degree of livelineſs in it. They do not conſider how incongruous it is, in a grave compoſition, to cheat the reader, and to

make him expect a contraſt in the thought, which upon examination is not found there.

A *light* wife doth make a *heavy* huſband.
Merchant of Venice.

Here is a ſtudied oppoſition in the words, not only without any oppoſition in the ſenſe, but even where there is a very intimate connection, that of cauſe and effect; for it is the levity of the wife that torments the huſband.

——————— Will maintain
Upon his *bad* life to make all this *good*.
King Richard II. *act* 1. *ſc.* 3.

Lucetta. What, ſhall theſe papers lie like tell-tales here?
Julia. If thou reſpect them, beſt to take them up.
Lucetta. Nay, I was *taken up* for *laying them down*.
Two Gentlemen of Verona, *act* 1. *ſc.* 3.

A fault directly oppoſite to that laſt mentioned, is to conjoin artificially words that expreſs ideas oppoſed to each other. This is a fault too groſs to be in common practice; and yet writers are guilty of it in ſome degree, when they conjoin by a copulative things tranſacted at different periods of time. Hence a want of neatneſs in the following expreſſion.

The nobility too, whom the King had no means of retaining by ſuitable offices and preferments, had been ſeized

ſeized with the general diſcontent, and unwarily threw themſelves into the ſcale which began already too much to preponderate.

Hiſtory of G. Britain, vol. i. *p.* 250.

In periods of this kind, it appears more neat to expreſs the paſt time by the participle paſſive, thus:

The nobility having been ſeized with the general diſcontent, unwarily threw themſelves, *&c.* (or,) The nobility, who had been ſeized, *&c.* unwarily threw themſelves, *&c.*

It is unpleaſant to find even a negative and affirmative propoſition connected by a copulative:

Nec excitatur claſſico miles truci,
Nec horret iratum mare;
Forumque vitat, et ſuperba civium
Potentiorum limina.

Horace, Epod. 2. *l.* 5.

If it appear not plain, and prove untrue,
Deadly divorce ſtep between me and you.

Shakeſpear.

In mirth and drollery it may have a good effect to connect verbally things that are oppoſite to each other in the thought. Example: Henry the Fourth of France introducing the Mareſchal Biron to ſome of his friends, "Here, Gentlemen," ſays he, "is the Mareſchal Biron, whom I freely pre-"ſent both to my friends and enemies."

This rule of ſtudying uniformity between the thought and expreſſion, may be extended to the conſtruction of ſentences or periods. A ſentence or period ought to expreſs one entire thought or mental propoſition; and different thoughts ought to be ſeparated in the expreſſion by placing them in different ſentences or periods. It is therefore offending againſt neatneſs, to crowd into one period entire thoughts requiring more than one; which is joining in language things that are ſeparated in reality. Of errors againſt this rule take the following examples.

Behold, thou art fair, my beloved, yea pleaſant; alſo our bed is green.

Cæſar, deſcribing the Suevi:

Atque in eam ſe conſuetudinem adduxerunt, ut locis frigidiſſimis, neque veſtitus, præter pelles, habeant quidquam, quarum propter exiguitatem, magna eſt corporis pars aperta, et laventur in fluminibus.

Commentaria, l. 4. prin.

Burnet, in the hiſtory of his own times, giving Lord Sunderland's character, ſays,

His own notions were always good; but he was a man of great expence.

I have ſeen a woman's face break out in heats, as ſhe has been talking againſt a great lord, whom ſhe had never

ver ſeen in her life; and indeed never knew a party-woman that kept her beauty for a twelvemonth.

Spectator, N° 57.

Lord Bolingbroke, ſpeaking of Strada:

I ſingle him out among the moderns, becauſe he had the fooliſh preſumption to cenſure Tacitus, and to write hiſtory himſelf; and your Lordſhip will forgive this ſhort excurſion in honour of a favourite writer.

Letters on hiſtory, vol. i. *let.* 5.

It ſeems to me, that in order to maintain the moral ſyſtem of the world at a certain point, far below that of ideal perfection, (for we are made capable of conceiving what we are incapable of attaining), but however ſufficient upon the whole to conſtitute a ſtate eaſy and happy, or at the worſt tolerable: I ſay, it ſeems to me, that the Author of nature has thought fit to mingle from time to time, among the ſocieties of men, a few, and but a few, of thoſe on whom he is graciouſly pleaſed to beſtow a larger proportion of the etherial ſpirit than is given in the ordinary courſe of his providence to the ſons of men.

Bolingbroke, on the ſpirit of patriotiſm, let. 1.

To crowd into a ſingle member of a period different ſubjects, is ſtill worſe than to crowd them into one period:

——————Trojam, genitore Adamaſto
Paupere (manſiſſetque utinam fortuna) profectus.

Æneid. iii. 614.

From

From conjunctions and disjunctions in general, we proceed to compariſons, which make one ſpecies of them, beginning with ſimiles. And here alſo, the intimate connection that words have with their meaning requires, that in deſcribing two reſembling objects, a reſemblance in the two members of the period ought to be ſtudied. To illuſtrate the rule in this caſe, I ſhall give various examples of deviations from it; beginning with reſemblances expreſſed in words that have no reſemblance.

I have obſerved of late, the ſtyle of ſome great *miniſters* very much to exceed that of any other *productions*.
Letter to the Lord High Treaſurer. Swift.

This, inſtead of ſtudying the reſemblance of words in a period that expreſſes a compariſon, is going out of one's road to avoid it. Inſtead of *productions*, which reſemble not miniſters great nor ſmall, the proper word is *writers* or *authors*.

If men of eminence are expoſed to cenſure on the one hand, they are as much liable to flattery on the other. If they receive reproaches which are not due to them, they likewiſe receive praiſes which they do not deſerve.
Spectator.

Here the ſubject plainly demands uniformity in expreſſion inſtead of variety; and therefore it is ſubmitted, whether the period would not do better in the following manner:

If men of eminence be expoſed to cenſure on the one hand, they are as much expoſed to flattery on the other. If they receive reproaches that are not due, they likewiſe receive praiſes that are not due.

I cannot but fancy, however, that this imitation, which paſſes ſo currently with *other judgments*, muſt at ſome time or other have ſtuck a little with your *Lordſhip* *. [Better thus]: I cannot but fancy, however, that this imitation, which paſſes ſo currently with *others*, muſt at ſome time or other have ſtuck a little with your *Lordſhip*.

A glutton or mere ſenſualiſt is as ridiculous as the other two characters.

Shafteſbury, vol. i. *p.* 129.

They wiſely prefer *the generous efforts of good-will and affection*, to the reluctant compliances *of ſuch as* obey by force.

Remarks on the hiſtory of England, letter 5. *Bolingbroke.*

Titus Livius, mentioning a demand made by the people of Enna of the keys from the Roman governor, makes him ſay,

Quas ſimul tradiderimus, Carthaginienſium extemplo Enna erit, fœdiuſque hic trucidabimur, quam Murgantiæ præſidium interfectum eſt.

l. 24. § 38.

* Letter concerning enthuſiaſm. Shafteſbury.

Quintus

Quintus Curtius, ſpeaking of Porus mounted on an elephant, and leading his army to battle:

Magnitudini Pori adjicere videbatur bellua qua vehebatur, tantum inter cæteras eminens, quanto aliis ipſe præſtabat.

l. 8. *cap.* 14.

It is ſtill a greater deviation from congruity, to affect not only variety in the words, but alſo in the conſtruction. Deſcribing Thermopylæ, Titus Livius ſays,

Id jugum, ſicut Apennini dorſo Italia dividitur, ita mediam Græciam diremit.

l. 36. § 15.

Speaking of Shakeſpear:

There may remain a ſuſpicion that we over-rate the greatneſs of his genius, in the ſame manner as bodies appear more gigantic on account of their being diſproportioned and miſhapen.

Hiſtory of G. Britain, vol. 1. *p.* 138.

This is ſtudying variety in a period where the beauty lies in uniformity. Better thus:

There may remain a ſuſpicion that we over-rate the greatneſs of his genius, in the ſame manner as we over-rate the greatneſs of bodies that are diſproportioned and miſhapen.

Next as to the length of the members that ſignify the reſembling objects. To produce a reſemblance between ſuch members, they ought not only to be conſtructed in the ſame manner, but as nearly as poſſible be equal in length. By neglecting this circumſtance, the following example is defective in neatneſs.

As the performance of all other religious duties will not avail in the ſight of God, *without charity*; ſo neither will the diſcharge of all other miniſterial duties avail in the ſight of men, *without a faithful diſcharge of this principal duty.*

Diſſertation upon parties, Dedication.

In the following paſſage are accumulated all the errors that a period expreſſing a reſemblance can well admit.

Miniſters are anſwerable for every thing done to the prejudice of the conſtitution, in the ſame proportion as the preſervation of the conſtitution in its purity and vigour, or the perverting and weakening it, are of greater conſequence to the nation, than any other inſtances of good or bad government.

Diſſertation upon parties, Dedication.

Next of a compariſon where things are oppoſed to each other. And here it muſt be obvious, that if reſemblance ought to be ſtudied in the words which expreſs two reſembling objects, there is equal reaſon for ſtudying oppoſition in the words which expreſs contraſted objects. This rule will be

be beſt illuſtrated by examples of deviations from it:

A friend exaggerates a man's virtues, an enemy inflames his crimes.

Spectator, N° 399.

Here the oppoſition in the thought is neglected in the words, which at firſt view ſeem to import, that the friend and the enemy are employ'd in different matters, without any relation to each other, whether of reſemblance or of oppoſition. And therefore the contraſt or oppoſition will be better marked by expreſſing the thought as follows.

A friend exaggerates a man's virtues, an enemy his crimes.

The following are examples of the ſame kind.

The wiſe man is happy when he gains his own approbation; the fool when he recommends himſelf to the applauſe of thoſe about him.

Ibid. N° 73.

Better:

The wiſe man is happy when he gains his own approbation; the fool when he gains that of others.

Sicut in frugibus pecudibuſque, non tantum ſemina ad ſervandum indolem valent, quantum terræ proprietas cœlique, ſub quo aluntur, mutat.

Livy, lib. 38. § 17.

We

We proceed to a rule of a different kind. During the courſe of a period, the ſcene ought to be continued without variation: the changing from perſon to perſon, from ſubject to ſubject, or from perſon to ſubject, within the bounds of a ſingle period, diſtracts the mind, and affords no time for a ſolid impreſſion. I illuſtrate this rule by giving examples of deviations from it.

Honos alit artes, *omneſque* incenduntur ad ſtudia gloriâ; jacentque *ea* ſemper quæ apud quoſque improbantur.

Cicero, Tuſcul. quæſt. l. 1.

Speaking of the diſtemper contracted by Alexander bathing in the river Cydnus, and of the cure offered by Philip the phyſician:

Inter hac à Parmenione fidiſſimo purpuratorum, literas *accipit*, quibus ei *denunciabat*, ne ſalutem ſuam Philippo committeret.

Quintus Curtius, l. 3. *cap.* 6.

Hook, in his Roman hiſtory, ſpeaking of Eumenes, who had been beat to the ground with a ſtone, ſays,

After a ſhort time *he* came to himſelf; and the next day, *they* put him on board his ſhip, *which* conveyed him firſt to Corinth, and thence to the iſland of Ægina.

I give another example of a period which is unpleaſant, even by a very ſlight deviation from the rule:

That

That ſort of inſtruction which is acquired by inculcating an important moral truth, &c.

This expreſſion includes two perſons, one acquiring, and one inculcating; and the ſcene is changed without neceſſity. To avoid this blemiſh, the thought may be expreſſed thus:

That ſort of inſtruction which is afforded by inculcating, &c.

The bad effect of ſuch change of perſon is remarkable in the following paſſage.

The *Britons*, daily haraſſed by cruel inroads from the Picts, were forced to call in the Saxons for their defence, *who* conſequently reduced the greateſt part of the iſland to their own power, drove the Britons into the moſt remote and mountainous parts, and *the reſt of the country*, in cuſtoms, religion, and language, became wholly Saxons.

Letter to the Lord High Treaſurer. Swift.

The following paſſage has a change from ſubject to perſon.

This proſtitution of praiſe is not only a deceit upon the groſs of mankind, who take their notion of characters from the learned; but alſo *the better ſort* muſt by this means loſe ſome part at leaſt of that deſire of fame which is the incentive to generous actions, when they find it promiſcuouſly beſtowed on the meritorious and undeſerving.

Guardian, N° 4.

Even

Even ſo ſlight a change as to vary the conſtruction in the ſame period, is unpleaſant:

Annibal luce prima, Baleáribus levique alia armatura præmiſſa, tranſgreſſus flumen, ut quoſque traduxerat, ita in acie locabat; Gallos Hiſpanoſque equites prope ripam lævo in cornu adverſus Romanum equitatum; dextrum cornu Numidis equitibus datum.

Tit. Liv. l. 22. § 46.

Speaking of Hannibal's elephants drove back by the enemy upon his own army:

Eo magis ruere in ſuos belluæ, tantoque majorem ſtragem edere quam inter hoſtes ediderant, quanto acrius pavor conſternatam agit, quam inſidentis magiſtri imperio regitur.

Liv. l. 27. § 14.

This paſſage is alſo faulty in a different reſpect, that there is no reſemblance between the members of the ſentence, though they expreſs a ſimile.

The preſent head, which relates to the choice of materials, ſhall be cloſed with a rule concerning the uſe of copulatives. Longinus obſerves, that it animates a period to drop the copulatives; and he gives the following example from Xenophon.

Cloſing their ſhields together, they were puſh'd, they fought, they ſlew, they were ſlain.

Treatiſe of the Sublime, cap. 16.

The reaſon I take to be what follows. A conti-

nued ſound, if not loud, tends to lay us aſleep: an interrupted ſound rouſes and animates by its repeated impulſes. Thus feet compoſed of ſyllables, being pronounced with a ſenſible interval between each, make more lively impreſſions than can be made by a continued ſound. A period of which the members are connected by copulatives, produceth an effect upon the mind approaching to that of a continued ſound; and therefore the ſuppreſſing copulatives muſt animate a deſcription. It produces a different effect akin to that mentioned: the members of a period connected by proper copulatives, glide ſmoothly and gently along; and are a proof of ſedateneſs and leiſure in the ſpeaker: on the other hand, one in the hurry of paſſion, neglecting copulatives and other particles, expreſſes the principal image only; and for that reaſon, hurry or quick action is beſt expreſſed without copulatives:

Veni, vidi, vici.

——————————Ite:
Ferte citi flammas, date vela, impellite remos.
Æneid. iv. 593.

Quis globus, O civis, caligine volvitur atra?
Ferte citi ferrum, dete tela, ſcandite muros.
Hoſtis adeſt, eja.
Æneid. ix. 37.

In this view Longinus* juſtly compares copulatives

* Treatiſe of the Sublime, cap. 16.

tives in a period to ſtrait tying, which in a race obſtructs the freedom of motion.

It follows, that a plurality of copulatives in the ſame period ought to be avoided: for if the laying aſide copulatives give force and livelineſs, a redundancy of them muſt render the period languid. I appeal to the following inſtance, though there are but two copulatives.

Upon looking over the letters of my female correſpondents, I find ſeveral from women complaining of jealous huſbands; and at the ſame time proteſting their own innocence, and deſiring my advice upon this occaſion.

Spectator, N° 170.

I except the caſe where the words are intended to expreſs the coldneſs of the ſpeaker; for there the redundancy of copulatives is a beauty:

Dining one day at an alderman's in the city, Peter obſerved him expatiating after the manner of his brethren, in the praiſes of his ſirloin of beef. "Beef," ſaid the ſage magiſtrate, "is the king of meat: Beef compre-
"hends in it the quinteſſence of partridge, and quail,
"and veniſon, and pheaſant, and plum-pudding, and
"cuſtard."

Tale of a Tub, § 4.

And the author ſhows great delicacy of taſte by varying the expreſſion in the mouth of Peter, who is repreſented more animated:

"Bread," ſays he, "dear brothers, is the ſtaff of life;
"in which bread is contained, *incluſive*, the quinteſſence

" of beef, mutton, veal, veniſon, patridges, plum-pud-
" ding, and cuſtard."

Another caſe muſt alſo be excepted: copulatives have a good effect where the intention is to give an impreſſion of a great multitude conſiſting of many diviſions; for example: " The army was " compoſed of Grecians, and Carians, and Ly-" cians, and Pamphylians, and Phrygians." The reaſon is, that a leiſurely ſurvey, which is expreſſed by the copulatives, makes the parts appear more numerous than they would do by a haſty ſurvey: in the latter caſe the army appears in one group; in the former, we take as it were an accurate ſurvey of each nation and of each diviſion *.

We proceed to the ſecond kind of beauty; which conſiſts in a due arrangement of the words or materials. This branch of the ſubject is no leſs nice than extenſive; and I deſpair of ſetting it in a clear light, except to thoſe who are well acquainted with the general principles that govern the ſtructure or compoſition of language.

In a thought, generally ſpeaking, there is at leaſt one capital object conſidered as acting or as ſuffering. This object is expreſſed by a ſubſtantive noun; its action is expreſſed by an active verb; and the thing affected by the action is expreſſed by another ſubſtantive noun: its ſuffering or

* See Demetrius Phalereus of Elocution, ſect. 63.

or paſſive ſtate is expreſſed by a paſſive verb; and the thing that acts upon it, by a ſubſtantive noun. Beſide theſe, which are the capital parts of a ſentence or period, there are generally under-parts; each of the ſubſtantives as well as the verb, may be qualified: time, place, purpoſe, motive, means, inſtrument, and a thouſand other circumſtances, may be neceſſary to complete the thought. And in what manner theſe ſeveral parts are connected in the expreſſion, will appear from what follows.

In a complete thought or mental propoſition, all the members and parts are mutually related, ſome ſlightly, ſome intimately. To put ſuch a thought in words, it is not ſufficient that the component ideas be clearly expreſſed; it is alſo neceſſary, that all the relations contained in the thought be expreſſed according to their different degrees of intimacy. To annex a certain meaning to a certain ſound or word, requires no art: the great nicety in all languages is, to expreſs the various relations that connect the parts of the thought. Could we ſuppoſe this branch of language to be ſtill a ſecret, it would puzzle, I am apt to think, the acuteſt grammarian, to invent an expeditious method: and yet, by the guidance merely of nature, the rude and illiterate have been led to a method ſo perfect, as to appear not ſuſceptible of any improvement; and the next ſtep in our progreſs ſhall be to explain that method.

Words that import a relation, muſt be diſtinguiſhed from ſuch as do not. Subſtantives commonly imply no relation; ſuch as *animal*, *man*, *tree*, *river*. Adjectives, verbs, and adverbs, imply a relation: the adjective *good* muſt relate to ſome being poſſeſſed of that quality: the verb *write* is applied to ſome perſon who writes; and the adverbs *moderately*, *diligently*, have plainly a reference to ſome action which they modify. When a relative word is introduced, it muſt be ſignified by the expreſſion to what word it relates, without which the ſenſe is not complete. For anſwering that purpoſe, I obſerve in Greek and Latin two different methods. Adjectives are declined as well as ſubſtantives; and declenſion ſerves to aſcertain their connection: If the word that expreſſes the ſubject be, for example, in the nominative caſe, ſo alſo muſt the word be that expreſſes its quality; example, *vir bonus*: again, verbs are related, on the one hand, to the agent, and, on the other, to the ſubject upon which the action is exerted: and a contrivance ſimilar to that now mentioned, ſerves to expreſs the double relation; the nominative caſe is appropriated to the agent, the accuſative to the paſſive ſubject; and the verb is put in the firſt, ſecond, or third perſon, to intimate its connection with the word that ſignifies the agent: examples, *Ego amo Tulliam*; *tu amas Semproniam*; *Brutus amat Portiam*. The other method is by juxtapoſition, which is neceſſary

ceſſary with reſpect to ſuch words only as are not declined, adverbs, for example, articles, prepoſitions, and conjunctions. In the Engliſh language there are few declenſions; and therefore juxtapoſition is our chief reſource: adjectives accompany their ſubſtantives *; an adverb accompanies the word it qualifies; and the verb occupies the middle place between the active and paſſive ſubjects to which it relates.

It muſt be obvious, that thoſe terms which have nothing relative in their ſignification, cannot be connected in ſo eaſy a manner. When two ſubſtantives happen to be connected, as cauſe and effect, as principal and acceſſory, or in any other manner, ſuch connection cannot be expreſſed by contiguity ſolely; for words muſt often in a period be placed together which are not thus related: the relation between ſubſtantives, therefore, cannot otherwiſe be expreſſed but by particles denoting the relation. Latin indeed and Greek, by their declenſions, go a certain length to expreſs

* Taking advantage of a declenſion to ſeparate an adjective from its ſubſtantive, as is commonly practiſed in Latin, though it detract not from perſpicuity, is certainly leſs neat than the Engliſh method of juxtapoſition. Contiguity is more expreſſive of an intimate relation, than reſemblance merely of the final ſyllables. Latin indeed has evidently the advantage when the adjective and ſubſtantive happen to be connected by contiguity, as well as by reſemblance of the final ſyllables.

ſuch relations, without the aid of particles. The relation of property for example, between Cæſar and his horſe, is expreſſed by putting the latter in the nominative caſe, the former in the genitive; *equus Cæſaris:* the ſame is alſo expreſſed in Engliſh without the aid of a particle, *Cæſar's horſe.* But in other inſtances, declenſions not being uſed in the Engliſh language, relations of this kind are commonly expreſſed by prepoſitions. Examples: That wine came *from* Cyprus. He is going *to* Paris. The ſun is *below* the horizon.

This form of connecting by prepoſitions, is not confined to ſubſtantives. Qualities, attributes, manner of exiſting or acting, and all other circumſtances, may in the ſame manner be connected with the ſubſtances to which they relate. This is done artificially by converting the circumſtance into a ſubſtantive; in which condition it is qualified to be connected with the principal ſubject by a prepoſition, in the manner above deſcrib'd. For example, the adjective *wiſe* being converted into the ſubſtantive *wiſdom*, gives opportunity for the expreſſion "a man *of* wiſdom," inſtead of the more ſimple expreſſion *a wiſe man:* this variety in the expreſſion, enriches language. I obſerve, beſide, that the uſing a prepoſition in this caſe, is not always a matter of choice: it is indiſpenſable with reſpect to every circumſtance that cannot be expreſſed by a ſingle adjective or adverb.

To pave the way for the rules of arrangement, one

one other preliminary is neceſſary; which is, to explain the difference between a natural ſtyle, and that where tranſpoſition or inverſion prevails. There are, it is true, no preciſe boundaries between them, for they run into each other like the ſhades of different colours. No perſon, however, is at a loſs to diſtinguiſh them in their extremes: and it is neceſſary to make the diſtinction; becauſe tho' ſome of the rules I ſhall have occaſion to mention are common to both, yet each have rules peculiar to itſelf. In a natural ſtyle, relative words are by juxtapoſition connected with thoſe to which they relate, going before or after, according to the peculiar genius of the language. Again, a circumſtance connected by a prepoſition, follows naturally the word with which it is connected. But this arrangement may be varied, when a different order is more beautiful: a circumſtance may be placed before the word with which it is connected by a prepoſition; and may be interjected even between a relative word and that to which it relates. When ſuch liberties are frequently taken, the ſtyle becomes inverted or tranſpoſed.

But as the liberty of inverſion is a capital point in the preſent ſubject, it will be neceſſary to examine it more narrowly, and in particular to trace the ſeveral degrees in which an inverted ſtyle recedes more and more from that which is natural. And firſt, as to the placing a circumſtance before the

the word with which it is connected, I obſerve, that it is the eaſieſt of all inverſion, even ſo eaſy as to be conſiſtent with a ſtyle that is properly termed natural: witneſs the following examples.

In the ſincerity of my heart, I profeſs, &c.

By our own ill management, we are brought to ſo low an ebb of wealth and credit, that, &c.

On Thurſday morning there was little or nothing tranſacted in Change-alley.

At St Bride's church in Fleet-ſtreet, Mr Woolſton, (who writ againſt the miracles of our Saviour), in the utmoſt terrors of conſcience, made a public recantation.

The interjecting a circumſtance between a relative word, and that to which it relates, is more properly termed inverſion; becauſe, by a disjunction of words intimately connected, it recedes farther from a natural ſtyle. But this licence has degrees; for the disjunction is more violent in ſome inſtances than in others. And to give a juſt notion of the difference, there is a neceſſity to enter a little more into an abſtract ſubject, than would otherwiſe be my inclination.

In nature, tho' a ſubject cannot exiſt without its qualities, nor a quality without a ſubject; yet in our conception of theſe, a material difference may be remarked. I cannot conceive a quality but

but as belonging to ſome ſubject: it makes indeed a part of the idea which is formed of the ſubject. But the oppoſite holds not; for tho' I cannot form a conception of a ſubject void of all qualities, a partial conception may be formed of it, abſtracting from any particular quality: I can, for example, form the idea of a fine Arabian horſe without regard to his colour, or of a white horſe without regard to his ſize. Such partial conception of a ſubject, is ſtill more eaſy with reſpect to action or motion; which is an occaſional attribute only, and has not the ſame permanency with colour or figure: I cannot form an idea of motion independent of a body; but there is nothing more eaſy than to form an idea of a body at reſt. Hence it appears, that the degree of inverſion depends greatly on the order in which the related words are placed: when a ſubſtantive occupies the firſt place, the idea it ſuggeſts muſt ſubſiſt in the mind at leaſt for a moment, independent of the relative words afterward introduced; and that moment may without difficulty be prolonged by interjecting a circumſtance between the ſubſtantive and its connections. This liberty, therefore, however frequent, will ſcarce alone be ſufficient to denominate a ſtyle inverted. The caſe is very different, where the word that occupies the firſt place denotes a quality or an action; for as theſe cannot be conceived without a ſubject, they cannot without greater violence be ſeparated from the ſubject that follows;

and

and for that reaſon, every ſuch ſeparation, by means of an interjected circumſtance belongs to an inverted ſtyle.

To illuſtrate this doctrine, examples are neceſſary; and I ſhall begin with thoſe where the word firſt introduced does not imply a relation.

——————Nor Eve to iterate
Her former treſpaſs fear'd.

——————Hunger and thirſt at once,
Powerful perſuaders, quicken'd at the ſcent
Of that alluring fruit, urg'd me ſo keen.

Moon that now meet'ſt the orient ſun, now fli'ſt
With the fix'd ſtars, fix'd in their orb that flies,
And ye five other wand'ring fires that move
In myſtic dance not without ſong, reſound
His praiſe,

In the following examples, where the word firſt introduced imports a relation, the disjunction will be found more violent.

Of man's firſt diſobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree, whoſe mortal taſte
Brought death into the world, and all our wo,
With loſs of Eden, till one greater man
Reſtore us, and regain the bliſsful ſeat,
Sing heav'nly muſe.

——————Upon the firm opacous globe
Of this round world, whoſe firſt convex divides

The

The luminous inferior orbs inclos'd
From chaos and th' inroad of darkneſs old,
Satan alighted walks.

——————— On a ſudden open fly
With impetuous recoil and jarring ſound,
Th' infernal doors.

——————— Wherein remain'd,
For what could elſe ? to our almighty foe
Clear victory, to our part loſs and rout.

——————— Forth ruſh'd, with whirlwind ſound,
The chariot of paternal Deity.

Language would have no great power, were it confined to the natural order of ideas. I ſhall ſoon have opportunity to make it evident, that by inverſion a thouſand beauties may be compaſſed, which muſt be relinquiſhed in a natural arrangement. In the mean time, it ought not to eſcape obſervation, that the mind of man is happily ſo conſtituted as to reliſh inverſion, tho' in one reſpect unnatural; and to reliſh it ſo much, as in many caſes to admit a ſeparation between words the moſt intimately connected. It can ſcarce be ſaid that inverſion has any limits; tho' I may venture to pronounce, that the disjunction of articles, conjunctions, or prepoſitions, from the words to which they belong, has very ſeldom a good effect. The following example with relation to a prepoſition, is perhaps as tolerable as any of the kind:

He

He would neither ſeparate *from*, nor act againſt *them*.

I give notice to the reader, that I am now ready to enter on the rules of arrangement; beginning with a natural ſtyle, and proceeding gradually to what is the moſt inverted. And in the arrangement of a period, as well as in a right choice of words, the firſt and great object being perſpicuity, the rule above laid down, that perſpicuity ought not to be ſacrificed to any other beauty, holds equally in both. Ambiguities occaſioned by a wrong arrangement are of two ſorts; one where the arrangement leads to a wrong ſenſe, and one where the ſenſe is left doubtful. The firſt, being the more culpable, ſhall take the lead, beginning with examples of words put in a wrong place.

How much the imagination of ſuch a preſence muſt exalt a genius, we may obſerve *merely* from the influence which an ordinary preſence has over men.

Characteriſticks, vol. 1. p. 7.

This arrangement leads to a wrong ſenſe: the adverb *merely* ſeems by its poſition to affect the preceding word; whereas it is intended to affect the following words, *an ordinary preſence;* and therefore the arrangement ought to be thus:

How much the imagination of ſuch a preſence muſt exalt a genius, we may obſerve from the influence which an ordinary preſence merely has over men. [Or, better],—which even an ordinary preſence has over men.

The

The time of the election of a poet-laureat being now at hand, it may be proper to give ſome account of the rites and ceremonies anciently uſed at that ſolemnity, and *only* diſcontinued through the neglect and degeneracy of later times.

Guardian.

The term *only* is intended to qualify the noun *degeneracy*, and not the participle *diſcontinued*; and therefore the arrangement ought to be as follows:

——————— and diſcontinued through the neglect and degeneracy only of later times.

Sixtus the Fourth was, if I miſtake not, a great collector of books at leaſt.

Letters on Hiſtory, vol. 1. *let.* 6. *Bolingbroke.*

The expreſſion here leads evidently to a wrong ſenſe; the adverb *at leaſt*, ought not to be connected with the ſubſtantive *books*, but with *collector* thus:

Sixtus the Fourth was a great collector at leaſt of books.

Speaking of Lewis XIV.

If he was not the greateſt king, he was the beſt actor of majeſty at leaſt, that ever filled a throne.

Ibid. letter 7.

Better

Better thus:

If he was not the greateſt king, he was at leaſt the beſt actor of majeſty, &c.

This arrangement removes the wrong ſenſe occaſioned by the juxtapoſition of *majeſty* and *at leaſt*.

The following examples are of a wrong arrangement of members.

I have confined myſelf to thoſe methods for the advancement of piety, which are in the power of a prince limited like ours by a ſtrict execution of the laws.

A project for the advancement of religion. *Swift.*

The ſtructure of this period leads to a meaning which is not the author's, *viz.* power limited by a ſtrict execution of the laws. That wrong ſenſe is removed by the following arrangement:

I have confined myſelf to thoſe methods for the advancement of piety, which, by a ſtrict execution of the laws, are in the power of a prince limited like ours.

This morning, when one of Lady Lizard's daughters was looking over ſome hoods and ribands brought by her tirewoman, with great care and diligence, I employ'd no leſs in examining the box which contained them.

Guardian, N° 4.

The

The wrong ſenſe occaſioned by this arrangement, may be eaſily prevented by varying it thus:

This morning when, with great care and diligence, one of Lady Lizard's daughters was looking over ſome hoods and ribands, &c.

A great ſtone that I happened to find after a long ſearch by the ſea-ſhore, ſerved me for an anchor.
Gulliver's Travels, part 1. *chap.* 8.

One would think that the ſearch was confined to the ſea-ſhore; but as the meaning is, that the great ſtone was found by the ſea-ſhore, the period ought to be arranged thus:

A great ſtone, that, after a long ſearch, I happened to find by the ſea-ſhore, ſerved me for an anchor.

Next of a wrong arrangement where the ſenſe is left doubtful; beginning, as in the former ſort, with examples of wrong arrangement of words in a member:

Theſe forms of converſation *by degrees* multiplied and grew troubleſome. *Spectator*, N° 119.

Here it is left doubtful whether the modification *by degrees* relates to the preceding member or to what follows: it ſhould be,

Theſe forms of converſation multiplied by degrees.

Nor does this falſe modeſty expoſe us *only* to ſuch actions as are indiſcreet, but very often to ſuch as are highly criminal.

Spectator, N° 458.

The ambiguity is removed by the following arrangement:

Nor does this falſe modeſty expoſe us to ſuch actions only as are indiſcreet, &c.

The empire of Blefuſcu is an iſland ſituated to the north-eaſt ſide of Lilliput, from whence it is parted *only* by a channel of 800 yards wide.

Gulliver's Travels, part 1. *chap.* 5.

The ambiguity may be removed thus:

———————— from whence it is parted by a channel of 800 yards wide only.

In the following examples the ſenſe is left doubtful by wrong arrangement of members.

The miniſter who grows leſs by his elevation, *like a little ſtatue placed on a mighty pedeſtal*, will always have his jealouſy ſtrong about him.

Diſſertation upon parties, Dedication. Bolingbroke.

Here, as far as can be gathered from the arrangement, it is doubtful, whether the object introduced by way of ſimile, relate to what goes before or to

to what follows: the ambiguity is removed by the following arrangement:

The miniſter, who, like a little ſtatue placed on a mighty pedeſtal, grows leſs by his elevation, will always, &c.

Since this is too much to aſk of freemen, nay of ſlaves, *if his expectation be not anſwered*, ſhall he form a laſting diviſion upon ſuch tranſient motives? *Ibid.*

Better thus:

Since this is too much to aſk of freemen, nay of ſlaves, ſhall he, if his expectations be not anſwered, form, &c.

Speaking of the ſuperſtitious practice of locking up the room where a perſon of diſtinction dies:

The knight ſeeing his habitation reduced to ſo ſmall a compaſs, and himſelf in a manner ſhut out of his own houſe, *upon the death of his mother*, ordered all the apartments to be flung open, and exorciſed by his chaplain.

Spectator, N° 110.

Better thus:

The knight, ſeeing his habitation reduced to ſo ſmall a compaſs, and himſelf in a manner ſhut out of his own houſe, ordered, upon the death of his mother, all the apartments to be flung open.

Speaking of ſome indecencies in converſation:

As it is impoſſible for ſuch an irrational way of converſation to laſt long among a people that make any profeſſion of religion, or ſhow of modeſty, *if the country gentlemen get into it*, they will certainly be left in the lurch.

Spectator, N° 119.

The ambiguity vaniſhes in the following arrangement:

——— the country gentlemen, if they get into it, will certainly be left in the lurch.

Speaking of a diſcovery in natural philoſophy, that colour is not a quality of matter:

As this is a truth which has been proved inconteſtably by many modern philoſophers, and is indeed one of the fineſt ſpeculations in that ſcience, *if the Engliſh reader would ſee the notion explained at large*, he may find it in the eighth chapter of the ſecond book of Mr Locke's eſſay on human underſtanding.

Spectator, N° 413.

Better thus:

As this is a truth, &c. the Engliſh reader, if he would ſee the notion explained at large, may find it, &c.

A woman ſeldom aſks advice before ſhe has bought her wedding-cloaths. When ſhe has made her own choice, *for form's ſake* ſhe ſends a *conge d'elire* to her friends.

Ibid. N° 475.

Better

Better thus:

——— ſhe ſends, for form's ſake, a *conge d'elire* to her friends.

And ſince it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a perpetual intercourſe of buying and ſelling, and dealing upon credit, *where fraud is permitted or connived at, or hath no law to puniſh it*, the honeſt dealer is always undone, and the knave gets the advantage.

Gulliver's Travels, part 1. *chap.* 6.

Better thus:

And ſince it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a perpetual intercourſe of buying and ſelling, and dealing upon credit, the honeſt dealer, where fraud is permitted or connived at, or hath no law to puniſh it, is always undone, and the knave gets the advantage.

From theſe examples, the following obſervation will occur, that a circumſtance ought never to be placed between two capital members of a period; for by ſuch ſituation it muſt always be doubtful, as far as we gather from the arrangement, to which of the two member it belongs: where it is interjected, as it ought to be, between parts of the member to which it belongs, the ambiguity is removed, and the capital members are kept diſtinct, which is a great beauty in compoſition. In general, to preſerve members diſtinct that ſignify things diſtinguiſhed in the thought, the beſt method is,

to place firſt in the conſequent member, ſome word that cannot connect with what precedes it.

If it ſhall be thought, that the objections here are too ſcrupulous, and that the defect of perſpicuity is eaſily ſupplied by accurate punctuation; the anſwer is, That punctuation may remove an ambiguity, but will never produce that peculiar beauty which is perceived when the ſenſe comes out clearly and diſtinctly by means of a happy arrangement. Such influence has this beauty, that by a natural tranſition of perception, it is communicated to the very ſound of the words, ſo as in appearance to improve the muſic of the period. But as this curious ſubject comes in more properly afterward, it is ſufficient at preſent to appeal to experience, that a period ſo arranged as to bring out the ſenſe clear, ſeems always more muſical than where the ſenſe is left in any degree doubtful.

A rule deſervedly occupying the ſecond place, is, That words expreſſing things connected in the thought, ought to be placed as near together as poſſible. This rule is derived immediately from human nature, prone in every inſtance to place together things in any manner connected *: where things are arranged according to their connections, we have a ſenſe of order; otherwiſe we have a ſenſe of diſorder, as of things placed by chance: and we naturally place words in the ſame order in which

* See chap. 1.

which we would place the things they ſignify. The bad effect of a violent ſeparation of words or members thus intimately connected, will appear from the following examples.

For the Engliſh are naturally fanciful, and very often diſpoſed, by that gloomineſs and melancholy of temper which is ſo frequent in our nation, to many wild notions and viſions, to which others are not ſo liable.

Spectator, N° 419.

Here the verb or aſſertion is, by a pretty long circumſtance, violently ſeparated from the ſubject to which it refers: this makes a harſh arrangement; the leſs excuſable that the fault is eaſily prevented by placing the circumſtance before the verb, after the following manner:

For the Engliſh are naturally fanciful, and, by that gloomineſs and melancholy of temper which is ſo frequent in our nation, are often diſpoſed to many wild notions, &c.

For as no mortal author, in the ordinary fate and viciſſitude of things, knows to what uſe his works may, ſome time or other, be apply'd, &c.

Spectator, N° 85.

Better thus:

For as, in the ordinary fate and viciſſitude of things, no mortal author knows to what uſe, ſome time or other, his works may be apply'd, &c.

From whence we may date likewiſe the rivalſhip of the houſe of France, for we may reckon that of Valois and that of Bourbon as one upon this occaſion, and the houſe of Auſtria, that continues at this day, and has oft coſt ſo much blood and ſo much treaſure in the courſe of it.

Letters on hiſtory, vol. 1. *let.* 6. *Bolingbroke.*

It cannot be impertinent or ridiculous therefore in ſuch a country, whatever it might be in the Abbot of St Real's, which was Savoy I think; or in Peru, under the Incas, where Garcilaſſo de la Vega ſays it was lawful for none but the nobility to ſtudy—for men of all degrees to inſtruct themſelves, in thoſe affairs wherein they may be actors, or judges of thoſe that act, or controllers of thoſe that judge.

Letters on hiſtory, vol. 1. *let.* 5. *Bolingbroke.*

If Scipio, who was naturally given to women, for which anecdote we have, if I miſtake not, the authority of Polybius, as well as ſome verſes of Nevius preſerved by Aulus Gellius, had been educated by Olympias at the court of Philip, it is improbable that he would have reſtored the beautiful Spaniard.

Ibid. let. 3.

If any one have a curioſity for more ſpecimens of this kind, they will be found without number in the works of the ſame author.

A pronoun, which ſaves the naming a perſon or thing a ſecond time, ought to be placed as near as poſſible to the name of that perſon or thing. This is a branch of the foregoing rule; and with the reaſon

reaſon there given another concurs, *viz.* That if other ideas intervene, it is difficult to recal the perſon or thing by reference:

If I had leave to print the Latin letters tranſmitted to me from foreign parts, they would fill a volume, and be a full defence againſt all that Mr Partridge, or his accomplices of the Portugal inquiſition, will be ever able to object; *who*, by the way, are the only enemies my predictions have ever met with at home or abroad.

Better thus:

——— and be a full defence againſt all that can be objected by Mr Partridge, or his accomplices of the Portugal inquiſition; who, by the way, are, &c.

There being a round million of creatures in human figure, throughout this kingdom, *whoſe* whole ſubſiſtence, &c.

A modeſt propoſal, &c. *Swift.*

Better:

There being throughout this kingdom, a round million of creatures in human figure, whoſe whole ſubſiſtence, *&c.*

Tom is a lively impudent clown, and has wit enough to have made him a pleaſant companion, had *it* been poliſhed and rectified by good manners.

Guardian, N° 162.

It is the cuſtom of the Mahometans, if they ſee any printed

printed or written paper upon the ground, to take it up, and lay it aſide carefully, as not knowing but it may contain ſome piece of their Alcoran.

Spectator, N° 85.

The arrangement here leads to a wrong ſenſe, as if the ground were taken up, not the paper. —— Better thus:

It is the cuſtom of the Mahometans, if they ſee upon the ground any printed or written paper, to take it up, *&c.*

The following rule depends on the communication of emotions to related objects; a principle in human nature that hath an extenſive operation: and we find this operation, even where the objects are not otherwiſe related than by juxtapoſition of the words that expreſs them. Hence, to elevate or depreſs an object, one method is, to join it in the expreſſion with another that is naturally high or low: witneſs the following ſpeech of Eumenes to the Roman ſenate.

Cauſam veniendi ſibi Roman fuiſſe, præter cupiditatem viſendi *deos hominesque*, quorum beneficio in ea fortuna eſſet, ſupra quam ne optare quidem auderet, etiam ut coram moneret ſenatum ut Perſei conatus obviam iret.

Livy, *l.* 42. *cap.* 11.

To join the Romans with the gods in the ſame enunciation, is an artful ſtroke of flattery, becauſe it tacitly puts them on a level. On the other hand,

hand, the degrading or vilifying an object, is done ſucceſsfully by ranking it with one that is really low:

I hope to have this entertainment in a readineſs for the next winter; and doubt not but it will pleaſe more than the opera or puppet-ſhow.

Spectator, N° 28.

Manifold have been the judgments which Heaven from time to time, for the chaſtiſement of a ſinful people, has inflicted upon whole nations. For when the degeneracy becomes common, 'tis but juſt the puniſhment ſhould be general. Of this kind, in our own unfortunate country, was that deſtructive peſtilence, whoſe mortality was ſo fatal as to ſweep away, if Sir William Petty may be believed, five millions of Chriſtian ſouls, beſides women and Jews.

God's revenge againſt punning. *Arbuthnot.*

Such alſo was that dreadful conflagration enſuing in this famous metropolis of London, which conſumed according to the computation of Sir Samuel Moreland, 100,000 houſes, not to mention churches and ſtables.

Ibid.

But on condition it might paſs into a law, I would gladly exempt both lawyers of all ages, ſubaltern and field officers, young heirs, dancing-maſters, pick-pockets, and players.

An infallible ſcheme to pay the public debts. *Swift.*

Sooner let earth, air, ſea, to chaos fall,
Men, monkeys, lap-dogs, parrots, periſh all.

Rape of the Lock.

Cir-

Circumſtances in a period reſemble ſmall ſtones in a building, employ'd to fill up vacuities among thoſe of a larger ſize. In the arrangement of a period, ſuch under-parts crowded together make a poor figure; and never are graceful but when interſperſed among the capital parts. I illuſtrate this rule by the following example.

It is likewiſe urged, that there are, by computation, in this kingdom, above 10,000 parſons, whoſe revenues, added to thoſe of my Lords the Biſhops, would ſuffice to maintain, *&c.*

Argument againſt aboliſhing Chriſtianity. Swift.

Here two circumſtances, *viz. by computation* and *in this kingdom*, are crowded together unneceſſarily: they make a better appearance ſeparated in the following manner:

It is likewiſe urged, that in this kingdom there are, by computation, above 10,000 parſons, *&c.*

If there be room for a choice, the ſooner a circumſtance is introduced, the better; becauſe circumſtances are proper for that coolneſs of mind, with which we begin a period as well as a volume: in the progreſs, the mind warms, and has a greater reliſh for matters of importance. When a circumſtance is placed at the beginning of the period, or near the beginning, the tranſition from it to the principal ſubject is agreeable: it is like aſcending,

ſcending, or going upward. On the other hand, to place it late in the period has a bad effect; for after being engaged in the principal ſubject, one is with reluctance brought down to give attention to a circumſtance. Hence evidently the preference of the following arrangement:

Whether in any country a choice altogether unexceptionable has been made, ſeems doubtful.

Before this other,

Whether a choice altogether unexceptionable has in any country been made, *&c.*

For this reaſon the following period is exceptionable in point of arrangement.

I have conſidered formerly, with a good deal of attention, the ſubject upon which you command me to communicate my thoughts to you.

Bolingbroke of the ſtudy of hiſtory, letter 1.

which, with a ſlight alteration, may be improved thus:

I have formerly, with a good deal of attention, conſidered the ſubject, *&c.*

Swift ſpeaking of a virtuous and learned education:

And although they may be, and too often are drawn, by the temptations of youth, and the opportunities of

a large fortune, into ſome irregularities, *when they come forward into the great world;* it is ever with reluctance and compunction of mind, becauſe their bias to virtue ſtill continues.

The Intelligencer, N° 9.

Better:

And although, *when they come forward into the great world*, they may be, and too often, *&c.*

The bad effect of placing a circumſtance laſt or late in a period, will appear from the following examples.

Let us endeavour to eſtabliſh to ourſelves an intereſt in him who holds the reins of the whole creation in his hand.

Spectator, N° 12.

Better thus:

Let us endeavour to eſtabliſh to ourſelves an intereſt in him, who, in his hand, holds the reins of the whole creation.

Virgil, who has caſt the whole ſyſtem of Platonic philoſophy, ſo far as it relates to the ſoul of man, into beautiful allegories, *in the ſixth book of his Æneid*, gives us the puniſhment, *&c.*

Spectator, N° 90.

Better thus:

Virgil, who in the ſixth book of his Æneid, has caſt, *&c.*

And

And Philip the Fourth was obliged at laſt to conclude a peace on terms repugnant to his inclination, to that of his people, to the intereſt of Spain, and to that of all Europe, in the Pyrenean treaty.

Letters on hiſtory, vol. i. *let.* 6. *Bolingbroke.*

Better thus:

And at laſt, in the Pyrenean treaty, Philip the Fourth was obliged to conclude a peace, *&c.*

In arranging a period, it is of importance to determine in what part of it a word makes the greateſt figure; whether at the beginning, during the courſe, or at the cloſe. The breaking ſilence rouſes the attention, and prepares for a deep impreſſion at the beginning: the beginning, however, muſt yield to the cloſe; which being ſucceeded by a pauſe, affords time for a word to make its deepeſt impreſſion*. Hence the following rule, That to give the utmoſt force to a period, it ought if poſſible to be cloſed with that word which makes the greateſt figure. The opportunity of a pauſe ſhould not be thrown away upon acceſſories, but

* To give force or elevation to a period, it ought to begin and end with a long ſyllable. For a long ſyllable makes naturally the ſtrongeſt impreſſion; and of all the ſyllables in a period, we are chiefly moved with the firſt and laſt.

Demetrius Phalereus of Elocution, ſect. 39.

but reſerved for the principal object, in order that it may make a full impreſſion: which is an additional reaſon againſt cloſing a period with a circumſtance. There are however periods that admit not ſuch a ſtructure; and in that caſe, the capital word ought, if poſſible, to be placed in the front, which next to the cloſe is the moſt advantageous for making an impreſſion. Hence, in directing our diſcourſe to a man of figure, we ought to begin with his name; and one will be ſenſible of a degradation, when this rule is neglected, as it frequently is for the ſake of verſe. I give the following examples.

Integer vitæ, ſceleriſque purus,
Non eget Mauri jaculis, neque arcu,
Nec venenatis gravidâ ſagittis,
Fuſce, pharetrâ.

Horat. Carm. l. 1. *ode* 22.

Je crains Dieu, cher Abner, et n'ai point d'autre crainte.

In theſe examples, the name of the perſon addreſſed to, makes a mean figure, being like a circumſtance ſlipt into a corner. That this criticiſm is well founded, we need no other proof than Addiſon's tranſlation of the laſt example:

O Abner! I fear my God, and I fear none but him.

Guardian, N° 117.

O father, what intends thy hand, ſhe cry'd,
Againſt thy only ſon? What fury, O ſon,
Poſſeſſes thee to bend that mortal dart
Againſt thy father's head?

Paradiſe loſt, book 2. *l.* 727.

Every one muſt be ſenſible of a dignity in the invocation at the beginning, which is not attained by that in the middle. I mean not however to cenſure this paſſage: on the contrary, it appears beautiful, by diſtinguiſhing the reſpect that is due to a father from that which is due to a ſon.

The ſubſtance of what is ſaid in this and the foregoing ſection, upon the method of arranging words in a period, ſo as to make the deepeſt impreſſion with reſpect to ſound as well as ſignification, is comprehended in the following obſervation: That order of words in a period will always be the moſt agreeable, where, without obſcuring the ſenſe, the moſt important images, the moſt ſonorous words, and the longeſt members, bring up the rear.

Hitherto of arranging ſingle words, ſingle members, and ſingle circumſtances. But the enumeration of many particulars in the ſame period is often neceſſary; and the queſtion is, In what order they ſhould be placed? It does not ſeem eaſy, at firſt view, to bring a ſubject apparently ſo looſe under any general rule: but luckily, reflecting

upon what is ſaid in the firſt chapter about order, we find rules laid down to our hand, which leave us no taſk but that of applying them to the preſent queſtion. And, firſt, with reſpect to the enumerating particulars of equal rank, it is laid down in the place quoted, that as there is no cauſe for preferring any one before the reſt, it is indifferent to the mind in what order they be viewed. And it is only neceſſary to be added here, that for the ſame reaſon, it is indifferent in what order they be named. 2dly, If a number of objects of the ſame kind, differing only in ſize, are to be ranged along a ſtraight line, the moſt agreeable order to the eye is that of an increaſing ſeries. In ſurveying a number of ſuch objects, beginning at the leaſt, and proceeding to greater and greater, the mind ſwells gradually with the ſucceſſive objects, and in its progreſs has a very ſenſible pleaſure. Preciſely for the ſame reaſon, words expreſſive of ſuch objects ought to be placed in the ſame order. The beauty of this figure, which may be termed *a climax in ſenſe*, has eſcaped lord Bolingbroke in the firſt member of the following period.

> Let but one great, brave, diſintereſted, active man ariſe, and he will be received, followed, and almoſt adored.

The following arrangement has ſenſibly a better effect:

Let

Let but one brave, great, active, diſintereſted man ariſe, &c.

Whether the ſame rule ought to be followed in enumerating men of different ranks, ſeems doubtful: on the one hand, a number of perſons preſented to the eye in form of an increaſing ſeries, is undoubtedly the moſt agreeable order: on the other hand, in every liſt of names, we ſet the perſon of the greateſt dignity at the top, and deſcend gradually through his inferiors. Where the purpoſe is to honour the perſons named according to their rank, the latter order ought to be followed; but every one who regards himſelf only, or his reader, will chooſe the former order. 3dly, As the ſenſe of order directs the eye to deſcend from the principal to its greateſt acceſſory, and from the whole to its greateſt part, and in the ſame order through all the parts and acceſſories till we arrive at the minuteſt; the ſame order ought to be followed in the enumeration of ſuch particulars. I ſhall give one familiar example. Talking of the parts of a column, the baſe, the ſhaft, the capital, theſe are capable of ſix different arrangements, and the queſtion is, Which is the beſt? When we have in view the erecting a column, we are naturally led to expreſs the parts in the order above mentioned; which at the ſame time is agreeable by aſcending. But conſidering the column as it ſtands, without reference to its erec-

tion, the ſenſe of order, as obſerved above, requires the chief part to be named firſt: for that reaſon we begin with the ſhaft; and the baſe comes next in order, that we may aſcend from it to the capital. Laſtly, In tracing the particulars of any natural operation, order requires that we follow the courſe of nature: hiſtorical facts are related in the order of time: we begin at the founder of a family, and proceed from him to his deſcendants: but in deſcribing a lofty oak, we begin with the trunk, and aſcend to the branches.

When force and livelineſs of expreſſion are demanded, the rule is, to ſuſpend the thought as long as poſſible, and to bring it out full and entire at the cloſe: which cannot be done but by inverting the natural arrangement. By introducing a word or member before its time, curioſity is raiſed about what is to follow; and it is agreeable to have our curioſity gratified at the cloſe of the period: the pleaſure we feel reſembles that of ſeeing a ſtroke exerted upon a body by the whole collected force of the agent. On the other hand, where a period is ſo conſtructed as to admit more than one complete cloſe in the ſenſe, the curioſity of the reader is exhauſted at the firſt cloſe, and what follows appears languid or ſuperfluous: his diſappointment contributes alſo to that appearance, when he finds, contrary to expectation, that the period is not yet finiſhed. Cicero, and after him Quintilian, recommend the verb to the laſt place.

This

This method evidently tends to ſuſpend the ſenſe till the cloſe of the period; for without the verb the ſenſe cannot be complete: and when the verb happens to be the capital word, which it frequently is, it ought at any rate to be the laſt, according to another rule, above laid down. I proceed as uſual to illuſtrate this rule by examples. The following period is placed in its natural order.

Were inſtruction an eſſential circumſtance in epic poetry, I doubt whether a ſingle inſtance could be given of this ſpecies of compoſition, in any language.

The period thus arranged admits a full cloſe upon the word *compoſition*; after which it goes on languidly, and cloſes without force. This blemiſh will be avoided by the following arrangement:

Were inſtruction an eſſential circumſtance in epic poetry, I doubt whether, in any language, a ſingle inſtance could be given of this ſpecies of compoſition.

Some of our moſt eminent divines have made uſe of this Platonic notion, as far as it regards the ſubſiſtence of our paſſions after death, with great beauty and ſtrength of reaſon.

Spectator, N° 90.

Better thus:

Some of our moſt eminent divines have, with great beauty and ſtrength of reaſon, made uſe of this Platonic notion, &c.

Men of the beſt ſenſe have been touched, more or leſs, with theſe groundleſs horrors and preſages of futurity, upon ſurveying the moſt indifferent works of nature.

Spectator, N° 505.

Better,

Upon ſurveying the moſt indifferent works of nature, men of the beſt ſenſe, &c.

She ſoon informed him of the place he was in, which, notwithſtanding all its horrors, appeared to him more ſweet than the bower of Mahomet, in the company of his Balſora.

Guardian, N° 167.

Better,

She ſoon, &c. appeared to him, in the company of his Balſora, more ſweet, &c.

The Emperor was ſo intent on the eſtabliſhment of his abſolute power in Hungary, that he expoſed the Empire doubly to deſolation and ruin for the ſake of it.

Letters on hiſtory, vol. 1. *let.* 7. *Bolingbroke.*

Better,

————that for the ſake of it he expoſed the empire doubly to deſolation and ruin.

None of the rules for the compoſition of periods are more liable to be abuſed, than thoſe laſt mentioned; witneſs many Latin writers, among the moderns

moderns eſpecially, whoſe ſtyle, by inverſions too violent, is rendered harſh and obſcure. Suſpenſion of the thought till the cloſe of the period, ought never to be preferred before perſpicuity. Neither ought ſuch ſuſpenſion to be attempted in a long period; becauſe in that caſe the mind is bewildered amidſt a profuſion of words: a traveller, while he is puzzled about the road, reliſhes not the fineſt proſpect:

All the rich preſents which Aſtyages had given him at parting, keeping only ſome Median horſes, in order to propagate the breed of them in Perſia, he diſtributed among his friends whom he left at the court of Ecbatana.

Travels of Cyrus, book 1.

The foregoing rules concern the arrangement of a ſingle period: I add one rule more concerning the diſtribution of a diſcourſe into different periods. A ſhort period is lively and familiar: a long period, requiring more attention, makes an impreſſion grave and ſolemn *. In general, a writer ought to ſtudy a mixture of long and ſhort periods, which prevent an irkſome uniformity, and entertain the mind with variety of impreſſions. In particular, long periods ought to be avoided till

* Demetrius Phalereus (of Elocution, ſect. 44.) obſerves, that long members in a period make an impreſſion of gravity and importance. The ſame obſervation is applicable to periods.

the reader's attention be thoroughly engaged; and therefore a diſcourſe, eſpecially of the familiar kind, ought never to be introduced with a long period. For that reaſon, the commencement of a letter to a very young lady on her marriage is faulty;

Madam, The hurry and impertinence of receiving and paying viſits on account of your marriage, being now over, you are beginning to enter into a courſe of life, where you will want much advice to divert you from falling into many errors, fopperies, and follies, to which your ſex is ſubject.

Swift.

See another example, ſtill more faulty, in the commencement of Cicero's oration, *Pro Archia poeta.*

Before proceeding farther, it may be proper to review the rules laid down in this and the preceding ſection, in order to make ſome general obſervations. That order of the words and members of a period is juſtly termed natural, which correſponds to the natural order of the ideas that compoſe the thought. The tendency of many of the foregoing rules is to ſubſtitute an artificial arrangement, in order to catch ſome beauty either of ſound or meaning for which there is no place in the natural order. But ſeldom it happens, that in the ſame period there is place for a plurality of theſe

theſe rules: if one beauty can be retained, another muſt be relinquiſhed; and the only queſtion is, Which ought to be preferred? This queſtion cannot be reſolved by any general rule: if the natural order be not reliſhed, a few trials will diſcover that artificial order which has the beſt effect; and this exerciſe, ſupported by a good taſte, will in time make the choice eaſy. All that can be ſaid in general is, that in making a choice, ſound ought to yield to ſignification.

The tranſpoſing words and members out of their natural order, ſo remarkable in the learned languages, has been the ſubject of much ſpeculation. It is agreed on all hands, that ſuch tranſpoſition or inverſion beſtows upon a period a very ſenſible degree of force and elevation; and yet writers ſeem to be at a loſs how to account for this effect. Cerceau * aſcribes ſo much power to inverſion, as to make it the characteriſtic of French verſe, and the ſingle circumſtance which in that language diſtinguiſhes verſe from proſe: and yet he pretends not to ſay, that it hath any other effect but to raiſe ſurpriſe; he muſt mean curioſity, which is done by ſuſpending the thought during the period, and bringing it out entire at the cloſe. This indeed is one effect of inverſion; but neither its ſole effect, nor even that which is the moſt remarkable, as is made evident above. But waving cenſure,

* Reflections ſur la poëſie Françoiſe.

——————————The ſtring let fly,
Twang'd ſhort and ſharp, like the ſhrill ſwallow's cry.
Odyſſey, xxi. 409.

The ſound of felling trees in a wood:

Loud ſounds the ax, redoubling ſtrokes on ſtrokes,
On all ſides round the foreſt hurls her oaks
Headlong. Deep echoing groan the thickets brown,
Then *ruſtling*, *crackling*, *craſhing*, thunder down.
Iliad, xxiii. 144.

But when loud ſurges laſh the ſounding ſhore,
The hoarſe rough verſe ſhould like the torrent roar.
Pope's Eſſay on Criticiſm, 369.

Dire Scylla there a ſcene of horror forms,
And here Charybdis fills the deep with ſtorms:
When the tide ruſhes from her rumbling caves,
The rough rock roars: tumultuous boil the waves.
Pope.

No perſon can be at a loſs about the cauſe of this beauty; it is obviouſly that of imitation.

That there is any other natural reſemblance of ſound to ſignification, muſt not be taken for granted. There is no reſemblance of ſound to motion, nor of ſound to ſentiment. We are however apt to be deceived by artful pronunciation: the ſame paſſage may be pronounced in many different tones, elevated or humble, ſweet or harſh, briſk or melancholy, ſo as to accord with the thought or

or ſentiment: ſuch concord muſt be diſtinguiſhed from that concord between ſound and ſenſe, which is perceived in ſome expreſſions independent of artful pronunciation: the latter is the poet's work; the former muſt be attributed to the reader. Another thing contributes ſtill more to the deceit: in language, ſound and ſenſe being intimately connected, the properties of the one are readily communicated to the other; for example, the quality of grandeur, of ſweetneſs, or of melancholy, tho' belonging to the thought ſolely, is transferred to the words, which by that means reſemble in appearance the thought that is expreſſed by them*. I have great reaſon to recommend theſe obſervations to the reader, conſidering how inaccurately the preſent ſubject is handled by critics: not one of them diſtinguiſhes the natural reſemblance of ſound and ſignification, from the artificial reſemblances now deſcribed; witneſs Vida in particular, who in a very long paſſage has given very few examples but what are of the latter kind †.

That there may be a reſemblance of articulate ſounds to ſome that are not articulate, is ſelf-evident; and that in fact there exiſt ſuch reſemblances ſucceſsfully employed by writers of genius, is clear from the foregoing examples, and from many others that might be given. But we may ſafe-

* See chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 5.

† Poet. L. 3. l. 365——454.

ly

ly pronounce, that this natural reſemblance can be carried no farther: the objects of the different ſenſes, differ ſo widely from each other, as to exclude any reſemblance: ſound in particular, whether articulate or inarticulate, reſembles not in any degree taſte, ſmell, nor motion; and as little can it reſemble any internal ſentiment, feeling or emotion. But muſt we then admit, that nothing but ſound can be imitated by ſound? Taking imitation in its proper ſenſe, as importing a reſemblance between two objects, the propoſition muſt be admitted: and yet in many paſſages that are not deſcriptive of ſound, every one muſt be ſenſible of a peculiar concord between the ſound of the words and their meaning. As there can be no doubt of the fact, what remains is to inquire into its cauſe.

Reſembling cauſes may produce effects that have no reſemblance; and cauſes that have no reſemblance may produce reſembling effects. A magnificent building, for example, reſembles not in any degree an heroic action; and yet the emotions they produce, are concordant, and bear a reſemblance to each other. We are ſtill more ſenſible of this reſemblance in a ſong, when the muſic is properly adapted to the ſentiment: there is no reſemblance between thought and ſound; but there is the ſtrongeſt reſemblance between the emotion raiſed by muſic tender and pathetic, and that raiſed by the complaint of an unſucceſsful lover. Applying

plying this obſervation to the preſent ſubject, it appears, that in ſome inſtances, the ſound even of a ſingle word makes an impreſſion reſembling that which is made by the thing it ſignifies: witneſs the word *running*, compoſed of two ſhort ſyllables; and more remarkably the words *rapidity*, *impetuoſity*, *precipitation*. Brutal manners produce in the ſpectator an emotion not unlike what is produced by a harſh and rough ſound; and hence the beauty of the figurative expreſſion *rugged* manners. Again, the word *little*, being pronounced with a very ſmall aperture of the mouth, has a weak and faint ſound, which makes an impreſſion reſembling that made by a diminutive object. This reſemblance of effects is ſtill more remarkable where a number of words are connected in a period: words pronounced in ſucceſſion make often a ſtrong impreſſion; and when this impreſſion happens to accord with that made by the ſenſe, we are ſenſible of a complex emotion, peculiarly pleaſant; one proceeding from the ſentiment, and one from the melody or ſound of the words. But the chief pleaſure proceeds from having theſe two concordant emotions combined in perfect harmony, and carried on in the mind to a full cloſe *. Except in the ſingle caſe where ſound is deſcribed, all the examples given by critics of ſenſe being imitated in ſound, reſolve into a reſemblance of effects:

* See chap. 2. part 4.

effects: emotions raiſed by ſound and ſignification may have a reſemblance; but ſound itſelf cannot have a reſemblance to any thing but ſound.

Proceeding now to particulars, and beginning with thoſe caſes where the emotions have the ſtrongeſt reſemblance, I obſerve, firſt, That by a number of ſyllables in ſucceſſion, an emotion is ſometimes raiſed extremely ſimilar to that raiſed by ſucceſſive motion; which may be evident even to thoſe who are defective in taſte, from the following fact, that the term *movement* in all languages is equally applied to both. In this manner, ſucceſſive motion, ſuch as walking, running, galloping, can be imitated by a ſucceſſion of long or ſhort ſyllables, or by a due mixture of both. For example, ſlow motion may be juſtly imitated in a verſe where long ſyllables prevail; eſpecially when aided by a ſlow pronunciation.

Illi inter ſeſe magnâ vi brachia tollunt.

Georg. iv. 174.

On the other hand, ſwift motion is imitated by a ſucceſſion of ſhort ſyllables:

Quadrupedante putrem ſonitu quatit ungula campum.

Again:

Radit iter liquidum, celeres neque commovet alas.

Thirdly, A line compoſed of monoſyllables, makes

makes an impreſſion, by the frequency of its pauſes, ſimilar to what is made by laborious interrupted motion:

With many a weary ſtep, and many a groan,
Up the high hill he heaves a huge round ſtone.
Odyſſey, xi. 736.

Firſt march the heavy mules ſecurely ſlow;
O'er hills, o'er dales, o'er craggs, o'er rocks they go.
Iliad, xxiii. 138.

Fourthly, The impreſſion made by rough ſounds in ſucceſſion, reſembles that made by rough or tumultuous motion: on the other hand, the impreſſion of ſmooth ſounds reſembles that of gentle motion. The following is an example of both.

Two craggy rocks projecting to the main,
The roaring wind's tempeſtuous rage reſtrain;
Within, the waves in ſofter murmurs glide,
And ſhips ſecure without their haulſers ride.
Odyſſey, iii. 118.

Another example of the latter:

Soft is the ſtrain when Zephyr gently blows,
And the ſmooth ſtream in ſmoother numbers flows.
Eſſay on Crit. 366.

Fifthly, Prolonged motion is expreſſed in an Alexandrine line. The firſt example ſhall be of ſlow motion prolonged.

A needleſs Alexandrine ends the ſong;
That like a wounded ſnake, drags its ſlow length along.
Eſſay on Crit. 356.

The next example is of forcible motion prolonged:

The waves behind impel the waves before,
Wide-rolling, foaming high, and tumbling to the ſhore.
Iliad, xiii. 1004.

The laſt ſhall be of rapid motion prolonged:

Not ſo when ſwift Camilla ſcours the plain,
Flies o'er th' unbending corn, and ſkims along the main.
Eſſay on Crit. 373.

Again ſpeaking of a rock torn from the brow of a mountain:

Still gath'ring force, it ſmokes, and urg'd amain,
Whirls, leaps, and thunders down, impetuous to the plain.
Iliad, xiii. 197.

Sixthly, a period conſiſting moſtly of long ſyllables, that is, of ſyllables pronounced ſlow, produceth an emotion reſembling faintly that which is produced by gravity and ſolemnity. Hence the beauty of the following verſe:

Olli ſedato reſpondit corde Latinus.

It reſembles equally an object that is inſipid and unintereſting.

Tædet

Tædet quotidianarum harum formarum.

Terence, Eunuchus, act 2. *ſc.* 3.

Seventhly, A ſlow ſucceſſion of ideas is a circumſtance that belongs equally to ſettled melancholy, and to a period compoſed of polyſyllables pronounced ſlow; and hence by ſimilarity of emotions, the latter is imitative of the former:

In thoſe deep ſolitudes, and awful cells,
Where heav'nly penſive Contemplation dwells,
And ever-muſing melancholy reigns.

Pope, Eloiſa to Abelard.

Eighthly, A long ſyllable made ſhort, or a ſhort ſyllable made long, raiſes, by the difficulty of pronouncing contrary to cuſtom, a feeling ſimilar to that of hard labour:

When Ajax ſtrives ſome rock's *vaſt* weight to throw,
The line too labours, and the words move ſlow.

Eſſay on Crit. 370.

Ninthly, Harſh or rough words pronounced with difficulty, excite a feeling ſimilar to that which proceeds from the labour of thought to a dull writer:

Juſt writes to make his barrenneſs appear,
And ſtrains from hard-bound brains eight lines a-year.

Pope's epiſtle to Dr Arbuthnot, l. 181.

I ſhall cloſe with one example more, which of

all makes the fineſt figure. In the firſt ſection mention is made of a climax in ſound; and in the ſecond, of a climax in ſenſe. It belongs to the preſent ſubject to obſerve, that when theſe coincide in the ſame paſſage, the concordance of ſound and ſenſe is delightful: the reader is conſcious not only of pleaſure from the two climaxes ſeparately, but of an additional pleaſure from their concordance, and from finding the ſenſe ſo juſtly imitated by the ſound. In this reſpect, no periods are more perfect than thoſe borrowed from Cicero in the firſt ſection.

The concord between ſenſe and ſound is no leſs agreeable in what may be termed an *anticlimax*, where the progreſs is from great to little; for this has the effect to make diminutive objects appear ſtill more diminutive. Horace affords a ſtriking example:

Parturiunt montes, naſcetur ridiculus mus.

The arrangement here is ſingularly artful: the firſt place is occupied by the verb, which is the capital word by its ſenſe as well as ſound: the cloſe is reſerved for the word that is the meaneſt in ſenſe as well as in ſound. And it muſt not be overlooked, that the reſembling ſounds of the two laſt ſyllables give a ludicrous air to the whole.

Reviewing the foregoing examples, it appears to me, contrary to expectation, that in paſſing from the ſtrongeſt reſemblances to thoſe that are fainter,

fainter, every ſtep affords additional pleaſure. Renewing the experiment again and again, I feel no wavering, but the greateſt pleaſure conſtantly from the fainteſt reſemblances. And yet how can this be? for if the pleaſure lie in imitation, muſt not the ſtrongeſt reſemblance afford the greateſt pleaſure? From this vexing dilemma I am happily relieved, by reflecting on a doctrine eſtabliſhed in the chapter of reſemblance and contraſt, that the pleaſure of reſemblance is the greateſt, where it is leaſt expected, and where the objects compared are in their capital circumſtances widely different. Nor will this appear ſurpriſing, when we deſcend to familiar examples. It raiſeth no degree of wonder to find the moſt perfect reſemblance between two eggs of the ſame bird: it is more rare to find ſuch reſemblance between two human faces; and upon that account ſuch an appearance raiſes ſome degree of wonder: but this emotion riſes to a ſtill greater height, when we find in a pebble, an agate, or other natural production, any reſemblance to a tree or to any organiſed body. We cannot heſitate a moment, in applying theſe obſervations to the preſent ſubject: what occaſion of wonder can it be to find one ſound reſembling another, where both are of the ſame kind? it is not ſo common to find a reſemblance between an articulate ſound and one not articulate; which accordingly affords ſome ſlight pleaſure. But the pleaſure ſwells greatly, when we employ ſound to imitate

things it reſembles not otherwiſe than by the effects produced in the mind.

I have had occaſion to obſerve, that to complete the reſemblance between ſound and ſenſe, artful pronunciation contributes not a little. Pronunciation therefore may be conſidered as a branch of the preſent ſubject; and with ſome obſervations upon it the ſection ſhall be concluded.

In order to give a juſt idea of pronunciation, it muſt be diſtinguiſhed from ſinging. The latter is carried on by notes, requiring each of them a different aperture of the windpipe: the notes properly belonging to the former, are expreſſed by different apertures of the mouth, without varying the aperture of the windpipe. This however doth not hinder pronunciation to borrow from ſinging, as one ſometimes is naturally led to do, in expreſſing a vehement paſſion.

In reading, as in ſinging, there is a key-note: above this note the voice is frequently elevated, to make the ſound correſpond to the elevation of the ſubject: but the mind in an elevated ſtate, is diſpoſed to action; therefore, in order to a reſt, it muſt be brought down to the key-note. Hence the term *cadence*.

The only general rule that can be given for directing the pronunciation, is, To ſound the words in ſuch a manner as to imitate the things they ſignify. In pronouncing words ſignifying what is elevated, the voice ought to be raiſed above its ordinary

nary tone; and words ſignifying dejection of mind, ought to be pronounced in a low note. To imitate a ſtern and impetuous paſſion, the words ought to be pronounced rough and loud; a ſweet and kindly paſſion, on the contrary, ought to be imitated by a ſoft and melodious tone of voice: in Dryden's ode of *Alexander's feaſt*, the line *Faln, faln, faln, faln,* repreſents a gradual ſinking of the mind; and therefore is pronounced with a falling voice by every one of taſte, without inſtruction. In general, words that make the greateſt figure ought to be marked with a peculiar emphaſis. Another circumſtance contributes to the reſemblance between ſenſe and ſound, which is ſlow or quick pronunciation: for though the length or ſhortneſs of the ſyllables with relation to each other, be in proſe aſcertained in ſome meaſure, and in verſe accurately; yet, taking a whole line or period together, it may be pronounced ſlow or faſt. A period accordingly ought to be pronounced ſlow, when it expreſſes what is ſolemn or deliberate; and ought to be pronounced quick, when it expreſſes what is briſk, lively, or impetuous.

The art of pronouncing with propriety and grace, being intended to make the ſound an echo to the ſenſe, ſcarce admits of any other general rule than that above mentioned. It may indeed be branched out into many particular rules and obſervations: but without much ſucceſs; becauſe no language furniſheth words to ſignify the diffe-

rent degrees of high and low, loud and ſoft, faſt and ſlow. Before theſe differences can be made the ſubject of regular inſtruction, notes muſt be invented, reſembling thoſe employ'd in muſic. We have reaſon to believe, that in Greece every tragedy was accompanied with ſuch notes, in order to aſcertain the pronunciation; but the moderns hitherto have not thought of this refinement. Cicero indeed *, without the help of notes, pretends to give rules for aſcertaining the various tones of voice that are proper in expreſſing the different paſſions; and it muſt be acknowledged, that in this attempt he hath exhauſted the whole power of language. At the ſame time, every perſon of diſcernment will perceive, that theſe rules avail little in point of inſtruction: the very words he employs, are not intelligible, except to thoſe who beforehand are acquainted with the ſubject.

To vary the ſcene a little, I propoſe to cloſe with a ſlight compariſon, between ſinging and pronouncing. In this compariſon, the five following circumſtances relative to articulate ſound, muſt be kept in view. 1ſt, A ſound or ſyllable is harſh or ſmooth. 2d, It is long or ſhort. 3d, It is pronounced high or low. 4th, It is pronounced loud or ſoft. And, laſtly, A number of words in ſucceſſion, conſtituting a period or member of a period, are pronounced ſlow or quick. Of theſe five

* De oratore, l. 3. cap. 58.

five the firſt depending on the component letters, and the ſecond being aſcertained by cuſtom, admit not any variety in pronouncing. The three laſt are arbitrary, depending on the will of the perſon who pronounces; and it is chiefly in the artful management of theſe that juſt pronunciation conſiſts. With reſpect to the firſt circumſtance, muſic has evidently the advantage; for all its notes are agreeable to the ear; which is not always the caſe of articulate ſounds. With reſpect to the ſecond, long and ſhort ſyllables variouſly combined, produce a great variety of feet; yet far inferior to the variety that is found in the multiplied combinations of muſical notes. With reſpect to high and low notes, pronunciation is ſtill more inferior to ſinging; for it is obſerved by Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus *, that in pronouncing, *i. e.* without altering the aperture of the windpipe, the voice is confined within three notes and a half: ſinging has a much greater compaſs. With reſpect to the two laſt circumſtances, pronunciation equals ſinging.

In this chapter, I have mentioned none of the beauties of language but what ariſe from words taken in their proper ſenſe. Beauties that depend on the metaphorical and figurative power of words, are reſerved to be treated chap. 20.

SECT.

* De ſtructura orationis, ſect. 2.

SECT. IV.

VERSIFICATION.

THE muſic of verſe, though handled by every grammarian, merits more attention than it has been honoured with. It is a ſubject intimately connected with human nature; and to explain it thoroughly, ſeveral nice and delicate feelings muſt be employ'd. But before entering upon it, we muſt ſee what verſe is, or, in other words, by what mark it is diſtinguiſhed from proſe; a point not ſo eaſy as may at firſt be apprehended. It is true, that the conſtruction of verſe is governed by preciſe rules; whereas proſe is more looſe, and ſcarce ſubjected to any rules. But are the many who have no rules, left without means to make the diſtinction? and even with reſpect to the learned, muſt they apply the rule before they can with certainty pronounce whether the compoſition be proſe or verſe? This will hardly be maintained; and therefore inſtead of rules, the ear muſt be appealed to as the proper judge. But by what mark does the ear diſtinguiſh verſe from proſe? The proper and ſatisfactory anſwer is, That theſe make

make different impreſſions upon every one who hath an ear. This advances us one ſtep in our inquiry.

Taking it then for granted, that verſe and proſe make upon the ear different impreſſions; nothing remains but to explain this difference, and to aſſign its cauſe. To this end, I call to my aid, an obſervation made above upon the ſound of words, that they are more agreeable to the ear when compoſed of long and ſhort ſyllables, than when all the ſyllables are of the ſame ſort: a continued ſound in the ſame tone, makes not a muſical impreſſion: the ſame note ſucceſſively renewed by intervals, is more agreeable; but ſtill makes not a muſical impreſſion. To produce that impreſſion, variety is neceſſary as well as number: the ſucceſſive ſounds or ſyllables, muſt be ſome of them long, ſome of them ſhort; and if alſo high and low, the muſic is the more perfect. The muſical impreſſion made by a period conſiſting of long and ſhort ſyllables arranged in a certain order, is what the Greeks call *rhythmus*, the Latins *numerus*, and we *melody* or *meaſure*. Cicero juſtly obſerves, that in one continued ſound there is no melody: "Numerus in continuatione nullus eſt." But in what follows he is wide of the truth, if by *numerus* he means melody or muſical meaſure: "Diſtinctio, et æqualium et ſæpe variorum in-
"tervallorum percuſſio, numerum conficit; quem
"in cadentibus guttis, quod intervallis diſtin-
"guuntur,

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THE muſic of verſe, though handled by every grammarian, merits more attention than it has been honoured with. It is a ſubject intimately connected with human nature; and to explain it thoroughly, ſeveral nice and delicate feelings muſt be employ'd. But before entering upon it, we muſt ſee what verſe is, or, in other words, by what mark it is diſtinguiſhed from proſe; a point not ſo eaſy as may at firſt be apprehended. It is true, that the conſtruction of verſe is governed by preciſe rules; whereas proſe is more looſe, and ſcarce ſubjected to any rules. But are the many who have no rules, left without means to make the diſtinction? and even with reſpect to the learned, muſt they apply the rule before they can with certainty pronounce whether the compoſition be proſe or verſe? This will hardly be maintained; and therefore inſtead of rules, the ear muſt be appealed to as the proper judge. But by what mark does the ear diſtinguiſh verſe from proſe? The proper and ſatisfactory anſwer is, That theſe make

make different impreſſions upon every one who hath an ear. This advances us one ſtep in our inquiry.

Taking it then for granted, that verſe and proſe make upon the ear different impreſſions; nothing remains but to explain this difference, and to aſſign its cauſe. To this end, I call to my aid, an obſervation made above upon the ſound of words, that they are more agreeable to the ear when compoſed of long and ſhort ſyllables, than when all the ſyllables are of the ſame ſort: a continued ſound in the ſame tone, makes not a muſical impreſſion: the ſame note ſucceſſively renewed by intervals, is more agreeable; but ſtill makes not a muſical impreſſion. To produce that impreſſion, variety is neceſſary as well as number: the ſucceſſive ſounds or ſyllables, muſt be ſome of them long, ſome of them ſhort; and if alſo high and low, the muſic is the more perfect. The muſical impreſſion made by a period conſiſting of long and ſhort ſyllables arranged in a certain order, is what the Greeks call *rhythmus*, the Latins *numerus*, and we *melody* or *meaſure*. Cicero juſtly obſerves, that in one continued ſound there is no melody: "Numerus in continuatione nullus eſt." But in what follows he is wide of the truth, if by *numerus* he means melody or muſical meaſure: "Diſtinctio, et æqualium et ſæpe variorum in-
"tervallorum percuſſio, numerum conficit; quem
"in cadentibus guttis, quod intervallis diſtin-
"guuntur,

" guuntur, notare poſſumus." Falling drops, whether with equal or unequal intervals, are certainly not muſic: we are not ſenſible of a muſical impreſſion but in a ſucceſſion of long and ſhort notes. And this alſo was probably the opinion of the author cited, tho' his expreſſion be a little unguarded *.

It will probably occur, that melody, if it depend on long and ſhort ſyllables combined in a ſentence, may be found in proſe as well as in verſe; conſidering eſpecially, that in both, particular words are accented or pronounced in a higher tone than the reſt; and therefore that verſe cannot be diſtinguiſhed from proſe by melody merely. The obſervation is juſt; and it follows, that the diſtinction between them, ſince it depends not ſingly on melody, muſt ariſe from the difference of the melody: which is preciſely the caſe; tho' that difference cannot with any accuracy be explained in words; all that can be ſaid is, that verſe is more muſical than proſe, and its melody more perfect. The difference between verſe and proſe,

* From this paſſage, however, we diſcover the etymology of the Latin term for muſical impreſſion. Every one being ſenſible that there is no muſic in a continued ſound; the firſt inquiries were probably carried no farther than to diſcover, that to produce a muſical impreſſion a number of ſounds is neceſſary; and muſical impreſſion obtained the name of *numerus*, before it was clearly aſcertained, that variety is neceſſary as well as number.

proſe, reſembles the difference, in muſic properly ſo called, between the ſong and the recitative: and the reſemblance is not the leaſt complete, that theſe differences, like the ſhades of colours, approximate ſometimes ſo nearly as ſcarce to be diſcernible: the melody of a recitative approaches ſometimes to that of a ſong; which, on the other hand, degenerates ſometimes to that of a recitative. Nothing is more diſtinguiſhable from proſe, than the bulk of Virgil's Hexameters: many of thoſe compoſed by Horace, are very little removed from proſe: Sapphic verſe has a very ſenſible melody: that, on the other hand, of an Iambic, is extremely faint *.

This more perfect melody of articulate ſounds, is what diſtinguiſheth verſe from proſe. Verſe is ſubjected to certain inflexible laws; the number and variety of the component ſyllables being aſcertained, and in ſome meaſure the order of ſucceſſion. Such reſtraint makes it a matter of difficulty to compoſe in verſe; a difficulty that is not to be ſurmounted but by a peculiar genius. Uſeful leſſons convey'd to us in verſe, are agreeable by the union of muſic with inſtruction: but are we

* Muſic, properly ſo called, is analyſed into melody and harmony. A ſucceſſion of ſounds ſo as to be agreeable to the ear, conſtitutes melody: harmony ariſes from co-exiſting ſounds. Verſe therefore can only reach melody, and not harmony.

we for that reaſon to reject knowledge offered in a plainer dreſs? That would be ridiculous: for knowledge is of intrinſic merit, independent of the means of acquiſition; and there are many, not leſs capable than willing to inſtruct us, who have no genius for verſe. Hence the uſe of proſe; which, for the reaſon now given, is not confined to preciſe rules. There belongs to it, a certain melody of an inferior kind, which ought to be the aim of every writer; but for ſucceeding in it, practice is neceſſary more than genius. Nor do we rigidly inſiſt for melodious proſe: provided the work convey inſtruction, its chief end, we are the leſs ſolicitous about its dreſs.

Having aſcertained the nature and limits of our ſubject, I proceed to the laws by which it is regulated. Theſe would be endleſs, were verſe of all different kinds to be taken under conſideration. I propoſe therefore to confine the inquiry, to Latin or Greek Hexameter, and to French and Engliſh Heroic verſe; which perhaps may carry me farther than the reader will chooſe to follow. The obſervations I ſhall have occaſion to make, will at any rate be ſufficient for a ſpecimen; and theſe, with proper variations, may eaſily be transferred to the compoſition of other ſorts of verſe.

Before I enter upon particulars, it muſt be premiſed in general, that to verſe of every kind, five things are of importance. 1ſt, The number of ſyllables that compoſe a verſe line. 2d, The different

ferent lengths of ſyllables, *i. e.* the difference of time taken in pronouncing. 3d, The arrangement of theſe ſyllables combined in words. 4th, The pauſes or ſtops in pronouncing. 5th, The pronouncing ſyllables in a high or a low tone. The three firſt mentioned are obviouſly eſſential to verſe: if any of them be wanting, there cannot be that higher degree of melody which diſtinguiſheth verſe from proſe. To give a juſt notion of the fourth, it muſt be obſerved, that pauſes are neceſſary for three different purpoſes: one, to ſeparate periods, and members of the ſame period, according to the ſenſe; another, to improve the melody of verſe; and the laſt, to afford opportunity for drawing breath in reading. A pauſe of the firſt kind is variable, being long or ſhort, frequent or leſs frequent, as the ſenſe requires. A pauſe of the ſecond kind, being determined by the melody, is in no degree arbitrary. The laſt ſort is in a meaſure arbitrary, depending on the reader's command of breath. But as one cannot read with grace, unleſs, for drawing breath, opportunity be taken of a pauſe in the ſenſe or in the melody, this pauſe ought never to be diſtinguiſhed from the others; and for that reaſon ſhall be laid aſide. With reſpect then to the pauſes of ſenſe and of melody, it may be affirmed without heſitation, that their coincidence in verſe is a capital beauty: but as it cannot be expected, in a long work eſpecially, that every line ſhould be ſo perfect;

fect; we ſhall afterward have occaſion to ſee, that the pauſe neceſſary for the ſenſe muſt often, in ſome degree, be ſacrificed to the verſe-pauſe, and the latter ſometimes to the former.

The pronouncing ſyllables in a high or low tone, contributes alſo to melody. In reading whether verſe or proſe, a certain tone is aſſumed, which may be called *the key-note*; and in that tone the bulk of the words are ſounded. Sometimes to humour the ſenſe, and ſometimes the melody, a particular ſyllable is ſounded in a higher tone; and this is termed *accenting a ſyllable*, or gracing it with an accent. Oppoſed to the accent, is the cadence, which I have not mentioned as one of the requiſites of verſe, becauſe it is entirely regulated by the ſenſe, and hath no peculiar relation to verſe. The cadence is a falling of the voice below the key-note at the cloſe of every period; and ſo little is it eſſential to verſe, that in correct reading the final ſyllable of every line is accented, that ſyllable only excepted with cloſes the period, where the ſenſe requires a cadence. The reader may be ſatisfied of this by experiments; and for that purpoſe I recommend to him the *Rape of the Lock*, which, in point of verſification, is the moſt complete performance in the Engliſh language. Let him conſult in a particular period canto 2. beginning at line 47. and cloſed line 52. with the word *gay*, which only of the whole final ſyllables is pronounced with a cadence. He may alſo examine

mine another period in the 5th canto which runs from line 45. to line 52.

Tho' the five requiſites above mentioned, enter the compoſition of every ſpecies of verſe, they are however governed by different rules, peculiar to each ſpecies. Upon quantity only, one general obſervation may be premiſed, becauſe it is applicable to every ſpecies of verſe, That ſyllables, with reſpect to the time taken in pronouncing, are long or ſhort; two ſhort ſyllables, with reſpect to time, being preciſely equal to a long one. Theſe two lengths are eſſential to verſe of all kinds; and to no verſe, as far as I know, is a greater variety of time neceſſary in pronouncing ſyllables. The voice indeed is frequently made to reſt longer than uſual upon a word that bears an important ſignification; but this is done to humour the ſenſe, and is not neceſſary for melody. A thing not more neceſſary for melody occurs with reſpect to accenting, ſimilar to that now mentioned: A word ſignifying any thing humble, low, or dejected, is naturally, in proſe, as well as in verſe, pronounced in a tone below the key-note.

We are now ſufficiently prepared for particulars; beginning with Latin or Greek Hexameter, which are the ſame. What I have to obſerve upon this ſpecies of verſe, will come under the four following heads; number, arrangement, pauſe, and accent: For as to quantity, what is obſerved above may ſuffice.

Hexameter lines, as to time, are all of the ſame length; being equivalent to the time taken in pronouncing twelve long ſyllables or twenty-four ſhort. An Hexameter line may conſiſt of ſeventeen ſyllables; and when regular and not Spondiac, it never has fewer than thirteen: whence it follows, that where the ſyllables are many, the plurality muſt be ſhort; where few, the plurality muſt be long.

This line is ſuſceptible of much variety as to the ſucceſſion of long and ſhort ſyllables. It is however ſubjected to laws that confine its variety within certain limits: and for aſcertaining theſe limits, grammarians have invented a rule by Dactyles and Spondees, which they denominate *feet*. One at firſt view is led to think, that theſe feet are alſo intended to regulate the pronunciation: which is far from being the caſe; for were one to pronounce according to theſe feet, the melody of a Hexameter line would be deſtroyed, or at beſt be much inferior to what it is when properly pronounced *. Theſe feet muſt be confined to regulate

* After giving ſome attention to this ſubject, and weighing deliberately every circumſtance, I was neceſſarily led to the foregoing concluſion, That the Dactyle and Spondee are no other than artificial meaſures, invented for trying the accuracy of compoſition. Repeated experiments have convinced me, that though the ſenſe ſhould be neglected, an Hexameter line read by Dactyles and Spondees will not be melodious. And the compoſition of an Hexameter line

late the arrangement, for they ſerve no other purpoſe. They are withal ſo artificial and complex, that I am tempted to ſubſtitute in their ſtead, other rules more ſimple and of more eaſy application; for example, the following. 1ſt, The line muſt always commence with a long ſyllable, and cloſe

line demonſtrates this to be true, without neceſſity of an experiment; for, as will appear afterward, there muſt always, in this line, be a capital pauſe at the end of the fifth long ſyllable, reckoning, as above, two ſhort for one long; and when we meaſure this line by Dactyles and Spondees, the pauſe now mentioned divides always a Dactyle, or a Spondee, without once falling in after either of theſe feet. Hence it is evident, that if a line be pronounced as it is ſcanned, by Dactyles and Spondees, the pauſe muſt utterly be neglected; which deſtroys the melody, becauſe this pauſe is eſſential to the melody of an Hexameter verſe. If, on the other hand, the melody be preſerved by making that pauſe, the pronouncing by Dactyles or Spondees muſt be abandoned.

What has led grammarians into the uſe of Dactyles and Spondees, ſeems not beyond the reach of conjecture. To produce melody, the Dactyle and the Spondee, which cloſe every Hexameter line, muſt be diſtinctly expreſſed in the pronunciation. This diſcovery, joined with another, that the foregoing part of the verſe could be meaſured by the ſame feet, probably led grammarians to adopt theſe artificial meaſures, and perhaps raſhly to conclude, that the pronunciation is directed by theſe feet as the compoſition is: the Dactyle and the Spondee at the cloſe, ſerve indeed to regulate the pronunciation as well as the compoſition; but in the foregoing part of the line, they regulate the compoſition only, not the pronunciation.

cloſe with two long preceded by two ſhort. 2d, More than two ſhort can never be found together, nor fewer than two. And, 3d, Two long ſyllables which have been preceded by two ſhort, cannot alſo be followed by two ſhort. Theſe few rules fulfil all the conditions of a Hexameter line, with relation to order or arrangement. To theſe again a ſingle rule may be ſubſtituted, for which I have a ſtill greater reliſh, as it regulates more affirmatively the conſtruction of every part. That I may put this rule into words with perſpicuity, I take a hint from the twelve long ſyllables that compoſe an

If we muſt have feet in verſe to regulate the pronunciation and conſequently the melody, theſe feet muſt be determined by the pauſes. All the ſyllables interjected between two pauſes ought to be deemed one muſical foot; becauſe, to preſerve the melody, they muſt all be pronounced together, without any ſtop. And therefore, whatever number there are of pauſes in a Hexameter line, the parts into which it is divided by theſe pauſes, make juſt ſo many muſical feet.

Connection obliges me here to anticipate, and to obſerve, that the ſame doctrine is applicable to Engliſh heroic verſe. Conſidering its compoſition merely, it is of two kinds; one compoſed of five Iambi; and one of a Trochæus followed by four Iambi: but theſe feet afford no rule for pronouncing; the muſical feet being obviouſly thoſe parts of the line that are interjected between two pauſes. To bring out the melody, theſe feet muſt be expreſſed in the pronunciation; or, which comes to the ſame, the pronunciation muſt be directed by the pauſes, without regard to the Iambus or Trochæus.

an Hexameter line, to divide it into twelve equal parts or portions, being each of them one long ſyllable or two ſhort. A portion being thus defined, I proceed to the rule. The 1ſt, 3d, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th, and 12th portions, muſt each of them be one long ſyllable; the 10th muſt always be two ſhort ſyllables; the 2d, 4th, 6th, and 8th, may either be one long or two ſhort. Or to expreſs the thing ſtill more curtly, The 2d, 4th, 6th, and 8th portions may be one long ſyllable or two ſhort; the 10th muſt be two ſhort ſyllables; all the reſt muſt conſiſt each of one long ſyllable. This fulfils all the conditions of an Hexameter line, and comprehends all the combinations of Dactyles and Spondees that this line admits.

Next in order comes the pauſe. At the end of every Hexameter line, every one muſt be ſenſible of a complete cloſe or full pauſe; the cauſe of which follows. The two long ſyllables preceded by two ſhort, which always cloſe an Hexameter line, are a fine preparation for a pauſe: for long ſyllables, or ſyllables pronounced ſlow, reſembling a ſlow and languid motion, tending to reſt, naturally incline the mind to reſt, or to pauſe; and to this inclination the two preceding ſhort ſyllables contribute, which by contraſt, make the ſlow pronunciation of the final ſyllables the more conſpicuous. Beſide this complete cloſe or full pauſe at the end, others are al-

ſo requiſite for the ſake of melody; of which I diſcover two clearly, and perhaps there may be more. The longeſt and moſt remarkable, ſucceeds the 5th portion: the other, which, being ſhorter and more faint, may be called *the ſemi-pauſe*, ſucceeds the 8th portion. So ſtriking is the pauſe firſt mentioned, as to be diſtinguiſhed even by the rudeſt ear: the monkiſh rhymes are evidently built upon it; in which by an invariable rule, the final word always chimes with that which immediately precedes the ſaid pauſe:

De planctu cudo || metrum cum carmine nudo
Mingere cum bumbis || res eſt ſaluberrima lumbis.

The difference of time in the pauſe and ſemi-pauſe, occaſions another difference no leſs remarkable; that it is lawful to divide a word by a ſemi-pauſe, but never by a pauſe, the bad effect of which is ſenſibly felt in the following examples:

Effuſus labor, at || que inmitis rupta Tyranni

Again:

Obſervans nido im || plumes detraxit; at illa

Again:

Loricam quam De || moleo detraxerat ipſe

The

The dividing a word by a ſemipauſe has not the ſame bad effect:

Jamque pedem referens || caſus e|vaſerat omnes.

Again:

Qualis populea || mœrens Philo|mela ſub umbra

Again:

Ludere que vellem || calamo per|miſit agreſti

Lines, however, where words are left entire, without being divided even by a ſemipauſe, run by that means much the more ſweetly:

Nec gemere aërea || ceſſabit | turtur ab ulmo.

Again:

Quadrupedante putrem || ſonitu quatit | ungula campum.

Again:

Eurydicen toto || referebant | flumine ripæ.

The reaſon of theſe obſervations will be evident upon the ſlighteſt reflection. Between things ſo intimately connected in reading aloud, as are ſenſe and ſound, every degree of diſcord is unpleaſant: and for that reaſon, it is a matter of importance, to make the muſical pauſes coincide

as much as poſſible with thoſe of ſenſe; which is requiſite, more eſpecially, with reſpect to the pauſe, a deviation from the rule being leſs remarkable in a ſemipauſe. Conſidering the matter as to melody ſolely, it is indifferent whether the pauſes be at the end of words or in the middle; but when we carry the ſenſe along, it is diſagreeable to find a word ſplit into two by a pauſe, as if there were really two words: and though the diſagreeableneſs here be connected with the ſenſe only, it is by an eaſy tranſition of perceptions transferred to the ſound; by which means, we conceive a line to be harſh and grating to the ear, when in reality it is only ſo to the underſtanding *.

To the rule that fixes the pauſe after the fifth portion, there is one exception, and no more: If the ſyllable ſucceeding the 5th portion be ſhort, the pauſe is ſometimes poſtponed to it.

Pupillis quos dura || premit cuſtodia matrum

Again,

In terras oppreſſa || gravi ſub religione

Again:

Et quorum pars magna || fui; quis talia fando

This contributes to diverſify the melody; and where

* See chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 5.

where the words are ſmooth and liquid, is not ungraceful; as in the following examples:

Formoſam reſonare || doces Amaryllida ſylvas

Again:

Agricolas, quibus ipſa || procul diſcordibus armis

If this pauſe, placed as aforeſaid after the ſhort ſyllable, happen alſo to divide a word, the melody by theſe circumſtances is totally annihilated. Witneſs the following line of Ennius, which is plain proſe:

Romæ mœnia terru || it impiger | Hannibal armis.

Hitherto the arrangement of the long and ſhort ſyllables of an Hexameter line and its different pauſes, have been conſidered with reſpect to melody: but to have a juſt notion of Hexameter verſe, theſe particulars muſt alſo be conſidered with reſpect to ſenſe. There is not perhaps in any other ſort of verſe, ſuch latitude in the long and ſhort ſyllables; a circumſtance that contributes greatly to that richneſs of melody which is remarkable in Hexameter verſe, and which made Ariſtotle pronounce, that an epic poem in any other verſe would not ſucceed *. One defect, however, muſt not be diſſembled, that the ſame means which

* Poet. cap. 25.

which contribute to the richneſs of the melody, render it leſs fit than ſeveral other ſorts for a narrative poem. There cannot be a more artful contrivance, as above obſerved, than to cloſe an Hexameter line with two long ſyllables preceded by two ſhort: but unhappily this conſtruction proves a great embarraſſment to the ſenſe; which will thus be evident. As in general, there ought to be a ſtrict concordance between a thought and the words in which it is dreſſed; ſo in particular, every cloſe in the ſenſe ought to be accompanied with a cloſe in the ſound. In proſe, this law may be ſtrictly obſerved; but in verſe, the ſame ſtrictneſs would occaſion inſuperable difficulties. Willing to ſacrifice to the melody of verſe, ſome ſhare of the concordance between thought and expreſſion, we freely excuſe the ſeparation of the muſical pauſe from that of the ſenſe, during the courſe of a line; but the cloſe of an Hexameter line is too conſpicuous to admit this liberty: for which reaſon there ought always to be ſome pauſe in the ſenſe at the end of every Hexameter line, were it but ſuch a pauſe as is marked with a comma; and for the ſame reaſon, there ought never to be a full cloſe in the ſenſe but at the end of a line, becauſe there the melody is cloſed. An Hexameter line, to preſerve its melody, cannot well admit any greater relaxation; and yet in a narrative poem, it is extremely difficult to adhere ſtrictly to the rule even with theſe indulgences. Virgil, the chief

chief of poets for verſification, is forced often to end a line without any cloſe in the ſenſe, and as often to cloſe the ſenſe during the running of a line; tho' a cloſe in the melody during the movement of the thought, or a cloſe in the thought during the movement of the melody, cannot be agreeable.

The accent, to which we proceed, is no leſs eſſential than the other circumſtances above handled. By a good ear it will be diſcerned, that in every line there is one ſyllable diſtinguiſhable from the reſt by a capital accent: that ſyllable, being the 7th portion, is invariably long.

Nec bene promeritis || capitûr nec | tangitur ira.

Again:

Non ſibi ſed toto || genitûm ſe | credere mundo.

Again:

Qualis ſpelunca || ſubitô com|mota columba.

In theſe examples, the accent is laid upon the laſt ſyllable of a word; which is favourable to the melody in the following reſpect, that the pauſe, which for the ſake of reading diſtinctly muſt follow every word, gives opportunity to prolong the accent. And for that reaſon, a line thus accented,

ed, has a more ſpirited air, than when the accent is placed on any other ſyllable. Compare the foregoing lines with the following:

Alba neque Aſſyrio || fucâtur | lana veneno.

Again:

Panditur interea || domus ômnipo|tentis Olympi.

Again:

Olli ſedato || reſpôndit | corde Latinus.

In lines where the pauſe comes after the ſhort ſyllable ſucceeding the fifth portion, the accent is diſplaced, and rendered leſs ſenſible: it ſeems to be ſplit into two, and to be laid partly on the 5th portion, and partly on the 7th, its uſual place; as in

Nuda genu, nodôque || finûs col|lecta fluentes

Again:

Formoſam reſonâre || docês Amar|yllida ſylvas

Beſide this capital accent, ſlighter accents are laid upon other portions; particularly upon the 4th, unleſs where it conſiſts of two ſhort ſyllables; upon the 9th, which is always a long ſyllable; and

and upon the 11th, where the line concludes with a monoſyllable. Such concluſion, by the by, impairs the melody, and for that reaſon is not to be indulged unleſs where it is expreſſive of the ſenſe. The following lines are marked with all the accents.

Ludere quæ vêllem calamô permîſit agreſti.

Again:

Et duræ quêrcus ſudâbunt rôſcida mella.

Again:

Parturiunt môntes, naſcêtur rîdiculûs mus.

Reflecting upon the melody of Hexameter verſe, we find, that order or arrangement doth not conſtitute the whole of it; for when we compare different lines, equally regular as to the ſucceſſion of long and ſhort ſyllables, the melody is found in very different degrees of perfection; which is not occaſioned by any particular combination of Dactyles and Spondees, or of long and ſhort ſyllables, becauſe we find lines where Dactyles prevail, and lines where Spondees prevail, equally melodious. Of the former take the following inſtance:

Æneadum genitrix hominum divumque voluptas.

Of

Of the latter:

Molli paulatim flaveſcet campus ariſta.

What can be more different as to melody than the two following lines, which, however, as to the ſucceſſion of long and ſhort ſyllables, are conſtructed preciſely in the ſame manner?

Spond. Dact. Spond. Spond. Dact. Spond.
Ad talos ſtola dimiſſa et circumdata palla. *Hor.*

Spond. Dact. Spond. Spond. Dact. Spond.
Placatumque nitet diffuſo lumine cœlum. *Lucr.*

In the former, the pauſe falls in the middle of a word, which is a great blemiſh, and the accent is diſturbed by a harſh eliſion of the vowel *a* upon the particle *et*. In the latter, the pauſes and the accent are all of them diſtinct and full: there is no eliſion; and the words are more liquid and ſounding. In theſe particulars conſiſts the beauty of an Hexameter line with reſpect to melody: and by neglecting theſe, many lines in the Satires and Epiſtles of Horace are leſs agreeable than plain proſe; for they are neither the one nor the other in perfection. To draw melody from theſe lines, they muſt be pronounced without relation to the ſenſe: it muſt not be regarded, that words are divided by pauſes, nor that harſh eliſions are multiplied. To add to the account, proſaic low-ſounding words are introduced; and which is ſtill worſe,

accents

accents are laid on them. Of ſuch faulty lines take the following inſtances.

Candida rectaque ſit, munda hactenus ſit neque longa.

Jupiter exclamat ſimul atque audirit; at in ſe

Cuſtodes, lectica, ciniſlones, paraſitæ

Optimus eſt modulator, ut Alfenus Vafer omni

Nunc illud tantum quæram, meritone tibi ſit.

Next in order comes Engliſh Heroic verſe, which ſhall be examined under the whole five heads, of number, quantity, arrangement, pauſe, and accent. This verſe is of two kinds; one named *rhyme* or *metre*, and one *blank verſe*. In the former, the lines are connected two and two by ſimilarity of ſound in the final ſyllables; and two lines ſo connected are termed a *couplet*: ſimilarity of ſound being avoided in the latter, couplets are baniſhed. Theſe two ſorts muſt be handled ſeparately, becauſe there are many peculiarities in each. Beginning with rhyme or metre, the firſt article ſhall be diſcuſſed in a few words. Every line conſiſts of ten ſyllables, five ſhort and five long; from which there are but two exceptions, both of them rare. The firſt is, where each line of a couplet is made eleven ſyllables, by an additional ſyllable at the end:

There heroes' wits are kept in pond'rous vaſes,
And beaus' in ſnuff-boxes and tweezer-caſes.

The

> The piece, you think, is incorrect? Why, take it;
> I'm all ſubmiſſion; what you'd have it, make it.

This licence is ſufferable in a ſingle couplet; but if frequent, would give diſguſt.

The other exception concerns the ſecond line of a couplet, which is ſometimes ſtretched out to twelve ſyllables, termed an *Alexandrine line:*

> A needleſs Alexandrine ends the ſong,
> That, like a wounded ſnake, drags its ſlow length along.

It doth extremely well when employ'd to cloſe a period with a certain pomp and ſolemnity, where the ſubject makes that tone proper.

With regard to quantity, it is unneceſſary to mention a ſecond time, that the quantities employ'd in verſe are but two, the one double of the other; that every ſyllable is reducible to one or other of theſe ſtandards; and that a ſyllable of the larger quantity is termed *long*, and of the leſſer quantity *ſhort*. It belongs more to the preſent article, to examine what peculiarities there may be in the Engliſh language as to long and ſhort ſyllables. Every language has ſyllables that may be pronounced long or ſhort at pleaſure; but the Engliſh above all abounds in ſyllables of that kind: in words of three or more ſyllables, the quantity for the moſt part is invariable: the exceptions are more frequent in diſſyllables: but as to monoſyllables,

lables, they may, without many exceptions, be pronounced either long or ſhort; nor is the ear hurt by a liberty that is rendered familiar by cuſtom. This ſhows, that the melody of Engliſh verſe muſt depend leſs upon quantity, than upon other circumſtances: in which it differs widely from Latin verſe, where every ſyllable, having but one ſound, ſtrikes the ear uniformly with its accuſtomed impreſſion; and a reader muſt be delighted to find a number of ſuch ſyllables, diſpoſed ſo artfully as to be highly melodious. Syllables variable in quantity cannot poſſeſs this power: for tho' cuſtom may render familiar, both a long and a ſhort pronunciation of the ſame word; yet the mind wavering between the two ſounds, cannot be ſo much affected as where every ſyllable has one fixed ſound. What I have further to ſay upon quantity, will come more properly under the following head, of arrangement.

And with reſpect to arrangement, which may be brought within a narrow compaſs, the Engliſh Heroic line is commonly Iambic, the firſt ſyllable ſhort, the ſecond long, and ſo on alternately through the whole line. One exception there is, pretty frequent, of lines commencing with a Trochæus, *i. e.* a long and a ſhort ſyllable: but this affects not the order of the following ſyllables, which go on alternately as uſual, one ſhort and one long. The following couplet affords an example of each kind.

Sŏme ĭn thĕ fīelds ŏf pūrĕſt ēthĕr plāy,
Ănd bāſk ănd whītĕn īn thĕ blāze ŏf dāy.

It is a great imperfection in Engliſh verſe, that it excludes the bulk of polyſyllables, which are the moſt ſounding words in our language; for very few of them have ſuch alternation of long and ſhort ſyllables as to correſpond to either of the arrangements mentioned. Engliſh verſe accordingly is almoſt totally reduced to diſſyllables and monoſyllables: *magnanimity* is a ſounding word totally excluded: *impetuoſity* is ſtill a finer word, by the reſemblance of the ſound and ſenſe; and yet a negative is put upon it, as well as upon numberleſs words of the ſame kind. Polyſyllables compoſed of ſyllables long and ſhort alternately, make a good figure in verſe; for example, *obſervance*, *opponent*, *oſtenſive*, *pindaric*, *productive*, *prolific*, and ſuch others of three ſyllables. *Imitation*, *imperfection*, *miſdemeanor*, *mitigation*, *moderation*, *obſervator*, *ornamental*, *regulator*, and others ſimilar of four ſyllables, beginning with two ſhort ſyllables, the third long, and the fourth ſhort, may find a place in a line commencing with a Trochæus. I know not if there be any of five ſyllables. One I know of ſix, *viz. miſinterpretation:* but words ſo compoſed are not frequent in our language.

One would not imagine without trial, how uncouth falſe quantity appears in verſe; not leſs than

a

a provincial tone or idiom. The article *the* is one of the few monoſyllables that is invariably ſhort: obſerve how harſh it makes a line where it muſt be pronounced long;

Thĭs nȳmph, tŏ thē dĕſtrūctiŏn ōf mănkĭnd.

Again,

Th' ădvēnt'rŏus bārŏn thē brĭght lōcks ădmīr'd.

Let it be pronounced ſhort, and it reduces the melody almoſt to nothing: better ſo however than falſe quantity. In the following examples we perceive the ſame defect:

And old impertinence || expel by new
With varying vanities || from ev'ry part
Love in theſe labyrinths || his ſlaves detains
New ſtratagems || the radiant lock to gain
Her eyes half languiſhing || half drown'd in tears
Roar'd for the handkerchief || that caus'd his pain
Paſſions like elements || though born to fight.

The great variety of melody conſpicuous in Engliſh verſe, ariſes chiefly from the pauſes and accents; which are of greater importance than is commonly thought. There is a degree of intricacy in this branch of our ſubject, and it will be dif-

ficult to give a diſtinct view of it; but it is too late to think of difficulties after we are engaged. The pauſe, which paves the way to the accent, offers itſelf firſt to our examination; and from a very ſhort trial, the following facts will be verified. 1ſt, A line admits but one capital pauſe. 2d, In different lines, we find this pauſe after the fourth ſyllable, after the fifth, after the ſixth, and after the ſeventh. Theſe four places of the pauſe lay a ſolid foundation for dividing Engliſh Heroic lines into four kinds; and I warn the reader beforehand, that unleſs he attend to this diſtinction, he cannot have any juſt notion of the richneſs and variety of Engliſh verſification. Each kind or order hath a melody peculiar to itſelf, readily diſtinguiſhable by a good ear: and I am not without hopes to make the cauſe of this peculiarity ſufficiently evident. It muſt be obſerved, at the ſame time, that the pauſe cannot be made indifferently at any of the places mentioned: it is the ſenſe that regulates the pauſe, as will be ſeen afterward; and conſequently, it is the ſenſe that determines of what order every line muſt be: there can be but one capital muſical pauſe in a line; and that pauſe ought to coincide, if poſſible, with a pauſe in the ſenſe, in order that the ſound may accord with the ſenſe.

What is ſaid ſhall be illuſtrated by examples of each ſort or order. And firſt of the pauſe after the fourth ſyllable:

Back

Back through the paths || of pleaſing ſenſe I ran.

Again,

Profuſe of bliſs || and pregnant with delight.

After the 5th:

So when an angel || by divine command,
With riſing tempeſts || ſhakes a guilty land.

After the 6th:

Speed the ſoft intercourſe || from ſoul to ſoul.

Again,

Then from his cloſing eyes || thy form ſhall part.

After the 7th:

And taught the doubtful battle || where to rage.

Again,

And in the ſmooth deſcription || murmur ſtill.

Beſide the capital pauſe now mentioned, inferior pauſes will be diſcovered by a nice ear. Of theſe there are commonly two in each line: one before the capital pauſe, and one after it. The former comes invariably after the firſt long ſyllable, whether the line begin with a long ſyllable or a ſhort.

The other in its variety imitates the capital pauſe: in ſome lines it comes after the 6th ſyllable, in ſome after the 7th, and in ſome after the 8th. Of theſe ſemipauſes take the following examples.

1ſt and 8th:

Led | through a ſad || variety | of wo,

1ſt and 7th:

Still | on that breaſt || enamour'd | let me lie.

2d and 8th:

From ſtorms | a ſhelter || and from heat | a ſhade.

2d and 6th:

Let wealth | let honour || wait | the wedded dame.

2d and 7th:

Above | all pain || all paſſion | and all pride.

Even from theſe few examples it appears, that the place of the laſt ſemipauſe, like that of the full pauſe, is directed in a good meaſure by the ſenſe. Its proper place with reſpect to the melody is after the eighth ſyllable, ſo as to finiſh the line with an Iambus diſtinctly pronounced, which, by a long ſyllable after a ſhort, is a preparation for reſt: but ſometimes

ſometimes it comes after the 6th, and ſometimes after the 7th ſyllable, in order to avoid a pauſe in the middle of a word, or between two words intimately connected; and ſo far melody is juſtly ſacrificed to ſenſe.

In diſcourſing of Hexameter verſe, it was laid down as a rule, That a full pauſe ought never to divide a word: ſuch licence deviates too far from the coincidence that ought to be between the pauſes of ſenſe and of melody. The ſame rule muſt obtain in an Engliſh line; and we ſhall ſupport reaſon by experiments:

A noble ſuper‖fluity it craves

Abhor, a perpe‖tuity ſhould ſtand

Are theſe lines diſtinguiſhable from proſe? Scarcely, I think.

The ſame rule is not applicable to a ſemipauſe, which being ſhort and faint, is not ſenſibly diſagreeable when it divides a word:

Relent|leſs walls ‖ whoſe darkſome round | contains
For her | white virgins ‖ hyme|neals ſing
In theſe | deep ſolitudes ‖ and aw|ful cells.

It muſt however be acknowledged, that the melody here ſuffers in ſome degree: a word ought to be pronounced without any reſt between its com-

ponent ſyllables: a ſemipauſe that bends to this rule, is ſcarce perceived.

The capital pauſe is ſo eſſential to the melody, that one cannot be too nice in the choice of its place, in order to have it clear and diſtinct. It cannot be in better company than with a pauſe in the ſenſe; and if the ſenſe require but a comma after the fourth, fifth, ſixth, or ſeventh ſyllable, it is ſufficient for the muſical pauſe. But to make ſuch coincidence eſſential, would cramp verſification too much; and we have experience for our authority, that there may be a pauſe in the melody where the ſenſe requires none. We muſt not however imagine, that a muſical pauſe may come after any word indifferently: ſome words, like ſyllables of the ſame word, are ſo intimately connected, as not to bear a ſeparation even by a pauſe. The ſeparating, for example, a ſubſtantive from its article would be harſh and unpleaſant: witneſs the following line, which cannot be pronounced with a pauſe as marked,

If Delia ſmile, the || flow'rs begin to ſpring.

But ought to be pronounced in the following manner,

If Delia ſmile, || the flow'rs begin to ſpring.

If then it be not a matter of indifference where to make the pauſe, there ought to be rules for determining

mining what words may be ſeparated by a pauſe, and what are incapable of ſuch ſeparation. I ſhall endeavour to aſcertain theſe rules; not chiefly for their utility, but in order to unfold ſome latent principles, that tend to regulate our taſte even where we are ſcarce ſenſible of them: and to that end, the method that appears the moſt promiſing, is to run over the verbal relations, beginning with the moſt intimate. The firſt that preſents itſelf is that of adjective and ſubſtantive, being the relation of ſubject and quality, the moſt intimate of all: and with reſpect to ſuch intimate companions, the queſtion is, Whether they can bear to be ſeparated by a pauſe. What occurs is, that a quality cannot exiſt independent of a ſubject; nor are they ſeparable even in imagination, becauſe they make parts of the ſame idea: and for that reaſon, with reſpect to melody as well as ſenſe, it muſt be diſagreeable, to beſtow upon the adjective a ſort of independent exiſtence, by interjecting a pauſe between it and its ſubſtantive. I cannot therefore approve the following lines, nor any of the ſort; for to my taſte they are harſh and unpleaſant.

Of thouſand bright || inhabitants of air
The ſprites of fiery || termagants inflame
The reſt, his many-colour'd || robe conceal'd
The ſame, his ancient || perſonage to deck

Ev'n

Ev'n here, where frozen || Chaſtity retires
I ſit, with ſad || civility, I read
Back to my native || moderation ſlide
Or ſhall we ev'ry || decency confound
Time was, a ſober || Engliſhman would knock
And place, on good || ſecurity, his gold
Taſte, that eternal || wanderer, which flies
But ere the tenth || revolving day was run
Firſt let the juſt || equivalent be paid.
Go, threat thy earth-born || Myrmidons; but here
Haſte to the fierce || Achilles' tent (he cries)
All but the ever-wakeful || eyes of Jove
Your own reſiſtleſs || eloquence employ

I have upon this article multiplied examples, that in a caſe where I have the misfortune to diſlike what paſſes current in practice, every man upon the ſpot may judge by his own taſte. And to taſte I appeal; for tho' the foregoing reaſoning appears to me juſt, it is however too ſubtile to afford conviction in oppoſition to taſte.

Conſidering this matter ſuperficially, one might be apt to imagine, that it muſt be the ſame, whether the adjective go firſt, which is the natural order, or the ſubſtantive, which is indulged by the laws of inverſion. But we ſoon diſcover this to be a miſtake: colour, for example, cannot be conceived

ceived independent of the ſurface coloured; but a tree may be conceived, as growing in a certain ſpot, as of a certain kind, and as ſpreading its extended branches all around, without ever thinking of its colour. In a word, a ſubject may be conſidered with ſome of its qualities independent of others; though we cannot form an image of any ſingle quality independent of the ſubject. Thus then, though an adjective named firſt be inſeparable from the ſubſtantive, the propoſition does not reciprocate: an image can be formed of the ſubſtantive independent of the adjective; and for that reaſon, they may be ſeparated by a pauſe, when the ſubſtantive takes the lead.

For thee the fates || ſeverely kind ordain
And curs'd with hearts || unknowing how to yield.

The verb and adverb are preciſely in the ſame condition with the ſubſtantive and adjective. An adverb, which modifies the action expreſſed by the verb, is not ſeparable from the verb even in imagination; and therefore I muſt alſo give up the following lines:

And which it much || becomes you to forget
'Tis one thing madly || to diſperſe my ſtore.

But an action may be conceived with ſome of its modifications, leaving out others; preciſely as a ſubject

ſubject may be conceived with ſome of its qualities, leaving out others: and therefore, when by inverſion the verb is firſt introduced, it has no bad effect to interject a pauſe between it and the adverb that follows. This may be done at the cloſe of a line, where the pauſe is at leaſt as full as that is which divides the line:

> While yet he ſpoke, the Prince advancing drew
> Nigh to the lodge, &c.

The agent and its action come next, expreſſed in grammar by the active ſubſtantive and its verb. Between theſe, placed in their natural order, there is no difficulty of interjecting a pauſe: an active being is not always in motion, and therefore it is eaſily ſeparable in idea from its action: when in a ſentence the ſubſtantive takes the lead, we know not that action is to follow; and as reſt muſt precede the commencement of motion, this interval is a proper opportunity for a pauſe.

But when by inverſion the verb is placed firſt, is it lawful to ſeparate it by a pauſe from the active ſubſtantive? I anſwer, No; becauſe an action is not an idea ſeparable from the agent, more than a quality from the ſubject to which it belongs. Two lines of the firſt rate for beauty, have always appeared to me exceptionable, upon account of the pauſe thus interjected between the verb and the conſequent ſubſtantive; and I have now diſcovered a reaſon to ſupport my taſte:

In

In theſe deep ſolitudes and awful cells,
Where heav'nly-penſive || Contemplation dwells,
And ever-muſing || Melancholy reigns.

The point of the greateſt delicacy regards the active verb and the paſſive ſubſtantive placed in their natural order. On the one hand, it will be obſerved, that theſe words ſignify things which are not ſeparable in idea. Killing cannot be conceived without a being that is put to death, nor painting without a ſurface upon which the colours are ſpread. On the other hand, an action and the thing on which it is exerted, are not, like ſubject and quality, united in one individual object: the active ſubſtantive is perfectly diſtinct from that which is paſſive; and they are connected by one circumſtance only, that the action of the former is exerted upon the latter. This makes it poſſible to take the action to pieces, and to conſider it firſt with relation to the agent, and next with relation to the patient. But after all, ſo intimately connected are the parts of the thought, that it requires an effort to make a ſeparation even for a moment: the ſubtiliſing to ſuch a degree is not agreeable, eſpecially in works of imagination. The beſt poets, however, taking advantage of this ſubtilty, ſcruple not to ſeparate by a pauſe an active verb from the thing upon which it is exerted. Such pauſes in a long work may be indulged; but taken ſingly, they certainly are not agreeable; and I appeal to the following examples:

The

The peer now ſpreads || the glitt'ring forfex wide
As ever ſully'd || the fair face of light
Repair'd to ſearch || the gloomy cave of Spleen
Nothing, to make || Philoſophy thy friend
Shou'd chance to make || the well-dreſs'd rabble ſtare
Or croſs, to plunder || provinces, the main
Theſe madmen ever hurt || the church or ſtate
How ſhall we fill || a library with wit
What better teach || a foreigner the tongue
Sure, if I ſpare || the miniſter, no rules
Of honour bind me, not to maul his tools.

On the other hand, when the paſſive ſubſtantive is by inverſion firſt named, there is no difficulty of interjecting a pauſe between it and the verb, more than when the active ſubſtantive is firſt named. The ſame reaſon holds in both, that though a verb cannot be ſeparated in idea from the ſubſtantive which governs it, and ſcarcely from the ſubſtantive it governs; yet a ſubſtantive may always be conceived independent of the verb: when the paſſive ſubſtantive is introduced before the verb, we know not that an action is to be exerted upon it; therefore we may reſt till the action commences. For the ſake of illuſtration take the following examples:

Shrines!

Shrines! where their vigils || pale-ey'd virgins keep
Soon as thy letters || trembling I uncloſe
No happier taſk || theſe faded eyes purſue.

What is ſaid about the pauſe, leads to a general obſervation, That the natural order of placing the active ſubſtantive and its verb, is more friendly to a pauſe than the inverted order; but that in all the other connections, inverſion affords a far better opportunity for a pauſe. And hence one great advantage of blank verſe over rhyme; its privilege of inverſion giving it a much greater choice of pauſes than can be had in the natural order of arrangement.

We now proceed to the ſlighter connections, which ſhall be diſcuſſed in one general article. Words connected by conjunctions and prepoſitions admit freely a pauſe between them, which will be clear from the following inſtances:

Aſſume what ſexes || and what ſhape they pleaſe
The light militia || of the lower ſky

Connecting particles were invented to unite in a period two ſubſtances ſignifying things occaſionally united in the thought, but which have no natural union: and between two things not only ſeparable in idea, but really diſtinct, the mind, for the

the ſake of melody, cheerfully admits by a pauſe a momentary disjunction of their occaſional union.

One capital branch of the ſubject is ſtill upon hand, to which I am directed by what is juſt now ſaid. It concerns thoſe parts of ſpeech which ſingly repreſent no idea, and which become not ſignificant till they be joined to other words. I mean conjunctions, prepoſitions, articles, and ſuch like acceſſories, paſſing under the name of *particles*. Upon theſe the queſtion occurs, Whether they can be ſeparated by a pauſe from the words that make them ſignificant? Whether, for example, in the following lines, the ſeparation of the acceſſory prepoſition from the principal ſubſtantive be according to rule?

The goddeſs with || a diſcontented air
And heighten'd by || the diamond's circling rays
When victims at || yon altar's foot we lay
So take it in || the very words of Creech
An enſign of || the delegates of Jove
Two ages o'er || his native realm he reign'd
While angels, with || their ſilver wings o'erſhade.

Or the ſeparation of the conjunction from the word that is connected by it with the antecedent word:

Talthybius and || Eurybates the good

It

It will be obvious at the firſt glance, that the foregoing reaſoning upon objects naturally connected, is not applicable to words which of themſelves are mere ciphers: we muſt therefore have recourſe to ſome other principle for ſolving the preſent queſtion. Theſe particles out of their place are totally inſignificant: to give them a meaning, they muſt be joined to certain words; and the neceſſity of this junction, together with cuſtom, forms an artificial connection that has a ſtrong influence upon the mind: it cannot bear even a momentary ſeparation, which deſtroys the ſenſe, and is at the ſame time contradictory to practice. Another circumſtance tends ſtill more to make this ſeparation diſagreeable in lines of the firſt and third order, that it bars the accent, which will be explained afterward, in treating of the accent.

Hitherto upon that pauſe only which divides the line. We proceed to the pauſe that concludes the line; and the queſtion is, Whether the ſame rules be applicable to both? This muſt be anſwered by making a diſtinction. In the firſt line of a couplet, the concluding pauſe differs little, if at all, from the pauſe that divides the line; and for that reaſon, the rules are applicable to both equally. The concluding pauſe of the couplet is in a different condition: it reſembles greatly the concluding pauſe in an Hexameter line. Both of them indeed are ſo remarkable, that they

never can be graceful, unleſs where they accompany a pauſe in the ſenſe. Hence it follows, that a couplet ought always to be finiſhed with ſome cloſe in the ſenſe; if not a point, at leaſt a comma. The truth is, that this rule is ſeldom tranſgreſſed. In Pope's works, I find very few deviations from the rule. Take the following inſtances:

> Nothing is foreign: parts relate to whole;
> One all-extending, all-preſerving ſoul
> Connects each being ——

Another:

> To draw freſh colours from the vernal flow'rs,
> To ſteal from rainbows ere they drop in ſhow'rs
> A brighter waſh ——

I add, with reſpect to pauſes in general, that ſuppoſing the connection to be ſo ſlender as to admit a pauſe, it follows not that a pauſe may in every ſuch caſe be admitted. There is one rule to which every other ought to bend, That the ſenſe muſt never be wounded or obſcured by the muſic; and upon that account I condemn the following lines:

> Ulyſſes, firſt || in public cares, ſhe found

And,

> Who riſing, high || th' imperial ſceptre rais'd.

With

With reſpect to inverſion, it appears, both from reaſon and experiments, that many words which cannot bear a ſeparation in their natural order, admit a pauſe when inverted. And it may be added, that when two words, or two members of a ſentence, in their natural order, can be ſeparated by a pauſe, ſuch ſeparation can never be amiſs in an inverted order. An inverted period, which deviates from the natural train of ideas, requires to be marked in ſome meaſure even by pauſes in the ſenſe, that the parts may be diſtinctly known. Take the following examples:

As with cold lips || I kiſs'd the ſacred veil
With other beauties || charm my partial eyes
Full in my view || ſet all the bright abode
With words like theſe || the troops Ulyſſes rul'd
Back to th' aſſembly roll || the thronging train
Not for their grief || the Grecian hoſt I blame.

The ſame where the ſeparation is made at the cloſe of the firſt line of the couplet:

For ſpirits, freed from mortal laws, with eaſe,
Aſſume what ſexes and what ſhapes they pleaſe.

The pauſe is tolerable even at the cloſe of the couplet, for the reaſon juſt now ſuggeſted, that inverted members require ſome ſlight pauſe in the ſenſe:

'Twas where the plane-tree ſpreads its ſhades around:
The altars heav'd; and from the crumbling ground
A mighty dragon ſhot.

Thus a train of reaſoning hath inſenſibly led us to concluſions with regard to the muſical pauſe, very different from thoſe in the firſt ſection, concerning the ſeparating by a circumſtance words intimately connected. One would conjecture, that where-ever words are ſeparable by interjecting a circumſtance, they ſhould be equally ſeparable by interjecting a pauſe: but, upon a more narrow inſpection, the appearance of analogy vaniſheth. This will be evident from conſidering, that a pauſe in the ſenſe diſtinguiſhes the different members of a period from each other; whereas, when two words of the ſame member are ſeparated by a circumſtance, all the three make ſtill but one member; and therefore that words may be ſeparated by an interjected circumſtance, tho' theſe words are not ſeparated by a pauſe in the ſenſe. This ſets the matter in a clear light; for, as obſerved above, a muſical pauſe is intimately connected with a pauſe in the ſenſe, and ought, as far as poſſible, to be governed by it: particularly a muſical pauſe ought never to be placed where a pauſe is excluded by the ſenſe; as, for example, between the adjective and following ſubſtantive, which make parts of the ſame idea; and ſtill leſs between a particle and the word that makes it ſignificant.

Abſtracting

Abſtracting at preſent from the peculiarity of melody ariſing from the different pauſes, it cannot fail to be obſerved in general, that they introduce into our verſe no ſlight degree of variety. A number of uniform lines having all the ſame pauſe, are extremely fatiguing; which is remarkable in French verſification. This imperfection will be diſcerned by a fine ear even in the ſhorteſt ſucceſſion, and becomes intolerable in a long poem. Pope excels in the variety of his melody; which, if different kinds can be compared, is indeed no leſs perfect than that of Virgil.

From what is laſt ſaid, there ought to be one exception. Uniformity in the members of a thought demands equal uniformity in the verbal members which expreſs that thought. When therefore reſembling objects or things are expreſſed in a plurality of verſe-lines, theſe lines in their ſtructure ought to be as uniform as poſſible; and the pauſes in particular ought all of them to have the ſame place. Take the following examples:

By foreign hands || thy dying eyes were clos'd,
By foreign hands || thy decent limbs compos'd,
By foreign hands || thy humble grave adorn'd.

Again:

Bright as the ſun || her eyes the gazers ſtrike;
And, like the ſun, || they ſhine on all alike.

Speaking of Nature, or the God of Nature;

Warms in the ſun || refreſhes in the breeze,
Glows in the ſtars || and bloſſoms in the trees;
Lives through all life || extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided || operates unſpent.

Pauſes will detain us longer than was foreſeen; for the ſubject is not yet exhauſted. It is laid down above, that Engliſh Heroic verſe admits no more but four capital pauſes; and that the capital pauſe of every line is determined by the ſenſe to be after the fourth, the fifth, the ſixth, or ſeventh ſyllable. That this doctrine holds true as far as melody alone is concerned, will be teſtified by every good ear. At the ſame time, I admit, that this rule may be varied where the ſenſe or expreſſion requires a variation, and that ſo far the melody may juſtly be ſacrificed. Examples accordingly are not unfrequent, in Milton eſpecially, of the capital pauſe being after the firſt, the ſecond, or the third ſyllable. And that this licence may be taken, even gracefully, when it adds vigour to the expreſſion, will be clear from the following example. Pope, in his tranſlation of Homer, deſcribes a rock broke off from a mountain, and hurling to the plain, in the following words:

From ſteep to ſteep the rolling ruin bounds;
At every ſhock the crackling wood reſounds;

Still

Still gath'ring force, it ſmokes; and urg'd amain,
Whirls, leaps, and thunders down, impetuous to the plain:
There ſtops || So Hector. Their whole force he prov'd,
Reſiſtleſs when he rag'd; and when he ſtopt, unmov'd.

In the penult line, the proper place of the muſical pauſe is at the end of the fifth ſyllable; but it enlivens the expreſſion by its coincidence with that of the ſenſe at the end of the ſecond ſyllable: the ſtopping ſhort before the uſual pauſe in the melody, aids the impreſſion that is made by the deſcription of the ſtone's ſtopping ſhort; and what is loſt to the melody by this artifice, is more than compenſated by the force that is added to the deſcription. Milton makes a happy uſe of this licence: witneſs the following examples from his *Paradiſe Loſt*.

——————Thus with the year
Seaſons return, but not to me returns
Day || or the ſweet approach of even or morn.

Celeſtial voices to the midnight-air
Sole || or reſponſive each to others note.

And over them triumphant Death his dart
Shook || but delay'd to ſtrike.

——————And wild uproar
Stood rul'd || ſtood vaſt infinitude confin'd.

——————And hard'ning in his ſtrength
Glories || for never ſince created man
Met ſuch embodied force.

From his ſlack hand the garland wreath'd for Eve
Down dropp'd || and all the faded roſes ſhed.

Of uneſſential night, receives him next,
Wide gaping || and with utter loſs of being,
Threatens him, &c.

——————For now the thought
Both of loſt happineſs and laſting pain
Torments him || round he throws his baleful eyes, &c.

If we conſider the foregoing paſſages with reſpect to melody ſingly, the pauſes are undoubtedly out of their proper place; but being united with thoſe of the ſenſe, they enforce the expreſſion, and enliven it greatly; for, as has been more than once obſerved, the beauty of expreſſion is communicated to the ſound, which, by a natural deception, makes even the melody appear more perfect than if the muſical pauſes were regular.

To explain the rules of accenting, two general obſervations muſt be premiſed. The firſt is, That accents have a double effect: they contribute to the melody, by giving it air and ſpirit: they contribute no leſs to the ſenſe, by diſtinguiſhing important words from others *. Theſe two effects never can be ſeparated, without impairing the

* An accent conſidered with reſpect to ſenſe is termed *emphaſis*.

concord

concord that ought to ſubſiſt between the thought and the melody: an accent, for example, placed on a low word, has the effect to burleſque it, by giving it an unnatural elevation; and the injury thus done to the ſenſe does not reſt there, for it ſeems alſo to injure the melody. Let us only reflect what a ridiculous figure a particle muſt make with an accent or emphaſis put upon it, a particle that of itſelf has no meaning, and that ſerves only, like cement, to unite words ſignificant. The other general obſervation is, That a word of whatever number of ſyllables, is not accented upon more than one of them. The reaſon is, that the object is ſet in its beſt light by a ſingle accent, ſo as to make more than one unneceſſary for the ſenſe: and if another be added, it muſt be for the ſound merely; which would be a tranſgreſſion of the foregoing rule, by ſeparating a muſical accent from that which is requiſite for the ſenſe.

Keeping in view the foregoing obſervations, the doctrine of accenting Engliſh Heroic verſe is extremely ſimple. In the firſt place, accenting is confined to the long ſyllables; for a ſhort ſyllable is not capable of an accent. In the next place, as the melody is enriched in proportion to the number of accents, every word that has a long ſyllable may be accented; unleſs the ſenſe interpoſe, which rejects the accenting a word that makes no figure by its ſignification. According to this rule,

a

a line may admit five accents; a caſe by no means rare.

But ſuppoſing every long ſyllable to be accented, there is, in every line, one accent that makes a greater figure than the reſt, being that which precedes the capital pauſe. It is diſtinguiſhed into two kinds; one that is immediately before the pauſe, and one that is divided from the pauſe by a ſhort ſyllable. The former belongs to lines of the firſt and third order; the latter to thoſe of the ſecond and fourth. Examples of the firſt kind:

Smooth flow the wâves || the zephyrs gently play,
Belinda ſmîl'd || and all the world was gay.

He rais'd his azure wând || and thus began.

Examples of the other kind:

There lay three gârters || half a pair of gloves,
And all the trôphies || of his former loves.

Our humble prôvince || is to tend the fair,
Not a leſs plêaſing || though leſs glorious care.

And hew triumphal ârches || to the ground.

Theſe accents make different impreſſions on the mind, which will be the ſubject of a following ſpeculation. In the mean time, it may be ſafely pronounced a capital defect in the compoſition of verſe, to put a low word, incapable of an accent, in

in the place where this accent ſhould be: this bars the accent altogether; than which I know no fault more ſubverſive of the melody, if it be not the barring a pauſe altogether. I may add affirmatively, that no ſingle circumſtance contributes more to the energy of verſe, than to put an important word where the accent ſhould be, a word that merits a peculiar emphaſis. To ſhow the bad effect of excluding the capital accent, I refer the reader to ſome inſtances given above *, where particles are ſeparated by a pauſe from the capital words that make them ſignificant; and which particles ought, for the ſake of melody, to be accented, were they capable of an accent. Add to theſe the following inſtances from the Eſſay on Criticiſm.

Of leaving what || is natural and fit

line 448.

Not yet purg'd off, || of ſpleen and ſour diſdain

l. 528.

No pardon vile || obſcenity ſhould find

l. 531.

When love was all || an eaſy monarch's care

l. 537.

For 'tis but half || a judge's taſk to know

l. 562.

'Tis

* Page 136.

'Tis not enough, || taſte, judgment, learning, join.
l. 563.

That only makes || ſuperior ſenſe belov'd
l. 578.

Whoſe right it is, || uncenſur'd, to be dull
l. 590.

'Tis beſt ſometimes || your cenſure to reſtrain.
l. 597.

When this fault is at the end of a line that cloſes a couplet, it leaves not the ſlighteſt trace of melody:

But of this frame the bearings, and the ties,
The ſtrong connections, nice dependencies.

In a line expreſſive of what is humble or dejected, it improves the reſemblance between the ſound and ſenſe to exclude the capital accent. This, to my taſte, is a beauty in the following lines.

In thêſe deep ſôlitudes || and awful cells
The pôor inhâbitant || behôlds in vain.

To conclude this article, the accents are not, like the ſyllables, confined to a certain number: ſome lines have no fewer than five, and there are lines that admit not above one. This variety, as we

we have ſeen, depends entirely on the different powers of the component words: particles, even where they are long by poſition, cannot be accented; and polyſyllables whatever ſpace they occupy, admit but one accent. Polyſyllables have another defect, that they generally exclude the full pauſe. It is ſhown above, that few polyſyllables can find place in the conſtruction of Engliſh verſe; and here are reaſons for excluding them, could they find place.

I am now ready to fulfil a promiſe concerning the four ſorts of lines that enter into Engliſh Heroic verſe. That theſe have, each of them, a peculiar melody diſtinguiſhable by a good ear, I ventured to ſuggeſt, and promiſed to account for: and tho' the ſubject is extremely delicate, I am not without hopes of making good my engagement. But firſt, by way of precaution, I warn the candid reader not to expect this peculiarity of modulation in every inſtance. The reaſon why it is not always perceptible has been mentioned more than once, that the thought and expreſſion have a great influence upon the melody; ſo great, as in many inſtances to make the pooreſt melody paſs for rich and ſpirited. This conſideration makes me inſiſt upon a conceſſion or two that will not be thought unreaſonable: firſt, That the experiment be tried upon lines equal with reſpect to the thought and expreſſion; for otherwiſe one may eaſily

eaſily be miſled in judging of the melody: and next, That theſe lines be regularly accented before the pauſe; for upon a matter abundantly refined in itſelf, I would not willingly be embarraſſed with faulty and irregular lines.

Theſe preliminaries adjuſted, I begin with ſome general obſervations, that will ſave repeating the ſame thing over and over upon every example. And, firſt, an accent ſucceeded by a pauſe, as in lines of the firſt and third order, makes a much greater figure than where the voice goes on without a ſtop. The fact is ſo certain, that no perſon who has an ear can be at a loſs to diſtinguiſh that accent from others. Nor have we far to ſeek for the efficient cauſe: the elevation of an accenting tone produceth in the mind a ſimilar elevation, which continues during the pauſe *; but where the pauſe is ſeparated from the accent by a ſhort ſyllable, as in lines of the ſecond and fourth order, the impreſſion made by the accent is more

ſlight

* Hence the livelineſs of the French language as to ſound, above the Engliſh; the laſt ſyllable in the former being generally long and accented, the long ſyllable in the latter being generally as far back in the word as poſſible, and often without an accent. For this difference I find no cauſe ſo probable as temperament and diſpoſition; the French being briſk and lively, the Engliſh ſedate and reſerved: and this, if it hold, is a pregnant inſtance of a reſemblance between the character of a people and that of their language.

ſlight when there is no ſtop, and the elevation of the accent is gone in a moment by the falling of the voice in pronouncing the ſhort ſyllable that follows. The pauſe alſo is ſenſibly affected by the poſition of the accent. In lines of the firſt and third order, the cloſe conjunction of the accent and pauſe, occaſions a ſudden ſtop without preparation, which rouſes the mind, and beſtows on the melody a ſpirited air. When, on the other hand, the pauſe is ſeparated from the accent by a ſhort ſyllable, which always happens in lines of the ſecond and fourth order, the pauſe is ſoft and gentle: for this ſhort unaccented ſyllable, ſucceeding one that is accented, muſt of courſe be pronounced with a falling voice, which naturally prepares for a pauſe; and the mind falls gently from the accented ſyllable, and ſlides into reſt as it were inſenſibly. Further, the lines themſelves derive different powers from the poſition of the pauſe, which will thus appear. A pauſe after the fourth ſyllable divides the line into two unequal portions, of which the larger comes laſt: this circumſtance reſolving the line into an aſcending ſeries, makes an impreſſion in pronouncing like that of aſcending; and to this impreſſion contribute the redoubled effort in pronouncing the larger portion, which is laſt in order. The mind has a different feeling when the pauſe ſucceeds the fifth ſyllable, which divides the line into two equal parts: theſe parts, pronounced with equal effort, are agreeable

by

by their uniformity. A line divided by a pauſe after the ſixth ſyllable, makes an impreſſion oppoſite to that firſt mentioned: being divided into two unequal portions, of which the ſhorter is laſt in order, it appears like a ſlow deſcending ſeries; and the ſecond portion being pronounced with leſs effort than the firſt, the diminiſhed effort prepares the mind for reſt. And this preparation for reſt is ſtill more ſenſibly felt where the pauſe is after the ſeventh ſyllable, as in lines of the fourth order.

To apply theſe obſervations is an eaſy taſk. A line of the firſt order is of all the moſt ſpirited and lively: the accent, being followed inſtantly by a pauſe, makes an illuſtrious figure: the elevated tone of the accent elevates the mind: the mind is ſupported in its elevation by the ſudden unprepared pauſe, which rouſes and animates: and the line itſelf, repreſenting by its unequal diviſion an aſcending ſeries, carries the mind ſtill higher, making an impreſſion ſimilar to that of going upward. The ſecond order has a modulation ſenſibly ſweet, ſoft, and flowing; the accent is not ſo ſprightly as in the former, becauſe a ſhort ſyllable intervenes between it and the pauſe: its elevation, by the ſame means, vaniſheth inſtantaneouſly: the mind, by a falling voice, is gently prepared for a ſtop: and the pleaſure of uniformity from the diviſion of the line into two equal parts, is calm and ſweet. The third order has a modulation not ſo eaſily expreſſed

preſſed in words: it in part reſembles the firſt order, by the livelineſs of an accent ſucceeded inſtantly by a full pauſe: but then the elevation occaſioned by this circumſtance, is balanced in ſome degree by the remitted effort in pronouncing the ſecond portion, which remitted effort has a tendency to reſt. Another circumſtance diſtinguiſheth it remarkably: its capital accent comes late, being placed on the ſixth ſyllable: and this circumſtance beſtows on it an air of gravity and ſolemnity. The laſt order reſembles the ſecond in the mildneſs of its accent, and ſoftneſs of its pauſe; it is ſtill more ſolemn than the third, by the lateneſs of its capital accent: it alſo poſſeſſes in a higher degree than the third, the tendency to reſt; and by that circumſtance is of all the beſt qualified for cloſing a period in the completeſt manner.

But theſe are not all the diſtinguiſhing characters of the different orders. Each order, alſo, is diſtinguiſhed by its final accent and pauſe: the unequal diviſion in the firſt order, makes an impreſſion of aſcending; and the mind at the cloſe is in the higheſt elevation, which naturally prompts it to put a ſtrong emphaſis upon the concluding ſyllable, whether by raiſing the voice to a ſharper tone, or by expreſſing the word in a fuller tone. This order accordingly is of all the leaſt proper for concluding a period, where a cadence is proper and not an accent. The ſecond order being deſtitute of the impreſſion of aſcent, cannot rival the

firſt order in the elevation of its concluding accent, nor conſequently in the dignity of its concluding pauſe; for theſe have a mutual influence. This order, however, with reſpect to its cloſe, maintains a ſuperiority over the third and fourth orders: in theſe the cloſe is more humble, being brought down by the impreſſion of deſcent, and by the remitted effort in pronouncing; conſiderably in the third order, and ſtill more conſiderably in the laſt. According to this deſcription, the concluding accents and pauſes of the four orders being reduced to a ſcale, will form a deſcending ſeries probably in an arithmetical progreſſion.

After what is ſaid, will it be thought refining too much to ſuggeſt, that the different orders are qualified for different purpoſes, and that a poet of genius will naturally be led to make a choice accordingly? I cannot think this altogether chimerical. As it appears to me, the firſt order is proper for a ſentiment that is bold, lively, or impetuous; the third order is proper for what is grave, ſolemn, or lofty; the ſecond for what is tender, delicate, or melancholy, and in general for all the ſympathetic emotions; and the laſt for ſubjects of the ſame kind, when tempered with any degree of ſolemnity. I do not contend, that any one order is fitted for no other taſk than that aſſigned it; for at that rate, no ſort of melody would be left for accompanying thoughts that have nothing peculiar in them. I only venture to ſuggeſt, and I do

do it with diffidence, that each of the orders is peculiarly adapted to certain ſubjects, and better qualified than the others for expreſſing them. The beſt way to judge is by experiment; and to avoid the imputation of a partial ſearch, I ſhall confine my inſtances to a ſingle poem, beginning with the

First order.

On her white breaſt, a ſparkling croſs ſhe wore,
Which Jews might kiſs, and infidels adore.
Her lively looks a ſprightly mind diſcloſe,
Quick as her eyes, and as unfix'd as thoſe:
Favours to none, to all ſhe ſmiles extends;
Oft ſhe rejects, but never once offends.
Bright as the ſun, her eyes the gazers ſtrike,
And, like the ſun, they ſhine on all alike.
Yet graceful eaſe, and ſweetneſs void of pride,
Might hide her faults, if belles had faults to hide;
If to her ſhare ſome female errors fall,
Look on her face, and you'll forget 'em all.

Rape of the Lock.

In accounting for the remarkable livelineſs of this paſſage, it will be acknowledged by every one who has an ear, that the melody muſt come in for a ſhare. The lines, all of them, are of the firſt order; a very unuſual circumſtance in the author of this poem, ſo eminent for variety in his verſification. Who can doubt, that he has been led by delicacy of taſte to employ the firſt order preferably to the others?

Second order.

Our humble province is to tend the fair,
Not a leſs pleaſing, though leſs glorious care;
To ſave the powder from too rude a gale,
Nor let th' impriſon'd eſſences exhale;
To draw freſh colours from the vernal flow'rs;
To ſteal from rainbows, ere they drop their ſhow'rs,
&c.

Again:

Oh, thoughtleſs mortals! ever blind to fate,
Too ſoon dejected, and too ſoon elate.
Sudden, theſe honours ſhall be ſnatch'd away,
And curs'd for ever this victorious day.

Third order.

To fifty choſen ſylphs, of ſpecial note,
We truſt th' important charge, the petticoat.

Again:

Oh ſay what ſtranger cauſe, yet unexplor'd,
Could make a gentle belle reject a lord?

A plurality of lines of the fourth order, would not have a good effect in ſucceſſion; becauſe, by a remarkable tendency to reſt, their proper office is to cloſe a period. The reader, therefore, muſt be ſatisfied with inſtances where this order is mixed with others.

Not

Not louder ſhrieks to pitying Heav'n are caſt,
When huſbands, or when lapdogs, breathe their laſt.

Again:

Steel could the works of mortal pride confound,
And hew triumphal arches to the ground.

Again:

She ſees, and trembles at th' approaching ill,
Juſt in the jaws of ruin, and codille.

Again:

With earneſt eyes, and round unthinking face,
He firſt the ſnuff-box open'd, then the caſe.

And this ſuggeſts another experiment, which is, to ſet the different orders more directly in oppoſition, by giving examples where they are mixed in the ſame paſſage.

Firſt and ſecond orders.

Sol through white curtains ſhot a tim'rous ray,
And ope'd thoſe eyes that muſt eclipſe the day.

Again:

Not youthful kings in battle ſeiz'd alive,
Not ſcornful virgins who their charms ſurvive,
Not ardent lovers robb'd of all their bliſs,
Not ancient ladies when refus'd a kiſs.

Not tyrants fierce that unrepenting die,
Not Cynthia when her mantua's pin'd awry,
E'er felt ſuch rage, reſentment, and deſpair,
As thou, ſad virgin! for thy raviſh'd hair.

First and third.

Think what an equipage thou haſt in air,
And view with ſcorn two pages and a chair.

Again:

What guards the purity of melting maids,
In courtly balls, and midnight maſquerades,
Safe from the treach'rous friend, the daring ſpark,
The glance by day, the whiſper in the dark?

Again:

With tender billet-doux he lights the pyre,
And breathes three am'rous ſighs to raiſe the fire;
Then proſtrate falls, and begs with ardent eyes,
Soon to obtain, and long poſſeſs the prize.

Again:

Jove's thunder roars, heav'n trembles all around,
Blue Neptune ſtorms, the bellowing deeps reſound,
Earth ſhakes her nodding tow'rs, the ground gives way,
And the pale ghoſts ſtart at the flaſh of day!

Second

Second and third.

> Sunk in Thaleſtris' arms, the nymph he found,
> Her eyes dejected, and her hair unbound.

Again:

> On her heav'd boſom hung her drooping head,
> Which with a ſigh ſhe raiſed; and thus ſhe ſaid.

Muſing on the foregoing ſubject, I begin to doubt whether all this while I have not been in a reverie, and whether the ſcene before me, full of objects new and ſingular, be not mere fairy-land. Is there any truth in the appearance, or is it wholly a work of imagination? We cannot doubt of its reality; and we may with aſſurance pronounce, that great is the merit of Engliſh Heroic verſe: for though uniformity prevails in the arrangement, in the equality of the lines, and in the reſemblance of the final ſounds; variety is ſtill more conſpicuous in the pauſes and in the accents, which are diverſified in a ſurpriſing manner. Of the beauty that reſults from a due mixture of uniformity and variety*, many inſtances have already occurred, but none more illuſtrious than Engliſh verſification; however rude it may be in the ſimplicity of its arrangement, it is highly melodious by its pauſes and accents, ſo as already to rival the

* See chap. 9.

moſt perfect ſpecies known in Greece or Rome; and it is no diſagreeable proſpect to find it ſuſceptible of ſtill greater refinement.

We proceed to blank verſe, which hath ſo many circumſtances in common with rhyme, that its peculiarities may be brought within a narrow compaſs. With reſpect to form, it differs from rhyme in rejecting the jingle of ſimilar ſounds, which purifies it from a childiſh pleaſure. But this improvement is a trifle compared with what follows. Our verſe is extremely cramped by rhyme; and the peculiar advantage of blank verſe is, that it is at liberty to attend the imagination in its boldeſt flights. Rhyme neceſſarily divides verſe into couplets; each couplet makes a complete muſical period, the parts of which are divided by pauſes, and the whole ſummed up by a full cloſe at the end: the melody begins anew with the next couplet: and in this manner a compoſition in rhyme proceeds couplet after couplet. I have often had occaſion to mention the correſpondence and concord that ought to ſubſiſt between ſound and ſenſe; from which it is a plain inference, that if a couplet be a complete period with regard to melody, it ought regularly to be the ſame with regard to ſenſe. As it is extremely difficult to ſupport ſuch ſtrictneſs of compoſition, licences are indulged, as explained above; which, however, muſt be uſed with diſcretion, ſo as to preſerve ſome degree of concord

concord between the ſenſe and the muſic: there ought never to be a full cloſe in the ſenſe but at the end of a couplet; and there ought always to be ſome pauſe in the ſenſe at the end of every couplet: the ſame period as to ſenſe may be extended through ſeveral couplets; but each couplet ought to contain a diſtinct member, diſtinguiſhed by a pauſe in the ſenſe as well as in the ſound; and the whole ought to be cloſed with a complete cadence *. Rules ſuch as theſe, muſt confine rhyme within very narrow bounds: a thought of any extent, cannot be reduced within its compaſs: the ſenſe muſt be curtailed and broken into parts, to make it ſquare with the curtneſs of the melody; and beſide, ſhort periods afford no latitude for inverſion.

I have examined this point with the ſtricter accuracy, in order to give a juſt notion of blank verſe; and to ſhow, that a ſlight difference in form may produce a great difference in ſubſtance. Blank verſe has the ſame pauſes and accents with rhyme, and a pauſe at the end of every line, like what concludes the firſt line of a couplet. In a word,

* This rule is quite neglected in French verſification. Even Boileau makes no difficulty, to cloſe one ſubject with the firſt line of a couplet, and to begin a new ſubject with the ſecond. Such licence, however ſanctified by practice, is unpleaſant by the diſcordance between the pauſes of the ſenſe and of the melody.

word, the rules of melody in blank verſe, are the ſame that obtain with reſpect to the firſt line of a couplet; but being diſengaged from rhyme, or from couplets, there is acceſs to make every line run into another, preciſely as to make the firſt line of a couplet run into the ſecond. There muſt be a muſical pauſe at the end of every line; but this pauſe is ſo ſlight as not to require a pauſe in the ſenſe: and accordingly the ſenſe may be carried on with or without pauſes, till a period of the utmoſt extent be completed by a full cloſe both in the ſenſe and the ſound: there is no reſtraint, other than that this full cloſe be at the end of a line; and this reſtraint is neceſſary, in order to preſerve a coincidence between ſenſe and ſound, which ought to be aimed at in general, and is indiſpenſable in the caſe of a full cloſe, becauſe it has a ſtriking effect. Hence the fitneſs of blank verſe for inverſion: and conſequently the luſtre of its pauſes and accents; for which, as obſerved above, there is greater ſcope in inverſion, than when words run in their natural order.

In the ſecond ſection of this chapter it is ſhown, that nothing contributes more than inverſion to the force and elevation of language: the couplets of rhyme confine inverſion within narrow limits; nor would the elevation of inverſion, were there acceſs for it in rhyme, readily accord with the humbler tone of that ſort of verſe. It is univerſally agreed, that the loftineſs of Milton's ſtyle ſupports

ſupports admirably the ſublimity of his ſubject; and it is not leſs certain, that the loftineſs of his ſtyle ariſes chiefly from inverſion. Shakeſpear deals little in inverſion; but his blank verſe being a ſort of meaſured proſe, is perfectly well adapted to the ſtage, where laboured inverſion is highly improper, becauſe in dialogue it never can be natural.

Hitherto I have conſidered that ſuperior power of expreſſion which verſe acquires by laying aſide rhyme. But this is not the only ground for preferring blank verſe: it has another preferable quality not leſs ſignal; and that is, a more extenſive and more complete melody. Its muſic is not, like that of rhyme, confined to a ſingle couplet; but takes in a great compaſs, ſo as in ſome meaſure to rival muſic properly ſo called. The interval between its cadences may be long or ſhort at pleaſure; and, by that means, its melody, with reſpect both to richneſs and variety, is ſuperior far to that of rhyme, and ſuperior even to that of the Greek and Latin Hexameter. Of this obſervation no perſon can doubt who is acquainted with the *Paradiſe Loſt:* in which work there are indeed many careleſs lines; but at every turn the richeſt melody as well as the ſublimeſt ſentiments are conſpicuous. Take the following ſpecimen.

Now Morn her roſy ſteps in th' eaſtern clime
Advancing, ſow'd the earth with orient pearl;

When

When Adam wak'd, ſo cuſtom'd, for his ſleep
Was aëry light from pure digeſtion bred
And temp'rate vapours bland, which th' only ſound
Of leaves and fuming rills, Aurora's fan,
Lightly diſpers'd, and the ſhrill matin ſong
Of birds on every bough; ſo much the more
His wonder was to find unwaken'd Eve
With treſſes diſcompos'd, and glowing cheek,
As through unquiet reſt: he on his ſide
Leaning half-rais'd, with looks of cordial love
Hung over her enamour'd, and beheld
Beauty, which, whether waking or aſleep,
Shot forth peculiar graces; then with voice
Mild, as when Zephyrus on Flora breathes,
Her hand ſoft touching, whiſper'd thus. Awake,
My faireſt, my eſpous'd, my lateſt found,
Heaven's laſt beſt gift, my ever-new delight,
Awake; the morning ſhines, and the freſh field
Calls us: we loſe the prime, to mark how ſpring
Our tended plants, how blows the citron grove,
What drops the myrrh, and what the balmy reed,
How nature paints her colours, how the bee
Sits on the bloom extracting liquid ſweet.

Book, 5. *l.* 1.

Comparing Latin Hexameter with Engliſh Heroic rhyme, the former has obviouſly the advantage in the following particulars. It is greatly preferable as to arrangement, by the latitude it admits in placing the long and ſhort ſyllables. Secondly, the length of an Hexameter line hath a majeſtic air: ours, by its ſhortneſs, is indeed more

more briſk and lively, but much leſs fitted for the ſublime. And, thirdly, the long high-ſounding words that Hexameter admits, add greatly to its majeſty. To compenſate theſe advantages, Engliſh rhyme poſſeſſes a greater number and greater variety both of pauſes and of accents. Theſe two ſorts of verſe ſtand indeed pretty much in oppoſition: in Hexameter, great variety of arrangement, none in the pauſes nor accents; in Engliſh rhyme, great variety in the pauſes and accents, very little in the arrangement.

In blank verſe are united, in a good meaſure, the ſeveral properties of Latin Hexameter and Engliſh rhyme; and it poſſeſſes beſide many ſignal properties of its own. It is not confined, like Hexameter, by a full cloſe at the end of every line; nor, like rhyme, by a full cloſe at the end of every couplet. Its conſtruction, which admits the lines to run into each other, gives it a ſtill greater majeſty than ariſes from the length of a Hexameter line. By the ſame means, it admits inverſion even beyond the Latin or Greek Hexameter; for theſe ſuffer ſome confinement by the regular cloſes at the end of every line. In its muſic it is illuſtrious above all: the melody of Hexameter verſe is circumſcribed to a line; and of Engliſh rhyme, to a couplet: the melody of blank verſe is under no confinement, but enjoys the utmoſt privilege, of which melody of verſe is ſuſceptible; which is, to run hand in hand with the

the ſenſe. In a word, blank verſe is ſuperior to Hexameter in many articles; and inferior to it in none, ſave in the freedom of arrangement, and in the uſe of long words.

In French Heroic verſe, there are found, on the contrary, all the defects of Latin Hexameter and Engliſh rhyme, without the beauties of either: ſubjected to the bondage of rhyme, and to the full cloſe at the end of every couplet, it is alſo extremely fatiguing by uniformity in its pauſes and accents: the line invariably is divided by the pauſe into two equal parts, and the accent is invariably placed before the pauſe.

Jeune et vaillant herôs || dont la haute ſageſſe
N'eſt point la fruit tardîf || d'une lente vieilleſſe.

Here every circumſtance contributes to a tireſome uniformity: a conſtant return of the ſame pauſe and of the ſame accent, as well as an equal diviſion of every line; which fatigue the ear without intermiſſion or change. I cannot ſet this matter in a better light, than by preſenting to the reader a French tranſlation of the following paſſage of Milton:

Two of far nobler ſhape, erect and tall,
Godlike erect, with native honour clad,
In naked majeſty, ſeem'd lords of all:
And worthy ſeem'd; for in their looks divine

The

The image of their glorious maker ſhone
Truth, wiſdom, ſanctitude ſevere and pure;
Severe, but in true filial freedom plac'd;
Whence true authority in men: though both
Not equal, as their ſex not equal ſeem'd;
For contemplation he and valour form'd,
For ſoftneſs ſhe and ſweet attractive grace;
He for God only, ſhe for God in him.

Were the pauſes of the ſenſe and ſound in this paſſage but a little better aſſorted, nothing in verſe could be more melodious. In general, the great defect of Milton's verſification, in other reſpects admirable, is the want of coincidence between the pauſes of the ſenſe and ſound.

The tranſlation is in the following words:

Ce lieux délicieux, ce paradis charmant,
Reçoit deux objets ſon plus bel ornement;
Leur port majeſtueux, et leur démarche altiere,
Semble leur meriter ſur la nature entiere
Ce droit de commander que Dieu leur a donné,
Sur leur auguſte front de gloire couronné.
Du ſouverain du ciël drille la reſemblance:
Dans leur ſimples regards éclatte l' innocence,
L'adorable candeur, l'aimable vérité,
La raiſon, la ſageſſe, et la sévérité,
Qu' adoucit la prudence, et cet air de droiture
Du viſage des rois reſpectable parure.
Ces deux objets divin n'ont pas les mêmes traits,
Ils paroiſſent formés, quoique tous deux parfaits;
L'un pour la majeſté, la force, et la nobleſſe;

L'autre

L'autre pour la douceur, la grace, et la tendreſſe ;
Celui-ci pour Dieu ſeul, l'autre pour l'homme encor.

Here the ſenſe is fairly tranſlated, the words are of equal power, and yet how inferior the melody!

Many attempts have been made to introduce Hexameter verſe into the living languages, but without ſucceſs. The Engliſh language, I am inclined to think, is not ſuſceptible of this melody: and my reaſons are theſe. Firſt, the polyſyllables in Latin and Greek are finely diverſified by long and ſhort ſyllables, a circumſtance that qualifies them for the melody of Hexameter verſe: ours are extremely ill qualified for that ſervice, becauſe they ſuperabound in ſhort ſyllables. Secondly, the bulk of our monoſyllables are arbitrary with regard to length, which is an unlucky circumſtance in Hexameter: for although cuſtom, as obſerved above, may render familiar a long or a ſhort pronunciation of the ſame word, yet the mind wavering between the two ſounds, cannot be ſo much affected with either, as with a word that hath always the ſame ſound; and for that reaſon, arbitrary ſounds are ill fitted for a melody which is chiefly ſupported by quantity. In Latin and Greek Hexameter, invariable ſounds direct and aſcertain the melody. Engliſh Hexameter would be deſtitute of melody, unleſs by artful pronunciation; becauſe of neceſſity the bulk of its ſounds muſt be arbitrary.

arbitrary. The pronunciation is eaſy in a ſimple movement of alternate long and ſhort ſyllables; but would be perplexing and unpleaſant in the diverſified movement of Hexameter verſe.

Rhyme makes ſo great a figure in modern poetry, as to deſerve a ſolemn trial. I have for that reaſon reſerved it to be examined with deliberation; in order to diſcover, if I can, its peculiar beauties, and its degree of merit. The firſt view of this ſubject leads naturally to the following reflection: "That rhyme having no relation to ſentiment, nor any effect upon the ear other than a mere jingle, ought to be baniſhed all compoſitions of any dignity, as affording but a trifling and childiſh pleaſure." It will alſo be obſerved, "That a jingle of words hath in ſome meaſure a ludicrous effect; witneſs the double rhymes of *Hudibras*, which contribute no ſmall ſhare to its drollery: that in a ſerious work this ludicrous effect would be equally remarkable, were it not obſcured by the prevailing gravity of the ſubject: that having however a conſtant tendency to give a ludicrous air to the compoſition, more than ordinary fire is requiſite to ſupport the dignity of the ſentiments againſt ſuch an undermining antagoniſt *."

* Voſſius, *De poematum cantu*, p. 26. ſays, "Nihil æque gravitati orationis afficit, quam in ſono ludere ſyllabarum."

Theſe arguments are ſpecious, and have undoubtedly ſome weight. Yet, on the other hand, it ought to be conſidered, that in modern tongues rhyme has become univerſal among men as well as children; and that it cannot have ſuch a currency without ſome foundation in human nature. In fact, it has been ſucceſsfully employ'd by poets of genius, in their ſerious and grave compoſitions, as well as in thoſe which are more light and airy. Here in weighing authority againſt argument, the ſcales ſeem to be upon a level; and therefore, to come at any thing deciſive, we muſt pierce a little deeper.

Muſic has great power over the ſoul; and may ſucceſsfully be employ'd to inflame or ſoothe paſſions, if not actually to raiſe them. A ſingle ſound, however ſweet, is not muſic; but a ſingle ſound repeated after intervals, may have the effect to rouſe attention, and to keep the hearer awake: and a variety of ſimilar ſounds, ſucceeding each other after regular intervals, muſt have a ſtill ſtronger effect. This conſideration is applicable to rhyme, which connects two verſe-lines by making them cloſe with two words ſimilar in ſound. And conſidering attentively the muſical effect of a couplet, we find, that it rouſes the mind, and produceth an emotion moderately gay without dignity or elevation: like the murmuring of a brook gliding through pebbles, it calms the mind when perturbed, and gently raiſes it when ſunk. Theſe effects are ſcarce perceived when the whole poem is

in

in rhyme; but are extremely remarkable by contraſt, in the couplets that cloſe the ſeveral acts of our later tragedies: the tone of the mind is ſenſibly varied by them, from anguiſh, diſtreſs, or melancholy, to ſome degree of eaſe and alacrity. For the truth of this obſervation, I appeal to the ſpeech of Jane Shore in the fourth act, when her doom was pronounced by Glo'ſter; to the ſpeech of Lady Jane Gray at the end of the firſt act; and to that of Caliſta, in the *Fair Penitent*, when ſhe leaves the ſtage, about the middle of the third act. The ſpeech of Alicia, at the cloſe of the fourth act of *Jane Shore*, puts the matter beyond doubt: in a ſcene of deep diſtreſs, the rhymes which finiſh the act, produce a certain gaiety and cheerfulneſs, far from according with the tone of the paſſion:

Alicia. For ever? Oh! For ever!
Oh! who can bear to be a wretch for ever!
My rival too! his laſt thoughts hung on her:
And, as he parted, left a bleſſing for her:
Shall ſhe be bleſs'd, and I be curs'd, for ever!
No; ſince her fatal beauty was the cauſe
Of all my ſuff'rings, let her ſhare my pains;
Let her, like me of ev'ry joy forlorn,
Devote the hour when ſuch a wretch was born:
Like me to deſerts and to darkneſs run,
Abhor the day, and curſe the golden ſun;
Caſt ev'ry good and ev'ry hope behind;
Deteſt the works of nature, loathe mankind:
Like me with cries diſtracted fill the air,
Tear her poor boſom, and her frantic hair,
And prove the torments of the laſt deſpair.

Having deſcribed, the beſt way I can, the impreſſion that rhyme makes on the mind; I proceed to examine whether there be any ſubjects to which rhyme is peculiarly adapted, and for what ſubjects it is improper. Grand and lofty ſubjects, which have a powerful influence, claim precedence in this inquiry. In the chapter of Grandeur and Sublimity it is eſtabliſhed, that a grand or ſublime object, inſpires a warm enthuſiaſtic emotion diſdaining ſtrict regularity and order; which emotion is very different from that inſpired by the moderately enlivening muſic of rhyme. Suppoſing then an elevated ſubject to be expreſſed in rhyme, what muſt be the effect? The intimate union of the muſic with the ſubject, produces an intimate union of their emotions? one inſpired by the ſubject, which tends to elevate and expand the mind; and one inſpired by the muſic, which, confining the mind within the narrow limits of regular cadence and ſimilar ſound, tends to prevent all elevation above its own pitch. Emotions ſo little concordant, cannot in union have a happy effect.

But it is ſcarce neceſſary to reaſon upon a caſe that never did, and probably never will happen, *viz.* an important ſubject clothed in rhyme, and yet ſupported in its utmoſt elevation. A happy thought or warm expreſſion, may at times give a ſudden bound upward; but it requires a genius greater than has hitherto exiſted, to ſupport a poem of any length in a tone elevated much above that

that of the melody. Taſſo and Arioſto ought not to be made exceptions, and ſtill leſs Voltaire. And after all, where the poet has the dead weight of rhyme conſtantly to ſtruggle with, how can we expect an uniform elevation in a high pitch; when ſuch elevation with all the ſupport it can receive from language, requires the utmoſt effort of the human genius?

But now, admitting rhyme to be an unfit dreſs for grand and lofty images; it has one advantage however, which is, to raiſe a low ſubject to its own degree of elevation. Addiſon * obſerves, "That rhyme, without any other aſſiſtance, "throws the language off from proſe, and very "often makes an indifferent phraſe paſs unregard-"ed; but where the verſe is not built upon "rhymes, there, pomp of ſound and energy of "expreſſion are indiſpenſably neceſſary, to ſup-"port the ſtyle, and keep it from falling into the "flatneſs of proſe." This effect of rhyme is remarkable in French verſe: which, being ſimple, and little qualified for inverſion, readily ſinks down to proſe where not artificially ſupported: rhyme is therefore indiſpenſable in French tragedy, and may be proper even in French comedy. Voltaire † aſſigns that very reaſon for adhering to

* Spectator, No. 285.

† Preface to his *OEdipus*, and in his diſcourſe upon tragedy, prefixed to the tragedy of *Brutus*.

rhyme in theſe compoſitions. He indeed candidly owns, that, even with the ſupport of rhyme, the tragedies of his country are little better than converſation-pieces; which ſeems to infer, that the French language is weak, and an improper dreſs for any grand ſubject. Voltaire was ſenſible of the imperfection; and yet Voltaire attempted an epic poem in that language.

The cheering and enlivening power of rhyme, is ſtill more remarkable in poems of ſhort lines, where the rhymes return upon the ear in a quick ſucceſſion; for which reaſon rhyme is perfectly well adapted to gay, light, and airy ſubjects. Witneſs the following:

O the pleaſing, pleaſing anguiſh,
When we love and when we languiſh!
Wiſhes riſing,
Thoughts ſurpriſing,
Pleaſure courting,
Charms tranſporting,
Fancy viewing,
Joys enſuing,
O the pleaſing, pleaſing anguiſh!

Roſamond, act. 1. *ſc.* 2.

For that reaſon, ſuch frequent rhymes are very improper for any ſevere or ſerious paſſion: the diſſonance between the ſubject and the melody is very ſenſibly felt. Witneſs the following:

Ardito

Ardito ti renda,
T'accenda
Di ſdegno
D'un figlio
Il periglio
D'un regno
L'amor.
E'dolce ad un'alma
Che aſpetta
Vendetta
Il perder la calma
Fra l'ire del cor.

Metaſtaſio. Artaſerſe, act. 3. ſc. 3.

Again:

Now under hanging mountains,
Beſide the fall of fountains,
Or where Hebrus wanders,
Rolling in meanders,
All alone,
Unheard, unknown,
He makes his moan,
And calls her ghoſt,
For ever, ever, ever loſt;
Now with furies ſurrounded,
Deſpairing, confounded,
He trembles, he glows,
Amidſt Rhodope's ſnows.

Pope, Ode for Muſic, l. 97.

Rhyme is not leſs unfit for anguiſh or deep diſtreſs, than for ſubjects elevated and lofty; and

for that reaſon has been long diſuſed in the Engliſh and Italian tragedy. In a work where the ſubject is ſerious though not elevated, rhyme has not a good effect; becauſe the airineſs of the melody agrees not with the gravity of the ſubject: the *Eſſay on Man*, which treats a ſubject great and important, would make a better figure in blank verſe. Sportive love, mirth, gaiety, humour, and ridicule, are the province of rhyme. The boundaries aſſigned it by nature, were extended in barbarous and illiterate ages; and in its uſurpations it has long been protected by cuſtom: but taſte in the fine arts, as well as in morals, improves daily; and makes a progreſs toward perfection, ſlow indeed but uniform; and there is no reaſon to doubt, that rhyme, in Britain, will in time be forc'd to abandon its unjuſt conqueſts, and to confine itſelf within its natural limits.

Having ſaid what occurred upon rhyme, I cloſe the ſection with a general obſervation, That the melody of verſe ſo powerfully enchants the mind, as to draw a veil over very groſs faults and imperfections. Of this power a ſtronger example cannot be given than the epiſode of Ariſtæus, which cloſes the fourth book of the *Georgics*. To renew a ſtock of bees when the former is loſt, Virgil aſſerts, that they may be produced in the entrails of a bullock, ſlain and managed in a certain manner. This leads him to ſay, how this ſtrange receit

receit was invented; which is as follows. Ariſtæus having loſt his bees by diſeaſe and famine, never dreams of employing the ordinary means for obtaining a new ſtock; but, like a froward child, complains heavily to his mother Cyrene, a water-nymph. She adviſes him to conſult Proteus, a ſea-god, not how he was to obtain a new ſtock, but only by what fatality he had loſt his former ſtock; adding, that violence was neceſſary, becauſe Proteus would ſay nothing voluntarily. Ariſtæus, ſatisfied with this advice, though it gave him no proſpect of repairing his loſs, proceeds to execution. Proteus is caught ſleeping, bound with cords, and compelled to ſpeak. He declares, that Ariſtæus was puniſhed with the loſs of his bees, for attempting the chaſtity of Euridice the wife of Orpheus; ſhe having been ſtung to death by a ſerpent in flying his embraces. Proteus, whoſe ſullenneſs ought to have been converted into wrath by the rough treatment he met with, becomes on a ſudden courteous and communicative. He gives the whole hiſtory of the expedition to hell which Orpheus undertook in order to recover his ſpouſe: a very entertaining ſtory, but without the leaſt relation to what was in view. Ariſtæus, returning to his mother, is adviſed to deprecate by ſacrifices the wrath of Orpheus, who was now dead. A bullock is ſacrificed, and out of the entrails ſpring miraculouſly a ſwarm of bees. Does it follow, that the ſame may be obtained without a miracle, as is ſuppoſed in the receit?

A LIST of the different FEET, and of their NAMES.

1. PYRRHICHIUS, consists of two short syllables. Examples: *Deus, given, cannot, billock, running.*

2. SPONDEUS, consists of two long syllables: *omnes, possess, forewarn, mankind, sometime.*

3. IAMBUS, composed of a short and a long: *pios, intent, degree, appear, consent, repent, demand, report, suspect, affront, event.*

4. TROCHAEUS, or CHOREUS, a long and short: *fervat, whereby, after, legal, measure, burden, holy, lofty.*

5. TRIBRACHYS, three short,: *melius, property.*

6. MOLOSSUS, three long: *delectant.*

7. ANAPAESTUS, two short and a long: *animos, condescend, apprehend, overheard, acquiesce, immature, overcharge, serenade, opportune.*

8. DACTYLUS,

8. Dactylus, a long and two ſhort: *carmina, evident, excellence, eſtimate, wonderful, altitude, burdened, miniſter, tenement.*

9. Bacchius, a ſhort and two long: *dolores.*

10. Hyppobacchius or Antibacchius, two long and a ſhort: *pelluntur.*

11. Creticus, or Amphimacer, a ſhort ſyllable between two long: *inſito, afternoon.*

12. Amphibrachys, a long ſyllable between two ſhort: *honore, conſider, imprudent, procedure, attended, propoſed, reſpondent, concurrence, apprentice, reſpective, revenue.*

13. Proceleusmaticus, four ſhort ſyllables: *hominibus, neceſſary.*

14. Dispondeus, four long ſyllables: *infinitis.*

15. Diiambus, compoſed of two Iambi: *ſeveritas.*

16. Ditrochaeus, of two Trochæi: *permanere, procurator.*

17. Ionicus,

17. Ionicus, two ſhort ſyllables and two long: *properabant.*

18. Another foot paſſes under the ſame name, compoſed of two long ſyllables and two ſhort: *calcaribus, poſſeſſory.*

19. Choriambus, two ſhort ſyllables between two long: *nobilitas.*

20. Antispastus, two long ſyllables between two ſhort: *Alexander.*

21. Paeon 1ſt, one long ſyllable and three ſhort: *temporibus, ordinary, inventory, temperament.*

22. Paeon 2d, the ſecond ſyllable long, and the other three ſhort: *rapidity, ſolemnity, minority, conſidered, imprudently, extravagant, reſpectfully, accordingly.*

23. Paeon 3d, the third ſyllable long and the other three ſhort: *animatus, independent, condeſcendence, ſacerdotal, reimburſement, manufacture.*

24. Paeon 4th, the laſt ſyllable long and the other three ſhort: *celeritas.*

25. Epitritus

25. EPITRITUS 1ſt, the firſt ſyllable ſhort and the other three long: *voluptates.*

26. EPITRITUS 2d, the ſecond ſyllable ſhort and the other three long: *pœnitentes.*

27. EPITRITUS 3d, the third ſyllable ſhort and the other three long: *diſcordias.*

28. EPITRITUS 4th, the laſt ſyllable ſhort and the other three long: *fortunatus.*

29. A word of five ſyllables compoſed of a Pyrrhichius and Dactylus: *miniſterial.*

30. A word of five ſyllables compoſed of a Trochæus and Dactylus: *ſingularity.*

31. A word of five ſyllables compoſed of a Dactylus and Trochæus: *precipitation, examination.*

32. A word of five ſyllables, the ſecond only long: *ſignificancy.*

33. A word of ſix ſyllables compoſed of two Dactyles: *impetuoſity.*

34. A word of ſix ſyllables compoſed of a Tribrachys and Dactyle: *puſillanimity.*

N. B.

N. B. Every word may be conſidered as a proſe foot, becauſe every word is diſtinguiſhed by a pauſe; and every foot in verſe may be conſidered as a verſe word, compoſed of ſyllables pronounced at once without a pauſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

COMPARISONS.

COMPARISONS, as obſerved above *, ſerve two purpoſes: when addreſſed to the underſtanding, their purpoſe is to inſtruct; when to the heart, their purpoſe is to pleaſe. Various means contribute to the latter; firſt, the ſuggeſting ſome unuſual reſemblance or contraſt; ſecond, the ſetting an object in the ſtrongeſt light; third, the aſſociating an object with others that are agreeable; fourth, the elevating an object; and, fifth, the depreſſing it. And that compariſons may give pleaſure by theſe various means, appears from what is ſaid in the chapter above cited; and will be made ſtill more evident by examples, which ſhall be given after premiſing ſome general obſervations.

Objects of different ſenſes cannot be compared together; for ſuch objects, being entirely ſeparated from each other, have no circumſtance in common to admit either reſemblance or contraſt. Objects of hearing may be compared together, as alſo of taſte, of ſmell, and of touch: but the chief fund of

* Chap. 8.

of compariſon are objects of ſight; becauſe, in writing or ſpeaking, things can only be compared in idea, and the ideas of ſight are more diſtinct and lively than thoſe of any other ſenſe.

When a nation emerging out of barbarity begins to think of the fine arts, the beauties of language cannot long lie concealed; and when diſcovered, they are generally, by the force of novelty, carried beyond moderation. Thus, in the early poems of every nation, we find metaphors and ſimiles founded on ſlight and diſtant reſemblances, which, loſing their grace with their novelty, wear gradually out of repute; and now, by the improvement of taſte, none but correct metaphors and ſimiles are admitted into any polite compoſition. To illuſtrate this obſervation, a ſpecimen ſhall be given afterward of ſuch metaphors as I have been deſcribing; with reſpect to ſimiles, take the following ſpecimen.

Behold, thou art fair, my love: thy hair is as a flock of goats that appear from Mount Gilead: thy teeth are like a flock of ſheep from the waſhing, every one bearing twins: thy lips are like a thread of ſcarlet: thy neck like the tower of David built for an armoury, whereon hang a thouſand ſhields of mighty men: thy two breaſts like two young roes that are twins, which feed among the lilies: thy eyes like the fiſh-pools in Heſhbon, by the gate of Bath-rabbim: thy noſe like the tower of Lebanon, looking toward Damaſcus.

Song of Solomon.

Thou

Thou art like ſnow on the heath; thy hair like the miſt of Cromla, when it curls on the rocks and ſhines to the beam of the weſt; thy breaſts are like two ſmooth rocks ſeen from Branno of the ſtreams; thy arms like two white pillars in the hall of the mighty Fingal.

Fingal.

It has no good effect to compare things by way of ſimile that are of the ſame kind; nor to compare by contraſt things of different kinds. The reaſon is given in the chapter quoted above; and the reaſon ſhall be illuſtrated by examples. The firſt is a compariſon built upon a reſemblance ſo obvious as to make little or no impreſſion.

This juſt rebuke inflam'd the Lycian crew,
They join, they thicken, and th' aſſault renew:
Unmov'd th' embody'd Greeks their fury dare,
And fix'd ſupport the weight of all the war;
Nor could the Greeks repel the Lycian pow'rs,
Nor the bold Lycians force the Grecian towr's.
As on the confines of adjoining grounds,
Two ſtubborn ſwains with blows diſpute their bounds;
They tug, they ſweat; but neither gain, nor yield,
One foot, one inch, of the contended field:
Thus obſtinate to death, they fight, they fall;
Nor theſe can keep, nor thoſe can win the wall.

Iliad. xii. 505.

Another, from Milton, lies open to the ſame objection. Speaking of the fallen angels ſearching for mines of gold.

A numerous brigade haſten'd: as when bands
Of pioneers with ſpade and pick-ax arm'd,
Forerun the royal camp to trench a field
Or caſt a rampart.

The next ſhall be of things contraſted that are of different kinds.

Queen. What, is my Richard both in ſhape and mind
Transform'd and weak? Hath Bolingbroke depos'd
Thine intellect? Hath he been in thy heart!
The lion thruſteth forth his paw,
And wounds the earth, if nothing elſe, with rage
To be o'erpower'd: and wilt thou, pupil-like,
Take thy correction mildly, kiſs the rod,
And fawn on rage with baſe humility?

Richard II. *act* 5. *ſc.* 1.

This compariſon has ſcarce any force: a man and a lion are of different ſpecies, and therefore are proper ſubjects for a ſimile; but there is no ſuch reſemblance between them in general, as to produce any ſtrong effect by contraſting particular attributes or circumſtances.

A third general obſervation is, That abſtract terms can never be the ſubject of compariſon, otherwiſe than by being perſonified. Shakeſpear compares adverſity to a toad, and ſlander to the bite of a crocodile; but in ſuch compariſons theſe abſtract terms muſt be imagined ſenſible beings.

To have a juſt notion of compariſons, they muſt

muſt be diſtinguiſhed into two kinds; one common and familiar, as where a man is compared to a lion in courage, or to a horſe in ſpeed; the other more diſtant and refined, where two things that have in themſelves no reſemblance or oppoſition, are compared with reſpect to their effects. This ſort of compariſon is occaſionally explained above *; and for further explanation take what follows. There is no reſemblance between a flower-pot and a cheerful ſong; and yet they may be compared with reſpect to their effects, the emotions they produce being ſimilar. There is as little reſemblance between fraternal concord and precious ointment; and yet obſerve how ſucceſsfully they are compared with reſpect to the impreſſions they make.

Behold how good and how pleaſant it is for brethern to dwell together in unity. It is like the precious ointment upon the head, that ran down upon Aaron's beard, and deſcended to the ſkirts of his garment.

Pſalm 133.

For illuſtrating this ſort of compariſon, I add ſome more examples:

Delightful is thy preſence, O Fingal! it is like the ſun on Cromla, when the hunter mourns his abſence for a ſeaſon, and ſees him between the clouds.

Did not Oſſian hear a voice? or is it the ſound of

* P. 86.

days that are no more? Often, like the evening-ſun, comes the memory of former times on my ſoul.

His countenance is ſettled from war; and is calm as the evening-beam, that from the cloud of the weſt looks on Cona's ſilent vale.

Sorrow, like a cloud on the ſun, ſhades the ſoul of Cleſſammor.

The muſic was like the memory of joys that are paſt, pleaſant and mournful to the ſoul.

Pleaſant are the words of the ſong, ſaid Cuchullin, and lovely are the tales of other times. They are like the calm due of the morning on the hill of roes, when the ſun is faint on its ſide, and the lake is ſettled and blue in the vale.

Theſe quotations are from the poems of Oſſian, who abounds with compariſons of this delicate kind, and appears ſingularly happy in them *.

I proceed to illuſtrate by particular inſtances the different means by which compariſons, whether of the one ſort or the other, can afford pleaſure; and, in the order above eſtabliſhed, I begin with ſuch inſtances as are agreeable, by ſuggeſting ſome unuſual reſemblance or contraſt:

* The nature and merit of Oſſian's compariſons is fully illuſtrated, in a diſſertation on the poems of that Author, by Dr Blair, profeſſor of rhetoric in the college of Edinburgh; a delicious morſel of criticiſm.

Sweet

Sweet are the uſes of Adverſity,
Which like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in her head.

As you like it, act 2. ſc. 1.

Gardiner. Bolingbroke hath ſeized the waſteful King.
What pity is't that he had not ſo trimm'd
And dreſs'd his land, as we this garden dreſs,
And wound the bark, the ſkin of our fruit-trees;
Leſt, being over proud with ſap and blood,
With too much riches it confound itſelf.
Had he done ſo to great and growing men,
They might have liv'd to bear, and he to taſte
Their fruits of duty. All ſuperfluous branches
We lop away, that bearing boughs may live:
Had he done ſo, himſelf had borne the crown,
Which waſte and idle hours have quite thrown down.

Richard II. act 3. ſc. 7.

See, how the Morning opes her golden gates,
And takes her farewell of the glorious Sun;
How well reſembles it the prime of youth,
Trimm'd like a younker prancing to his love!

Second part Henry VI. act 2. ſc. 1.

Brutus. O Caſſius you are yoked with a lamb,
That carries anger as the flint bears fire:
Who, much enforced, ſhows a haſty ſpark,
And ſtraight is cold again.

Julius Cæſar, act 4. ſc. 3.

Thus they their doubtful conſultations dark
Ended, rejoicing in their matchleſs chief:
As when from mountain-tops, the duſky clouds
Aſcending, while the North-wind ſleeps, o'erſpread

Heav'n's cheerful face, the lowring element
Scowls o'er the darken'd landſcape, ſnow and ſhow'r;
If chance the radiant ſun with farewell ſweet
Extends his ev'ning-beam, the fields revive,
The birds their notes renew, and bleating herds
Atteſt their joy, that hill and valley rings.

Paradiſe Loſt, b. 2.

As the bright ſtars, and milky way,
Show'd by the night, are hid by day:
So we in that accompliſh'd mind,
Help'd by the night new graces find,
Which by the ſplendor of her view,
Dazzled before, we never knew.

Waller.

The laſt exertion of courage compared to the blaze of a lamp before extinguiſhing, *Taſſo Gieruſalem, canto* 19. *ſt.* 22.

None of the foregoing ſimiles, as they appear to me, tend to illuſtrate the principal ſubject: and therefore the pleaſure they afford muſt ariſe from ſuggeſting reſemblances that are not obvious: I mean the chief pleaſure; for undoubtedly a beautiful ſubject introduced to form the ſimile affords a ſeparate pleaſure, which is felt in the ſimiles mentioned, particularly in that cited from Milton.

The next effect of a compariſon in the order mentioned, is to place an object in a ſtrong point of

of view; which effect is remarkable in the following ſimiles:

As when two ſcales are charg'd with doubtful loads,
From ſide to ſide the trembling balance nods,
(While ſome laborious matron, juſt and poor,
With nice exactneſs weighs her woolly ſtore),
Till pois'd aloft, the reſting beam ſuſpends
Each equal weight; nor this nor that deſcends:
So ſtood the war, till Hector's matchleſs might,
With fates prevailing, turn'd the ſcale of fight.
Fierce as a whirlwind up the wall he flies,
And fires his hoſt with loud repeated cries.

Iliad, b. xii. 521.

Ut flos in ſeptis ſecretis naſcitur hortis,
Ignotus pecori, nullo contuſus aratro,
Quem mulcent auræ, firmat ſol, educat imber,
Multi illum pueri, multæ cupiere puellæ;
Idem, cum tenui carptus defloruit ungui,
Nulli illum pueri, nullæ cupiêre puellæ:
Sic virgo, dum intacta manet, dum cara ſuis; ſed
Cum caſtum amiſit, polluto corpore, florem,
Nec pueris jucunda manet, nec cara puellis.

Catullus.

The imitation of this beautiful ſimile by *Arioſto*, *canto* 1. *ſt.* 42. falls ſhort of the original. It is alſo in part imitated by Pope*.

Lucetta. I do not ſeek to quench your love's hot fire,
But qualify the fire's extreme rage,

* Dunciad, b. 4. l. 405.

Leſt it ſhould burn above the bounds of reaſon.

Julia. The more thou damm'ſt it up, the more it burns:

The current, that with gentle murmur glides,
Thou know'ſt, being ſtopp'd, impatiently doth rage;
But when his fair courſe is not hindered,
He makes ſweet muſic with th' enamel'd ſtones,
Giving a gentle kiſs to every ſedge
He overtaketh in his pilgrimage:
And ſo by many winding nooks he ſtrays
With willing ſport, to the wild ocean.
Then let me go, and hinder not my courſe:
I'll be as patient as a gentle ſtream,
And make a paſtime of each weary ſtep,
Till the laſt ſtep have brought me to my love;
And there I'll reſt, as, after much turmoil,
A bleſſed ſoul doth in Elyſium.

Two Gentlemen of Verona, act 2. *ſc.* 10.

——— She never told her love;
But let concealment, like a worm i' the bud,
Feed on her damaſk cheek: ſhe pin'd in thought;
And with a green and yellow melancholy,
She ſat like Patience on a monument,
Smiling at Grief.

Twelfth-Night, act 2. *ſc.* 6.

York. Then, as I ſaid, the Duke, great Bolingbroke,
Mounted upon a hot and fiery ſteed,
Which his aſpiring rider ſeem'd to know,
With ſlow but ſtately pace, kept on his courſe:
While all tongues cry'd, God ſave thee, Bolingbroke.

Ducheſs. Alas! poor Richard, where rides he the while!

York,

York. As in a theatre, the eyes of men,
After a well-grac'd actor leaves the ſtage,
Are idly bent on him that enters next,
Thinking his prattle to be tedious:
Even ſo, or with much more contempt, mens eyes
Did ſcowl on Richard; no man cry'd, God ſave him!
No joyful tongue gave him his welcome home;
But duſt was thrown upon his ſacred head:
Which with ſuch gentle ſorrow he ſhook off,
His face ſtill combating with tears and ſmiles,
The badges of his grief and patience;
That had not God, for ſome ſtrong purpoſe, ſteel'd
The hearts of men, they muſt perforce have melted,
And barbariſm itſelf have pitied him.

Richard II. *act* 5. *ſc.* 3.

Northumberland. How doth my ſon and brother?
Thou trembleſt, and the whiteneſs in thy cheek
Is apter than thy tongue to tell thy errand.
Even ſuch a man, ſo faint, ſo ſpiritleſs,
So dull, ſo dead in look, ſo wo-be-gone,
Drew Priam's curtain in the dead of night,
And would have told him, half his Troy was burn'd;
But Priam found the fire, ere he his tongue:
And I my Piercy's death, ere thou report'ſt it.

Second part, Henry IV. *act* 1. *ſc.* 3.

Why, then I do but dream on ſov'reignty,
Like one that ſtands upon a promontory,
And ſpies a far-off ſhore where he would tread,
Wiſhing his foot were equal with his eye,
And chides the ſea that ſunders him from thence,
Saying, he'll lave it dry to have his way:
So do I wiſh, the crown being ſo far off,

And

And ſo I chide the means that keep me from it,
And ſo (I ſay) I'll cut the cauſes off,
Flatt'ring my mind with things impoſſible.

Third part, Henay VI. *act* 3. *ſc.* 3.

——————— Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking ſhadow, a poor player,
That ſtruts and frets his hour upon the ſtage,
And then is heard no more.

Macbeath, act 5. *ſc.* 5.

O thou Goddeſs,
Thou divine Nature! how thyſelf thou blazon'ſt
In theſe two princely boys! they are as gentle
As zephyrs blowing below the violet,
Not wagging his ſweet head; and yet as rough,
(Their royal blood inchaf'd) as the rudeſt wind,
That by the top doth take the mountain pine,
And make him ſtoop to th' vale.

Cymbeline, act 4. *ſc.* 4.

Why did not I paſs away in ſecret, like the flower of the rock that lifts its fair head unſeen, and ſtrows its withered leaves on the blaſt?

Fingal.

There is a joy in grief when peace dwells with the ſorrowful. But they are waſted with mourning O daughter of Toſcar, and their days are few. They fall away like the flower on which the ſun looks in his ſtrength, after the mildew has paſſed over it, and its head is heavy with the drops of night.

Fingal.

The

The ſight obtained of the city of Jeruſalem by the Chriſtian army, compared to that of land diſcovered after a long voyage, Taſſo's *Gieruſalem, canto* 3. *ſt.* 4. The fury of Rinaldo ſubſiding when not oppoſed, to that of wind or water when it has a free paſſage, *canto* 20. *ſt.* 58.

As words convey but a faint and obſcure notion of great numbers, a poet, to give a lively notion of the object he deſcribes with regard to number, does well to compare it to what is familiar and commonly known. Thus Homer * compares the Grecian army in point of number to a ſwarm of bees: in another paſſage † he compares it to that profuſion of leaves and flowers which appear in the ſpring, or of inſects in a ſummer's evening; and Milton,

——————— As when the potent rod
Of Amram's ſon, in Egypt's evil day,
Wav'd round the coaſt, up call'd a pitchy cloud
Of locuſts, warping on the eaſtern wind,
That o'er the realm of impious Pharaoh hung
Like night, and darkened all the land of Nile:
So numberleſs were thoſe bad angels ſeen,
Hovering on wing under the cope of hell,
'Twixt upper, nether, and ſurrounding fires.

Paradiſe Loſt, b. 1.

Such compariſons have, by ſome writers ‡, been

* Book 2. l. 111. † Book 2. l. 551.
‡ See Vidæ Poetic. lib. 2. l. 282.

condemned

condemned for the lowneſs of the images introduced: but ſurely without reaſon; for, with regard to numbers, they put the principal ſubject in a ſtrong light.

The foregoing compariſons operate by reſemblance; others have the ſame effect by contraſt.

York. I am the laſt of Noble Edward's ſons,
Of whom thy father, Prince of Wales, was firſt;
In war, was never lion rag'd more fierce;
In peace, was never gentle lamb more mild;
Than was that young and princely gentleman.
His face thou haſt, for even ſo look'd he,
Accompliſh'd with the number of thy hours.
But when he frown'd it was againſt the French,
And not againſt his friends. His noble hand
Did win what he did ſpend; and ſpent not that
Which his triumphant father's hand had won.
His hands were guilty of no kindred's blood,
But bloody with the enemies of his kin.
Oh, Richard! York is too far gone with grief,
Or elſe he never would compare between.

Richard II. *act* 2. *ſc.* 3.

Milton has a peculiar talent in embelliſhing the principal ſubject by aſſociating it with others that are agreeable; which is the third end of a compariſon. Similes of this kind have, beſide, a ſeparate effect: they diverſify the narration by new images that are not ſtrictly neceſſary to the compariſon: they are ſhort epiſodes, which, without drawing

drawing us from the principal ſubject, afford great delight by their beauty and variety:

He ſcarce had ceas'd, when the ſuperior fiend
Was moving toward the ſhore; his pond'rous ſhield,
Ethereal temper, maſſy, large, and round,
Behind him caſt; the broad circumference
Hung on his ſhoulders like the moon, whoſe orb
Through optic glaſs the Tuſcan artiſt views
At ev'ning from the top of Feſole,
Or in Valdarno, to deſcry new lands,
Rivers, or mountains, in her ſpotty globe.

Milton, b. 1.

——— Thus far theſe, beyond
Compare of mortal proweſs, yet obſerv'd
Their dread commander. He, above the reſt
In ſhape and geſture proudly eminent,
Stood like a tow'r; his form had yet not loſt
All her original brightneſs, nor appear'd
Leſs than archangel ruin'd, and th' exceſs
Of glory obſcur'd: as when the ſun new-riſen
Looks through the horizontal miſty air
Shorn of his beams; or from behind the moon
In dim eclipſe, diſaſtrous twilight ſheds
On half the nations, and with fear of change
Perplexes monarchs.

Milton, b. 1.

As when a vulture on Imaus bred,
Whoſe ſnowy ridge the roving Tartar bounds,
Diſlodging from a region ſcarce of prey
To gorge the fleſh of lambs, or yeanling kids,
On hills where flocks are fed, flies toward the ſprings

Of

Of Ganges or Hydaſpes, Indian ſtreams,
But in his way lights on the barren plains
Of Sericana, where Chineſes drive
With ſails and wind their cany waggons light:
So on this windy ſea of land, the fiend
Wak'd up and down alone, bent on his prey.

Milton, b. 3.

——— Yet higher than their tops
The verdurous wall of paradiſe up ſprung:
Which to our general ſire gave proſpect large
Into this nether empire neighbouring round.
And higher than that wall, a circling row
Of goodlieſt trees loaden with faireſt fruit,
Bloſſoms and fruits at once of golden hue,
Appear'd, with gay enamel'd colours mix'd,
On which the ſun more glad impreſs'd his beams
Than in fair evening cloud, or humid bow,
When God had ſhow'r'd the earth; ſo lovely ſeem'd
That landſcape: and of pure now purer air
Meets his approach, and to the heart inſpires
Vernal delight and joy, able to drive
All ſadneſs but deſpair: now gentle gales
Fanning their odoriferous wings diſpenſe
Native perfumes, and whiſper whence they ſtole
Thoſe balmy ſpoils. As when to them who ſail
Beyond the Cape of Hope, and now are paſt
Mozambic, off at ſea north-eaſt winds blow
Sabean odour from the ſpicy ſhore
Of Araby the Bleſt; with ſuch delay
Well-pleas'd they ſlack their courſe, and many a league
Cheer'd with the grateful ſmell, old Ocean ſmiles.

Milton, b. 4.

With

With regard to ſimiles of this kind, it will readily occur to the reader, that when a reſembling ſubject is once properly introduced in a ſimile, the mind is tranſitorily amuſed with the new object, and is not diſſatisfied with the ſlight interruption. Thus, in fine weather, the momentary excurſions of a traveller for agreeable proſpects or elegant buildings, cheer his mind, relieve him from the languor of uniformity, and without much lengthening his journey, in reality, ſhorten it greatly in appearance.

Next of compariſons that aggrandize or elevate. Theſe affect us more than any other ſort: the reaſon of which may be gathered from the chapter of Grandeur and Sublimity; and, without reaſoning, will be evident from the following inſtances:

As when a flame the winding valley fills,
And runs on crackling ſhrubs between the hills,
Then o'er the ſtubble, up the mountain flies,
Fires the high woods, and blazes to the ſkies,
This way and that, the ſpreading torrent roars;
So ſweeps the hero through the waſted ſhores.
Around him wide, immenſe deſtruction pours,
And earth is delug'd with the ſanguine ſhow'rs.

Iliad xx. 569.

Through blood, through death, Achilles ſtill proceeds,
O'er ſlaughtered heroes, and o'er rolling ſteeds.
As when avenging flames with fury driv'n
On guilty towns exert the wrath of Heav'n,

The

The pale inhabitants, ſome fall, ſome fly,
And the red vapours purple all the ſky:
So rag'd Achilles; Death and dire diſmay,
And toils, and terrors, fill'd the dreadful day.

Iliad xxi. 605.

Methinks, King Richard and myſelf ſhould meet
With no leſs terror than the elements
Of fire and water, when their thund'ring ſhock,
At meeting, tears the cloudy cheeks of heav'n.

Richard II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 5.

As ruſheth a foamy ſtream from the dark ſhady ſteep of Cromla, when thunder is rolling above, and dark brown night reſts on the hill: ſo fierce, ſo vaſt, ſo terrible, ruſh forward the ſons of Erin. The chief, like a whale of Ocean followed by all its billows, pours valour forth as a ſtream, rolling its might along the ſhore.

Fingal, b. 1.

As roll a thouſand waves to a rock, ſo Swaran's hoſt came on; as meets a rock a thouſand waves, ſo Inisfail met Swaran.

Ibid.

I beg peculiar attention to the following ſimile for a reaſon that ſhall be mentioned.

Thus breathing death, in terrible array,
The cloſe compacted legions urg'd their way:
Fierce they drove on, impatient to deſtroy;
Troy charg'd the firſt, and Hector firſt of Troy.
As from ſome mountain's craggy forehead torn,
A rock's round fragment flies with fury borne,

(Which

(Which from the ſtubborn ſtone a torrent rends)
Precipitate the pond'rous maſs deſcends;
From ſteep to ſteep the rolling ruin bounds:
At every ſhock the crackling wood reſounds;
Still gath'ring force, it ſmokes; and, urg'd amain,
Whirls, leaps, and thunders down, impetuous to the plain:
There ſtops—So Hector. Their whole force he prov'd:
Reſiſtleſs when he rag'd; and when he ſtopt, unmov'd.

Iliad, xiii. 187.

The image of a falling rock is certainly not elevating*; and yet undoubtedly the foregoing ſimile fires and ſwells the mind: it is grand therefore, if not ſublime. And the following ſimile will afford additional evidence, that there is a real, tho' nice, diſtinction between theſe two feelings:

So ſaying, a noble ſtroke he lifted high,
Which hung not, but ſo ſwift with tempeſt fell
On the proud creſt of Satan, that no ſight,
Nor motion of ſwift thought, leſs could his ſhield
Such ruin intercept. Ten paces huge
He back recoil'd; the tenth on bended knee
His maſſy ſpear upſtaid; as if on earth
Winds under ground or waters forcing way,
Sidelong had puſh'd a mountain from his ſeat
Half-ſunk with all his pines.

Milton, *b.* 6.

A compariſon by contraſt may contribute to grandeur or elevation, no leſs than by reſemblance;

* See chap. 4.

of which the following compariſon of Lucan is a remarkable inſtance:

Victrix cauſa diis placuit, ſed victa Catoni.

Conſidering that the Heathen deities poſſeſſed a rank but one degree above that of mankind, I think it would not be eaſy by a ſingle expreſſion, to exalt more one of the human ſpecies, than is done in this compariſon. I am ſenſible, at the ſame time, that ſuch a compariſon among Chriſtians, who entertain more exalted notions of the Deity, would juſtly be reckoned extravagant and abſurd.

The laſt article mentioned, is that of leſſening or depreſſing a hated or diſagreeable object; which is effectually done by reſembling it to any thing low or deſpicable. Thus Milton, in his deſcription of the rout of the rebel-angels, happily expreſſes their terror and diſmay in the following ſimile:

——————————— As a herd
Of goats or timorous flock together throng'd,
Drove them before him thunder-ſtruck, purſu'd
With terrors and with furies to the bounds
And chryſtal wall of heav'n, which op'ning wide,
Rowl'd inward, and a ſpacious gap diſclos'd
Into the waſteful deep: the monſtrous ſight
Struck them with horror backward, but far worſe
Urg'd them behind; headlong themſelves they threw
Down

Down from the verge of heav'n.

Milton, b. 6.

In the ſame view, Homer, I think, may be juſtified in comparing the ſhouts of the Trojans in battle to the noiſe of cranes *, and to the bleating of a flock of ſheep †: it is no objection that theſe are low images; for it was his intention to leſſen the Trojans by oppoſing their noiſy march to the ſilent and manly march of the Greeks. Addiſon ‡, deſcribing the figure that men make in the ſight of a ſuperior being, takes opportunity to mortify their pride by comparing them to a ſwarm of Piſmires.

A compariſon that has none of the good effects mentioned in this diſcourſe, but is built upon common and trifling circumſtances, makes a mighty ſilly figure:

Non ſum neſcius, grandia conſilia a multis plerumque cauſis, ceu magna navigia a plurimis remis, impelli.

Strada de bello Belgico.

By this time, I imagine, the different purpoſes of compariſon, and the various impreſſions it makes on the mind, are ſufficiently illuſtrated by proper examples. This was an eaſy taſk. It is more difficult to lay down rules about the propriety

* Beginning of book 3. † Book 4. l. 498.
‡ Guardian, No. 153.

ty or impropriety of compariſons; in what circumſtances they may be introduced, and in what circumſtances they are out of place. It is evident, that a compariſon is not proper on every occaſion: a man when cool and ſedate, is not diſpoſed to poetical flights, nor to ſacrifice truth and reality to imaginary beauties: far leſs is he ſo diſpoſed when oppreſſed with care, or intereſted in ſome important tranſaction that engroſſes him totally. On the other hand, a man, when elevated or animated by paſſion, is diſpoſed to elevate or animate all his objects: he avoids familiar names, exalts objects by circumlocution and metaphor, and gives even life and voluntary action to inanimate beings. In this heat of mind, the higheſt poetical flights are indulged, and the boldeſt ſimiles and metaphors reliſhed *. But without ſoaring ſo high, the mind is frequently in a tone to reliſh chaſte and moderate ornament; ſuch as compariſons that ſet the principal object in a ſtrong point of view, or that embelliſh and diverſify the narration. In general, when by any animating paſſion, whether pleaſant or painful, an impulſe is given to the imagination; we are in that condition diſpoſed to every ſort of figurative expreſſion, and in particular to compariſons. This in a great meaſure is

* It is accordingly obſerved by Longinus, in his Treatiſe of the Sublime, that the proper time for metaphor, is when the paſſions are ſo ſwelled as to hurry on like a torrent.

is evident from the compariſons already mentioned; and ſhall be further illuſtrated by other inſtances. Love, for example, in its infancy, rouſing the imagination, prompts the heart to diſplay itſelf in figurative language, and in ſimiles:

Troilus. Tell me, Apollo, for thy Daphne's love,
What Creſſid is, what Pandar, and what we?
Her bed is India; there ſhe lies, a pearl:
Between our Ilium, and where ſhe reſides,
Let it be call'd the wild and wandering flood;
Ourſelf the merchant; and this failing Pandar
Our doubtful hope, our convoy, and our bark.

Troilus and Creſſid, act 1. *ſc.* 1.

Again:

Come, gentle Night; come, loving black-brow'd Night!
Give me my Romeo; and, when he ſhall die,
Take him, and cut him out in little ſtars,
And he will make the face of Heav'n ſo fine,
That all the world ſhall be in love with Night,
And pay no worſhip to the gariſh Sun.

Romeo and Juliet, act 3. *ſc.* 4.

The dread of a misfortune, however eminent, involving always ſome doubt and uncertainty, agitates the mind, and excites the imagination:

Wolſey. ——————Nay, then, farewell;
I've touch'd the higheſt point of all my greatneſs,
And from that full meridian of my glory

I haſte now to my ſetting. I ſhall fall,
Like a bright exhalation in the evening,
And no man ſee me more.

Henry VIII. *act* 3. *ſc.* 4.

But it will be a better illuſtration of the preſent head, to give examples where compariſons are improperly introduced. I have had already occaſion to obſerve, that ſimiles are not the language of a man in his ordinary ſtate of mind, diſpatching his daily and uſual work. For that reaſon, the following ſpeech of a gardener to his ſervants, is extremely improper:

Go, bind thou up yon dangling apricots,
Which, like unruly children, make their ſire
Stoop with oppreſſion of their prodigal weight:
Give ſome ſupportance to the bending twigs.
Go thou; and, like an executioner,
Cut off the heads of too faſt-growing ſprays,
That look too lofty in our commonwealth;
All muſt be even in our government.

Richard II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 7.

The fertility of Shakeſpear's vein betrays him frequently into this error. There is the ſame impropriety in another ſimile of his:

Hero. Good Margaret, run thee into the parlour;
There ſhalt thou find my couſin Beatrice;
Whiſper her ear, and tell her, I and Urſula
Walk in the orchard, and our whole diſcourſe
Is all of her; ſay, that thou overheard'ſt us:

And

And bid her ſteal into the pleached bower,
Where honeyſuckles, ripen'd by the ſun,
Forbid the ſun to enter; like to favourites,
Made proud by princes, that advance their pride
Againſt that power that bred it.

Much ado about Nothing, act 3. *ſc.* 1.

Rooted grief, deep anguiſh, terror, remorſe, deſpair, and all the ſevere diſpiriting paſſions, are declared enemies, perhaps not to figurative language in general, but undoubtedly to the pomp and ſolemnity of compariſon. Upon that account, the ſimile pronounced by young Rutland, under terror of death from an inveterate enemy, and praying mercy, is unnatural:

So looks the pent-up lion o'er the wretch
That trembles under his devouring paws;
And ſo he walks inſulting o'er his prey,
And ſo he comes to rend his limbs aſunder.
Ah, gentle Clifford, kill me with thy ſword,
And not with ſuch a cruel threat'ning look.

Third part Henry VI. *act* 1. *ſc.* 5.

Nothing appears more out of place, nor more aukwardly introduced, than the following ſimile:

Lucia. ——————— Farewell, my Portius,
Farewell, though death is in the word, *for-ever!*

Portius. Stay, Lucia, ſtay; what doſt thou ſay?
for-ever?

Lucia. Have I not ſworn? If, Portius, thy ſucceſs
Muſt throw thy brother on his fate, farewell,

Oh, how ſhall I repeat the word, *for-ever!*

Portius. Thus, o'er the dying lamp th' unſteady flame
Hangs quivering on a point, leaps off by fits,
And falls again, as loath to quit its hold *.
—— Thou muſt not go, my ſoul ſtill hovers o'er thee,
And can't get looſe.

Cato, act 3. *ſc.* 2.

Nor doth the ſimile which cloſes the firſt act of the ſame tragedy make a better appearance; the ſituation there repreſented being too diſpiriting for a ſimile. A ſimile is improper for one who dreads the diſcovery of a ſecret machination:

Zara. The mute not yet return'd! Ha! 'twas the King,
The King that parted hence! frowning he went;
His eyes like meteors roll'd, then darted down
Their red and angry beams; as if his ſight
Would, like the raging Dog-ſtar, ſcorch the earth,
And kindle ruin in its courſe.

Mourning Bride, act 5. *ſc.* 3.

A man ſpent and diſpirited after loſing a battle, is not diſpoſed to heighten or illuſtrate his diſcourſe by ſimiles:

York. With this we charg'd again; but out, alas!
We bodg'd again; as I have ſeen a ſwan
With bootleſs labour ſwim againſt the tide,

And

* This ſimile would have a fine effect pronounced by the chorus in a Greek tragedy.

And ſpend her ſtrength with over-matching waves.
Ah! hark, the fatal followers do purſue;
And I am faint and cannot fly their fury.
The ſands are number'd that make up my life;
Here muſt I ſtay, and here my life muſt end.

Third part Henry VI. *act* 1. *ſc.* 6.

Far leſs is a man diſpoſed to ſimiles who is not only defeated in a pitch'd battle, but lies at the point of death mortally wounded:

Warwick. ——————— My mingled body ſhows,
My blood, my want of ſtrength, my ſick heart ſhows,
That I muſt yield my body to the earth,
And, by my fall, the conqueſt to my foe.
Thus yields the cedar to the ax's edge,
Whoſe arms gave ſhelter to the princely eagle;
Under whoſe ſhade the ramping lion ſlept,
Whoſe top-branch over-peer'd Jove's ſpreading tree,
And kept low ſhrubs from winter's pow'rful wind.

Third part Henry VI. *act* 5. *ſc.* 3.

Queen Katherine, deſerted by the King, and in the deepeſt affliction on her divorce, could not be diſpoſed to any ſallies of imagination: and for that reaſon, the following ſimile, however beautiful in the mouth of a ſpectator, is ſcarce proper in her own:

I am the moſt unhappy woman living,
Shipwreck'd upon a kingdom, where no pity,

No

No friends, no hope! no kindred weep for me!
Almoſt no grave allow'd me! like the lily,
That once was miſtreſs of the field, and flouriſh'd,
I'll hang my head, and periſh.

King Henry VIII. *act* 3. *ſc.* 1.

Similes thus unſeaſonably introduced, are finely ridiculed in the *Rehearſal.*

Bayes. Now here ſhe muſt make a ſimile.
Smith. Where's the neceſſity of that, Mr Bayes?
Bayes. Becauſe ſhe's ſurpriſed; that's a general rule; you muſt ever make a ſimile when you are ſurpriſed; 'tis a new way of writing.

A compariſon is not always faultleſs even where it is properly introduced. I have endeavoured above to give a general view of the different ends to which a compariſon may contribute: a compariſon, like other human productions, may fall ſhort of its aim; of which defect inſtances are not rare even among good writers; and to complete the preſent ſubject, it will be neceſſary to make ſome obſervations upon ſuch faulty compariſons. I begin with obſerving, that nothing can be more erroneous than to inſtitute a compariſon too faint: a diſtant reſemblance or contraſt fatigues the mind with its obſcurity, inſtead of amuſing it: and tends not to fulfil any one end of a compariſon. The following ſimiles ſeem to labour under this defect.

Albus

Albus ut obſcuro deterget nubila cœlo
Sæpe Notus, neque parturit imbres
Perpetuos: ſic tu ſapiens finire memento
Triſtitiam, vitæque labores,
Molli, Plance, mero.

Horat. Carm. l. 1. *ode* 7.

——— Medio dux agmine Turnus
Vertitur arma tenens, et toto vertice ſupra eſt.
Ceu ſeptem ſurgens ſedatis amnibus altus
Per tacitum Ganges: aut pingui flumine Nilus
Cum refluit campis, et jam ſe condidit alveo.

Æneid. ix. 28.

Talibus orabat, taleſque miſerrima fletus
Fertque refertque ſoror: ſed nullis ille movetur
Fletibus, aut voces ullas tractabilis audit.
Fata obſtant: placidaſque viri Deus obſtruit aures.
Ac veluti annoſo validam cum robore quercum
Alpini Boreæ, nunc hinc, nunc flatibus illinc
Eruere inter ſe certant; it ſtridor, et alte
Conſternunt terram concuſſo ſtipite frondes:
Ipſa hæret ſcopulis: et quantum vertice ad auras
Æthereas, tantum radice in Tartara tendit.
Haud ſecus aſſiduis hinc atque hinc vocibus heros
Tunditur, et magno perſentit pectore curas:
Mens immota manet, lacrymæ volvuntur inanes.

Æneid. iv. 437.

K. Rich. Give me the crown.—Here, Couſin, ſeize the crown,
Here, on this ſide, my hand; on that ſide, thine.
Now is this golden crown like a deep well,
That owes two buckets, filling one another;

The

The emptier ever dancing in the air,
The other down, unſeen and full of water:
That bucket down, and full of tears, am I,
Drinking my griefs, whilſt you mount up on high.

Richard II. *act* 4. *ſc.* 3.

King John. Oh! Couſin, thou art come to ſet mine eye;
The tackle of my heart is crack'd and burnt;
And all the ſhrowds wherewith my life ſhould ſail,
Are turned to one thread, one little hair:
My heart hath one poor ſtring to ſtay it by,
Which holds but till thy news be uttered.

King John, *act* 5. *ſc.* 10.

York. My uncles both are ſlain in reſcuing me:
And all my followers, to the eager foe
Turn back, and fly like ſhips before the wind,
Or lambs purſu'd by hunger-ſtarved wolves.

Third part Henry VI. *act* 1. *ſc.* 6.

The latter of the two ſimiles is good: the former, by its faintneſs of reſemblance, has no effect but to load the narration with an uſeleſs image.

The next error I ſhall mention is a capital one. In an epic poem, or in a poem upon any elevated ſubject, a writer ought to avoid raiſing a ſimile on a low image, which never fails to bring down the principal ſubject. In general, it is a rule, That a grand object ought never to be reſembled to one that

that is diminutive, however delicate the reſemblance may be; for it is the peculiar character of a grand object to fix the attention, and ſwell the mind; in which ſtate, to contract it to a minute object, is unpleaſant. The reſembling an object to one that is greater, has, on the contrary, a good effect, by raiſing or ſwelling the mind: for one paſſes with ſatisfaction from a ſmall to a great object; but cannot be drawn down, without reluctance, from great to ſmall. Hence the following ſimiles are faulty.

Meanwhile the troops beneath Patroclus' care,
Invade the Trojans, and commence the war.
As waſps, provok'd by children in their play,
Pour from their manſions by the broad highway,
In ſwarms the guiltleſs traveller engage,
Whet all their ſtings, and call forth all their rage;
All riſe in arms, and with a general cry
Aſſert their waxen domes, and buzzing progeny:
Thus from the tents the fervent legion ſwarms,
So loud their clamours, and ſo keen their arms.

Iliad xvi. 312.

So burns the vengeful hornet (foul all o'er)
Repuls'd in vain, and thirſty ſtill of gore;
(Bold ſon of air and heat) on angry wings
Untam'd, untir'd, he turns, attacks and ſtings.
Fir'd with like ardour fierce Atrides flew,
And ſent his ſoul with ev'ry lance he threw.

Iliad xvii. 642.

Inſtant

Inſtant ardentes Tyrii: pars ducere muros,
Molirique arcem, et manibus ſubvolvere ſaxa;
Pars aptare locum tecto, et concludere ſulco.
Jura magiſtratuſque legunt, ſanctumque ſenatum.
Hic portus alii effodiunt: hic alta theatris
Fundamenta locant alii, immaneſque columnas
Rupibus excidunt, ſcenis decora alta futuris.
Qualis apes æſtate nova per florea rura
Exercet ſub ſole labor, cum gentis adultos
Educunt fœtus, aut cum liquentia mella
Stipant, et dulci diſtendunt nectare cellas,
Aut onera accipiunt venientum, aut agmine facto
Ignavum fucos pecus a præſepibus arcent.
Fervet opus, redolentque thymo fragrantia mella.

Æneid. i. 427.

To deſcribe bees gathering honey as reſembling the builders of Carthage, would have a much better effect *.

Tum vero Teucri incumbunt, et littore celſas
Deducunt toto naves: natat uncta carina;
Frondenteſque ferunt remos, et robora ſylvis
Infabricata, fugæ ſtudio.
Migrantes cernas, totaque ex urbe ruentes.
Ac veluti ingentem formicæ farris acervum
Cum populant, hyemis memores, tectoque reponunt:
It nigrum campis agmen, prædamque per herbas
Convectant calle anguſto: pars grandia trudunt

Obnixæ

* And accordingly Demetrius Phalerius (of Elocution, ſect. 85.) obſerves, that it has a better effect to compare ſmall things to great than great things to ſmall.

Obnixæ frumenta humeris: pars agmina cogunt,
Caſtigantque moras: opere omnis ſemita fervet.
Æneid. iv. 397.

The following ſimile has not any one beauty to recommend it. The ſubject is Amata, the wife of King Latinus.

Tum vero infelix, ingentibus excita monſtris,
Immenſam ſine more furit lymphata per urbem:
Ceu quondam torto volitans ſub verbere turbo,
Quem pueri magno in gyro vacua atria circum
Intenti ludo exercent. Ille actus habena
Curvatis fertur ſpatiis: ſtupet inſcia turba,
Impubeſque manus, mirata volubile buxum;
Dant animos plagæ. Non curſu ſegnior illo
Per medias urbes agitur, populoſque feroces.
Æneid. vii. 376.

This ſimile ſeems to border upon the burleſque.

An error oppoſite to the former, is the introdūcing a reſembling image, ſo elevated or great as to bear no proportion to the principal ſubject. Their remarkable diſparity, ſeizing the mind, never fails to depreſs the principal ſubject by contraſt, inſtead of raiſing it by reſemblance: and if the diſparity be very great, the ſimile degenerates into burleſque; nothing being more ridiculous than to force an object out of its proper rank in nature, by equalling it with one greatly ſuperior or greatly

ly inferior. This will be evident from the following compariſons.

Fervet opus, redolentque thymo fragrantia mella.
Ac veluti lentis Cyclopes fulmina maſſis
Cum properant: alii taurinis follibus auras
Accipiunt, redduntque: alii ſtridentia tingunt
Æra lacu: gemit impoſitis incudibus Ætna:
Illi inter ſeſe magna vi brachia tollunt
In numerum; verſantque tenaci forcipe ferrum.
Non aliter (ſi parva licet componere magnis)
Cecropias innatus apes amor urget habendi,
Munere quamque ſuo. Grandævis oppida curæ,
Et munire favos, et Dædala fingere tecta.
At feſſæ multâ referunt ſe nocte minores,
Crura thymo plenæ: paſcuntur et arbuta paſſim,
Et glaucas ſalices, caſiamque crocumque rubentem,
Et pinguem tiliam, et ferrugineos hyacinthos.
Omnibus una quies operum, labor omnibus unus.

Georgic. iv. 169.

The Cyclopes make a better figure in the following ſimile:

——The Thracian leader preſt,
With eager courage, far before the reſt;
Him Ajax met, inflam'd with equal rage:
Between the wond'ring hoſts the chiefs engage;
Their weighty weapons round their heads they throw,
And ſwift, and heavy, falls each thund'ring blow.
As when in Ætna's caves the giant brood,
The one-ey'd ſervants of the Lemnian god,
In order round the burniug anvil ſtand,
And forge, with weighty ſtrokes, the forked brand;

The

The ſhaking hills their fervid toils confeſs,
And echoes rattling through each dark receſs:
So rag'd the fight.

Epigoniad, b. 8.

Tum Bitian ardentem oculis animiſque frementem;
Non jaculo, neque enim jaculo vitam ille dediſſet;
Sed magnum ſtridens contorta falarica venit
Fulminis acta modo, quam nec duo taurea terga,
Nec duplici ſquama lorica fidelis et auro
Suſtinuit: collapſa ruunt immania membra:
Dat tellus gemitum, et clypeum ſuper intonat ingens.
Qualis in Euboico Baiarum littore quondam
Saxea pila cadit, magnis quam molibus ante
Conſtructam jaciunt ponto: ſic illa ruinam
Prona trahit, penituſque vadis illiſa recumbit:
Miſcent ſe maria, et nigræ attolluntur arenæ:
Tum ſonitu Prochyta alta tremit, durumque cubile
Inarime Jovis imperiis impoſita Typhoëo.

Æneid. ix. 703.

Loud as a bull makes hill and valley ring,
So roar'd the lock when it realeas'd the ſpring.

Odyſſey, xxi. 51.

Such a ſimile upon the ſimpleſt of all actions, that of opening a door, is pure burleſque.

A writer of delicacy will avoid drawing his compariſons from any image that is nauſeous, ugly, or remarkably diſagreeable: for however ſtrong the reſemblance may be, more will be loſt than gained

by ſuch compariſon. Therefore I cannot help condemning, though with ſome reluctance, the following ſimile, or rather metaphor.

O thou fond many! with what loud applauſe
Did'ſt thou beat heav'n with bleſſing Bolingbroke
Before he was what thou would'ſt have him be?
And now being trimm'd up in thine own deſires,
Thou, beaſtly feeder, art ſo full of him,
That thou provok'ſt thyſelf to caſt him up.
And ſo, thou common dog, didſt thou diſgorge
Thy glutton boſom of the royal Richard,
And now thou would'ſt eat thy dead vomit up,
And howl'ſt to find it.

Second part, Henry IV. *act* 1. *ſc.* 6.

The ſtrongeſt objection that can lie againſt a compariſon is, that it conſiſts in words only, not in ſenſe. Such falſe coin, or baſtard wit, does extremely well in burleſque; but is far below the dignity of the epic, or of any ſerious compoſition:

The noble ſiſter of Poplicola,
The moon of Rome; chaſte as the iſicle
That's curled by the froſt from pureſt ſnow,
And hangs on Dian's temple.

Coriolanus, act 5. *ſc.* 3.

There is evidently no reſemblance between an iſicle and a woman, chaſte or unchaſte: but chaſtity is cold in a metaphorical ſenſe, and an iſicle is cold in a proper ſenſe: and this verbal reſemblance,

blance, in the hurry and glow of compoſing, has been thought a ſufficient foundation for the ſimile. Such phantom ſimiles are mere witticiſms, which ought to have no quarter, except where purpoſely introduced to provoke laughter. Lucian, in his diſſertation upon hiſtory, talking of a certain author, makes the following compariſon, which is verbal merely:

This author's deſcriptions are ſo cold, that they ſurpaſs the Caſpian ſnow, and all the ice of the north.

Virgil has not eſcaped this puerility:

——— Galathæa thymo mihi dulcior Hyblæ.
Bucol. vii. 37.

——— Ego Sardois videar tibi amarior herbis.
Ibid. 41.

Gallo, cujus amor tantum mihi creſcit in horas,
Quantum vere novo viridis ſe ſubjicit alnus.
Bucol. x. 37.

Nor Taſſo, in his Aminta:

Picciola e' l' ape, e fa col picciol morſo
Pur gravi, e pur moleſte le ferite;
Ma, qual coſa é più picciola d'amore,
Se in ogni breve ſpatio entra, e s' aſconde
In ogni breve ſpatio? hor, ſotto a l ombra
De le palpebre, hor trà minuti rivi
D'un biondo crine, hor dentro le pozzette
Che forma un dolce riſo in bella guancia;

E pur fa tanto grandi, e ſi mortali,
E coſi immedicabili le piaghe.

Act 2. *ſc.* 1.

Nor Boileau, the chaſteſt of all writers; and that even in his art of poetry:

Ainſi tel autrefois, qu'on vit avec Faret
Charbonner de ſes vers les murs d'un cabaret,
S'en va mal à propos d'une voix inſolente,
Chanter du peuple Hébreu la fuite triomphante,
Et pourſuivant Moiſe au travers des déſerts,
Court avec Pharaon ſe noyer dans les mers.

Chant. 1. *l.* 21.

Mais allons voir le Vrai juſqu'en ſa ſource même.
Un dévot aux yeux creux, et d'abſtinence blême,
S'il n'a point le cœur juſte, eſt affreux devant Dieu.
L'Evangile au Chrêtien ne dit, en aucun lieu,
Sois devot: elle dit, Sois doux, ſimple, equitable:
Car d'un devot ſouvent au Chrêtien veritable
La diſtance eſt deux fois plus longue, à mon avis,
Que du Pôle Antarctique au Détroit de Davis.

Boileau, Satire 11.

——— But for their ſpirits and ſouls
This word *rebellion* had froze them up
As fiſh are in a pond.

Second part Henry IV. *act* 1. *ſc.* 3.

Queen. The pretty vaulting ſea refus'd to drown me;
Knowing, that thou wou'dſt have me drown'd on ſhore,
With tears as ſalt as ſea, through thy unkindneſs.

Second part Henry VI. *act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

Here

Here there is no manner of reſemblance but in the word *drown;* for there is no real reſemblance between being drown'd at ſea, and dying of grief at land. But perhaps this ſort of tinſel wit may have a propriety in it, when uſed to expreſs an affected, not a real paſſion, which was the Queen's caſe.

Pope has ſeveral ſimiles of the ſame ſtamp. I ſhall tranſcribe one or two from the *Eſſay on Man*, the graveſt and moſt inſtructive of all his performances:

And hence one maſter paſſion in the breaſt,
Like Aaron's ſerpent, ſwallows up the reſt.

Epiſt. 2. *l.* 131.

And again, talking of this ſame ruling or maſter paſſion:

Nature its mother, Habit is its nurſe;
Wit, ſpirit, faculties, but make it worſe;
Reaſon itſelf but gives it edge and power;
As heav'n's bleſs'd beam turns vinegar more ſour.

Ibid. l. 145.

Lord Bolingbroke, ſpeaking of hiſtorians:

Where their ſincerity as to fact is doubtful, we ſtrike out truth by the confrontation of different accounts; as we ſtrike out ſparks of fire by the colliſion of flints and ſteel.

Let us vary the phraſe a very little, and there will not remain a ſhadow of reſemblance. Thus,

We diſcover truth by the confrontation of different accounts; as we ſtrike out ſparks of fire by the colliſion of flints and ſteel.

Racine makes Pyrrhus ſay to Andromaque,

Vaincu, chargé de fers, de regrets conſumé,
Brulé de plus de feux que je n'en allumai,
Helas! fus-je jamais ſi cruel que vous l'êtes?

And Oreſtes in the ſame ſtrain:

Que les Scythes ſont moins cruel qu' Hermoine.

Similes of this kind put one in mind of a ludicrous French ſong;

Je croyois Janneton
Auſſi douce que belle:
Je croyois Janneton
Plus douce qu'un mouton;
Helas! helas!
Elle eſt cent fois, mille fois, plus cruelle
Que n'eſt le tigre aux bois.

Again:

Helas! l'amour m'a pris,
Comme le chat fait la ſouris.

A vulgar Iriſh ballad begins thus:

I have as much love in ſtore
As there's apples in Portmore.

Where the ſubject is burleſque or ludicrous, ſuch ſimiles are far from being improper. Horace ſays pleaſantly,

Quanquam tu levior cortice.

L. 3. *ode* 9.

And Shakeſpear,

In breaking oaths he's ſtronger than Hercules.

And this leads me to obſerve, that beſide the foregoing compariſons, which are all ſerious, there is a ſpecies, the end and purpoſe of which is to excite gaiety or mirth. Take the following examples:

Falſtaff, ſpeaking to his page:

I do here walk before thee, like a ſow that hath overwhelmed all her litter but one.

Second part Henry IV. *act* 1. *ſc.* 4.

I think he is not a pick-purſe, nor a horſe-ſtealer; but for his verity in love, I do think him as concave as a cover'd goblet, or a worm-eaten nut.

As you like it, act 3. *ſc.* 10.

This ſword a dagger had his page,
That was but little for his age;
And therefore waited on him ſo,
As dwarfs upon knights-errant do.

Hudibras, canto 1.

Deſcription of Hudibras's horſe:

He was well ſtay'd, and in his gait
Preſerv'd a grave, majeſtic ſtate.
At ſpur or ſwitch no more he ſkipt,
Or mended pace, than Spaniard whipt:
And yet ſo fiery, he would bound
As if he griev'd to touch the ground:
That Cæſar's horſe, who, as fame goes,
Had corns upon his feet and toes,
Was not by half ſo tender hooft,
Nor trod upon the ground ſo ſoft.
And as that beaſt would kneel and ſtoop,
(Some write) to take his rider up;
So Hudibras his ('tis well known)
Would often do to ſet him down.

Canto 1.

Honour is, like a widow won
With briſk attempt and putting on,
With entering manfully, and urging;
Not ſlow approaches, like a virgin.

Canto 1.

The ſun had long ſince in the lap
Of Thetis taken out his nap;

And

And, like a lobſter boil'd, the morn
From black to red began to turn.

Part 2. *canto* 2.

Books, like men their authors, have but one way of coming into the world; but there are ten thouſand to go out of it, and return no more.

Tale of a Tub.

And in this the world may perceive the difference between the integrity of a generous author, and that of a common friend. The latter is obſerved to adhere cloſe in proſperity; but on the decline of fortune, to drop ſuddenly off: whereas the generous author, juſt on the contrary, finds his hero on the dunghill, from thence by gradual ſteps raiſes him to a throne, and then immediately withdraws, expecting not ſo much as thanks for his pains.

Tale of a Tub.

The moſt accompliſh'd way of uſing books at preſent is, to ſerve them as ſome do lords, learn their *titles*, and then brag of their acquaintance.

Tale of a Tub.

Box'd in a chair, the beau impatient ſits,
While ſpouts run clatt'ring o'er the roof by fits;
And ever and anon with frightful din
The leather ſounds; he trembles from within.
So when Troy chairmen bore the wooden ſteed,
Pregnant with Greeks, impatient to be freed,
(Thoſe bully Greeks, who, as the moderns do,
Inſtead of paying chairmen, run them through),

Laocoon

Laocoon ſtruck the outſide with his ſpear,
And each impriſon'd hero quak'd for fear.
Deſcription of a City Shower. *Swift.*

Clubs, diamonds, hearts, in wild diſorder ſeen,
With throngs promiſcuous ſtrow the level green.
Thus when diſpers'd a routed army runs,
Of Aſia's troops, and Afric's ſable ſons,
With like confuſion, different nations fly,
Of various habit, and of various dye,
The pierc'd battalions diſunited, fall
In heaps on heaps; one fate o'erwhelms them all.
Rape of the Lock, canto 3.

He does not conſider, that ſincerity in love is as much out of faſhion as ſweet ſnuff; nobody takes it now.
Careleſs Huſband.

Lady Eaſy. My dear, I am afraid you have provoked her a little too far.

Sir Charles. O! Not at all. You ſhall ſee, I'll ſweeten her, and ſhe'll cool like a diſh of tea. *Ibid.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

FIGURES.

THE endleſs variety of expreſſions brought under the head of tropes and figures by ancient critics and grammarians, makes it evident, that they had no preciſe criterion for diſtinguiſhing tropes and figures from plain language. It was accordingly my opinion, that little could be made of them in the way of rational criticiſm; till diſcovering, by a ſort of accident, that many of them depend on principles formerly explained, I gladly embrace the opportunity to ſhow the influence of theſe principles where it would be the leaſt expected. Confining myſelf therefore to ſuch figures, I am luckily freed from much traſh; without dropping, as far as I remember, any trope or figure that merits a proper name. And I begin with Proſopopœia or perſonification, which is juſtly intitled to the firſt place.

SECT.

SECT. I.

PERSONIFICATION.

THE beſtowing ſenſibility and voluntary motion upon things inanimate, is ſo bold a figure, as to require, one ſhould imagine, very peculiar circumſtances for operating the deluſion: and yet, in the language of poetry, we find variety of expreſſions, which though commonly reduced to that figure, are uſed without ceremony, or any ſort of preparation; as, for example, *thirſty* ground, *hungry* church-yard, *furious* dart, *angry* ocean. Theſe epithets, in their proper meaning, are attributes of ſenſible beings: what is their meaning when applied to things inanimate? do they make us conceive the ground, the church-yard, the dart, the ocean, to be endued with animal functions? This is a curious inquiry; and whether ſo or not, it cannot be declined in handling the preſent ſubject.

The mind, agitated by certain paſſions, is prone to beſtow ſenſibility, upon things inanimate *. This is an additional inſtance of the influence of paſſion upon our opinions and belief †. I give examples. Antony, mourning over the body of Cæſar

* Page 204. † Chap. 2. part 5.

ſar murdered in the ſenate-houſe, vents his paſſion in the following words:

Antony. O pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth,
That I am meek and gentle with theſe butchers.
Thou art the ruins of the nobleſt man
That ever lived in the tide of time.

Julius Cæſar, act 3. *ſc.* 4.

Here Antony muſt have been impreſſed with a notion, that the body of Cæſar was liſtening to him, without which the ſpeech would be fooliſh and abſurd. Nor will it appear ſtrange, conſidering what is ſaid in the chapter above cited, that paſſion ſhould have ſuch power over the mind of man. In another example of the ſame kind, the earth, as a common mother, is animated to give refuge againſt a father's unkindneſs:

Almeria. O Earth, behold, I kneel upon thy boſom,
And bend my flowing eyes to ſtream upon
Thy face, imploring thee that thou wilt yield!
Open thy bowels of compaſſion, take
Into thy womb the laſt and moſt forlorn
Of all thy race. Hear me thou common parent;
——I have no parent elſe.——Be thou a mother,
And ſtep between me and the curſe of him,
Who was—who was, but is no more a father;
But brands my innocence with horrid crimes;
And for the tender names of *child* and *daughter*,
Now calls me *murderer* and *parricide*.

Mourning Bride, act 4. *ſc.* 7.

Plaintive

Plaintive paſſions are extremely ſolicitous for vent; and a ſoliloquy commonly anſwers the purpoſe: but when ſuch a paſſion becomes exceſſive, it cannot be gratified but by ſympathy from others; and if denied that conſolation in a natural way, it will convert even things inanimate into ſympathiſing beings. This Philoctetes complains to the rocks and promontories of the iſle of Lemnos *; and Alceſtes dying, invokes the ſun, the light of day, the clouds, the earth, her huſband's palace, &c. †. Moſchus, lamenting the death of Bion, conceives, that the birds, the fountains, the trees, lament with him. The ſhepherd, who in Virgil bewails the death of Daphnis, expreſſeth himſelf thus:

Daphni, tuum Pœnos etiam ingemuiſſe leones
Interitum, monteſque feri ſylvæque loquuntur.

Eclogue, v. 27.

Again:

Illum etiam lauri, illum etiam flevere myricæ.
Pinifer illum etiam ſola ſub rupe jacentem
Mænalus, et gelidi fleverunt ſaxa Lycæi.

Eclogue x. 13.

Again:

Ho viſto al pianto mio
Reſponder per pietate i faſſi e l'onde;

* Philoctetes of Sophocles, act 4. ſc. 2.
† Alceſtes of Euripides, act 2. ſc. 1.

E ſoſpirar le fronde
Ho viſto al pianto mio.
Ma non ho viſto mai,
Ne ſpero di vedere
Compaſſion ne la crudele, e bella.

Aminta di Taſſo, act. 1. ſc. 2.

That ſuch perſonification is derived from nature, will not admit the leaſt remaining doubt, after finding it in poems of the darkeſt ages and remoteſt countries. No figure is more frequent in Oſſian's works; for example,

The battle is over, ſaid the King, and I behold the blood of my friends. Sad is the heath of Lena, and mournful the oaks of Cromla.

Again:

The ſword of Gaul trembles at his ſide, and longs to glitter in his hand.

King Richard having got intelligence of Bolingbroke's invaſion, ſays, upon landing in England from his Iriſh expedition, in a mixture of joy and reſentment,

——————I weep for joy
To ſtand upon my kingdom once again.
Dear earth, I do ſalute thee with my hand,
Though rebels wound thee with their horſes hoofs.
As a long parted mother with her child
Plays fondly with her tears, and ſmiles in meeting;

So

So weeping, ſmiling, greet I thee, my earth,
And do thee favour with my royal hands.
Feed not thy ſovereign's foe, my gentle earth,
Nor with thy ſweets comfort his rav'nous ſenſe:
But let thy ſpiders that ſuck up thy venom,
And heavy-gaited toads, lie in their way;
Doing annoyance to the treach'rous feet,
Which with uſurping ſteps do trample thee.
Yield ſtinging nettles to mine enemies;
And, when they from thy boſom pluck a flower,
Guard it, I pr'ythee, with a lurking adder;
Whoſe double tongue may with a mortal touch
Throw death upon thy ſovereign's enemies.
Mock not my ſenſeleſs conjuration, Lords:
This earth ſhall have a feeling; and theſe ſtones
Prove armed ſoldiers, ere her native king
Shall faulter under foul rebellious arms.

Richard II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 2.

After a long voyage, it was cuſtomary among the ancients to ſalute the natal ſoil. A long voyage being of old a greater enterpriſe than at preſent, the ſafe return to one's country after much fatigue and danger, was a delightful circumſtance; and it was natural to give the natal ſoil a temporary life, in order to ſympathiſe with the traveller. See an example, *Agamemnon* of Æſchilus, act 3. in the beginning. Regret for leaving a place one has been accuſtomed to, has the ſame effect *.

Terror

* Philoctetes of Sophocles, at the cloſe.

Terror produceth the ſame effect: it is communicated in thought to every thing around, even to things inanimate:

Speaking of Polyphemus,

Clamorem immenſum tollit, quo pontus et omnes
Intremuere undæ, penituſque exterrita tellus
Italiæ.

Æneid. iii. 672.

——— As when old Ocean roars,
And heaves huge ſurges to the *trembling* ſhores.

Iliad ii. 249.

Go, view the ſettling ſea. The ſtormy wind is laid; but the billows ſtill tremble on the deep, and ſeem to fear the blaſt.

Fingal.

Racine, in the tragedy of *Phedra*, deſcribing the ſea-monſter that deſtroyed Hippolytus, conceives the ſea itſelf to be ſtruck with terror as well as the ſpectators:

Le flot qui l'apporta recule epouvanté.

A man alſo naturally communicates his joy to all objects around, animate or inanimate:

———As when to them who ſail

Beyond the Cape of Hope, and now are paſt
Mozambic, off at ſea north-eaſt winds blow
Sabean odour from the ſpicy ſhore
Of Arabia the Bleſt; with ſuch delay
Well pleas'd, they ſlack their courſe, and many a league
Cheer'd with the grateful ſmell old Ocean ſmiles.

Paradiſe Loſt, *b.* 4.

I have been profuſe of examples, to ſhow what power many paſſions have to animate their objects. In all the foregoing examples, the perſonification, if I miſtake not, is ſo complete as to afford conviction, momentary indeed, of life and intelligence. But it is evident from numberleſs inſtances, that perſonification is not always ſo complete: it is a common figure in deſcriptive poetry, underſtood to be the language of the writer, and not of the perſons he deſcribes: in this caſe, it ſeldom or never comes up to conviction, even momentary, of life and intelligence. I give the following examples.

Firſt in *his* eaſt the glorious lamp was ſeen,
Regent of day, and all th' horizon round
Inveſted with bright rays; jocund to run
His longitude through heav'n's high road: the gray
Dawn and the Pleiades before *him* danc'd,
Shedding ſweet influence. Leſs bright the moon,
But oppoſite, in levell'd weſt was ſet
His mirror, with full face borrowing *her* light

From

From *him*; for other light *she* needed none.

Paradise Lost, *b.* 7. *l.* 370*.

Night's candles are burnt out, and jocund day
Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain-tops.

Romeo and Juliet, *act* 3. *sc.* 7.

But look, the morn, in russet mantle clad,
Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastward hill.

Hamlet, *act* 1. *sc.* 1.

It may, I presume, be taken for granted, that, in the foregoing instances, the personification, either with the poet or his reader, amounts not to a conviction of intelligence: that the sun, the moon, the day, the morn, are not here understood to be sensible beings. What then is the nature of this personification? I think it must be referred to the imagination: the inanimate object is imagined to be a sensible being, but without any conviction, even for a moment, that it really is so. Ideas or fictions of imagination have power to raise emotions in the mind †; and when any thing inanimate is, in imagination, supposed to be a sensible being,

* The chastity of the English language, which in common usage distinguishes by genders no words but what signify beings male and female, gives thus a fine opportunity for the prosopopœia; a beauty unknown in other languages, where every word is masculine or feminine.

† See Appendix, containing definitions and explanations of terms, § 28.

being, it makes by that means a greater figure than when an idea is formed of it according to truth. This ſort of perſonification, however, is far inferior to the other in elevation. Thus perſonification is of two kinds. The firſt, being more noble, may be termed *paſſionate perſonification*: the other, more humble, *deſcriptive perſonification;* becauſe ſeldom or never is perſonification in a deſcription carried to conviction.

The imagination is ſo lively and active, that its images are raiſed with very little effort; and this juſtifies the frequent uſe of deſcriptive perſonification. This figure abounds in Milton's *Allegro*, and *Penſeroſo*.

Abſtract and general terms, as well as particular objects, are often neceſſary in Poetry. Such terms however are not well adapted to poetry, becauſe they ſuggeſt not any image: I can readily form an image of Alexander or Achilles in wrath; but I cannot form an image of wrath in the abſtract, or of wrath independent of a perſon. Upon that account, in works addreſſed to the imagination, abſtract terms are frequently perſonified; but ſuch perſonification reſts upon imagination merely, not upon conviction.

Sed mihi vel Tellus optem prius ima dehiſcat;
Vel Pater omnipotens adigat mē fulmine ad umbras,
Pallentes umbras Erebi, noctemque profundam,
Ante *pudor* quam te violo, aut tua jura reſolvo.

Æneid. iv. *l.* 24.

Thus,

Thus, to explain the effects of ſlander, it is imagined to be a voluntary agent.

——— No, 'tis Slander ;
Whoſe edge is ſharper than the ſword ; whoſe tongue
Out-venoms all the worms of Nile ; whoſe breath
Rides on the poſting winds, and doth belie
All corners of the world, kings, queens, and ſtates,
Maids, matrons : nay, the ſecrets of the grave
This viperous Slander enters.

Shakeſpear, Cymbeline, act 3. ſc. 4.

As alſo human paſſions : take the following example.

——— For *Pleaſure* and *Revenge*
Have ears more deaf than adders, to the voice
Of any true deciſion.

Troilus and Creſſida, act 2. ſc. 4.

Virgil explains fame and its effects by a ſtill greater variety of action *. And Shakeſpear perſonifies death and its operations in a manner ſingularly fanciful :

——— Within the hollow crown
That rounds the mortal temples of a king,
Keeps Death his court ; and there the antic ſits,
Scoffing his ſtate, and grinning at his pomp ;
Allowing him a breath, a little ſcene

* Æneid iv. 173.

To monarchize, be fear'd, and kill with looks;
Infuſing him with ſelf and vain conceit,
As if his fleſh, which walls about our life,
Were braſs impregnable; and humour'd thus,
Comes at the laſt, and with a little pin
Bores through his caſtle-walls, and farewell king.

Richard II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 4.

Not leſs ſucceſsfully is life and action given even to ſleep:

King Henry. How many thouſands of my pooreſt ſubjects
Are at this hour aſleep! O gentle *Sleep*,
Nature's ſoft nurſe, how have I frighted thee,
That thou no more wilt weigh my eye-lids down,
And ſteep my ſenſes in forgetfulneſs?
Why rather, Sleep, ly'ſt thou in ſmoky cribs,
Upon uneaſy pallets ſtretching thee,
And huſh'd with buzzing night-flies to thy ſlumber,
Than in the perfum'd chambers of the great,
Under the canopies of coſtly ſtate,
And lull'd with ſounds of ſweeteſt melody?
O thou dull god, why ly'ſt thou with the vile
In loathſome beds, and leav'ſt the kingly couch,
A watch-caſe to a common larum-bell?
Wilt thou, upon the high and giddy maſt,
Seal up the ſhip-boy's eyes, and rock his brains
In cradle of the rude imperious ſurge,
And in the viſitation of the winds,
Who take the ruffian billows by the top,
Curling their monſtrous heads, and hanging them
With deaf'ning clamours in the ſlippery ſhrouds,

That,

That, with the hurly, Death itſelf awakes?
Can'ſt thou, O partial Sleep, give thy repoſe
To the wet ſea-boy in an hour ſo rude;
And, in the calmeſt and the ſtilleſt night,
With all appliances and means to boot,
Deny it to a King? Then, happy low! lie down;
Uneaſy lies the head that wears a crown.

Second part, Henry IV. *act* 3. *ſc.* 1.

I ſhall add one example more, to ſhow that deſcriptive perſonification may be uſed with propriety, even where the purpoſe of the diſcourſe is inſtruction merely:

Oh! let the ſteps of youth be cautious,
How they advance into a dangerous world;
Our duty only can conduct us ſafe.
Our paſſions are ſeducers: but of all,
The ſtrongeſt *Love*. He firſt approaches us
In childiſh play, wantoning in our walks:
If heedleſsly we wander after him,
As he will pick out all the dancing-way,
We're loſt, and hardly to return again.
We ſhould take warning: he is painted blind,
To ſhow us, if we fondly follow him,
The precipices we may fall into.
Therefore let *Virtue* take him by the hand:
Directed ſo, he leads to certain joy.

Southern.

Hitherto ſucceſs has attended our ſteps: but whether we ſhall complete our progreſs with equal ſucceſs, ſeems doubtful; for when we look back

to the expreſſions mentioned in the beginning, *thirſty* ground, *furious* dart, and ſuch like, it ſeems no leſs difficult than at firſt, to ſay whether there be in them any ſort of perſonification. Such expreſſions evidently raiſe not the ſlighteſt conviction of ſenſibility: nor do I think they amount to deſcriptive perſonification; becauſe, in them, we do not even figure the ground or the dart to be animated. If ſo, they cannot at all come under the preſent ſubject. To ſhow which, I ſhall endeavour to trace the effect that ſuch expreſſions have in the mind. Doth not the expreſſion *angry ocean*, for example, tacitly compare the ocean in a ſtorm to a man in wrath? By this tacit compariſon, the ocean is elevated above its rank in nature; and yet perſonification is excluded, becauſe, by the very nature of compariſon, the things compared are kept diſtinct, and the native appearance of each is preſerved. It will be ſhown afterward, that expreſſions of this kind belong to another figure, which I term *a figure of ſpeech*, and which employs the ſeventh ſection of the preſent chapter.

Though thus in general we can diſtinguiſh deſcriptive perſonification from what is merely a figure of ſpeech, it is, however, often difficult to ſay, with reſpect to ſome expreſſions, whether they are of the one kind or of the other. Take the following inſtances.

The

The moon ſhines bright: in ſuch a night as this,
When the ſweet wind did gently *kiſs* the trees,
And they did make no noiſe; in ſuch a night,
Troilus methinks mounted the Trojan wall,
And ſigh'd his ſoul towards the Grecian tents
Where Creſſid lay that night.

Merchant of Venice, act 5. ſc. 1.

——————— I have ſeen
Th' *ambitious* ocean ſwell, and rage, and foam,
To be exalted with the threat'ning clouds.

Julius Cæſar, act 1. ſc. 6.

With reſpect to theſe and numberleſs other examples of the ſame kind, it muſt depend upon the reader, whether they be examples of perſonification, or of a figure of ſpeech merely: a ſprightly imagination will advance them to the former claſs; with a plain reader they will remain in the latter.

Having thus at large explained the preſent figure, its different kinds, and the principles upon which it is founded: what comes next in order, is, to ſhow in what caſes it may be introduced with propriety, when it is ſuitable, when unſuitable. I begin with obſerving, that paſſionate perſonification is not promoted by every paſſion indifferently. All diſpiriting paſſions are averſe to it; and remorſe, in particular, is too ſerious and ſevere to be gratified with a phantom of the mind. I cannot therefore

therefore approve the following ſpeech of Enobarbus, who had deſerted his maſter Antony:

Be witneſs to me, O thou bleſſed moon,
When men revolted ſhall upon record
Bear hateful memory, poor Enobarbus did
Before thy face repent ———————
Oh ſovereign miſtreſs of true melancholy,
The poiſonous damp of night diſpunge upon me,
That life, a very rebel to my will,
May hang no longer on me.

Anthony and Cleopatra, act 4. *ſc.* 7.

If this can be juſtified, it muſt be upon the Heathen ſyſtem of theology, which converted into deities the ſun, moon, and ſtars.

Secondly, After a paſſionate perſonification is properly introduced, it ought to be confined to its proper province, that of gratifying the paſſion, without giving place to any ſentiment or action but what anſwers that purpoſe; for perſonification is at any rate a bold figure, and ought to be employed with great reſerve. The paſſion of love, for example, in a plaintive tone, may give a momentary life to woods and rocks, in order to make them ſenſible of the lover's diſtreſs; but no paſſion will ſupport a conviction ſo far ſtretched, as that theſe woods and rocks ſhould be living witneſſes to report the diſtreſs to others:

Ch'

Ch' i' t'ami piu de la mia vita,
Se tu nol ſai, crudele,
Chiedilo à queſte ſelve
Che te'l diranno, et te'l diran con eſſe
Le fere loro e i duri ſterpi, e i ſaſſi
Di queſti alpeſtri monti,
Ch' i' ho ſi ſpeſſe volte
Inteneriti al ſuon de' miei lamenti.

Paſtor Fido, act 3. *ſc.* 3.

No lover who is not crazed will utter ſuch a ſentiment: it is plainly the operation of the writer, indulging his inventive faculty without regard to nature. The ſame obſervation is applicable to the following paſſage:

In winter's tedious nights ſit by the fire
With good old folks, and let them tell thee tales
Of woful ages, long ago betid:
And ere thou bid good night, to quit their grief,
Tell them the lamentable fall of me,
And ſend the hearers weeping to their beds.
For why! the ſenſeleſs brands will ſympathiſe
The heavy accent of thy moving tongue,
And in compaſſion weep the fire out.

Richard II. *act* 5. *ſc.* 1.

One muſt read this paſſage very ſeriouſly to avoid laughing. The following paſſage is quite extravagant: the different parts of the human body are too intimately connected with ſelf, to be perſonified by the power of any paſſion; and after converting

verting ſuch a part into a ſenſible being, it is ſtill worſe to make it be conceived as riſing in rebellion againſt ſelf:

Cleopatra. Haſte, bare my arm, and rouſe the ſerpent's fury.
Coward fleſh——————
Wouldſt thou conſpire with Cæſar, to betray me,
As thou wert none of mine? Ill force thee to't.
Dryden, All for Love, act 5.

Next comes deſcriptive perſonification; upon which I muſt obſerve, in general, that it ought to be cautiouſly uſed. A perſonage in a tragedy, agitated by a ſtrong paſſion, deals in warm ſentiments; and the reader, catching fire by ſympathy, reliſheth the boldeſt perſonifications: but a writer, even in the moſt lively deſcription, taking a lower flight, ought to content himſelf with ſuch eaſy perſonifications as agree with the tone of mind inſpired by the deſcription. Nor is even ſuch eaſy perſonification always admitted; for in plain narrative, the mind, ſerious and ſedate, rejects perſonification altogether. Strada, in his hiſtory of the Belgic wars, has the following paſſage, which, by a ſtrained elevation above the tone of the ſubject, deviates into burleſque.

Vix deſcenderat a prætoria navi Cæſar; cum fœda illico exorta in portu tempeſtas, claſſem impetu disjecit, prætoriam

prætoriam hauſit; quaſi non vecturam amplius Cæſarem, Cæſariſque fortunam.

Dec. 1. *l.* 1.

Neither do I approve, in Shakeſpear, the ſpeech of King John, gravely exhorting the citizens of Angiers to a ſurrender; though a tragic writer has much greater latitude than a hiſtorian. Take the following ſpecimen:

The cannons have their bowels full of wrath;
And ready mounted are they to ſpit forth
Their iron-indignation 'gainſt your walls.

Act 2. *ſc.* 3.

Secondly, If extraordinary marks of reſpect to a perſon of low rank be ridiculous, no leſs ſo is the perſonification of a low ſubject. This rule chiefly regards deſcriptive perſonification; for a ſubject can hardly be low that is the cauſe of a violent paſſion; in that circumſtance, at leaſt, it muſt be of importance. But to aſſign any rule other than taſte merely, for avoiding things below even deſcriptive perſonification, will, I am afraid, be a hard taſk. A poet of ſuperior genius, poſſeſſing the power of inflaming the mind, may take liberties that would be too bold in ohters. Homer appears not extravagant in animating his darts and arrows: nor Thomſon in animating the ſeaſons, the winds, the rains, the dews; he even ventures

ventures to animate the diamond, and doth it with propriety:

——— That poliſh'd bright
And all its native luſtre let abroad,
Dares, as it ſparkles on the fair-one's breaſt,
With vain ambition emulate her eyes.

But there are things familiar and baſe, to which perſonification cannot deſcend. In a compoſed ſtate of mind, to animate a lump of matter even in the moſt rapid flight of fancy, degenerates into burleſque:

How now! What noiſe! that ſpirit's poſſeſſed with haſte,
That wounds th' unreſiſting poſtern with theſe ſtrokes.
Shakeſpear, Meaſure for Meaſure, act 4. ſc. 6.

——— Or from the ſhore
The plovers when to ſcatter o'er the heath,
And ſing their wild notes to the liſt'ning *waſte*.
Thomſon, Spring, l. 23.

Speaking of a man's hand cut off in battle:

Te deciſa ſuum, Laride, dextera quærit:
Semianimeſque micant digiti: ferrumque retractant.
Æneid. x. 395.

The perſonification here of a hand is inſufferable, eſpecially in a plain narration: not to mention that ſuch a trivial incident is too minutely deſcribed.

The

The ſame obſervation is applicable to abſtract terms, which ought not to be animated unleſs they have ſome natural dignity. Thomſon, in this article, is licentious; witneſs the following inſtances out of many:

O vale of bliſs! O ſoftly ſwelling hills!
On which *the power of cultivation* lies,
And joys to ſee the wonders of his toil.

Summer, l. 1435.

Then fated *Hunger* bids his brother *Thirſt*
Produce the mighty bowl:
Nor wanting is the brown October, drawn
Mature and perfect, from *his* dark retreat
Of thirty years; and now *his honeſt front*
Flames in the light refulgent.

Autumn, l. 516.

Thirdly, It is not ſufficient to avoid improper ſubjects: ſome preparation is neceſſary, in order to rouſe the mind; for the imagination refuſes its aid, till it be warmed at leaſt, if not inflamed. Yet Thomſon, without the leaſt ceremony or preparation, introduceth each ſeaſon as a ſenſible being:

From brightening fields of æther fair diſclos'd,
Child of the ſun, refulgent *Summer* comes,
In pride of youth, and felt through Nature's depth.
He comes attended by the ſultry hours,
And ever fanning breezes, on his way;
While from his ardent look, the turning Spring

Averts

Averts her bluſhful face, and earth and ſkies
All ſmiling to his hot dominion leaves.

Summer, l. 1.

See *Winter* comes, to rule the vary'd year,
Sullen and ſad with all his riſing train,
Vapours, and *clouds* and *ſtorms*.

Winter, l. 1.

This has violently the air of writing mechanically without taſte. It is not natural that the imagination of a writer ſhould be ſo much heated at the very commencement; and, at any rate, he cannot expect ſuch ductility in his readers. But if this practice can be juſtified by authority, Thomſon has one of no mean note: Vida begins his firſt eclogue in the following words:

Dicite, vos Muſæ, et juvenum memorate querelas;
Dicite; nam motas ipſas ad carmina cautes
Et requieſſe ſuos perhibent vaga flumina curſus.

Even Shakeſpear is not always careful to prepare the mind for this bold figure. Take the following inſtance.

——————— Upon theſe taxations,
The clothiers all, not able to maintain
The many to them 'longing, have put off
The ſpinſters, carders, fullers, weavers; who,
Unfit for other life, compell'd by hunger,
And lack of other means, in deſp'rate manner

Daring

Daring th' event to th' teeth, are all in uproar,
And *Danger* ſerves among them.

Henry VIII. *act* 1. *ſc.* 4.

Fourthly, Deſcriptive perſonification, ſtill more than what is paſſionate, ought to be kept within the bounds of moderation, A reader warmed with a beautiful ſubject, can imagine, even without paſſion, the winds, for example, to be animated: but ſtill the winds are the ſubject; and any action aſcribed to them beyond or contrary to their uſual operation, appearing unnatural, ſeldom fails to baniſh the illuſion altogether: the reader's imagination too far ſtrained, refuſes its aid; and the deſcription becomes obſcure, inſtead of being more lively and ſtriking. In this view, the following paſſage, deſcribing Cleopatra on ſhipboard, appears to me exceptionable.

The barge ſhe ſat in, like a burniſh'd throne,
Burnt on the water: the poop was beaten gold,
Purple the ſails, and ſo perfum'd, that
The winds were love-ſick with 'em.

Antony and Cleopatra, act 2. *ſc.* 3.

The winds in their impetuous courſe have ſo much the appearance of fury, that it is eaſy to figure them wreaking their reſentment againſt their enemies, by deſtroying houſes, ſhips, &c.; but to figure them love-ſick, has no reſemblance to them in any circumſtance. In another paſſage, where

Cleopatra is alſo the ſubject, the perſonification of the air is carried beyond all bounds:

——————— The city caſt
Its people out upon her; and Antony
Inthron'd i' th' market-place, did ſit alone,
Whiſtling to th' air, which but for vacancy,
Had gone to gaze on Cleopatra too,
And made a gap in nature.

Antony and Cleopatra, act 2. ſc. 3.

The following perſonification of the earth or ſoil is not leſs wild:

She ſhall be dignifi'd with this high honour,
To bear my Lady's train; leſt the baſe earth
Should from her veſture chance to ſteal a kiſs;
And of ſo great a favour growing proud,
Diſdain to root the ſummer-ſwelling flower,
And make rough winter everlaſtingly.

Two Gentlemen of Verona, act 2. ſc. 7.

Shakeſpear, far from approving ſuch intemperance of imagination, puts this ſpeech in the mouth of a ranting lover. Neither can I reliſh what follows.

Omnia quæ, Phœbo quondam meditante, beatus
Audit Eurotas, juſſitque ediſcere lauros,
Ille canit.

Virgil. Buc. vi. 82.

The cheerfulneſs ſingly of a paſtoral ſong, will ſcarce

ſcarce ſupport perſonification in the loweſt degree. But admitting, that a river gently flowing may be imagined a ſenſible being liſtening to a ſong, I cannot enter into the conceit of the river's ordering his laurels to learn the ſong: here all reſemblance to any thing real is quite loſt. This however is copied literally by one of our greateſt poets; early indeed, before maturity of taſte or judgment:

Thames heard the numbers as he flow'd along,
And bade his willows learn the moving ſong.
Pope's Paſtorals, paſt. 4. *l.* 13.

This author, in riper years, is guilty of a much greater deviation from the rule. Dullneſs may be imagined a deity or idol, to be worſhipped by bad writers; but then ſome ſort of diſguiſe is requiſite, ſome baſtard virtue muſt be beſtowed, to make ſuch worſhip in ſome degree excuſible. Yet in the *Dunciad*, Dullneſs without the leaſt diſguiſe, is made the object of worſhip. The mind rejects ſuch a fiction as unnatural; for dullneſs is a defect, of which even the dulleſt mortal is aſhamed:

Then he: Great tamer of all human art!
Firſt in my care, and ever at my heart;
Dullneſs! whoſe good old cauſe I yet defend,
With whom my Muſe began, with whom ſhall end,
E'er ſince Sir Fopling's periwig was praiſe,
To the laſt honours of the Bull and Bays!

O thou! of bus'neſs the directing ſoul!
To this our head, like bias to the bowl,
Which as more pond'rous, made its aim more true,
Obliquely wadling to the mark in view:
O! ever gracious to perplex'd mankind,
Still ſpread a healing miſt before the mind:
And, leſt we err by Wit's wild dancing light,
Secure us kindly in our native night.
Or, if to wit a coxcomb make pretence,
Guard the ſure barrier between that and ſenſe;
Or quite unravel all the reas'ning thread,
And hang ſome curious cobweb in its ſtead!
As, forc'd from wind-guns, lead itſelf can fly,
And pond'rous ſlugs cut ſwiftly through the ſky;
As clocks to weight their nimble motion owe,
The wheels above urg'd by the load below:
Me Emptineſs and Dullneſs could inſpire,
And were my elaſticity, and fire.

B. i. 163.

The following inſtance is ſtretched beyond all reſemblance: it is bold to take a part or member of a living creature, and to beſtow upon it life, volition, and action: after animating two ſuch members, it is ſtill bolder to make one envy the other; for this is wide of any reſemblance to reality:

——————— De noſtri baci
Meritamenti ſia giudice quella,
Che la bocca ha più bella.
Tutte concordemente
Eleſſer la beliſſima Amarilli;
Ed' ella i ſuoi begli occhi

Dolcemente

Dolcemente chinando,
Di modeſto roſſor tutta ſi tinſe,
E mòſtro ben, che non men bella è dentro
Di quel che ſia di fuori;
O foſſe, che'l bel volto
Aveſſe invidia all' onorata bocca,
E s'adornaſſe anch' egli
Della purpurea ſua pompoſa veſta,
Quaſi voleſſe dir, ſon bello anch'io.

Paſtor Fido, act 2. *ſc.* 1.

Fifthly, The enthuſiaſm of paſſion may have the effect to prolong paſſionate perſonification: but deſcriptive perſonification cannot be diſpatched in too few words: a circumſtantiate deſcription diſſolves the charm, and makes the attempt to perſonify appear ridiculous. Homer ſucceeds in animating his darts and arrows: but ſuch perſonification ſpun out in a French tranſlation, is mere burleſque:

Et la fléche en furie, avide de ſon ſang,
Part, vole à lui, l'atteint, et lui perce le flanc.

Horace ſays happily,

Poſt equitem ſedet atra Cura.

Obſerve how this thought degenerates by being divided, like the former, into a number of minute parts:

Un fou rempli d'erreurs, que le trouble accompagne
Et malade à la ville ainſi qu' à la campagne,
En vain monte à cheval pour tromper ſon ennui,
Le Chagrin monte en croupe, et galope avec lui.

A poet, in a ſhort and lively expreſſion, may animate his muſe, his genius, and even his verſe: but to animate his verſe, and to addreſs a whole epiſtle to it, as Boileau doth *, is inſupportable.

The following paſſage is not leſs faulty:

Her fate is whiſper'd by the gentle breeze,
And told in ſighs to all the trembling trees;
The trembling trees, in ev'ry plain and wood,
Her fate remurmer to the ſilver flood;
The ſilver flood, ſo lately calm, appears
Swell'd with new paſſion, and o'erflows with tears;
The winds, and trees, and floods, her death deplore,
Daphne, our grief! our glory! now no more.

Pope's Paſtorals, iv. 61.

Let grief or love have the power to animate the winds, the trees, the floods, provided the figure be diſpatched in a ſingle expreſſion: even in that caſe, the figure ſeldom has a good effect; becauſe grief or love of the paſtoral kind, are cauſes rather too faint for ſo violent an effect as imagining the winds, trees, or floods, to be ſenſible beings. But when this figure is deliberately ſpread out,

* Epiſtle 10.

with

with great regularity and accuracy, through many lines, the reader, inſtead of reliſhing it, is ſtruck with its ridiculous appearance.

SECT. II.

APOSTROPHE.

THIS figure and the former are derived from the ſame principle. If, to humour a plaintive paſſion, we can beſtow a momentary ſenſibility upon an inanimate object, it is not more difficult to beſtow a momentary preſence upon a ſenſible being who is abſent:

Hinc Drepani me portus et illætabilis ora
Accipit. Hic, pelagi tot tempeſtatibus actus,
Heu! genitorem, omnis curæ caſuſque levamen,
Amitto Anchiſen: *hic me pater optime feſſum*
Deſeris, heu! tantis nequicquam erepte periclis.
Nec vates Helenus, cum multa horrenda moneret,
Hos mihi prædixit luctus; non dira Celæno.

Æneid. iii. 707.

Strike the harp in praiſe of Bragela, whom I left in the iſle of miſt, the ſpouſe of my love. Doſt thou raiſe thy fair face from the rock to find the ſails of Cuchullin? The ſea is rolling far diſtant, and its white foam ſhall deceive thee for my ſails. Retire for it is night my love, and the dark winds ſigh in thy hair. Retire to the

hall of my feaſts, and think of the times that are paſt; for I will not return till the ſtorm of war is gone. O Connal ſpeak of wars and arms, and ſend her from my mind; for lovely with her raven-hair is the white-boſom'd daughter of Sorglan.

Fingal, b. 1.

Speaking of Fingal abſent.

Happy are thy people, O Fingal; thine arm ſhall fight their battles. Thou art the firſt in their dangers; the wiſeſt in the days of their peace: thou ſpeakeſt, and thy thouſands obey; and armies tremble at the ſound of thy ſteel. Happy are thy people, O Fingal.

This figure is ſometimes joined with the former: things inanimate, to qualify them for liſtening to a paſſionate expoſtulation, are not only perſonified, but alſo conceived to be preſent:

Et ſi fata Deûm, ſi mens non læva fuiſſet,
Impulerat ferro Argolicas fœdare latebras:
Trojaque nunc ſtares, Priamique arx alta maneres.

Æneid, ii. 54.

Helena——————Poor Lord, is't I
That chaſe thee from thy country, and expoſe
Thoſe tender limbs of thine to the event
Of non-ſparing war? And is it I
That drive thee from the ſportive court, where thou
Waſt ſhot at with fair eyes, to be the mark

Of

Of ſmoky muſkets? *O you leaden meſſengers,*
That ride upon the violent ſpeed of fire,
Fly with falſe aim; pierce the ſtill moving air
That ſings with piercing; do not touch my Lord.
All's well that ends well, act 3. ſc. 4

And let them lift ten thouſand ſwords, ſaid Nathos with a ſmile: the ſons of car-borne Uſnoth will never tremble in danger. Why doſt thou roll with all thy foam, thou roaring ſea of Ullin? why do ye ruſtle on your dark wings, ye whiſtling tempeſts of the ſky? Do ye think, ye ſtorms, that ye keep Nathos on the coaſt? No; his ſoul detains him; children of the night! Althos, bring my father's arms, &c.

Fingal.

Whether haſt thou fled, O wind, ſaid the King of Morven! Doſt thou ruſtle in the chambers of the ſouth, and purſue the ſhower in other lands? Why comeſt not thou to my ſails, to the blue face of my ſeas? The foe is in the land of Morven, and the King is abſent.

Fingal.

Haſt thou left thy blue courſe in heaven, golden-hair'd ſon of the ſky! The weſt hath opened its gates; the bed of thy repoſe is there. The waves gather to behold thy beauty: they lift their trembling heads; thy ſee thee lovely in thy ſleep; but they ſhrink away with fear. Reſt in thy ſhadowy cave, O Sun! and let thy return be in joy.

Fingal.

Daughter of Heaven, fair art thou! the ſilence of thy

thy face is pleaſant. Thou comeſt forth in lovelineſs: the ſtars attend thy blue ſteps in the eaſt. The clouds rejoice in thy preſence, O Moon! and brighten their dark-brown ſides. Who is like thee in heaven, daughter of the night? The ſtars are aſhamed in thy preſence, and turn aſide their ſparkling eyes. Whither doſt thou retire from thy courſe, when the darkneſs of thy countenance grows? Haſt thou thy hall like Oſſian? Dwelleſt thou in the ſhadow of grief? Have thy ſiſters fallen from heaven? and are they who rejoiced with thee at night no more?——Yes, they have fallen, fair light; and often doſt thou retire to mourn.——But thou thyſelf ſhalt, one night, fail; and leave thy blue path in heaven. The ſtars will then lift their heads: they, who in thy preſence were aſhamed, will rejoice.

Fingal.

This figure, like all others, requires an agitation of mind. In plain narrative, as, for example, in giving the genealogy of a family, it has no good effect:

——————— Fauno Picus pater; iſque parentem
Te, Saturne, refert; tu ſanguinis ultimus auctor.

Æneid. vii. 48.

SECT.

SECT. III.

HYPERBOLE.

IN this fignre, by which an object is magnified or diminiſhed beyond truth, we have another effect of the foregoing principle. An object of an uncommon ſize, either very great of its kind or very little, ſtrikes us with ſurpriſe; and this emotion produces a momentary conviction that the object is greater or leſs than it is in reality *: the ſame effect, preciſely, attends figurative grandeur or littleneſs; and hence the hyperbole, which expreſſes that momentary conviction. A writer, taking advantage of this natural deluſion, warms his deſcription greatly by the hyperbole: and the reader, even in his cooleſt moments, reliſhes the figure, being ſenſible that it is the operation of nature upon a glowing fancy.

It cannot have eſcaped obſervation, that a writer is commonly more ſucceſsful in magnifying by a hyperbole than in diminiſhing. The reaſon is, that a minute object contracts the mind, and fetters its power of imagination; but that the mind, dilated and inflamed with a grand object, moulds

* See Chap. 8.

objects

objects for its gratification with great facility. Longinus, with reſpect to a diminiſhing hyperbole, quotes the following ludicrous thought from a comic poet: "He was owner of a bit of ground "no larger than a Lacedemonian letter*." But, for the reaſon now given, the hyperbole has by far the greater force in magnifying objects; of which take the following examples:

For all the land which thou ſeeſt, to thee will I give it, and to thy ſeed for ever. And I will make thy ſeed as the duſt of the earth; ſo that if a man can number the duſt of the earth, then ſhall thy ſeed alſo be numbered.

Geneſis xiii. 15. 16.

Illa vel intactæ ſegetis per ſumma volaret
Gramina: nec teneras curſu læſiſſet ariſtas.

Æneid. vii. 808.

——— Atque imo barathri ter gurgite vaſtos
Sorbet in abruptum fluctus, rurſuſque ſub auras
Erigit alternos, et ſidera verberat undâ.

Æneid. iii. 421.

——— Horificis juxta tonat Ætna ruinis,
Interdumque atram prorumpit ad æthera nubem,
Turbine fumantem piceo et candente favilla:
Attollitque globos flammarum, et ſidera lambit.

Æneid. iii. 571.

* Chap. 31. of his Treatiſe on the Sublime.

Speaking

Speaking of Polyphemus:

——————— Ipſe arduus, altaque pulſat
Sidera.

Æneid. iii. 619.

——————— When he ſpeaks,
The air, a charter'd libertine, is ſtill.

Henry V. *act* 1. *ſc.* 1.

Now ſhield with ſhield, with helmet helmet clos'd,
To armour armour, lance to lance oppos'd.
Hoſt againſt hoſt with ſhadowy ſquadrons drew,
The ſounding darts in iron tempeſts flew,
Victors and vanquiſh'd join promiſcous cries,
And ſhrilling ſhouts and dying groans ariſe;
With ſtreaming blood the ſlipp'ry fields are dy'd,
And ſlaughter'd heroes ſwell the dreadful tide.

Iliad iv. 508.

The following may alſo paſs, though far ſtretched.

E conjungendo à temerario ardire
Eſtrema forza, e infaticabil lena
Vien che ſi'impetuoſo il ferro gire,
Che ne trema la terra, e'l ciel balena.

Gieruſalem, cant. 6. *ſt.* 46.

Quintilian * is ſenſible that this figure is natural: "For," ſays he, "not contented with truth, "we naturally inclined to augment or diminiſh "beyond it; and for that reaſon the hyperbole is

* L. 8. cap. 6. in fin.

"familiar

" familiar even among the vulgar and illiterate :" and he adds, very juſtly, " That the hyperbole i " then proper, when the ſubject of itſelf exceed " the common meaſure." From theſe premiſſes one would not expect the following inference, th only reaſon he can find for juſtifying this figure o ſpeech, " Conceditur enim amplius dicere, quia " dici quantum eſt, non poteſt : meliuſque ultra " quam citra ſtat oratio." (We are indulged to ſay more than enough, becauſe we cannot ſay enough ; and it is better to be above than under). In the name of wonder, why this childiſh reaſoning, after obſerving that the hyperbole is founded on human nature? I could not reſiſt this perſonal ſtroke of criticiſm ; intended not againſt our author, for no human creature is exempt from error, but againſt the blind veneration that is paid to the ancient claſſic writers, without diſtinguiſhing their blemiſhes from their beauties.

Having examined the nature of this figure, and the principle on which it is erected, I proceed, as in the firſt ſection, to the rules by which it ought to be governed. And, in the firſt place, it is a capital fault, to introduce an hyperbole in the deſcription of any thing ordinary or familiar; for in ſuch a caſe, it is altogether unnatural, being deſtitute of ſurpriſe, its only foundation. Take the following inſtance, where the ſubject is extremely familiar, *viz.* ſwimming to gain the ſhore after a ſhipwreck.

I

I ſaw him beat the ſurges under him,
And ride upon their backs; he trode the water;
Whoſe enmity he flung aſide, and breaſted
The ſurge moſt ſwoln that met him: his bold head
'Bove the contentious waves he kept, and oar'd
Himſelf with his good arms, in luſty ſtrokes
To th' *ſhore*, that o'er his wave-borne baſis bow'd,
As ſtooping to relieve him.

Tempeſt, act 2. *ſc.* 1.

In the next place, it may be gathered from what is ſaid, that an hyperbole can never ſuit the tone of any diſpiriting paſſion: ſorrow in particular will never prompt ſuch a figure; for which reaſon the following hyperboles muſt be condemned as unnatural:

K. Rich. Aumerle, thou weep'ſt my tender-hearted couſin!
We'll make foul weather with deſpiſed tears:
Our ſighs, and they, ſhall lodge the ſummer-corn,
And make a dearth in this revolting land.

Richard II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

Draw them to Tyber's bank, and weep your tears
Into the channel, till the loweſt ſtream
Do kiſs the moſt exalted ſhores of all.

Julius Cæſar, act 1. *ſc.* 1.

Thirdly, A writer, if he wiſh to ſucceed, ought always to have the reader in his eye: he ought in particular never to venture a bold thought or expreſſion,

expreſſion, till the reader be warmed and prepared. For that reaſon, an hyperbole in the beginning of a work can never be in its place. Example:

Jam pauca aratro jugera regiæ
Moles relinquent.

Horat. Carm. l. 1. *ode* 15.

The niceſt point of all, is to aſcertain the natural limits of an hyperbole, beyond which being overſtrained it hath a bad effect. Longinus, in the above-cited chapter, with great propriety of thought, enters a caveat againſt an hyperbole of this kind: he compares it to a bow-ſtring, which relaxes by overſtraining, and produceth an effect directly oppoſite to what is intended. To aſcertain any preciſe boundary, would be difficult, if not impracticable. Mine ſhall be an humbler taſk which is, to give a ſpecimen of what I reckon overſtrained hyperbole; and I ſhall be brief upon them, becauſe examples are to be found every where: no fault is more common among writers of inferior rank; and inſtances are found even among claſſical writers; witneſs the following hyperbole, too bold even for an Hotſpur.

Hotſpur talking of Mortimer:

In ſingle oppoſition hand to hand,
He did confound the beſt part of an hour

In

In changing hardiment with great Glendower.
Three times they breath'd, and three times did they
drink,
Upon agreement, of ſwift Severn's flood;
Who then affrighted with their bloody looks,
Ran fearfully among the trembling reeds,
And hid his criſp'd head in the hollow bank,
Blood-ſtained with theſe valiant combatants.

Firſt part Henry IV. *act* 1. *ſc.* 4.

Speaking of Henry V.

England ne'er had a king until his time:
Virtue he had, deſerving to command:
His brandiſh'd ſword did blind men with its beams:
His arms ſpread wider than a dragon's wings:
His ſparkling eyes, replete with awful fire,
More dazzled, and drove back his enemies,
Than mid-day ſun fierce bent againſt their faces.
What ſhould I ſay? his deeds exceed all ſpeech:
He never lifted up his hand, but conquer'd.

Firſt part Henry VI. *act* 1. *ſc.* 1.

Se tutti gli alberi del mondo foſſero penne,
Il cielo foſſe carta, il mare inchoſtro,
Non baſteriano a deſcrivere la minima
Parte delle voſtre perfettioni.

Se tante lingue haveſſi, e tante voci,
Quant' occhi il cielo, e quante arene il mare,
Perderian tutto il ſuono, e la favella
Nel dire a pieno le voſtri lodi immenſi.

Guarini.

It is obſervable, that a hyperbole, even the moſt extravagant, commonly produces ſome emotion: the preſent hyperbole is an exception; and the reaſon is, that numbers, in which the extravagance entirely conſiſts, make no impreſſion upon the imagination when they exceed what can eaſily be conceived.

Laſtly, An hyperbole, after it is introduced with all advantages, ought to be comprehended within the feweſt words poſſible: as it cannot be reliſhed but in the hurry and ſwelling of the mind, a leiſurely view diſſolves the charm, and diſcovers the deſcription to be extravagant at leaſt, and perhaps alſo ridiculous. This fault is palpable in a ſonnet which paſſeth for one of the moſt complete in the French language. Phillis, in a long and florid deſcription, is made as far to outſhine the ſun as he outſhines the ſtars,

Le ſilence regnoit ſur la terre et ſur l'onde,
L'air devenoit ſerain et l'Olimpe vermeil,
Et l'amoureux Zephir affranchi du ſommeil,
Reſſuſcitoit les fleurs d'une haleine feconde.

L'Aurore deployoit l'or de ſa treſſe blonde,
Et ſemoit de rubis le chemin du ſoleil;
Enfin ce Dieu venoit au plus grand appareil
Qu'il ſoit jamais venu pour éclairer le monde.

Quand la jeune Phillis au viſage riant,
Sortant de ſon palais plus clair que l'orient,

Fi

Fit voir une lumiere et plus vive et plus belle.
Sacre flambeau du jour, n'en ſoyez point jaloux.
Vous parûtes alors auſſi peu devant elle,
Que les feux de la nuit avoient fait devant vous.
Malleville.

There is in Chaucer a thought expreſſed in a ſingle line, which gives more luſtre to a young beauty, than the whole of this much-laboured poem:

Up roſe the ſun, and up roſe Emelie.

SECT. IV.

The Means or Inſtrument conceived to be the Agent.

WHEN we ſurvey a number of connected objects, that which makes the greateſt figure employs chiefly our attention; and the emotion it raiſes, if lively, prompts us even to exceed nature in the conception we form of it. Take the following examples.

For Neleus' ſon Alcides' *rage* had ſlain.

A broken rock the *force* of Pirus threw.

In theſe inſtances, the rage of Hercules and the

force of Pirus, being the capital circumſtances are ſo far exalted as to be conceived the agent that produce the effects.

In the following inſtances, hunger being the chief circumſtance in the deſcription, is itſelf imagined to be the patient.

Whoſe hunger has not taſted food theſe three days.

Jane Shore.

——————— As when the *force*
Of ſubterranean wind tranſports a hill.

Paradiſe Loſt.

——————— As when the *potent rod*
Of Amram's ſon, in Egypt's evil day
Wav'd round the coaſt, upcall'd a pitchy cloud
Of locuſts.

Paradiſe Loſt.

SECT. V.

A Figure, which, among related Objects, extends the Properties of one to another.

THIS figure is not dignified with a proper name, becauſe it has been overlooked by writers. It merits, however, a place in this work; and muſt be diſtinguiſhed from thoſe for-

merl

merly handled, as depending on a different principle. *Giddy brink*, *jovial wine*, *daring wound*, are examples of this figure. Here are adjectives that cannot be made to ſignify any quality of the ſubſtantives to which they are joined: a *brink*, for example, cannot be termed *giddy* in a ſenſe, either proper or figurative, that can ſignify any of its qualities or attributes. When we examine attentively the expreſſion, we diſcover, that a *brink* is termed *giddy* from producing that effect in thoſe who ſtand on it. In the ſame manner a wound is ſaid to be *daring*, not with reſpect to itſelf, but with reſpect to the boldneſs of the perſon who inflicts it: and wine is ſaid to be *jovial*, as inſpiring mirth and jollity. Thus the attributes of one ſubject are extended to another with which it is connected; and the expreſſion of ſuch a thought muſt be conſidered as a figure, becauſe the attribute is not applicable to the ſubject in any proper ſenſe.

How are we to account for this figure, which we ſee lies in the thought, and to what principle ſhall we refer it? Have poets a privilege to alter the nature of things, and at pleaſure to beſtow attributes upon a ſubject to which they do not belong? We have had often occaſion to inculcate, that the mind paſſeth eaſily and ſweetly along a train of connected objects; and, where the objects are intimately connected, that it is diſpoſed to carry along the good or bad properties of one to

another; eſpecially when it is in any degree inflamed with theſe properties *. From this principle is derived the figure under conſideration. Language, invented for the communication of thought, would be imperfect, if it were not expreſſive even of the ſlighter propenſities and more delicate feelings: but language cannot remain ſo imperfect among a people who have received any poliſh; becauſe language is regulated by internal feeling, and is gradually improved to expreſs whatever paſſes in the mind. Thus, for example, when a ſword in the hand of a coward, is termed *a coward ſword*, the expreſſion is ſignificative of an internal operation; for the mind, in paſſing from the agent to its inſtrument, is diſpoſed to extend to the latter the properties of the former. Governed by the ſame principle, we ſay *liſtening* fear, by extending the attribute *liſtening* of the man who liſtens, to the paſſion with which he is moved. In the expreſſion, *bold deed*, or *audax facinus*, we extend to the effect what properly belongs to the cauſe. But not to waſte time by making a commentary upon every expreſſion of this kind, the beſt way to give a complete view of the ſubject, is to exhibit a table of the different relations that may give occaſion to this figure. And in viewing the table, it will be obſerved, that the figure

* See chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 5.

figure can never have any grace but where the relations are of the moſt intimate kind.

1. An attribute of the cauſe expreſſed as an attribute of the effect.

Audax facinus.

Of yonder fleet a *bold* diſcovery make.

An impious mortal gave the *daring* wound.

——————To my *advent'rous* ſong,
That with no middle flight intends to ſoar.
Paradiſe Loſt.

2. An attribute of the effect expreſſed as an attribute of the cauſe.

Quos periiſſe ambos *miſera* cenſebam in mari.
Plautus.

No wonder, fallen ſuch a *pernicious* height.
Paradeſe Loſt.

3. An effect expreſſed as an attribute of the cauſe.

Jovial wine, Giddy brink, Drowſy night, Muſing midnight, Panting height, aſtoniſh'd thought, Mournful gloom.

Caſting a dim *religious* light.
Milton, Comus.

And the *merry* bells ring round,
And the *jocund* rebecks ſound.

Milton, Allegro.

4. An attribute of a ſubject beſtowed upon one of its parts or members.

Longing arms.
It was the nightingale and not the lark,
That pierc'd the *fearful* hollow of thin ear.

Romeo and Juliet, act 3. *ſc.* 7.

——————— Oh, lay by
Thoſe moſt ungentle looks and angry weapons;
Unleſs you mean my griefs and killing fears
Should ſtretch me out at your *relentleſs* feet.

Fair Penitent, act 3.

——————— And ready now
To ſtoop with *wearied* wing and *willing* feet,
On the bare outſide of this world,

Paradiſe Loſt, b. 3.

5. A quality of the agent given to the inſtrument with which it operates.

Why peep your *coward* ſwords half out their ſhells!

6. An attribute of the agent given to the ſubject upon which it operates.

High-climbing hill.

Milton.

7. A quality of one ſubject given to another.

Icci, *beatis* nunc Arabum invides
Gazis.

Horat. Carm. l. 1. *ode* 29.

When ſapleſs age, and weak unable limbs,
Should bring thy father to his *drooping* chair.

Shakeſpear.

By art, the pilot through the boiling deep
And howling tempeſt, ſteers the *fearleſs* ſhip.

Iliad xxiii. 385.

Then, nothing loath, th' enamour'd fair he led,
And ſunk tranſported on the *conſcious* bed.

Odyſſey viii. 337.

A *ſtupid* moment motionleſs ſhe ſtood.

Summer, l. 1336.

8. A circumſtance connected with a ſubject, expreſſed as a quality of the ſubject.

Breezy ſummit.
'Tis ours the chance of *fighting* fields to try.

Iliad i. 301.

Oh! had I dy'd before that *well-fought* wall.

Odyſſey v. 395.

From this table it appears, that the adorning a cauſe with an attribute of the effect, is not ſo agreeable as the oppoſite expreſſion. The progreſs from

from cauſe to effect is natural and eaſy: the oppoſite progreſs reſembles retrogade motion *; and therefore *panting height*, *aſtoniſh'd thought*, are ſtrained and uncouth expreſſions, which a writer of taſte will avoid.

It is not leſs ſtrained, to apply to a ſubject in in its preſent ſtate, an epithet that may belong to it in ſome future ſtate:

Submerſaſque obrue puppes.

Æneid. i. 73.

And mighty *ruins* fall,

Iliad v. 411.

Impious ſons their *mangled* fathers wound,

Another rule regards this figure, That the property of one ſubject ought not to be beſtowed upon another with which that property is incongruous:

King Rich. ——— How dare thy joints forget
To pay their *awful* duty to our preſence?

Richard II. *act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

The connection between an awful ſuperior and his ſubmiſſive dependent is ſo intimate, that an attribute may readily be transferred from the one to the other: but awfulneſs cannot be ſo transferred, becauſe it is inconſiſtent with ſubmiſſion.

SECT.

* See chap. 1.

SECT. VI.

Metaphor and Allegory.

A Metaphor differs from a ſimile, in form only, not in ſubſtance: in a ſimile, the two ſubjects are kept diſtinct in the expreſſion, as well as in the thought; in a metaphor, the two ſubjects are kept diſtinct in the thought only, not in the expreſſion. A hero reſembles a lion, and, upon that reſemblance many ſimiles have been raiſed by Homer and other poets. But inſtead of reſembling a lion, let us take the aid of the imagination, and feign or figure the hero to be a lion: by that variation the ſimile is converted into a metaphor; which is carried on by deſcribing all the qualities of a lion that reſemble thoſe of the hero. The fundamental pleaſure here, that of reſemblance, belongs to the thought. An additional pleaſure ariſes from the expreſſion: the poet, by figuring his hero to be a lion, goes on to deſcribe the lion in appearance, but in reality the hero; and his deſcription is peculiarly beautiful, by expreſſing the virtues and qualities of the hero in new terms, which, properly ſpeaking, belong not to him, but to the lion. This will better be underſtood by examples. A family connected with a common parent,

rent, reſembles a tree, the trunk and branches of which are connected with a common root: but let uſe ſuppoſe, that a family is figured, not barely to be like a tree, but to be a tree; and then the ſimile will be converted into a metaphor, in the following manner:

Edward's ſev'n ſons, whereof thyſelf art one,
Were ſev'n fair branches, ſpringing from one root:
Some of theſe branches by the deſt'nies cut:
But Thomas, my dear lord, my life, my Glo'ſter,
One flouriſhing branch of his moſt royal root,
Is hack'd down, and his ſummer-leaves all faded,
By Envy's hand and Murder's bloody axe.

Richard. II *act* 1. *ſc.* 3.

Figuring human life to be a voyage at ſea:

There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in ſhallows and in miſeries.
On ſuch a full ſea are we now afloat,
And we muſt take the current while it ſerves,
Or loſe our ventures.

Julius Cæſar, act 4. *ſc.* 5.

Figuring glory and honour to be a garland of flowers.

Hotſpur. ——————— Wou'd to heav'n,
Thy name in arms were now as great as mine!

Pr.

Pr. Henry. I'll make it greater, ere I part from thee,
And all the budding honours on thy creſt
I'll crop, to make a garland for my head.

Firſt part Henry IV. *act* 5. *ſc.* 9.

Figuring a man who hath acquired great reputation and honour to be a tree full of fruit:

——————— Oh, boys, this ſtory
The world may read in me: my body's mark'd
With Roman ſwords; and my report was once
Firſt with the beſt of note. Cymbeline lov'd me;
And when a ſoldier was the theme, my name
Was not far off: then was I as a tree,
Whoſe boughs did bend with fruit. But in one night,
A ſtorm or robbery, call it what you will,
Shook down my mellow hangings, nay my leaves;
And left me bare to weather.

Cymbeline, act 3. *ſc.* 3.

Bleſt be thy ſoul, thou king of ſhells, ſaid Swaran of the dark-brown ſhield. In peace thou art the gale of ſpring; in war, the mountain-ſtorm. Take now my hand in friendſhip, thou noble king of Morven.

Fingal.

Thou dwelleſt in the ſoul of Malvina, ſon of mighty Oſſian. My ſighs ariſe with the beam of the eaſt: my tears deſcend with the drops of night. I was a lovely tree in thy preſence, Oſcar, with all my branches round me: but thy death came like a blaſt from the deſert, and laid my green head low: the ſpring returned with its ſhowers, but no leaf of mine aroſe.

Fingal.

I am aware that the term *metaphor* has been uſed in a more extenſive ſenſe than I give it; but I thought it of conſequence, in a diſquiſition of ſome intricacy, to confine the term to its proper ſenſe, and to ſeparate from it things that are diſtinguiſhed by different names. An allegory differs from a metaphor; and what I would chooſe to call *a figure of ſpeech*, differs from both. I proceed to explain theſe differences. A metaphor is defined above to be an act of the imagination, figuring one thing to be another. An allegory requires no ſuch operation, nor is one thing figured to be another: it conſiſts in chooſing a ſubject having properties or circumſtances reſembling thoſe of the principal ſubject; and the former is deſcribed in ſuch a manner as to repreſent the latter; the ſubject thus repreſented is kept out of view; we are left to diſcover it by reflection; and we are pleaſed with the diſcovery, becauſe it is our own work. Quintilian * gives the following inſtance of an allegory,

O navis, referent in mare te novi
Fluctus. O quid agis? fortiter occupa portum.
Horat. lib. 1. ode 14.

and explains it elegantly in the following words: "Totuſque ille Horatii locus, quo navim pro re-
"publica,

* L. 8. cap. 6. ſect. 2.

" publica, fluctuum tempeſtates pro bellis civili-
" bus, portum pro pace atque concordia, dicit."

A finer or more correct allegory is not to be found than the following, in which a vineyard is made to repreſent God's own people the Jews.

Thou haſt brought a vine out of Egypt: thou haſt caſt out the Heathen, and planted it. Thou didſt cauſe it to take deep root, and it filled the land. The hills were covered with its ſhadow, and the boughs thereof were like the goodly cedars. Why haſt thou then broken down her hedges, ſo that all which paſs do pluck her? The boar out of the wood doth waſte it, and the wild beaſt doth devour it. Return, we beſeech thee, O God of hoſts: look down from heaven, and behold, and viſit this vine, and the vineyard thy right hand hath planted, and the branch thou madeſt ſtrong for thyſelf.

Pſalm 80.

In a word, an allegory is in every reſpect ſimilar to an hieroglyphical painting, excepting only that words are uſed inſtead of colours. Their effects are preciſely the ſame: a hieroglyphic raiſes two images in the mind; one ſeen, which repreſents one not ſeen: an allegory does the ſame; the repreſentative ſubject is deſcribed; and reſemblance leads us to apply the deſcription to the ſubject repreſented. In a figure of ſpeech, there is no fiction of the imagination employed, as in a metaphor, nor a repreſentative ſubject introduced, as in

in an allegory. This figure, as its name implies, regards the expreſſion only, not the thought; and it may be defined, the uſing a word in a ſenſe different from what is proper to it. Thus youth, or the beginning of life, is expreſſed figuratively by *morning of life*: morning is the beginning of the day; and in that view it is employed to ſignify the beginning of any other ſeries, life eſpecially, the progreſs of which is reckoned by days.

Figures of ſpeech are reſerved for a ſeparate ſection; but metaphor and allegory are ſo much connected, that they muſt be handled together: the rules particularly for diſtinguiſhing the good from the bad, are common to both. We ſhall therefore proceed to theſe rules, after adding ſome examples to illuſtrate the nature of an allegory. Horace, ſpeaking of his love to Pyrrha, which was now extinguiſhed, expreſſeth himſelf thus:

——————— Me tabulâ ſacer
Votivâ paries indicat uvida
Suſpendiſſe potenti
Veſtimenta maris Deo.

Carm. l. 1. *ode* 5.

Again:

Phœbus volentem prælia me loqui,
Victas et urbes, increpuit lyrâ:
Ne parva Tyrrhenum per æquor
Vela darem.

Carm. l. 5. *ode* 15.

Queen.

Queen. Great Lords, wiſe men ne'er ſit and wail
their loſs,
But chearly ſeek how to redreſs their harms.
What though the maſt be now thrown overboard,
The cable broke, the holding anchor loſt,
And half our ſailors ſwallow'd in the flood;
Yet lives our pilot ſtill. Is't meet, that he
Should leave the helm, and, like a fearful lad,
With tearful eyes, add water to the ſea,
And give more ſtrength to that which hath too much;
While in his moan the ſhip ſplits on the rock,
Which induſtry and courage might have ſav'd?
Ah, what a ſhame! ah, what a fault were this!

Third Part Henry VI. *act* 5. *ſc.* 5.

Oroonoko. Ha! thou haſt rous'd
The lion in his den: he ſtalks abroad,
And the wide foreſt trembles at his roar.
I find the danger now.

Oroonoko, act 3. *ſc.* 2.

My well-beloved hath a vineyard in a very fruitful hill. He fenced it, gathered out the ſtones thereof, planted it with the choiceſt vine, built a tower in the midſt of it, and alſo made a wine-preſs therein: he looked that it ſhould bring forth grapes, and it brought forth wild grapes. And now, O inhabitants of Jeruſalem, and men of Judah, judge, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard. What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done? Wherefore, when I looked that it ſhould bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes? And now go to; I will tell you what I will do to my vineyard: I will take away the hedge thereof, and it ſhall be eaten up; and

break down the wall thereof, and it ſhall be trodden down. And I will lay it waſte: it ſhall not be pruned, nor digged, but there ſhall come up briers and thorns: I will alſo command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it. For the vineyard of the Lord of hoſts is the houſe of Iſrael, and the men of Judah his pleaſant plant.

Iſaiah, v. 1.

The rules that govern metaphors, and allegories, are of two kinds: the conſtruction of theſe figures comes under the firſt kind: the propriety or impropriety of introduction comes under the other. I begin with rules of the firſt kind; ſome of which coincide with thoſe already given for ſimiles; ſome are peculiar to metaphors and allegories.

And, in the firſt place, it has been obſerved, that a ſimile cannot be agreeable where the reſemblance is either too ſtrong or too faint. This holds equally in metaphor and allegory; and the reaſon is the ſame in all. In the following inſtances, the reſemblance is too faint to be agreeable.

Malcolm. ——— But there's no bottom, none,
In my voluptuouſneſs: your wives, your daughters,
Your matrons, and your maids, could not fill up
The ciſtern of my luſt.

Macbeth, act 4. *ſc.* 4.

The beſt way to judge of this metaphor, is to convert it into a ſimile; which would be bad, becauſe there

there is ſcarce any reſemblance between luſt and a ciſtern, or betwixt enormous luſt and a large ciſtern.

Again:

He cannot buckle his diſtemper'd cauſe
Within the belt of rule.

Macbeth, act 5. *ſc.* 2.

There is no reſemblance between a diſtempered cauſe and any body that can be confined within a belt.

Again:

Steep me in poverty to the very lips.

Othello, act 4. *ſc.* 9.

Poverty here muſt be conceived a fluid, which it reſembles not in any manner.

Speaking to Bolingbroke baniſhed for ſix years:

The ſullen paſſage of thy weary ſteps
Eſteem a ſoil, wherein thou art to ſet
The precious jewel of thy home-return.

Richard II. *act* 1. *ſc.* 6.

Again:

Here is a letter, lady,
And every word in it a gaping wound
Iſſuing life-blood.

Merchant of Venice, act 3. *ſc.* 3.

Tantæ *molis* erat Romanam condere gentem.

Æneid. i. 37.

The following metaphor is ſtrained beyond all endurance: Timur-bec, known to us by the name of Tamerlane the Great, writes to Bajazet Emperor of the Ottomans in the following terms:

Where is the monarch who dares reſiſt us? where is the potentate who doth not glory in being numbered among our attendants? As for thee, deſcended from a Turcoman ſailor, ſince the veſſel of thy unbounded ambition hath been wreck'd in the gulf of thy ſelf-love, it would be proper, that thou ſhouldſt take in the ſails of thy temerity, and caſt the anchor of repentance in the port of ſincerity and juſtice, which is the port of ſafety; leſt the tempeſt of our vengeance make thee periſh in the ſea of the puniſhment thou deſerveſt.

Such ſtrained figures, as obſerved above *, are not unfrequent in the firſt dawn of refinement: the mind in a new enjoyment knows no bounds, and is generally carried to exceſs, till taſte and experience diſcover the proper limits.

Secondly, Whatever reſemblance ſubjects may have, it is wrong to put one for another, where they bear no mutual proportion: upon comparing a very high to a very low ſubject, the ſimile takes on an air of burleſque; and the ſame will be the effect, where the one is imagined to be the other.

* Chap. 19. Compariſons.

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as in a metaphor; or made to repreſent the other, as in an allegory.

Thirdly, Theſe figures, a metaphor eſpecially, ought not to be crowded with many minute circumſtances; for in that caſe it is ſcarcely poſſible to avoid obſcurity. A metaphor above all ought to be ſhort: it is difficult, for any time, to ſupport a lively image of a thing being what we know it is not; and for that reaſon, a metaphor drawn out to any length, inſtead of illuſtrating or enlivening the principal ſubject, becomes diſagreeable by overſtraining the mind. Here Cowley is extremely licentious: take the following inſtance.

Great and wiſe conqu'ror, who where-e'er
Thou com'ſt, doth fortify, and ſettle there!
Who canſt defend as well as get,
And never hadſt one quarter beat up yet;
Now thou art in, thou ne'er wilt part
With one inch of my vanquiſh'd heart;
For ſince thou took'ſt it by aſſault from me,
'Tis garriſon'd ſo ſtrong with thoughts of thee,
It feart no beauteous enemy.

For the ſame reaſon, however agreeable long allegories may at firſt be by their novelty, they never afford any laſting pleaſure: witneſs the *Fairy-Queen*, which with great power of expreſſion, variety of images, and melody of verſification, is ſcarce ever read a ſecond time.

In the fourth place, the compariſon carried on in a ſimile, being in a metaphor ſunk by imagining the principal ſubject to be that very thing which it only reſembles; an opportunity is furniſhed to deſcribe it in terms taken ſtrictly or literally with reſpect to its imagined nature. This ſuggeſts another rule, That in conſtructing a metaphor, the writer ought to make uſe of ſuch words only as are applicable literally to the imagined nature of his ſubject: figurative words ought carefully to be avoided; for ſuch complicated figures, inſtead of ſetting the principal ſubject in a ſtrong light, involve it in a cloud; and it is well if the reader, without rejecting by the lump, endeavour patiently to gather the plain meaning regardleſs of the figures:

A ſtubborn and unconquerable flame
Creeps in his veins, and drinks the ſtreams of life.
Lady Jane Gray, act I. *ſc.* I.

Copied from Ovid,

Sorbent avidæ præcordia flammæ.
Metamorph. lib. ix. 172.

Let us analyſe this expreſſion. That a fever may be imagined a flame, I admit; though more than one ſtep is neceſſary to come at the reſemblance: a fever, by heating the body, reſembles fire; and it is no ſtretch to imagine a fever to be a fire: again

again, by a figure of ſpeech, flame may be put for fire, becau e they are commonly conjoined; and therefore a fever may be termed a flame. But now admitting a fever to be a flame, its effects ought to be explained in words that agree literally to a flame. This rule is not obſerved here; for a flame *drinks* figuratively only, not properly.

King Henry to his ſon Prince Henry:

> Thou hid'ſt a thouſand daggers in thy thoughts,
> Which thou haſt whetted on thy ſtony heart
> To ſtab at half an hour of my frail life.
>
> *Second Part, Henry* IV. *act* 4. *ſc.* 11.

Such faulty metaphors are pleaſantly ridiculed in the *Rehearſal*:

Phyſician. Sir, to conclude, the place you fill has more than amply exacted the talents of a wary pilot; and all theſe threatening ſtorms, which, like impregnate clouds, hover o'er our heads, will, when they once are graſp'd but by the eye of reaſon, melt into fruitful ſhowers of bleſſings on the people.

Bayes. Pray mark that allegory. Is not that good?

Johnſon. Yes, that graſping of a ſtorm with the eye is admirable.

Act 2. *ſc.* 1.

Fifthly, The jumbling different metaphors in the ſame ſentence, beginning with one metaphor and ending with another, commonly called a mixt

metaphor, ought never to be indulged. Quintilian bears teſtimony againſt it in the bittereſt terms; "Nam id quoque in primis eſt cuſtodien-
"dum, ut quo ex genere cœperis tranſlationis,
"hoc deſinas. Multi enim, cum initium a tem-
"peſtate ſumpſerunt, incendio aut ruina finiunt;
"quæ eſt inconſequentia rerum fœdiſſima." *L.* 8. *cap.* 6. § 2.

K. Henry.——Will you again unknit
This churliſh knot of all-abhorred war,
And move in that obedient orb again,
Where you did give a fair and natural light?
Firſt part Henry VI. *act* 5. *ſc.* 1.

Whether 'tis nobler in the mind, to ſuffer
The ſtings and arrows of outrag'ous fortune;
Or to take arms againſt a ſea of troubles,
And by oppoſing end them.
Hamlet, act 3. *ſc.* 2.

In the ſixth place, It is unpleaſant to join different metaphors in the ſame period, even where they are preſerved diſtinct: for when the ſubject is imagined to be firſt one thing and then another in the ſame period without interval, the mind is diſtracted by the rapid tranſition; and when the imagination is put on ſuch hard duty, its images are too faint to produce any good effect:

At

At regina gravi jamdudum ſaucia cura,
Vulnus alit venis, et cæco carpitur igni.

Æneid. iv. 1.

——————Eſt mollis flamma medullas
Interea, et tacitum vivit ſub pectore vulnus.

Æneid. iv. 66.

Motum ex Metello conſule civicum,
Bellique cauſas, et vitia, et modos,
Ludumque fortunæ, graveſque
Principum amicitias, et arma
Nondum expiatis uncta cruoribus,
Periculoſæ plenum opus aleæ,
Tractas, et incedis per ignes
Subpoſitos cineri doloſo.

Horat. Carm. l. 2. *ode* 1.

In the laſt place, It is ſtill worſe to jumble together metaphorical and natural expreſſion, ſo as that the period muſt be underſtood in part metaphorically, in part literally; for the imagination cannot follow with ſufficient eaſe changes ſo ſudden and unprepared: a metaphor begun and not carried on, hath no beauty; and inſtead of light there is nothing but obſcurity and confuſion. Inſtances of ſuch incorrect compoſition are without number. I ſhall, for a ſpecimen, ſelect a few from different authors.

Speaking of Britain,

This precious ſtone ſet in the ſea,
Which ſerves it in the office of a wall,

Or

Or as a moat defenſive to a houſe
Againſt the envy of leſs happier lands.

Richard II. *act* 2. *ſc.* 1.

In the firſt line Britain is figured to be a precious ſtone: in the following lines, Britain, diveſted of her metaphorical dreſs, is preſented to the reader in her natural appearance.

Theſe growing feathers pluck'd from Cæſar's wing,
Will make him fly an ordinary pitch,
Who elſe would ſoar above the view of men,
And keep us all in ſervile fearfulneſs.

Julius Cæſar, act 1. *ſc.* 1.

Rebus anguſtis animoſus atque
Fortis adpare: ſapienter idem
Contrahes vento nimium ſecundo
Turgida vela. *Hor.*

The following is a miſerable jumble of expreſſions, ariſing from an unſteady view of the ſubject, between its figurative and natural appearance:

But now from gath'ring clouds deſtruction pours,
Which ruins with mad rage our halcyon hours:
Miſts from black jealouſies the tempeſt form,
Whilſt late diviſions reinforce the ſtorm.

Diſpenſary, canto 3.

To thee, the world its preſent homage pays,
The harveſt early, but mature the praiſe.

Pope's Imitation of Horace. b. 2.

Oui,

Oui, ſa pudeur n'eſt que franche grimace,
Qu'une ombre de vertu qui garde mal la place,
Et qui s'evanouit, comme l'on peut ſavoir,
Aux rayons du ſoleil qu'une bourſe fait voir.

Moliere, l'Etourdi, act 3. ſc. 2.

Et ſon feu, depourvû de ſenſe et de lecture,
S'éteint à chaque pas, faute de nourriture.

Boileau, l'Art poetique, chant 3. l. 319.

Dryden, in his dedication of the tranſlation of *Juvenal*, ſays,

When thus, as I may ſay, before the uſe of the loadſtone, or knowledge of the compaſs, I was ſailing in a vaſt ocean, without other help than the pole-ſtar of the ancients, and the rules of the French ſtage among the moderns, &c.

There is a time when factions, by the vehemence of their own fermentation, ſtun and diſable one another.

Bolingbroke.

This fault of jumbling the figure and plain expreſſion into one confuſed maſs, is not leſs common in allegory than in metaphor. Take the following examples.

——— Heu! quoties fidem,
Mutatoſque Deos flebit, et aſpera
Nigris æquora ventis
Emirabitur inſolens,
Qui nunc te fruitur credulus aureâ:
Qui ſemper vacuam, ſemper amabilem
Sperat, neſcius auræ
Fallacis. *Horat. Carm. l. 1. ode 5.*

Pour

Pour moi ſur cette mer, qu'ici bas nous courons,
Je ſonge à me pourvoir d'eſquif et d'avirons,
A regler mes deſirs, à prévenir l'orage,
Et ſauver, s'il ſe peut, ma Raiſon du naufrage.
Boileau, epitre 5.

Lord Halifax, ſpeaking of the ancient fabuliſts: "They (ſays he) wrote in ſigns and ſpoke in parables: all their fables carry a double meaning; "the ſtory is one and entire; the characters the "ſame throughout; not broken or changed, and "always conformable to the nature of the creature they introduce. They never tell you, that "the dog which ſnapp'd at a ſhadow, loſt his "troop of horſe; that would be unintelligible. "This is his (Dryden's) new way of telling a "ſtory, and confounding the moral and the fable "together." After inſtancing from the hind and panther, he goes on thus: "What relation has "the hind to our Saviour; or what notion have "we of a panther's Bible? If you ſay he means "the church, how does the church feed on lawns, "or range in the foreſt? Let it be always a "church or always a cloven-footed beaſt, for we "cannot bear his ſhifting the ſcene every line."

A few words more upon allegory. Nothing gives greater pleaſure than this figure, when the repreſentative ſubject bears a ſtrong analogy, in all its circumſtances, to that which is repreſented: but the choice is ſeldom ſo lucky; the analogy being

being generally ſo faint and obſcure, as to puzzle and not pleaſe. An allegory is ſtill more difficult in painting than in poetry: the former can ſhow no reſemblance but what appears to the eye; the latter hath many other reſources for ſhowing the reſemblance. And therefore, with reſpect to what the Abbé du Bos * terms mixt allegorical compoſitions, theſe may do in poetry; becauſe, in writing, the allegory can eaſily be diſtinguiſhed from the hiſtorical part: no perſon, for example, miſtakes Virgil's Fame for a real being. But ſuch a mixture in a picture is intolerable; becauſe in a picture the objects muſt appear all of the ſame kind, wholly real or wholly emblematical. For this reaſon, the hiſtory of Mary de Medicis, in the palace of Luxenbourg, painted by Rubens, is unpleaſant by a perpetual jumble of real and allegorical perſonages, which produce a diſcordance of parts, and an obſcurity upon the whole: witneſs in particular, the tablature repreſenting the arrival of Mary de Medicis at Marſeilles; where, together with the real perſonages, the Nereids and Tritons appear ſounding their ſhells: ſuch a mixture of fiction and reality in the ſame group, is ſtrangely abſurd. The picture of Alexander and Roxana, deſcribed by Lucian, is gay and fanciful; but it ſuffers by the allegorical figures. It is not in the wit of man to invent an allegorical re-

* Reflections ſur la Poeſie, vol. 1. ſect. 24.

preſentation

preſentation deviating farther from any ſhadow of reſemblance, than one exhibited by Lewis XIV. *anno* 1664; in which an enormous chariot, intended to repreſent that of the ſun, is dragg'd along, ſurrounded with men and women, repreſenting the four ages of the world, the celeſtial ſigns, the ſeaſons, the hours, &c.; a monſtrous compoſition, ſuggeſted probably by Guido's tablature of Aurora, and ſtill more abſurd.

In an allegory as well as in a metaphor, terms ought to be choſen that properly and literally are applicable to the repreſentative ſubject: nor ought any circumſtance to be added that is not proper to the repreſentative ſubject, however juſtly it may be applicable properly or figuratively to the principal. The following allegory is therefore faulty:

> Ferus et Cupido,
> Semper ardentes acuens ſagittas
> Cote *cruentâ*.
>
> *Horat. l.* 2. *odè* 8.

For though blood may ſuggeſt the cruelty of love, it is an improper or immaterial circumſtance in the repreſentative ſubject: water, not blood, is proper for a whetſtone.

We proceed to the next head, which is, to examine in what circumſtance theſe figures are proper, in what improper. This inquiry is not altogether

gether ſuperſeded by what is ſaid upon the ſame ſubject in the chapter of Compariſons; becauſe upon trial it will be found, that a ſhort metaphor or allegory may be proper, where a ſimile, drawn out to a greater length, and in its nature more ſolemn, would ſcarce be reliſhed.

And, firſt, a metaphor, like a ſimile, is excluded from common converſation, and from the deſcription of ordinary incidents.

Second, in expreſſing any ſevere paſſion that wholly occupies the mind, metaphor is improper. For which reaſon, the following ſpeech of Macbeth is faulty.

Methought I heard a voice cry, Sleep no more!
Macbeth doth murder ſleep; the innocent ſleep;
Sleep that knits up the ravell'd ſleeve of Care,
The birth of each day's life, ſore Labour's bath,
Balm of hurt minds, great Nature's ſecond courſe,
Chief nouriſher in Life's feaſt.——

Act 2. *ſc.* 3.

The following example, of deep deſpair, beſide the highly figurative ſtyle, hath more the air of raving than of ſenſe:

Caliſta. Is it the voice of thunder, or my father?
Madneſs! Confuſion! let the ſtorm come on,
Let the tumultuous roar drive all upon me,
Daſh my devoted bark; ye ſurges, break it;
'Tis for my ruin that the tempeſt riſes.

When

When I am loſt, ſunk to the bottom low,
Peace ſhall return, and all be calm again.

Fair Penitent, act 4.

The metaphor I next introduce, is ſweet and lively, but it ſuits not a fiery temper inflamed with paſſion: parables are not the language of wrath venting itſelf without reſtraint:

Chamont. You took her up a little tender flower,
Juſt ſprouted on a bank, which the next froſt
Had nip'd; and with a careful loving hand,
Tranſplanted her into your own fair garden,
Where the ſun always ſhines: there long ſhe flouriſh'd,
Grew ſweet to ſenſe and lovely to the eye,
Till at the laſt a cruel ſpoiler came,
Cropt this fair roſe, and rifled all its ſweetneſs,
Then caſt it like a loathſome weed away.

Orphan, act 4.

The following ſpeech, full of imagery, is not natural in grief and dejection of mind:

Gonſalez. O my ſon! from the blind dotage
Of a father's fondneſs theſe ills aroſe.
For thee I've been ambitious, baſe and bloody:
For thee I've plung'd into this ſea of ſin;
Stemming the tide with only one weak hand,
While t'other bore the crown (to wreathe thy brow,)
Whoſe weight has ſunk me ere I reach'd the ſhore.

Mourning Bride, act 5. *ſc.* 6.

There

There is an enchanting picture of deep diſtreſs in Macbeth *, where Macduff is repreſented lamenting his wife and children, inhumanly murdered by the tyrant. Stung to the heart with the news, he queſtions the meſſenger over and over: not that he doubted the fact, but that his heart revolted againſt ſo cruel a misfortune. After ſtruggling ſome time with his grief, he turns from his wife and children to their ſavage butcher; and then gives vent to his reſentment, but ſtill with manlineſs and dignity:

O, I could play the woman with mine eyes,
And braggart with my tongue. But, gentle Heav'n!
Cut ſhort all intermiſſion; front to front
Bring thou this fiend of Scotland and myſelf;
Within my ſword's length ſet him.—If he 'ſcape,
Then Heav'n forgive him too.

The whole ſcene is a delicious picture of human nature. One expreſſion only ſeems doubtful: in examining the meſſenger, Macduff expreſſes himſelf thus:

He hath no children—all my pretty ones!
Did you ſay, all? what, all? Oh, hell-kite! all?
What! all my pretty little chickens and their dam,
At one fell ſwoop!

* Act 4. ſc. 6.

Metaphorical expreſſion, I am ſenſible, may ſometimes be uſed with grace, where a regular ſimile would be intolerable: but there are ſituations ſo ſevere and diſpiriting, as not to admit even the ſlighteſt metaphor. It requires great delicacy of taſte to determine with firmneſs, whether the preſent caſe be of that kind: I incline to think it is; and yet I would not willingly alter a ſingle word of this admirable ſcene.

But metaphorical language is proper when a man ſtruggles to bear with dignity or decency a misfortune however great: the ſtruggle agitates and animates the mind:

Wolſey. Farewell, a long farewell, to all my greatneſs!
This is the ſtate of man; to-day he puts forth
The tender leaves of hope; to-morrow bloſſoms,
And bears his bluſhing honours thick upon him;
The third day comes a froſt, a killing froſt,
And when he thinks, good eaſy man, full ſurely
His greatneſs is a ripening, nips his root,
And then he falls as I do.

Henry VIII. *act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

SECT.

SECT. VII.

Figure of Speech.

IN the ſection immediately foregoing, a figure of ſpeech is defined, "The uſing a word in a "ſenſe different from what is proper to it;" and the new or uncommon ſenſe of the word is termed *the figurative ſenſe*. The figurative ſenſe muſt have a relation to that which is proper; and the more intimate the relation is, the figure is the more happy. How ornamental this figure is to language, will not be readily imagined by any one who hath not given peculiar attention; and therefore I ſhall endeavour to unfold its capital beauties and advantages. In the firſt place, a word uſed figuratively or in a new ſenſe, ſuggeſts at the ſame time the ſenſe it commonly bears: and thus it has the effect to preſent two objects; one ſignified by the figurative ſenſe, which may be termed *the principal object*; and one ſignified by the proper ſenſe, which may be termed *acceſſory*: the principal makes a part of the thought; the acceſſory is merely ornamental. In this reſpect, a figure of ſpeech is preciſely ſimilar to concordant ſounds in muſic, which without contributing to the melody, make it harmonious. I explain myſelf by examples.

Youth, by a figure of ſpeech, is termed *the morning of life*. This expreſſion ſignifies *youth*, the principal object, which enters into the thought: it ſuggeſts, at the ſame time, the proper ſenſe of *morning*; and this acceſſary object, being in itſelf beautiful, and connected by reſemblance to the principal object, is not a little ornamental. *Imperious ocean* is an example of a different kind, where an attribute is expreſſed figuratively: together with *ſtormy*, the figurative meaning of the epithet *imperious*, there is ſuggeſted its proper meaning, *viz.* the ſtern authority of a deſpotic prince; and theſe two are ſtrongly connected by reſemblance. Upon this figurative power of words, Vida deſcants with elegance:

Nonne vides, verbis ut veris ſæpe relictis
Accerſant ſimulata, aliundeque nomina porro
Tranſportent, aptentque aliis ea rebus; ut ipſæ,
Exuviaſque novas, res, inſolitoſque colores
Indutæ, ſæpe externi mirentur amictus
Unde illi, lætæque aliena luce fruantur,
Mutatoque habitu, nec jam ſua nomina mallent?
Sæpe ideo, cum bella canunt, incendia credas
Cernere, diluviumque ingens ſurgentibus undis.
Contra etiam Martis pugnas imitabitur ignis,
Cum furit accenſis acies Vulcania campis.
Nec turbato oritur quondam minor æquore pugna:
Confligunt animoſi Euri certamine vaſto
Inter ſe, pugnantque adverſis molibus undæ.
Uſque adeo paſſim ſua res inſignia lætæ

Permu-

Permutantque, juvantque viciſſim; et mutua ſeſe
Altera in alterius transformat protinus ora.
Tum ſpecie capti gaudent ſpectare legentes:
Nam diverſa ſimul datur è re cernere eadem
Multarum ſimulacra animo ſubeuntia rerum.

Poet. lib. 3. *l.* 44.

In the next place, this figure poſſeſſes a ſignal power of aggrandiſing an object, by the following means. Words, which have no original beauty but what ariſes from their ſound, acquire an adventitious beauty from their meaning: a word ſignifying any thing that is agreeable, becomes by that means agreeable; for the agreeableneſs of the object is communicated to its name *. This acquired beauty by the force of cuſtom, adheres to the word even when uſed figuratively; and the beauty received from the thing it properly ſignifies, is communicated to the thing which it is made to ſignify figuratively. Conſider the foregoing expreſſion *Imperious ocean*, how much more elevated it is than *Stormy ocean*.

Thirdly, this figure hath a happy effect by preventing the familiarity of proper names. The familiarity of a proper name, is communicated to the thing it ſignifies by means of their intimate connection; and the thing is thereby brought

* See chap. 2. part. 1. ſect. 5.

down in our feeling *. This bad effect is prevented by using a figurative word instead of one that is proper; as, for example, when we express the sky by terming it *the blue vault of heaven*; for though no work of art can compare with the sky in grandeur, the expression however is relished, because it prevents the object from being brought down by the familiarity of its proper name. With respect to the degrading familiarity of proper names, Vida has the following passage:

Hinc si dura mihi passus dicendus Ulysses,
Non illum vero memorabo nomine, sed qui
Et mores hominum multorum vidit, et urbes,
Naufragus eversæ post sæva incendia Trojæ.

Poet. lib. 2. *l.* 46.

Lastly, By this figure language is enriched, and rendered more copious; in which respect, were there no other, a figure of speech is a happy invention. This property is finely touched by Vida:

Quinetiam agricolas ea fandi nota voluptas
Exercet, dum læta seges, dum trudere gemmas
Incipiunt vites, sitientiaque ætheris imbrem
Prata bibunt, ridentque satis surgentibus agri.

Hanc

* I have often regretted, that a factious spirit of opposition to the reigning family makes it necessary in public worship to distinguish the King by his proper name. One will scarce imagine who has not made the trial, how much better it sounds to pray for our Sovereign Lord the King, without any addition.

Hanc vulgo ſpeciem propriæ penuria vocis
Intulit, indictiſque urgens in rebus egeſtas.
Quippe ubi ſe vera oſtendebant nomina nuſquam,
Fas erat hinc atque hinc transferre ſimillima veris.
Poet. lib. 3. l. 90.

The beauties I have mentioned belong to every figure of ſpeech. Several other beauties peculiar to one or other ſort, I ſhall have occaſion to remark afterward.

Not only ſubjects, but qualities, actions, effects, may be expreſſed figuratively. Thus, as to ſubjects, *the gates of breath* for the lips, *the watery kingdom* for the ocean. As to qualities, *fierce* for ſtormy, in the expreſſion *Fierce winter: Altus* for *profundus; Altus puteus, Altum mare: Breathing* for *perſpiring; Breathing plants.* Again, as to actions, The ſea *rages*, Time will *melt* her frozen thoughts, Time *kills* grief. An effect is put for the cauſe, as *lux* for the ſun; and a cauſe for the effect, as *boum labores* for corn. The relation of reſemblance is one plentiful ſource of figures of ſpeech; and nothing is more common than to apply to one object the name of another that reſembles it in any reſpect: height, ſize, and worldly greatneſs, reſemble not each other; but the emotions they produce reſemble each other, and prompted by this reſemblance, we naturally expreſs worldly greatneſs by height or ſize: one feels a certain uneaſineſs in ſeeing a great depth;

and hence depth is made to expreſs any thing diſagreeable by exceſs, as *depth* of grief, *depth* of deſpair; again, height of place, and time long paſt, produce ſimilar feelings; and hence the expreſſion, *Ut altius repetam:* diſtance in paſt time, producing a ſtrong feeling, is put for any ſtrong feeling, *Nihil mihi antiquius noſtra amicitia:* ſhortneſs with relation to ſpace, for ſhortneſs with relation to time, *Brevis eſſe laboro, obſcurus fio:* ſuffering a puniſhment reſembles paying a debt; hence *pendere pœnas.* In the ſame manner, light may be put for glory, ſunſhine for proſperity, and weight for importance.

Many words, originally figurative, having, by long and conſtant uſe, loſt their figurative power, are degraded to the inferior rank of proper terms. Thus the words that expreſs the operations of the mind, have in all languages been originally figurative: the reaſon holds in all, that when theſe operations came firſt under conſideration, there was no other way of deſcribing them but by what they reſembled: it was not practicable to give them proper names, as may be done to objects that can be aſcertained by ſight and touch. A *ſoft* nature, *jarring* tempers, *weight* of wo, *pompous* phraſe, *beget* compaſſion, *aſſuage* grief, *break* a vow, *bend* the eye downward, *ſhower* down curſes, *drown'd* in tears, *wrapt* in joy, *warm'd* with eloquence, *loaded* with ſpoils, and a thouſand other expreſſions of the like nature, have

loſt

loſt their figurative ſenſe. Some terms there are, that cannot be ſaid to be either altogether figurative or altogether proper: originally figurative, they are tending to ſimplicity, without having loſt altogether their figurative power. Virgil's *Regina ſaucia cura*, is perhaps one of theſe expreſſions: with ordinary readers, *ſaucia* will be conſidered as expreſſing ſimply the effect of grief; but one of a lively imagination will exalt the phraſe into a figure.

For epitomiſing this ſubject, and at the ſame time for giving a clear view of it, I cannot think of a better method, than to preſent to the reader a liſt of the ſeveral relations upon which figures of ſpeech are commonly founded. This liſt I divide into two tables; one of ſubjects expreſſed figuratively, and one of attributes.

FIRST TABLE.

Subjects expreſſed figuratively.

1. A word proper to one ſubject employed figuratively to expreſs a reſembling ſubject.

There is no figure of ſpeech ſo frequent, as what is derived from the relation of reſemblance. Youth, for example, is ſignified figuratively by the *morning* of life. The life of a man reſembles

a natural day in ſeveral particulars: the morning is the beginning of day, youth the beginning of life; the morning is cheerful, ſo is youth, &c. By another reſemblance, a bold warrior is termed the *thunderbolt* of war; a multitude of troubles, a *ſea* of troubles.

This figure, above all others, affords pleaſure to the mind by variety of beauties. Beſide the beauties above mentioned, common to all ſorts, it poſſeſſes in particular the beauty of a metaphor or of a ſimile: a figure of ſpeech built upon reſemblance, ſuggeſts always a compariſon between the principal ſubject and the acceſſory; whereby every good effect of a metaphor or ſimile, may in a ſhort and lively manner, be produced by this figure of ſpeech.

2. A word proper to the effect employed figuratively to expreſs the cauſe.

Lux for the ſun. *Shadow* for cloud. A helmet is ſignified by the expreſſion *glittering terror*. A tree by *ſhadow* or *umbrage*. Hence the expreſſion:

Nec habet Pelion umbras. *Ovid.*

Where the dun umbrage hangs. *Spring*, *l.* 1023.

A

A wound is made to ſignify an arrow:

Vulnere non pedibus te conſequar. *Ovid.*

There is a peculiar force and beauty in this figure: the word which ſignifies figuratively the principal ſubject, denotes it to be a cauſe by ſuggeſting the effect.

3. A word proper to the cauſe, employed figuratively to expreſs the effect.

Boumque labores, for corn. *Sorrow* or *grief*, for tears.

Again Ulyſſes veil'd his penſive head;
Again, unmann'd, a ſhow'r of *ſorrow* ſhed.

Streaming *Grief* his faded cheek bedew'd.

Blindneſs for darkneſs:

Cæcis erramus in undis. *Æneid.* iii. 200.

There is a peculiar energy in this figure, ſimilar to that in the former: the figurative name denotes the ſubject to be an effect, by ſuggeſting its cauſe.

4. Two things being intimately connected, the proper name of the one employed figuratively to ſignify the other.

Day

Day for light. *Night* for darkneſs; and hence, A ſudden night. *Winter* for a ſtorm at ſea:

Interea magno miſceri murmure pontum,
Emiſſamque Hyemem ſenſit Neptunus.

Æneid. 1. 128.

This laſt figure would be too bold for a Britiſh writer, as a ſtorm at ſea is not inſeparably connected with winter in this climate.

5. A word proper to an attribute, employed figuratively to denote the ſubject.

Youth and *beauty* for thoſe who are young and beautiful:

Youth and beauty ſhall be laid in duſt.

Majeſty for the King:

What art thou, that uſurp'ſt this time of night,
Together with that fair and warlike form,
In which the *Majeſty* of buried Denmark
Did ſometime march?

Hamlet, act 1. *ſc.* 1.

——— Or have ye choſen this place
After the toils of battle, to repoſe
Your weary'd *virtue.*

Paradiſe Loſt.

Verdure for a green field. *Summer, l.* 301.

Speaking

Speaking of cranes,

The pigmy nations wounds and death they bring,
And all the *war* deſcends upon the wing.
Iliad iii. 10.

Cool *age* advances venerably wiſe. *Iliad* iii. 149.

The peculiar beauty of this figure ariſes from ſuggeſting an attribute that embelliſhes the ſubject, or puts it in a ſtronger light.

6. A complex term employed figuratively to denote one of the component parts.

Funus for a dead body. *Burial* for a grave.

7. The name of one of the component parts inſtead of the complex term.

Tæda for a marriage. The *Eaſt* for a country ſituated eaſt from us. *Jovis veſtigia ſervat*, for imitating Jupiter in general.

8. A word ſignifying time or place, employed figuratively to denote what is connected with it.

Clime for a nation, or for a conſtitution of government: hence the expreſſion *Merciful clime*, *Fleecy winter* for ſnow, *Seculum felix*.

9. A

9. A part for the whole.

The *Pole* for the earth. The *head* for the perſon:

Triginta minas pro capite tuo dedi. *Plautus.*

Tergum for the man:

Fugiens tergum. *Ovid.*

Vultus for the man:

Jam fulgor armorum fugaces
Terret equos, equitumque vultus. *Horat.*

Quis deſiderio ſit pudor aut modus
Tam chari *capitis?* *Horat.*

Dumque virent *genua?* *Horat.*

Thy growing virtues juſtify'd my cares,
And promis'd comfort to my *ſilver hairs.*
Iliad ix. 616.

——— Forthwith from the pool he rears
His mighty *ſtature.* *Paradiſe Loſt.*

The ſilent *heart* with grief aſſails. *Parnell.*

The peculiar beauty of this figure conſiſts in marking that part which makes the greateſt figure.

10. The name of the container, employed figuratively to ſignify what is contained.

Grove

Grove for the birds in it, Vocal *grove*. *Ships* for the ſeamen, Agonizing *ſhips*. *Mountains* for the ſheep paſturing upon them, Bleating *mountains*. *Zacynthus*, *Ithaca*, &c. for the inhabitants. *Ex mœſtis domibus*, Livy.

11. The name of the ſuſtainer, employed figuratively to ſignify what is ſuſtained.

Altar for the ſacrifice. *Field* for the battle fought upon it, Well-fought *field*.

12. The name of the materials, employed figuratively to ſignify the things made of them.

Ferrum for *gladius*.

13. The names of the Heathen deities, employed figuratively to ſignify what they patroniſe.

Jove for the air, *Mars* for war, *Venus* for beauty, *Cupid* for love, *Ceres* for corn, *Neptune* for the ſea, *Vulcan* for fire.

This figure beſtows great elevation upon the ſubject; and therefore ought to be confined to the higher ſtrains of poetry.

SE-

SECOND TABLE.

Attributes expreſſed figuratively.

When two attributes are connected, the name of the one may be employed figuratively to expreſs the other.

Purity and virginity are attributes of the ſame perſon: hence the expreſſion, *Virgin* ſnow, for pure ſnow.

2. A word ſignifying properly an attribute of one ſubject, employed figuratively to expreſs a reſembling attribute of another ſubject.

Tottering ſtate. *Imperious* ocean. *Angry* flood. *Raging* tempeſt. *Shallow* fears.

My ſure divinity ſhall bear the ſhield,
And edge thy ſword to *reap* the glorious field.
Odyſſey xx. 61.

Black omen, for an omen that portends bad fortune.

Ater odor. *Virgil.*

The peculiar beauty of this figure ariſes from ſuggeſting a compariſon.

3. A

3. A word proper to the ſubject, employed to expreſs one of its attributes.

Mens for *intellectus*. *Mens* for a reſolution:

Iſtam, oro, exue mentem.

4. When two ſubjects have a reſemblance by a common quality, the name of the one ſubject may be employed figuratively to denote that quality in the other.

Summer life for agreeable life.

5. The name of the inſtrument made to ſignify the power of employing it.

——— Melpomene, cui liquidam pater
Vocem cum *cithara* dedit.

The ample field of figurative expreſſion diſplayed in theſe tables, affords great ſcope for reaſoning. Several of the obſervations relating to metaphor, are applicable to figures of ſpeech: theſe I ſhall ſlightly retouch, with ſome additions peculiarly adapted to the preſent ſubject.

In the firſt place, as the figure under conſideration is built upon relation, we find from experience, and it muſt be obvious from reaſon, that the beauty of the figure depends on the intimacy

of the relation between the figurative and proper ſenſe of the word. A ſlight reſemblance, in particular, will never make this figure agreeable: the expreſſion, for example, *Drink down a ſecret*, for liſtening to a ſecret with attention, is harſh, and uncouth, becauſe there is ſcarce any reſemblance between *liſtening* and *drinking*. The expreſſion *weighty crack*, uſed by Ben Johnſon for *loud crack*, is worſe if poſſible: a loud ſound has not the ſlighteſt reſemblance to a piece of matter that is weighty. The following expreſſion of Lucretius is not leſs faulty, "Et lepido quæ ſunt *fucata* ſo-"nore." i. 645.

——————— Sed magis
Pugnas et exactos tyrannos
Denſum humeris *bibit* aure vulgus.

Horat. Carm. l. 2. *ode* 13.

Phemius! let acts of gods, and heroes old,
What ancient bards in hall and bow'r have told,
Attemper'd to the lyre, your voice employ,
Such the pleas'd *ear will drink* with ſilent joy.

Odyſſey, i. 433.

Strepitumque exterritus *hauſit*.

Æneid. vi. 559.

——————Write, my Queen,
And with mine eyes I'll *drink* the words you ſend.

Cymbeline, act 1. *ſc.* 2.

As thus th'effulgence tremulous I *drink*.

Summer, l. 1684.

Neque

Neque *audit* currus habenas.

Georg. i. 514.

O Prince! (Lycaon's valiant ſon reply'd),
As thine the ſteeds, be thine the taſk to guide.
The horſes practis'd to their lord's command,
Shall *hear* the rein, and anſwer to thy hand.

Iliad, v. 288.

The following figures of ſpeech ſeem altogether wild and extravagant, the figurative and proper meaning having no connection whatever. *Moving* ſoftneſs, Freſhneſs *breathes*, *Breathing* proſpect, *Flowing* ſpring, *Dewy* light, *Lucid* coolneſs, and many others of this falſe coin, may be found in Thomſon's *Seaſons*.

Secondly, The proper ſenſe of the word ought to bear ſome proportion to the figurative ſenſe, and not ſoar much above it, nor ſink much below it. This rule, as well as the foregoing, is finely illuſtrated by Vida:

Hæc adeo cum ſint, cum fas audere poetis
Multa modis multis; tamen obſervare memento
Si quando haud propriis rem mavis dicere verbis,
Tranſlatiſque aliunde notis, longeque petitis,
Ne nimiam oſtendas, quærendo talia, curam.
Namque aliqui exercent vim duram, et rebus inique
Nativam eripiunt formam, indignantibus ipſis,
Invitaſque jubent alienos ſumere vultus
Haud magis imprudens mihi erit, et luminis expers,
Qui puero ingentes habitus det ferre gigantis,

Quam ſiquis ſtabula alta lares appellet equinos,
Aut crines magnæ genitricis gramina dicat.

Poet. iii. 148.

Thirdly, In a figure of ſpeech, every circumſtance ought to be avoided that agrees with the proper ſenſe only, not the figurative ſenſe; for it is the latter that expreſſes the thought, and the former ſerves for no other purpoſe but to make harmony:

Zacynthus green with ever-ſhady groves,
And Ithaca, preſumptuous boaſt their loves;
Obtruding on my choice a ſecond lord,
They preſs the Hymenean rite abhorr'd.

Odyſſey, xix. 152.

Zacynthus here ſtanding figuratively for the inhabitants, the deſcription of the iſland is quite out of place: it puzzles the reader, by making him doubt whether the word ought to be taken in its proper or figurative ſenſe.

———Write, my Queen,
And with mine eyes I'll drink the words you ſend,
Though ink be made of gall.

Cymbeline, act i. *ſc.* 2.

The diſguſt one has to drink ink in reality, is not to the purpoſe where the ſubject is drinking ink figuratively.

In the fourth place, To draw conſequences from

a

a figure of ſpeech, as if the word were to be underſtood literally, is a groſs abſurdity, for it is confounding truth with fiction.

Be Moubray's ſins ſo heavy in his boſom,
That they may break his foaming courſer's back,
And throw the rider headlong in the liſts,
A caitiff recreant to my couſin Hereford.

Richard II. *act* 1. *ſc.* 3.

Sin may be imagined heavy in a figurative ſenſe: but weight in a proper ſenſe belongs to the acceſſory only; and therefore to deſcribe the effects of weight, is to deſert the principal ſubject, and to convert the acceſſory into a principal:

Cromwell. How does your Grace?
Wolſey. Why, well;
Never ſo truly happy, my good Cromwell.
I know myſelf now, and I feel within me
A peace above all earthly dignities,
A ſtill and quiet conſcience. The King has cur'd me,
I humbly thank his Grace; and from theſe ſhoulders,
Theſe ruin'd pillars, out of pity, taken
A load would ſink a navy, too much honour.

Henry VIII. *act* 3. *ſc.* 6.

Ulyſſes ſpeaking of Hector:

I wonder now how yonder city ſtands,
When we have here the baſe and pillar by us.

Troilus and Creſſida, act 4. *ſc.* 9.

Othello. No; my heart is turn'd to ſtone: I ſtrike it, and it hurts my hand. *Othello, act* 4. *ſc.* 5.

Not leſs, even in this deſpicable now,
Than when my name fill'd Afric with affrights,
And froze your hearts beneath your torrid zone.
Don Sebaſtian, King of Portugal, act 1.

How long a ſpace, ſince firſt I lov'd, it is!
To look into a glaſs I fear,
And am ſurpris'd with wonder, when I miſs
Grey hairs and wrinkles there.
Cowley, vol. 1. *p.* 86.

I choſe the flouriſhing'ſt tree in all the park,
With freſheſt boughs and faireſt head;
I cut my love into his gentle bark,
And in three days behold 'tis dead;
My very written flames ſo violent be,
They've burnt and wither'd up the tree.
Cowley, vol. 1. *p.* 136.

Ah, mighty Love, that it were inward heat
Which made this precious limbeck ſweat!
But what, alas! ah what does it avail,
That ſhe weeps tears ſo wondrous cold,
As ſcarce the aſs's hoof can hold,
So cold, that I admire they fall not hail.
Cowley, vol. 1. *p.* 132.

Such a play of words is pleaſant in a ludicrous poem.

Almeria. O Alphonſo, Alphonſo!
Devouring ſeas have waſh'd thee from my ſight,

No

No time ſhall raſe thee from my memory;
No, I will live to be thy monument:
The cruel ocean is no more thy tomb;
But in my heart thou art interr'd.

Mourning Bride, act 1. *ſc.* 1.

This would be very right, if there were any inconſiſtence, in being interred in one place really, and in another place figuratively.

Je crains que cette ſaiſon
Ne nous amene la peſte;
La gueule du chien celeſte
Vomit feu ſur l'horiſon.
Afin que je m'en delivre,
Je veux lire ton gros livre
Juſques au dernier feüillet:
Tout ce que ta plume trace,
Robinet, a de la glace
A faire trembler Juillet. *Maynard.*

In me tota ruens Venus
Cyprum deſeruit.

Horat. Carm. l. 1. *ode* 19.

From conſidering that a word uſed in a figurative ſenſe ſuggeſts at the ſame time its proper meaning, we diſcover a fifth rule, That we ought not to employ a word in a figurative ſenſe, the proper ſenſe of which is inconſiſtent or incongruous with the ſubject: for every inconſiſtency, and even incongruity, though in the expreſſion only and not real, is unpleaſant:

Interea genitor Tyberini ad fluminis undam
Vulnera *ficcabat* lymphis ———————

Æneid. x. 833.

Tres adeo incertos cæca caligine *soles*
Erramus pelago, totidem ſine ſidere noctes.

Æneid. iii. 203.

The foregoing rule may be extended to form a ſixth, That no epithet ought to be given to the figurative ſenſe of a word that agrees not alſo with its proper ſenſe:

——————— Dicat Opuntiæ
Frater Megillæ, quo *beatus*
Vulnere. *Horat. Carm. lib.* 1. *ode* 27.

Parcus deorum cultor, et infrequens,
Inſanientis dum ſapientiæ
Conſultus erro. *Horat. Carm. lib.* 1. *ode* 34.

Seventhly, The crowding into one period or thought different figures of ſpeech, is not leſs faulty than crowding metaphors in that manner: the mind is diſtracted in the quick tranſition from one image to another, and is puzzled inſtead of being pleaſed:

I am of ladies moſt deject and wretched,
That ſuck'd the honey of his muſic-vows.

Hamlet.

My bleeding boſom ſickens at the ſound.

Odyſſey, i. 439.

—Ah

——————Ah miſer,
Quantâ laboras in *Charybdi!*
Digne puer meliore *flammâ.*
Quæ ſaga, quis te ſolvere Theſſalis
Magus *venenis*, quis poterit deus?
Vix illigatum te triformi
Pegaſus expediet *Chimerâ.*

Horat. Carm. lib. 1. *ode* 27.

Eighthly, If crowding figures be bad, it is ſtill worſe to graft one figure upon another: For inſtance,

While his keen falchion drinks the warriors lives.

Iliad xi. 211.

A falchion drinking the warriors blood is a figure built upon reſemblance, which is paſſable. But then in the expreſſion, *lives* is again put for *blood;* and by thus grafting one figure upon another the expreſſion is rendered obſcure and unpleaſant.

Ninthly, Intricate and involved figures that can ſcare be analyſed, or reduced to plain language, are leaſt of all tolerable;

Votis incendimus aras.

Æneid. iii. 279.

——— Onerantque caniſtris
Dona laboratæ Cereris.

Æneid. viii. 180.

Vulcan

Vulcan to the Cyclopes:

Arma acri facienda viro: nunc viribus uſus,
Nunc manibus rapidis, omni nunc arte magiſtra:
Præcipitate moras. *Æneid.* viii. 441.

——— Huic gladio, per que ærea ſuta
Per tunicam ſqualentem auro, latus *haurit* apertum.
Æneid. x. 313.

Semotique puris tarda neceſſitas
Lethi, corripuit gradum.
Horat. Carm. lib. 1. *ode* 3.

Scribêris Vario fortis, et hoſtium
Victor, Mæonii carminis *alite.*
Horat. Carm. lib. 1. *ode* 6.

Elſe ſhall our fates be number'd with the dead.
Iliad v. 294.

Commutual death the fate of war confounds.
Iliad viii. 85. *and* xi. 117.

Speaking of Proteus,

Inſtant he wears, eluſive of the rape,
The mimic force of every ſavage ſhape.
Odyſſey, iv. 563.

Rolling convulſive on the floor, is ſeen
The piteous object of a proſtrate Queen.
Ibid. iv. 952.

The mingling tempeſt waves its gloom.
Autumn, 337.

A various ſweetneſs ſwells the gentle race.

Ibid. 640.

A ſober calm fleeces unbounded ether.

Ibid. 967.

The diſtant water-fall ſwells in the breeze.

Winter, 738.

In the tenth place, When a ſubject is introduced by its proper name, it is abſurd to attribute to it the properties of a different ſubject to which the word is ſometimes applied in a figurative ſenſe:

Hear me, oh Neptune! thou whoſe arms are hurl'd
From ſhore to ſhore, and gird the ſolid world.

Odyſſey, ix. 617.

Neptune is here introduced perſonally, and not figuratively for the ocean: the deſcription therefore, which is only applicable to the latter, is altogether improper.

It is not ſufficient, that a figure of ſpeech be regularly conſtructed, and be free from blemiſh: it requires taſte to diſcern when it is proper, when improper; and taſte, I ſuſpect, is our only guide. One however may gather from reflection and experience, that ornaments and graces ſuit not any of the diſpiriting paſſions, nor are proper for expreſſing any thing grave and important. In familiar converſation, they are in ſome meaſure ridiculous:

lous: Proſpero, in the *Tempeſt*, ſpeaking to his daughter Miranda, ſays,

> The fringed curtains of thine eyes advance,
> And ſay what thou ſeeſt yond.

No exception can be taken to the juſtneſs of the figure; and circumſtances may be imagined to make it proper; but it is certainly not proper in familiar converſation.

In the laſt place, Though figures of ſpeech have a charming effect when accurately conſtructed and properly introduced, they ought however to be ſcattered with a ſparing hand: nothing is more luſcious, and nothing conſequently more ſatiating, than redundant ornaments of any kind.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Narration and Description.

HORACE, and many critics after him, exhort writers to chooſe a ſubject adapted to their genius. Such obſervations would multiply rules of criticiſm without end; and at any rate belong not to the preſent work, the object of which is human nature in general, and what is common to the ſpecies. But though the choice of a ſubject comes not under ſuch a plan, the manner of execution comes under it; becauſe the manner of execution is ſubjected to general rules, derived from principles common to the ſpecies. Theſe rules, as they concern the things expreſſed as well as the language or expreſſion, require a diviſion of this chapter into two parts; firſt of thoughts, and next of words. I pretend not to juſtify this diviſion as entirely accurate: for in diſcourſing of thoughts, it is difficult to abſtract altogether from the words; and ſtill more difficult, in diſcourſing of words, to abſtract altogether from the thought.

The firſt rule is, That in hiſtory, the reflections ought to be chaſte and ſolid; for while the mind is

is intent upon truth, it is little diſpoſed to the operations of the imagination. Strada's Belgic hiſtory is full of poetical images, which diſcording with the ſubject, are unpleaſant; and they have a ſtill worſe effect, by giving an air of fiction to a genuine hiſtory. Such flowers ought to be ſcattered with a ſparing hand, even in epic poetry; and at no rate are they proper, till the reader be warmed, and by an enlivened imagination be prepared to reliſh them: in that ſtate of mind they are agreeable; but while we are ſedate and attentive to an hiſtorical chain of facts, we reject with diſdain, every fiction. This Belgic hiſtory is indeed wofully vicious both in matter and in form: it is ſtuffed with frigid and unmeaning reflections; and its poetical flaſhes, even laying aſide their impropriety, are mere tinſel.

Second, Vida*, following Horace, recommends a modeſt commencement of an epic poem; giving for a reaſon, That the writer ought to huſband his fire. This reaſon has weight; but what is ſaid above ſuggeſts a reaſon ſtill more weighty: bold thoughts and figures are never reliſhed till the mind be heated and thoroughly engaged, which is not the reader's caſe at the commencement. Homer introduces not a ſingle ſimile in the

* Poet. lib. 2. l. 30.

the firſt book of the Iliad, nor in the firſt book of the Odyſſey. On the other hand, Shakeſpear begins one of his plays with a ſentiment too bold for the moſt heated imagination:

Bedford. Hung be the heav'ns with black, yield day to night!
Comets, importing change of times and ſtates,
Brandiſh your cryſtal treſſes in the ſky,
And with them ſcourge the bad revolting ſtars,
That have conſented unto Henry's death!
Henry the Fifth, too famous to live long!
England ne'er loſt a king of ſo much worth.

Firſt part Henry VI.

The paſſage with which Strada begins his hiſtory, is too poetical for a ſubject of that kind; and at any rate too high for the beginning of a grave performance. A third reaſon ought to have no leſs influence than either of the former, That a man, who, upon his firſt appearance, ſtrains to make a figure, is too oſtentatious to be reliſhed. Hence the firſt ſentences of a work ought to be ſhort, natural and ſimple. Cicero, in his oration *pro Archia poeta*, errs againſt this rule: his reader is out of breath at the very firſt period; which ſeems never to end. Burnet begins the Hiſtory of his Own Times with a period long and intricate.

A third rule or obſervation is, That where the ſubject is intended for entertainment ſolely, not for

for inſtruction, a thing ought to be deſcribed as it appears, not as it is in reality. In running, for example, the impulſe upon the ground is proportioned in ſome degree to the celerity of motion: though in appearance it is otherwiſe; for a perſon in ſwift motion ſeems to ſkim the ground, and ſcarcely to touch it. Virgil, with great taſte, deſcribes quick running according to appearance; and raiſes an image far more lively than by adhering ſcrupulouſly to truth:

Hos ſuper advenit Volſca de gente Camilla,
Agmen agens equitum et florentes ære catervas,
Bellatrix: non illa colo calathiſve Minervæ
Fœmineas aſſueta manus; ſed prælia virgo
Dura pati, curſuque pedum prævertere ventos.
Illa vel intactæ ſegetis per ſumma volaret
Gramina: nec teneras curſu læſiſſet ariſtas:
Vel mare per medium, fluctu ſuſpenſa tumenti,
Ferret iter; celeres nec tingeret æquore plantas.

Æneid. vii. 803.

This example is copied by the author of *Telemachus:*

Les Brutiens ſont legeres à la courſe comme les cerfs, et comme les daims. On croiroit que l'herbemême la plus tendre n'eſt point foulée ſous leurs pieds; à peine laiſſent-ils dans le ſable quelques traces de leurs pas.

Liv. 10.

Again:

Again:

Déjà il avoit abattu Euſilas ſi léger à la courſe, qu'à peine il imprimoit la trace de ſes pas dans le ſable, et qui devançoit dans ſon pays les plus rapides flots de l'Eurotas et de l'Alphée.

Liv. 20.

Fourth, in narration as well as in deſcription, objects ought to be painted ſo accurately as to form in the mind of the reader diſtinct and lively images. Every uſeleſs circumſtance ought indeed to be ſuppreſſed, becauſe every ſuch circumſtance loads the narration; but if a circumſtance be neceſſary, however ſlight, it cannot be deſcribed too minutely. The force of language conſiſts in raiſing complete images*; which have the effect to tranſport the reader as by magic into the very place of the important action, and to convert him as it were into a ſpectator, beholding every thing that paſſes. The narrative in an epic poem ought to rival a picture in the livelineſs and accuracy of its repreſentations: no circumſtance muſt be omitted that tends to make a complete image; becauſe an imperfect image, as well as any other imperfect conception, is cold and unintereſting. I ſhall illuſtrate this rule by ſeveral examples, giving the firſt place to a beautiful paſſage from Virgil:

* Chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 7.

Qualis *populeâ* mœrens Philomela ſub umbrâ
Amiſſos queritur fœtus, quos durus *arator*
Obſervans nido *implumes* detraxit.

Georg. lib. 4. *l.* 511.

The poplar, ploughman, and unfledged young, though not eſſential in the deſcription, tend to make a complete image, and upon that account are an embelliſhment.

Again:

Hic viridem Æneas *frondenti ex ilice* metam
Conſtituit, ſignum nautis.

Æneid. v. 129.

Horace, addreſſing to Fortune:

Te pauper ambit ſollicita prece
Ruris colonus: te dominam æquoris,
Quicumque Bithynâ laceſſit
Carpathium pelagus carinâ.

Carm. lib. 1. *ode* 35.

——Illum ex mœnibus hoſticis
Matrona bellantis tyranni
Proſpiciens, et adulta virgo,
Suſpiret: Eheu, ne rudis agminum
Sponſus laceſſat regius aſperum
Tactu leonem, quem cruenta
Per medias rapit ira cædes.

Carm. lib. 3. *ode* 2.

Shake-

Shakeſpear ſays *, "You may as well go about "to turn the ſun to ice by fanning in his face "with a *peacock's* feather." The peacock's feather, not to mention the beauty of the object, completes the image: an accurate image cannot be formed of that fanciful operation, without conceiving a particular feather; and one is at a loſs when this is neglected in the deſcription. Again, "the rogues ſlighted me into the river with as "little remorſe, as they would have drown'd a "bitch's blind puppies, fifteen i' th' litter †."

Old Lady. You would not be a queen?
Anne. No not for all the riches under heav'n.
Old Lady. 'Tis ſtrange: a threepence bow'd would hire me, old as I am, to queen it.

Henry VIII. *act* 2. *ſc.* 5.

In the following paſſage, the action, with all its material circumſtances, is repreſented ſo much to the life, that it would ſcarce appear more diſtinct to a real ſpectator; and it is the manner of deſcription that contributes greatly to the ſublimity of the paſſage.

He ſpake; and to confirm his words, out-flew
Millions of flaming ſwords, drawn from the thighs
Of mighty cherubim; the ſudden blaze
Far round illumin'd hell: highly they rag'd

* Henry V. act 4. ſc. 4.
† Merry Wives of Windſor, act 3. ſc. 15.

Againſt the Higheſt, and fierce with graſped arms
Claſh'd on their ſounding ſhields the din of war,
Hurling defiance toward the vault of heav'n.

Milton, b. 1.

A paſſage I am to cite from Shakeſpear, falls not much ſhort of that now mentioned in particularity of deſcription:

O you hard hearts! you cruel men of Rome!
Knew you not Pompey? Many a time and oft
Have you climb'd up to walls and battlements,
To towers and windows, yea, to chimney-tops,
Your infants in your arms; and there have ſat
The live-long day with patient expectation
To ſee great Pompey paſs the ſtreets of Rome;
And when you ſaw his chariot but appear,
Have you not made an univerſal ſhout,
That Tyber trembled underneath his banks,
To hear the replication of your ſounds,
Made in his concave ſhores?

Julius Cæſar, act 1. *ſc.* 1.

The following paſſage is ſcarce inferior to either of thoſe mentioned:

Far before the reſt, the ſon of Oſſian comes; bright in the ſmiles of youth, fair as the firſt beams of the ſun. His long hair waves on his back: his dark brow is half beneath his helmet. The ſword hangs looſe on the hero's ſide; and his ſpear glitters as he moves. I fled from his terrible eye, King of high Temora.

Fingal.

The

The *Henriade* of Voltaire errs greatly againſt the foregoing rule: every incident is touched in a ſummary way, without ever deſcending to circumſtances. This manner is good in a general hiſtory, the purpoſe of which is to record important tranſactions: but in a fable it is cold and unintereſting; becauſe it is impracticable to form diſtinct images of perſons or things repreſented in a manner ſo ſuperficial.

It is obſerved above, that every uſeleſs circumſtance ought to be ſuppreſſed. The crowding ſuch circumſtances, is, on the one hand, no leſs to be avoided, than the conciſeneſs for which Voltaire is blamed, on the other. In the *Æneid* *, Barce, the nurſe of Sichæus, whom we never hear of before nor after, is introduced for a purpoſe not more important than to call Anna to her ſiſter Dido: and that it might not be thought unjuſt in Dido, even in this trivial circumſtance, to prefer her huſband's nurſe before her own, the poet takes care to inform his reader, that Dido's nurſe was dead. To this I muſt oppoſe a beautiful paſſage in the ſame book, where, after Dido's laſt ſpeech, the poet, without detaining his readers by deſcribing the manner of her death, haſtens to the lamentation of her attendants:

Dixerat: atque illam media inter talia ferro
Collapſam aſpiciunt comites, enſemque cruore

* Lib. 4. l. 632.

Spumantem, ſparſaſque manus. It clamor ad alta
Atria, concuſſam bacchatur fama per urbem;
Lamentis gemituque et fœmineo ululatu
Tecta fremunt, reſonat magnis plangoribus æther.
Lib. 4. *l.* 663.

As an appendix to the foregoing rule, I add the following obſervation, That to make a ſudden and ſtrong impreſſion, ſome ſingle circumſtance happily ſelected, has more power than the moſt laboured deſcription. Macbeth, mentioning to his lady ſome voices he heard while he was murdering the King, ſays,

There's one did laugh in ſleep, and one cry'd Murder!
They wak'd each other; and I ſtood and heard them;
But they did ſay their prayers, and addreſs them
Again to ſleep.
Lady. There are two lodg'd together.
Macbeth. One cry'd, God bleſs us! and Amen the other;
As they had ſeen me with theſe hangman's hands.
Liſtening their fear, I could not ſay Amen,
When they did ſay, God bleſs us.
Lady. Conſider it not ſo deeply.
Macbeth. But wherefore could not I pronounce Amen?
I had moſt need of bleſſing, and Amen
Stuck in my throat.
Lady. Theſe deeds muſt not be thought
After theſe ways; ſo it will make us mad.
Macbeth. Methought, I heard a voice cry,
Sleep no more!
Macbeth doth murder ſleep, *&c.* *Act* 2. *ſc.* 3.

Alphonſo,

Alphonſo, in the *Mourning Bride*, ſhut up in the ſame priſon where his father had been confined:

In a dark corner of my cell I found
This paper, what it is this light will ſhow.
" If my Alphonſo"———Ha! [*Reading.*
" If my Alphonſo live, reſtore him, Heav'n;
" Give me more weight, cruſh my declining years
" With bolts, with chains, impriſonment, and want;
" But bleſs my ſon, viſit not him for me."
It is his hand; this was his pray'r—Yet more:
" Let ev'ry hair, which ſorrow by the roots [*Reading.*
" Tears from my hoary and devoted head,
" Be doubled in thy mercies to my ſon:
" Not for myſelf, but him, hear me, all-gracious"—
'Tis wanting what ſhould follow———Heav'n ſhould follow,
But 'tis torn off—Why ſhould that word alone
Be torn from his petition? 'Twas to Heav'n,
But Heav'n was deaf, Heav'n heard him not; but thus,
Thus as the name of Heav'n from this is torn,
So did it tear the ears of mercy from
His voice, ſhutting the gates of pray'r againſt him.
If piety be thus debarr'd acceſs
On high, and of good men the very beſt
Is ſingled out to bleed, and bear the ſcourge,
What is reward? or what is puniſhment?
But who ſhall dare to tax eternal juſtice?

Mourning Bride, act 3. *ſc.* 1.

This incident is a happy invention, and a mark of uncommon genius.

Deſcribing Prince Henry;

I ſaw young Harry, with his beaver on,
His cuiſſes on his thighs, gallantly arm'd,
Riſe from the ground like feather'd Mercury;
And vaulted with ſuch eaſe into his ſeat,
As if an angel dropt down from the clouds,
To turn and wind a fiery Pegaſus,
And witch the world with noble horſemanſhip.

Firſt part Henry IV. *act* 4. *ſc.* 2.

King Henry. Lord Cardinal, if thou think'ſt on Heaven's bliſs,
Hold up thy hand, make ſignal of thy hope.
He dies, and makes no ſign!

Second part Henry VI. *act* 3. *ſc.* 10.

The ſame author ſpeaking ludicrouſly of an army debilitated with diſeaſes, ſays,

Half of them dare not ſhake the ſnow from off their caſſocks, leſt they ſhake themſelves to pieces.

I have ſeen the walls of Balclutha, but they were deſolate. The flames had reſounded in the halls; and the voice of the people is heard no more. The ſtream of Clutha was removed from its place by the fall of the walls. The thiſtle ſhook there its lonely head: the moſs whiſtled to the wind. The fox looked out from the windows: and the rank graſs of the wall waved round his head. Deſolate is the dwelling of Morna: ſilence is in the houſe of her fathers.

Fingal.

To draw a character is the maſter-ſtroke of deſcription. In this Tacitus excels: his portraits are natural and lively, not a feature wanting nor miſplaced. Shakeſpear, however, exceeds Tacitus in livelineſs, ſome characteriſtical circumſtance being generally invented or laid hold of, which paints more to the life than many words. The following inſtances will explain my meaning, and at the ſame time prove my obſervation to be juſt.

Why ſhould a man, whoſe blood is warm within,
Sit like his grandſire cut in alabaſter?
Sleep when he wakes, and creep into the jaundice,
By being peeviſh? I tell thee what, Anthonio,
(I love thee, and it is my love that ſpeaks),
There are a ſort of men, whoſe viſages
Do cream and mantle like a ſtanding pond;
And do a wilful ſtillneſs entertain,
With purpoſe to be dreſs'd in an opinion
Of wiſdom, gravity, profound conceit;
As who ſhould ſay, I am Sir Oracle,
And when I ope my lips, let no dog bark!
O my Anthonio, I do know of thoſe,
That therefore only are reputed wiſe,
For ſaying nothing.

Merchant of Venice, act 1. *ſc.* 2.

Again:

Gratiano ſpeaks an infinite deal of nothing, more than any man in all Venice: his reaſons are two grains of wheat hid in two buſhels of chaff; you ſhall ſeek all day ere you find them, and when you have them they are not worth the ſearch. *Ibid.*

In

In the following paſſage a character is completed by a ſingle ſtroke.

Shallow. O the mad days that I have ſpent; and to ſee how many of mine old acquaintance are dead.

Silence. We ſhall all follow, Couſin.

Shallow. Certain, 'tis certain, very ſure, very ſure; Death (as the Pſalmiſt ſaith) is certain to all: all ſhall die. How a good yoke of bullocks at Stamford fair?

Slender. Truly, Couſin, I was not there.

Shallow. Death is certain. Is old *Double* of your town living yet?

Silence. Dead, Sir.

Shallow. Dead! ſee, ſee; he drew a good bow: and dead. He ſhot a fine ſhoot. How a ſcore of ewes now?

Silence. Thereafter as they be. A ſcore of good ewes may be worth ten pounds.

Shallow. And is old *Double* dead?

Second part Henry IV. *act* 3. *ſc.* 3.

Deſcribing a jealous huſband:

Neither preſs, coffer, cheſt, trunk, well, vault, but he hath an abſtract for the remembrance of ſuch places, and goes to them by his note. There is no hiding you in the houſe.

Merry Wives of Windſor, act 4. *ſc.* 3.

Congreve has an inimitable ſtroke of this kind in his comedy of *Love for Love:*

Ben Legend. Well, father, and how do all at home? how does brother Dick, and brother Val?

Sir Sampſon. Dick: body o' me, Dick has been dead

theſe

theſe two years. I writ you word when you were at Leghorn.

Ben. Meſs, that's true: marry, I had forgot. Dick's dead, as you ſay.

Act 3. *ſc.* 6.

Falſtaff ſpeaking of ancient Piſtol:

He's no ſwaggerer, hoſteſs: a tame cheater i'faith; you may ſtroak him as gently as a puppy-grey-hound; he will not ſwagger with a Barbary hen, if her feathers turn back in any ſhew of reſiſtance.

Second Part Henry IV. *act* 2. *ſc.* 9.

Oſſian, among his other excellencies, is eminently ſucceſsful in drawing characters; and he never fails to delight his reader with the beautiful attitudes of his heroes. Take the following inſtances.

O Oſcar! bend the ſtrong in arm; but ſpare the feeble hand. Be thou a ſtream of many tides againſt the foes of thy people; but like the gale that moves the graſs to thoſe who aſk thine aid.—So Tremor lived; ſuch Trathal was; and ſuch has Fingal been. My arm was the ſupport of the injured; and the weak reſted behind the lightning of my ſteel.

We heard the voice of joy on the coaſt, and we thought that the mighty Cathmore came. Cathmore the friend of ſtrangers the brother of red-haired Cairbar. But their ſouls were not the ſame; for the light of heaven was in the boſom of Cathmore. His towers roſe on the banks of Atha: ſeven paths led to his halls: ſeven chiefs

chiefs ſtood on theſe paths, and called the ſtranger to the feaſt. But Cathmore dwelt in the wood to avoid the voice of praiſe.

Dermid and Oſcar were one: they reaped the battle together. Their friendſhip was ſtrong as their ſteel; and death walked between them to the field. They ruſh on the foe like two rocks falling from the brow of Ardven. Their ſwords are ſtained with the blood of the valiant: warriors faint at their name. Who is equal to Oſcar but Dermid? who to Dermid but Oſcar?

Son of Comhal, replied the chief, the ſtrength of Morni's arm has failed; I attempt to draw the ſword of my youth, but it remains in its place: I throw the ſpear, but it falls ſhort of the mark: and I feel the weight of my ſhield. We decay like the graſs of the mountain, and our ſtrength returns no more. I have a ſon, O Fingal, his ſoul has delighted in the actions of Morni's youth; but his ſword has not been fitted againſt the foe, neither has his fame begun. I come with him to battle, to direct his arm. His renown will be a ſun to my ſoul, in the dark hour of my departure. O that the name of Morni were forgot among the people! that the heroes would only ſay, "Behold the father of Gaul."

Some writers, through heat of imagination, fall into contradiction; ſome are guilty of downright abſurdities; and ſome even rave like madmen. Againſt ſuch capital errors one cannot be more effectually warned than by collecting inſtances; and the firſt ſhall be of a contradiction, the moſt venial of all. Virgil ſpeaking of Neptune,

Interea

Interea magno miſceri murmure pontum,
Emiſſamque hyemem ſenſit Neptunus, et imis
Stagna refuſa vadis: *graviter commotus*, et alto
Proſpiciens, ſummâ *placidum* caput extulit undâ.

Æneid. i. 128.

Again:

When firſt young Maro, in his boundleſs mind,
A work t' outlaſt *immortal* Rome deſign'd.

Eſſay on Criticiſm, l. 130.

The following examples are of abſurdities.

Alii pulſis e tormento catenis diſcerpti ſectique, dimidiato corpore pugnabant ſibi ſuperſtites, ac peremptæ partis ultores.

Strada, Dec. 2. *l.* 2.

Il povér huomo, che non ſen' era accorto,
Andava combattendo, ed era morto. *Berni.*

He fled; but flying, left his life behind.

Iliad xi. 433.

Full through his neck the weighty falchion ſped:
Along the pavement roll'd the mutt'ring head.

Odyſſey xxii. 365.

The laſt article is of raving like one mad. Cleopatra ſpeaking to the aſpic,

——————— Welcome, thou kind deceiver,
Thou beſt of thieves; who, with an eaſy key,

Doſt

Doſt open life, and unperceiv'd by us,
Ev'n ſteal us from ourſelves; diſcharging ſo
Death's dreadful office, better than himſelf;
Touching our limbs ſo gently into ſlumber,
That Death ſtands by, deceiv'd by his own image,
And thinks himſelf but Sleep.

Dryden, All for Love, act 5.

Reaſons that are common and known to every one, ought to be taken for granted: to expreſs them is childiſh, and interrupts the narration. Quintus Curtius, relating the battle of Iſſus,

Jam in conſpectu, ſed extra teli jactum, utraque acies erat; quum priores Perſæ inconditum et trucem ſuſtulere clamorem. Redditur et a Macedonibus major, exercitus impar numero, ſed jugis montium vaſtiſque ſaltibus repercuſſus: *quippe ſemper circumjecta nemora petræque, quantumcunque accepere vocem, multiplicato ſono referunt.*

Having diſcuſſed what obſervations occurred upon the thoughts or things expreſſed, I proceed to what more peculiarly concern the language or verbal dreſs. The language proper for expreſſing paſſion being handled in a former chapter, ſeveral obſervations there made are applicable to the preſent ſubject; particularly, That as words are intimately connected with the ideas they repreſent, the emotions raiſed by the ſound and by the ſenſe ought to be concordant. An elevated ſubject requires an elevated ſtyle; what is familiar, ought to

to be familiarly expreſſed: a ſubject that is ſerious and important, ought to be clothed in plain nervous language: a deſcription, on the other hand, addreſſed to the imagination, is ſuſceptible of the higheſt ornaments that ſounding words and figurative expreſſion can beſtow upon it.

I ſhall give a few examples of the foregoing rules. A poet of any genius is not apt to dreſs a high ſubject in low words; and yet blemiſhes of that kind are found even in claſſical works. Horace, obſerving that men are ſatisfied with themſelves, but ſeldom with their condition, introduces Jupiter indulging to each his own choice:

Jam faciam quod vultis: eris tu, qui modo miles,
Mercator: tu, conſultus modo, ruſticus: hinc vos,
Vos hinc mutatis diſcedite partibus: eia,
Quid ſtatis? nolint: atqui licet eſſe beatis.
Quid cauſæ eſt, merito quin illis *Jupiter ambas*
Iratas buccas inflet? neque ſe fore poſthac
Tam facilem dicat, votis ut præbeat aurem?

Sat. lib. 1. *ſat.* 1. *l.* 16.

Jupiter in wrath puffing up both cheeks, is a low and even ludicrous expreſſion, far from ſuitable to the gravity and importance of the ſubject: every one muſt feel the diſcordance. The following couplet, ſinking far below the ſubject, is no leſs ludicrous.

Not

Not one looks backward, onward ſtill he goes,
Yet ne'er looks forward farther than his noſe.

Eſſay on Man, ep. iv. 223.

Le Rhin tremble et fremit à ces triſtes nouvelles;
Le feu ſort à travers ſes humides prunelles.
C'eſt donc trop peu, dit-il, que l'Eſcaut en deux mois
Ait appris à couler ſous de nouvelles loix;
Et de mille remparts mon onde environnée
De ces fleuves ſans nom ſuivra la deſtinée?
Ah! periſſent mes eaux, ou par d'illuſtres coups
Montrons qui doit cédar des mortels ou de nous.
A ces mots *eſſuiant ſa barbe limonneuſe*,
Il prend d'un vieux guerrier la figure poudreuſe.
Son front cicatricé rend ſon air furieux,
Et l'ardeur du combat étincelle en ſes yeux.

Boileau, epitre 4. *l.* 61.

A god wiping his dirty beard is proper for burleſque poetry only; and altogether unſuitable to the ſtrained elevation of this poem.

On the other hand, to raiſe the expreſſion above the tone of the ſubject, is a fault than which none is more common. Take the following inſtances.

Orcan le plus fidéle à ſerver ſes deſſeins,
Né ſous le ciel brûlant des plus noirs Affricains.

Bajazet, act 3. *ſc.* 8.

Les ombres par trois fois ont obſcurci les cieux
Depuis que le ſommeil n'eſt entré dans vos yeux;

E

Et le jour a trois fois chaſſé la nuit obſcure
Depuis que votre corps languit ſans nourriture.

Phedra, act 1. *ſc.* 3.

Aſſuerus. Ce mortel, qui montra tant de zéle pour moi, Vit-il encore ?

Aſaph. ——— Il voit l'aſtre qui vous éclaire.

Eſther, act 2. *ſc.* 3.

Oui, c'eſt Agamemnon, c'eſt ton roi qui t'eveille ;
Viens, reconnois la voix qui frappe ton oreille.

Iphigenie.

No jocund health that Denmark drinks to-day,
But the great cannon to the clouds ſhall tell ;
And the King's rowſe the heav'ns ſhall bruit again,
Reſpeaking earthly thunder.

Hamlet, act 1. *ſc.* 2.

——————— In the inner room
I ſpy a winking lamp, that weakly ſtrikes
The ambient air, ſcarce kindling into light.

Southern, Fate of Capua, act 3.

In the funeral orations of the Biſhop of Meaux, the following paſſages are raiſed far above the tone of the ſubject :

L'Ocean etonné de ſe voir traverſé tant de fois, en des appareils ſi divers, et pour des cauſes ſi differentes, *&c.* *p.* 6.

Grande Reine, je ſatisfais à vos plus tendres deſirs, quand je célébre ce monarque ; et ſon cœur qui n'a jamais vêcu que pour lui, ſe eveille, tout poudre qu'il eſt,

et devient ſenſible, même ſous ce drap mortuaire, au nom d'un epoux ſi cher. *p.* 32.

Monteſquieu, in a didactic work, *L'eſprit des Loix*, gives too great indulgence to imagination: the tone of his language ſwells frequently above his ſubject. I give an example:

Mr le Comte de Boulainvilliers et Mr l'Abbé Dubos ont fait chacun un ſyſteme, dont l'un ſemble être une conjuration contre le tiers-etat, et l'autre une conjuration contre la nobleſſe. Lorſque le Soleil donna à Phaéton ſon char à conduire, il lui dit, Si vous montez trop haut, vous brulerez la demeure céleſte; ſi vous deſcendez trop bas, vous réduirez en cendres la terre: n'allez point trop à droite, vous tomberiez dans la conſtellation du ſerpent; n'allez point trop à gauche, vous iriez dans celle de l'autel: tenez-vous entre les deux.

L. 30. *ch.* 10.

The following paſſage, intended, one would imagine, as a receipt to boil water, is altogether burleſque by the laboured elevation of the diction:

A maſſy caldron of ſtupendous frame
They brought, and plac'd it o'er the riſing flame:
Then heap the lighted wood; the flame divides
Beneath the vaſe, and climbs around the ſides:
In its wide womb they pour the ruſhing ſtream:
The boiling water bubbles to the brim.

Iliad, xviii. 405.

In

In a paſſage at the beginning of the 4th book of Telemachus, one feels a ſudden bound upward without preparation, which accords not with the ſubject:

Calypſo, qui avoit été juſqu' à ce moment immobile et tranſportée de plaiſir en écoutant les avantures de Télémaque, l'interrompit pour lui faire prendre quelque repôs. Il eſt tems, lui dit-elle, qui vous alliez goûter la douceur du ſommeil aprés tant de travaux. Vous n'avez rien à craindre ici; tout vous eſt favorable. Abandonnez vous donc à la joye. Goutez la paix, et tous les autres dons des dieux dont vous allez être comblé. Demain, *quand l'Aurore avec ſes doigts de rôſes entr'ouvrira les portes dorées de l'Orient, et que le Chevaux du Soleil ſortans de l'onde amére repandront les flames du jour, pour chaſſer devant eux toutes les etoiles du ciel,* nous reprendrons, mon cher Télémaque, l'hiſtoire de vos malheurs.

This obviouſly is copied from a ſimilar paſſage in the Æneid, which ought not to have been copied, becauſe it lies open to the ſame cenſure; but the force of authority is great:

At regina gravi jamdudum ſaucia cura
Vulnus alit venis, et cæco carpitur igni.
Multa viri virtus animo, multuſque recurſat
Gentis honos: hærent infixi pectore vultus,
Verbaque: nec placidam membris dat cura quietem.
Poſtera Phœbea luſtrabat lampade terras,
Humentemque Aurora polo dimoverat umbram;
Cum ſic unanimem alloquitur maleſana ſororem.

Lib. iv. 1.

Take another example where the words riſe above the ſubject:

Ainſi les peuples y accoururent bientôt en foule de toutes partes; le commerce de cette ville étoit ſemblable au flux et au reflux de la mer. Les tréſors y entroient comme les flots viennent l'un ſur l'autre. Tout y étoit apporté et en ſortoit librement; tout ce qui y entroit étoit utile; tout ce qui en ſortoit, laiſſoit en ſortant d'autres richeſſes en ſa place. La juſtice ſevére preſide dans le port au milieu de tant de nations. La franchiſe, la bonne foi, la candeur, ſembloient du haut de ces ſuperbs tours appeller les marchands des terres les plus éloignées: chacun de ces marchands, *ſoit qu'il vînt des rives orientales où le ſoleil ſort chaque jour du ſein des ondes, ſoit qu'il fût parti de cette grande mer où le ſoleil laſſé de ſon cours va eteindre ſes feux*, vivoit paiſible et en ſureté dans Salente comme dans ſa patrie!

Telemaque, l. 12.

The language of Homer is ſuited to his ſubject, no leſs accurately than the actions and ſentiments of his heroes are to their characters. Virgil, in that particular, falls ſhort of perfection: his language is ſtately throughout; and though he deſcends at times to the ſimpleſt branches of cookery, roaſting and boiling for example, yet he never relaxes a moment from the high tone*. In adjuſting his language to his ſubject, no writer equals Swift. I can recollect but one exception, which at the ſame

* See Æneid. lib. i. 188.—219.

time

time is far from being groſs: *The journal of a modern lady* is compoſed in a ſtyle blending ſprightlineſs with familiarity, perfectly ſuited to the ſubject: in one paſſage, however, the poet deviating from that ſtyle, takes a tone above his ſubject. The paſſage I have in view begins, *l.* 116. *But let me now a while ſurvey, &c.* and ends at *l.* 135.

It is proper to be obſerved upon this head, that writers of inferior rank are continually upon the ſtretch to enliven and enforce their ſubject by exaggeration and ſuperlatives. This unluckily has an effect contrary to what is intended; the reader, diſguſted with language that ſwells above the ſubject, is led by contraſt to think more meanly of the ſubject than it may poſſibly deſerve. A man of prudence, beſide, will be no leſs careful to huſband his ſtrength in writing than in walking: a writer too liberal of ſuperlatives, exhauſts his whole ſtock upon ordinary incidents, and reſerves no ſhare to expreſs, with greater energy, matters of importance *.

* Montaigne, reflecting upon the then preſent modes, obſerves, that there never was at any other time ſo abject and ſervile proſtitution of words in the addreſſes made by people of faſhion to one another; the humbleſt tenders of life and ſoul, no profeſſions under that of devotion and adoration; the writer conſtantly declaring himſelf a vaſſal, nay a ſlave: ſo that when any more ſerious occaſion of friendſhip or gratitude requires more genuine profeſſions, words are wanting to expreſs them.

Many writers of that kind abound ſo in epithets, as if poetry conſiſted entirely in high-ſounding words. Take the following inſtance.

When black-brow'd Night her duſky mantle ſpread,
And wrapt in ſolemn gloom the ſable ſky:
When ſoothing Sleep her opiate dews had ſhed,
And ſeal'd in ſilken ſlumbers ev'ry eye:
My wakeful thoughts admit no balmy reſt,
Nor the ſweet bliſs of ſoft oblivion ſhare:
But watchful wo diſtracts my aching breaſt,
My heart the ſubject of corroding care:
From haunts of men with wand'ring ſteps and ſlow
I ſolitary ſteal, and ſooth my penſive wo.

Here every ſubſtantive is faithfully attended by ſome tumid epithet; like young maſter, who cannot walk abroad without having a lac'd livery-man at his heels. Thus in reading without taſte, an emphaſis is laid on every word; and in ſinging without taſte, every note is grac'd. Such redundancy of epithets, inſtead of pleaſing, produce ſatiety and diſguſt.

The power of language to imitate thought, is not confined to the capital circumſtances above mentioned: it reacheth even the ſlighter modifications. Slow action, for example, is imitated by words pronounced ſlow: labour or toil, by words harſh or rough in their ſound. But this ſubject has been already handled *.

* Ch. 18. ſect. 3.

In

In dialogue-writing, the condition of the ſpeaker is chiefly to be regarded in framing the expreſſion. The ſentinel in *Hamlet*, interrogated with relation to the ghoſt whether his watch had been quiet, anſwers with great propriety for a man in his ſtation, "Not a mouſe ſtirring *".

I proceed to a ſecond remark, no leſs important than the former. No perſon of reflection but muſt be ſenſible, that an incident makes a ſtronger impreſſion on an eye-witneſs, than when heard at ſecond hand. Writers of genius, ſenſible that the eye is the beſt avenue to the heart, repreſent every thing as paſſing in our ſight; and, from readers or hearers, transform us as it were into ſpectators: a ſkilful writer conceals himſelf, and preſents his perſonages: in a word, every thing becomes dramatic as much as poſſible. Plutarch *de gloria Athenienſium*, obſerves, that Thucydides makes his reader a ſpectator, and inſpires him with the ſame paſſions as if he were an eye-witneſs; and the ſame obſervation is applicable to our countryman Swift. From this happy talent ariſes that energy of ſtyle which is peculiar to him: he can-

* One can ſcarce avoid ſmiling at the blindneſs of a certain critic, who, with an air of ſelf-ſufficiency, condemns this expreſſion as low and vulgar. A French poet, ſays he, would expreſs the ſame thought in a more ſublime manner: "Mais "tout dort, et l'armée, et les vents, et Neptune." And he adds, "The Engliſh poet may pleaſe at London, but the "French every where elſe."

not always avoid narration; but the pencil is his choice, by which he beſtows life and colouring upon his objects. Pope is richer in ornament, but poſſeſſeth not in the ſame degree the talent of drawing from the life. A tranſlation of the ſixth ſatire of Horace, begun by the former and finiſhed by the latter, affords the faireſt opportunity for a compariſon. Pope obviouſly imitates the picturesque manner of his friend: yet every one of taſte muſt be ſenſible, that the imitation, though fine, falls ſhort of the original. In other inſtances, where Pope writes in his own ſtyle, the difference of manner is ſtill more conſpicuous.

Abſtract or general terms have no good effect in any compoſition for amuſement; becauſe it is only of particular objects that images can be formed *. Shakeſpear's ſtyle in that reſpect is excellent: every article in his deſcriptions is particular, as in nature; and if accidentally a vague expreſſion ſlip in, the blemiſh is diſcernible by the bluntneſs of its impreſſion. Take the following example: Falſtaff, excuſing himſelf for running away at a robbery, ſays,

> By the Lord, I knew ye, as well as he that made ye. Why, hear ye, my maſters; was it for me to kill the heir-apparent? ſhould I turn upon the true prince? Why, thou knoweſt, I am as valiant as Hercules; but

* See chap. 4.

beware

beware inſtinct, the lion will not touch the true prince: *inſtinct is a great matter.* I was a coward on inſtinct: I ſhall think the better of myſelf, and thee, during my life; I for a violent lion, and thou for a true prince. But, by the Lord, lads, I am glad you have the money. Hoſteſs, clap to the doors, watch to-night, pray to-morrow. Gallants, lads, boys, hearts of gold, all the titles of good fellowſhip come to you! What, ſhall we be merry? ſhall we have a play *extempore?*

Firſt part Henry IV. *act* 2. *ſc.* 9.

The ſentence I object to is, *inſtinct is a great matter,* which makes but a poor figure, compared with the livelineſs of the reſt of the ſpeech. It was one of Homer's advantages, that he wrote before general terms were multiplied: the ſuperior genius of Shakeſpear diſplays itſelf in avoiding them after they were multiplied. Addiſon deſcribes the family of Sir Roger de Coverley in the following words:

You would take his valet de chambre for his brother, his butler is gray-headed, his groom is one of the graveſt men that I have ever ſeen, and his coachman has the looks of a privy counſellor.

Spectator, N° 106.

The deſcription of the groom is leſs lively than of the others; plainly becauſe the expreſſion, being vague and general, tends not to form any image.

" Dives

"Dives opum variarum *," is an expreſſion ſtill more vague; and ſo are the following:

——————Mæcenas, *mearum*
Grande decus, columenque *rerum*.
Horat. Carm. lib. 2. *ode* 17.

——————et fide Teîa
Dices *laborantes in uno*
Penelopen, vitreamque Circen.
Ibid. lib. 1. *ode* 17.

——————Ridiculum acri
Fortius et melius magnas plerumque *ſecat res*.
Horat. Satir. lib. 1. *ſat.* 10.

In the fine arts it is a rule, to put the capital objects in the ſtrongeſt point of view; and even to preſent them oftener than once, where it can be done. In hiſtory-painting, the principal figure is placed in the front, and in the beſt light: an equeſtrian ſtatue is placed in a centre of ſtreets, that it may be ſeen from many places at once. In no compoſition is there greater opportunity for this rule than in writing:

——————Sequitur pulcherrimus Aſtur,
Aſtur equo fidens et verſicoloribus armis.
Æneid x. 180.

——————Full many a lady
I've ey'd with beſt regard, and many a time

* Georg. ii. 468.

Th'

Th' harmony of their tongues hath into bondage
Brought my too diligent ear; for ſeveral virtues
Have I lik'd ſeveral women, never any
With ſo full ſoul, but ſome defect in her
Did quarrel with the nobleſt grace ſhe ow'd,
And put it to the foil. But you, O you,
So perfect, and ſo peerleſs, are created
Of every creature's beſt.

The Tempeſt, act 3. *ſc.* 1.

Orlando. ——— Whate'er you are
That in this deſert inacceſſible,
Under the ſhade of melancholy boughs,
Loſe and neglect the creeping hours of time;
If ever you have look'd on better days;
If ever been where bells have knoll'd to church;
If ever ſat at any good man's feaſt;
If ever from your eye-lids wip'd a tear,
And know what 'tis to pity and be pity'd;
Let gentleneſs my ſtrong enforcement be,
In the which hope I bluſh and hide my ſword.

Duke ſen. True is it that we have ſeen better days;
And have with holy bell been knoll'd to church;
And ſat at good mens feaſts; and wip'd our eyes
Of drops that ſacred pity had engender'd:
And therefore ſit you down in gentleneſs,
And take upon command what help we have,
That to your wanting may be miniſtred.

As you like it.

With thee converſing I forget all time;
All ſeaſons and their change, all pleaſe alike.
Sweet is the breath of morn, her riſing ſweet,
With charm of earlieſt birds; pleaſant the ſun

When

When firſt on this delightful land he ſpreads
His orient beams, on herbs, tree, fruit, and flow'r,
Gliſt'ring with dew; fragrant the fertile earth
After ſoft ſhowers; and ſweet the coming on
Of grateful evening mild, the ſilent night
With this her ſolemn bird, and this fair moon,
And theſe the gems of heav'n, her ſtarry train.
But neither breath of morn, when ſhe aſcends
With charm of earlieſt birds, nor riſing ſun
On this delightful land, nor herb, fruit, flow'r,
Gliſtering with dew, nor fragrance after ſhowers,
Nor grateful evening mild, nor ſilent night,
With this her ſolemn bird, nor walk by moon
Or glittering ſtar light, without thee is ſweet.

Paradiſe Loſt, *b.* 4. *l.* 634.

What mean ye, that ye uſe this proverb, The fathers have eaten ſour grapes, and the children's teeth are ſet on edge? As I live, ſaith the Lord God, ye ſhall not have occaſion to uſe this proverb in Iſrael. If a man keep my judgements to deal truly, he is juſt, he ſhall ſurely live. But if he be a robber, a ſhedder of blood; if he have eaten upon the mountains, and defiled his neighbour's wife; if he have oppreſſed the poor and needy, have ſpoiled by violence, have not reſtored the pledge, have lift up his eyes to idols, have given forth upon uſury, and have taken increaſe: ſhall he live? he ſhall not live: he ſhall ſurely die; and his blood ſhall be upon him. Now, lo, if he beget a ſon, that ſeeth all his father's ſins, and conſidereth, and doeth not ſuch like; that hath not eaten upon the mountains, hath not lift up his eyes to idols, nor defiled his neighbour's wife, hath not oppreſſed any, nor with-held the pledge, neither hath ſpoiled by violence, but hath given his

his bread to the hungry, and covered the naked with a garment; that hath not received uſury nor increaſe, that hath executed my judgements, and walked in my ſtatutes; he ſhall not die for the iniquity of his father; he ſhall ſurely live. The ſoul that ſinneth, it ſhall die; the ſon ſhall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither ſhall the father bear the iniquity of the ſon; the righteouſneſs of the righteous ſhall be upon him, and the wickedneſs of the wicked ſhall be upon him. Have I any pleaſure that the wicked ſhould die, ſaith the Lord God; and not that he ſhould return from his ways and live?

Ezekiel. xviii.

The repetitions in Homer, which are frequent, have been the occaſion of much criticiſm. Suppoſe we were at a loſs about the reaſon, might not taſte be ſufficient to juſtify them? At the ſame time, we are at no loſs about the reaſon: they evidently make the narration dramatic, and have an air of truth, by making things appear as paſſing in our ſight. But ſuch repetitions are unpardonable in a didactic poem. In one of Heſiod's poems of that kind, a long paſſage occurs twice in the ſame chapter.

A conciſe comprehenſive ſtyle is a great ornament in narration; and a ſuperfluity of unneceſſary words, no leſs than of circumſtances, a great nuiſance. A judicious ſelection of the ſtriking circumſtances clothed in a nervous ſtyle, is delightful. In this ſtyle, Tacitus excels all writers, ancient and modern. Inſtances are numberleſs: take the following ſpecimen.

Crebra

Crebra hinc prælia, et fæpius in modum latrocinii: per ſaltus, per paludes; ut cuique fors aut virtus: temere, proviſo, ob iram, ob prædam, juſſa, et aliquando ignaris ducibus.

Annal. lib. 12. § 39.

After Tacitus, Oſſian in that reſpect juſtly merits the place of diſtinction. One cannot go wrong for examples in any part of the book; and at the firſt opening the following inſtance meets the eye:

Nathos cloathed his limbs in ſhining ſteel. The ſtride of the chief is lovely: the joy of his eye terrible. The wind ruſtles in his hair. Darthula is ſilent at his ſide: her look is fixed on the chief. Striving to hide the riſing ſigh, two tears ſwell in her eyes.

I add one other inſtance, which, beſide the property under conſideration, raiſes delicately our moſt tender ſympathy.

Son of Fingal! doſt thou not behold the darkneſs of Crothar's hall of ſhells? My ſoul was not dark at the feaſt, when my people lived. I rejoiced in the preſence of ſtrangers, when my ſon ſhone in the hall. But, Oſſian, he is a beam that is departed, and left no ſtreak of light behind. He is fallen, ſon of Fingal, in the battles of his father.———Rothmar, the chief of graſſy Tromlo, heard that my eyes had failed; he heard that my arms were fixed in the hall, and the pride of his ſoul aroſe. He came towards Croma: my people fell before him. I took my arms in the hall, but what could ſightleſs Crothar do? My ſteps were un-

unequal; my grief was great. I wiſhed for the days that were paſt: days! wherein I fought, and won in the field of blood. My ſon returned from the chace; the fair-haired Fovar-gormo. He had not lifted his ſword in battle, for his arm was young. But the ſoul of the youth was great; the fire of valour burnt in his eye. He ſaw the diſordered ſteps of his father, and his ſigh aroſe. King of Croma, ne ſaid, is it becauſe thou haſt no ſon? is it for the weakneſs of Fovar-gormo's arm that thy ſighs ariſe: I begin, my father, to feel the ſtrength of my arm; I have drawn the ſword of my youth, and I have bent the bow. Let me meet this Rothmar, with the youths of Croma: let me meet him, O my father, for I feel my burning ſoul.

And thou ſhalt meet him, I ſaid, ſon of the fightleſs Crothar! But let others advance before thee, that I may hear the tread of thy feet at thy return; for my eyes behold thee not, fair-haired Fovar-gormo!——He went; he met the foe; he fell. The foe advances towards Croma. He who ſlew my ſon is near, with all his pointed ſpears.

If a conciſe or nervous ſtyle be a beauty, tautology muſt be a blemiſh; and yet writers, fettered by verſe, are not ſufficiently careful to avoid this ſlovenly practice: they may be pitied, but they cannot be juſtified. Take for a ſpecimen the following inſtances, from the beſt poet, for verſification at leaſt, that England has to boaſt of.

High on his helm celeſtial lightnings play,
His beamy ſhield emits a living ray,

Th'

Th' unweary'd blaze inceſſant ſtreams ſupplies,
Like the red ſtar that fires th' autumnal ſkies.

Iliad v. 5.

Strength and omnipotence inveſt thy throne.

Iliad viii. 576.

So ſilent fountains, from a rock's tall head,
In ſable ſtreams ſoft trickling waters ſhed.

Iliad ix. 19.

His clanging armour rung.

Iliad xii. 94.

Fear on their cheek, and horror in their eye.

Iliad xv. 4.

The blaze of armour flaſh'd againſt the day.

Iliad xvii. 736.

As when the piercing blaſts of Boreas blow.

Iliad xix. 380.

And like the moon, the broad refulgent ſhield
Blaz'd with long rays, and gleam'd athwart the field.

Iliad xix. 402.

No—could our ſwiftneſs o'er the winds prevail,
Or beat the pinions of the weſtern gale,
All were in vain——— *Iliad* xix. 460.

The humid ſweat from ev'ry pore deſcends.

Iliad xxiii. 829.

Redundant

Redundant epithets, ſuch as *humid* in the laſt citation, are by Quintilian diſallowed to orators; but indulged to poets*, becauſe his favourite poets, in a few inſtances, are reduced to ſuch epithets for the ſake of verſification; for inſtance, *Prata canis albicant pruinis* of Horace, and *liquidos fontes* of Virgil.

As an apology for ſuch careleſs expreſſions, it may well ſuffice, that Pope, in ſubmitting to be a tranſlator, acts below his genius. In a tranſlation, it is hard to require the ſame ſpirit or accuracy, that is cheerfully beſtowed on an original work. And to ſupport the reputation of that author, I ſhall give ſome inſtances from Virgil and Horace, more faulty by redundancy than any of thoſe above mentioned:

Sæpe etiam immenſum cœlo venit agmen aquarum,
Et fœdam glomerant tempeſtatem imbribus atris
Collectæ ex alto nubes: ruit arduus æther,
Et pluviâ ingenti ſata læta, boumque labores
Diluit.

Georg. lib. i. 322.

Poſtquam altum tenuere rates, nec jam amplius ullæ
Apparent terræ; cœlum undique et undique pontus:
Tum mihi cæruleus ſupra caput aſtitit imber,
Noctem hyememque ferens: et inhorruit unda tenebris.

Æneid. lib. iii. 192.

——————— Hinc tibi copia
Manabit ad plenum benigno

* L. 8. cap. 6. ſect. 2.

Ruris honorum opulenta cornu.

Horat. Carm. lib. 1. *ode* 17.

Videre feſſos vomerem inverſum boves
Collo trahentes languido,

Horat. epod. ii. 63

Here I can luckily apply Horace's rule againſt himſelf:

Eſt brevitate opus, ut currat ſententia, neu ſe
Impediat verbis laſſas onerantibus aures.

Satir. lib. 1. *ſat.* x. 9

I cloſe this chapter with a curious inquiry. An object, however ugly to the ſight, is far from being ſo when repreſented by colours or by words. What is the cauſe of this difference? With reſpect to painting, the cauſe is obvious: a good picture, whatever the ſubject be, is agreeable by the pleaſure we take in imitation; and this pleaſure overbalancing the diſagreeableneſs of the ſubject, makes the picture upon the whole agreeable. With reſpect to the deſcription of an ugly object, the cauſe follows. To connect individuals in the ſocial ſtate, no particular contributes more than language, by the power it poſſeſſes of an expeditious communication of thought, and a lively repreſentation of tranſactions. But nature hath not been ſatisfied to recommend language by its utility merely: independent of utility, it is made ſuſceptible of many beauties, which are directly felt

felt, without any intervening reflection *. And this unfolds the myſtery; for the pleaſure of language is ſo great, as in a lively deſcription to overbalance the diſagreeableneſs of the image raiſed by it †. This, however, is no encouragement to chooſe a diſagreeable ſubject; for the pleaſure is incomparably greater where the ſubject and the deſcription are both of them agreeable.

The following deſcription is upon the whole agreeable, though the ſubject deſcribed is in itſelf diſmal:

Nine times the ſpace that meaſures day and night
To mortal men, he with his horrid crew
Lay vanquiſh'd, rolling in the fiery gulf,
Confounded though immortal! but his doom
Reſerv'd him to more wrath; for now the thought
Both of loſt happineſs and laſting pain
Torments him; round he throws his baleful eyes
That witneſs'd huge affliction and diſmay,
Mix'd with obdurate pride and ſtedfaſt hate:
At once as far as angels ken he views
The diſmal ſituation waſte and wild:
A dungeon horrible, on all ſides round
As one great furnace flam'd; yet from thoſe flames
No light, but rather darkneſs viſible
Serv'd only to diſcover ſights of wo,
Regions of ſorrow, doleful ſhades, where peace

* See chap. 18.

† See chap. 2. part 4.

And reſt can never dwell, hope never comes
That comes to all; but torture without end
Still urges, and a fiery deluge, fed
With ever-burning ſulphur unconſum'd!
Such place eternal juſtice had prepar'd
For thoſe rebellious.

Paradiſe Loſt, book 1. *l.* 5

An unmanly depreſſion of ſpirits in time of dan
ger is not an agreeable ſight; and yet a fine de
ſcription or repreſentation of it will be reliſhed

K. Richard. What muſt the King do now? muſt he
ſubmit?
The King ſhall do it: muſt he be depos'd?
The King ſhall be contented: muſt he loſe
The name of King? o' God's name, let it go:
I'll give my jewels for a ſet of beads;
My gorgeous palace for a hermitage;
My gay apparel, for an almſman's gown:
My figur'd goblets, for a diſh of wood;
My ſceptre, for a palmer's walking-ſtaff;
My ſubjects, for a pair of carved ſaints;
And my large kingdom for a little grave;
A little, little grave;——an obſcure grave.
Or, I'll be bury'd in the King's highway;
Some way of common tread, where ſubjects feet
May hourly trample on their ſovereign's head;
For on my heart they tread now, whilſt I live;
And, bury'd once, why not upon my head?

Richard II. *act* 3. *ſc.*

Objects that ſtrike terror in a ſpectator, have i
poetr

poetry and painting a fine effect. The picture by raiſing a ſlight emotion of terror, agitates the mind; and in that condition every beauty makes a deep impreſſion. May not contraſt heighten the pleaſure, by oppoſing our preſent ſecurity to the danger of encountering the object repreſented?

——————— The other ſhape,
If ſhape it might be call'd, that ſhape had none
Diſtinguiſhable in member, joint, or limb;
Or ſubſtance might be call'd that ſhadow ſeem'd,
For each ſeem'd either; black it ſtood as night,
Fierce as ten furies, terrible as hell,
And ſhook a dreadful dart.

Paradiſe Loſt, book 2. *l.* 666.

——————— Now ſtorming fury roſe,
And clamour ſuch as heard in heaven till now
Was never: arms on armour claſhing bray'd
Horrible diſcord, and the madding wheels
Of brazen chariots rag'd; dire was the noiſe
Of conflict: overhead the diſmal hiſs
Of fiery darts in flaming vollies flew,
And flying vaulted either hoſt with fire.
So under fiery cope together ruſh'd
Both battles main, with ruinous aſſault
And inextinguiſhable rage: all heaven
Reſounded; and had earth been then, all earth
Had to her centre ſhook.

Paradiſe Loſt, book 6. *l.* 207

Ghoſt. ——————— But that I am forbid
To tell the ſecrets of my priſon-houſe,
I could a tale unfold, whoſe lighteſt word
Would harrow up thy ſoul, freeze thy young blood,

Make thy two eyes, like ſtars, ſtart from their ſpheres,
Thy knotty and combined locks to part,
And each particular hair to ſtand on end,
Like quills upon the fretful porcupine:
But this eternal blazon muſt not be
To ears of fleſh and blood.

Hamlet, act 1. *ſc.* 8.

Gratiano. Poor Deſdemona! I'm glad thy father's dead:
Thy match was mortal to him; and pure grief
Shore his old thread in twain. Did he live now,
This ſight would make him do a deſperate turn:
Yea, curſe his better angel from his ſide,
And fall to reprobation.

Othello, act 5. *ſc.* 8.

Objects of horror muſt be excepted from the foregoing theory; for no deſcription, however lively, is ſufficient to overbalance the diſguſt raiſed even by the idea of ſuch objects. Every thing horrible ought therefore to be avoided in a deſcription. Nor is this a ſevere law: the poet will avoid ſuch ſcenes for his own ſake, as well as for that of his reader; and to vary his deſcriptions, nature affords plenty of objects that diſguſt us in ſome degree without raiſing horror. I am obliged therefore to condemn the picture of Sin in the ſecond book of *Paradiſe Loſt*, though a maſterly performance: the original would be a horrid ſpectacle; and the horror is not much ſoftened in the copy:

——— Penſive

——— Penſive here I ſat
Alone; but long I ſat not, till my womb,
Pregnant by thee, and now exceſſive grown,
Prodigious motion felt and rueful throes.
At laſt this odious offspring whom thou ſeeſt,
Thine own begotten, breaking violent way,
Tore through my intrails, that with fear and pain
Diſtorted, all my nether ſhape thus grew
Transform'd; but he my inbred enemy
Forth iſſu'd, brandiſhing his fatal dart,
Made to deſtroy: I fled, and cry'd out Death;
Hell trembl'd at the hideous name, and ſigh'd
From all her caves, and back reſounded Death.
I fled; but he purſu'd, (though more, it ſeems,
Inflam'd with luſt than rage), and ſwifter far,
Me overtook, his mother all diſmay'd,
And in embraces forcible and foul
Ingendring with me, of that rape begot
Theſe yelling monſters that with ceaſeleſs cry
Surround me, as thou ſaw'ſt, hourly conceiv'd
And hourly born, with ſorrow infinite
To me; for when they liſt, into the womb
That bred them they return, and howl and gnaw
My bowels, their repaſt; then burſting forth,
Afreſh with conſcious terrors vex me round,
That reſt or intermiſſion none I find.
Before mine eyes in oppoſition ſits
Grim Death, my ſon and foe, who ſets them on,
And me his parent would full ſoon devour
For want of other prey, but that he knows,
His end with mine involv'd; and knows that I
Should prove a bitter morſel, and his bane,
Whenever that ſhall be.

Book 2. *l.* 777.

Iago's character in the tragedy of *Othello*, is inſufferably monſtrous and Satanical: not even Shakeſpear's maſterly hand can make the picture agreeable.

Though the objects introduced in the following ſcenes are not altogether ſo horrible as Sin is in Milton's deſcription; yet with every perſon of delicacy, diſguſt will be the prevailing emotion:

—— Strophades Graio ſtant nomine dictæ
Inſulæ Ionio in magno: quas dira Celæno,
Harpyiæque colunt aliæ: Phineia poſtquam
Clauſa domus, menſaſque metu liquere priores.
Triſtius haud illis monſtrum, nec ſævior ulla
Peſtis et ira Deûm Stygiis ſeſe extulit undis.
Virginei volucrum vultus, fœdiſſima ventris
Proluvies, uncæque manus, et pallida ſemper
Ora fame.
Huc ubi delati portus intravimus: ecce
Læta boum paſſim campis armenta videmus,
Caprigenumque pecus, nullo cuſtode, per herbas.
Irruimus ferro, et Divos ipſumque vocamus
In prædam partemque Jovem: tunc littore curvo
Extruimuſque toros, dapibuſque epulamur opimis.
At ſubitæ horrifico lapſu de montibus adſunt
Harpyiæ: et magnis quatiunt clangoribus alas:
Diripiuntque dapes, contactuque omnia fœdant
Immundo: tum vox tetrum dira inter odorem.

Æneid. lib. iii. 210.

Sum patria ex Ithaca, comes infelicis Ulyſſei,
Nomen Achemenides: Trojam, genitore Adamaſto
Paupere

Paupere

Paupere (manſiſſetque utinam fortuna !) profectus.
Hic me, dum trepidi crudelia limina linquunt,
Immemores ſocii vaſto Cyclopis in antro
Deſeruere. Domus ſanie dapibuſque cruentis,
Intus opaca, ingens : ipſe arduus, altaque pulſat
Sidera : (Dii, talem terris avertite peſtem)
Nec viſu facilis, nec dictu affabilis ulli.
Viſceribus miſerorum, et ſanguine veſcitur atro.
Vidi egomet, duo de numero cum corpora noſtro,
Prenſa manu magna, medio reſupinus in antro,
Frangeret ad ſaxum, ſanieque aſperſa natarent
Limina : vidi, atro cum membra fluentia tabo
Manderet, et tepidi tremerent ſub dentibus artus.
Haud impune quidem : nec talia paſſus Ulyſſes,
Oblituſve ſui eſt Ithacus diſcrimine tanto.
Nam ſimul expletus dapibus, vinoque ſepultus
Cervicem inflexam poſuit, jacuitque per antrum
Immenſus, ſaniem eructans, ac fruſta cruento
Per ſomnum commixta mero ; nos, magna precati
Numina, ſortitique vices, unà undique circum
Fundimur, et telo lumen terebramus acuto
Ingens, quod torva ſolum ſub fronte latebat.

Æneid. lib. iii. 613.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

Epic and Dramatic Composition.

TRAGEDY differs not from the epic in ſubſtance: in both the ſame ends are purſued, namely, inſtruction and amuſement; and in both the ſame mean is employed, namely, imitation of human actions. They differ only in the manner of imitating: epic poetry employs narration; tragedy repreſents its facts as paſſing in our ſight: in the former, the poet introduces himſelf as an hiſtorian; in the latter, he preſents his actors, and never himſelf *.

This

* The dialogue in a dramatic compoſition diſtinguiſhes it ſo clearly from other compoſitions, that no writer has thought it neceſſary to ſearch for any other diſtinguiſhing mark. But much uſeleſs labour has been beſtowed, to diſtinguiſh an epic poem by ſome peculiar mark. Boſſu defines it to be, "A "compoſition in verſe, intended to form the manners by in-"ſtructions diſguiſed under the allegories of an important "action;" which excludes every epic poem founded upon real facts, and perhaps includes ſeveral of Æſop's fables. Voltaire reckons verſe ſo eſſential, as for that ſingle reaſon to exclude the adventures of Telemachus. See his *Eſſay upon Epic Poetry*. Others, affected with ſubſtance more than with form, heſitate not to pronounce that poem to be epic.—

It

This difference regarding form only, may be thought ſlight: but the effects it occaſions, are by no means ſo; for what we ſee makes a deeper impreſſion than what we learn from others. A narrative poem is a ſtory told by another: facts and incidents paſſing upon the ſtage, come under our own obſervation; and are beſide much enlivened by action and geſture, expreſſive of many ſentiments beyond the reach of words.

A dramatic compoſition has another property, independent altogether of action; which is, that it makes a deeper impreſſion than narration: in the former, perſons expreſs their own ſentiments; in the latter, ſentiments are related at ſecond hand. For that reaſon, Ariſtotle, the father of critics, lays it down as a rule, That in an epic poem the author ought to take every opportunity of introducing his actors, and of confining the narrative

It is not a little diverting to ſee ſo many profound critics hunting for what is not: they take for granted, without the leaſt foundation, that there muſt be ſome preciſe criterion to diſtinguiſh epic poetry from every other ſpecies of writing. Literary compoſitions run into each other, preciſely like colours: in their ſtrong tints they are eaſily diſtinguiſhed; but are ſuſceptible of ſo much variety, and of ſo many different forms, that we never can ſay where one ſpecies ends and another begins. As to the general taſte, there is little reaſon to doubt, that a work where heroic actions are related in an elevated ſtyle, will, without further requiſite, be deemed an epic poem.

rative part within the narroweſt bounds*. Homer underſtood perfectly the advantage of this method; and his two poems abound in dialogue. Lucan runs to the oppoſite extreme, even ſo far as to ſtuff his *Pharſalia* with cold and languid reflections; the merit of which he aſſumes to himſelf, and deigns not to ſhare with his actors. Nothing can be more injudiciouſly timed, than a chain of ſuch reflections, which ſuſpend the battle of Pharſalia after the leaders had made their ſpeeches, and the two armies are ready to engage†.

Ariſtotle, regarding the fable only, divides tragedy into ſimple and complex: but it is of greater moment, with reſpect to dramatic as well as epic poetry, to found a diſtinction upon the different ends attained by ſuch compoſitions. A poem, whether dramatic or epic, that has nothing in view but to move the paſſions and to exhibit pictures of virtue and vice, may be diſtinguiſhed by the name of *pathetic*: but where a ſtory is purpoſely contrived to illuſtrate ſome moral truth, by ſhowing that diſorderly paſſions naturally lead to external misfortunes; ſuch compoſition may be denominated *moral*‡. Beſide making a deeper impreſſion

* Poet. chap. 25. ſect. 6.

† Lib. 7. from line 385. to line 460.

‡ The ſame diſtinction is applicable to that ſort of fable which is ſaid to be the invention of Æſop. A moral, it is

impreſſion than can be done by cool reaſoning, a moral poem does not fall ſhort of reaſoning in affording conviction: the natural connection of vice with miſery, and of virtue with happineſs, may be illuſtrated by ſtating a fact as well as by urging an argument. Let us aſſume, for example, the following moral truths; that diſcord among the chiefs renders ineffectual all common meaſures; and that the conſequences of a ſlightly-founded quarrel, foſtered by pride and arrogance, are no leſs fatal than thoſe of the groſſeſt injury: theſe truths may be inculcated, by the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles at the ſiege of Troy. If facts or circumſtances be wanting, ſuch as tend to rouſe the turbulent paſſions, they muſt be invented; but no accidental nor unaccountable event ought to be admitted; for the neceſſary or probable connection between vice and miſery is not learned from any events but what are naturally occaſioned by the characters and paſſions of the perſons repreſented, acting in ſuch and ſuch circumſtances. A real event of which we ſee not the cauſe,

is true, is by all critics conſidered as eſſential to ſuch a fable. But nothing is more common than to be led blindly by authority; for of the numerous collections I have ſeen, the fables that clearly inculcate a moral, make a very ſmall part. In many fables, indeed, proper pictures of virtue and vice are exhibited: but the bulk of theſe collections convey no inſtruction, nor afford any amuſement beyond what a child receives in reading an ordinary ſtory.

cauſe, may afford a leſſon, upon the preſumption that what hath happened may again happen: but this cannot be inferted from a ſtory that is known to be a fiction.

Many are the good effects of ſuch compoſitions. A pathetic compoſition, whether epic or dramatic, tends to a habit of virtue, by exciting us to do what is right, and reſtraining us from what is wrong *. Its frequent pictures of human woes, produce, beſide, two effects extremely ſalutary: they improve our ſympathy, and fortify us to bear our own misfortunes. A moral compoſition obviouſly produces the ſame good effects, becauſe by being moral it ceaſeth not to be pathetic: it enjoys beſide an excellence peculiar to itſelf; for it not only improves the heart, as above mentioned, but inſtructs the head by the moral it contains. I cannot imagine any entertainment more ſuited to a rational being, than a work thus happily illuſtrating ſome moral truth: where a number of perſons of different characters are engaged in an important action, ſome retarding, others promoting, the great cataſtrophe: and where there is dignity of ſtyle as well as of matter. A work of that kind has our ſympathy at command; and can put in motion the whole train of the ſocial affections: our curioſity in ſome ſcenes is excited, in others gratified; and our delight is conſummated at

* See chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 4.

at the cloſe, upon finding, from the characters and ſituations exhibited at the commencement, that every incident down to the final cataſtrophe is natural, and that the whole in conjunction make a regular chain of cauſes and effects.

Conſidering that an epic and a dramatic poem are the ſame in ſubſtance, and have the ſame aim or end, one will readily imagine, that ſubjects proper for the one muſt be equally proper for the other. But conſidering their difference as to form, there will be found reaſon to correct that conjecture at leaſt in ſome degree. Many ſubjects may indeed be treated with equal advantage in either form; but the ſubjects are ſtill more numerous for which they are not equally qualified; and there are ſubjects proper for the one, and not for the other. To give ſome ſlight notion of the difference, as there is no room here for enlarging upon every article, I obſerve, that dialogue is better qualified for expreſſing ſentiments, and narrative for diſplaying facts. Heroiſm, magnanimity, undaunted courage, and other elevated virtues, figure beſt in action: tender paſſions, and the whole tribe of ſympathetic affections, figure beſt in ſentiment. It clearly follows, that tender paſſions are more peculiarly the province of tragedy, grand and heroic actions of epic poetry *.

* In Racine tender ſentiments prevail; in Corneille, grand and heroic manners. Hence clearly the preference of the former

I have no occaſion to ſay more upon the epic, conſidered as peculiarly adapted to certain ſubjects. But as dramatic ſubjects are more complex, I muſt take a narrower view of them; which I do the more willingly, in order to clear a point involved in great obſcurity by critics.

In the chapter of Emotions and Paſſions *, it is occaſionally ſhown, that the ſubject beſt fitted for tragedy is where a man has himſelf been the cauſe of his misfortune; not ſo as to be deeply guilty, nor altogether innocent: the misfortune muſt be occaſioned by a fault incident to human nature, and therefore in ſome degree venial. Such misfortunes call forth the ſocial affections, and warmly intereſt the ſpectator. An accidental misfortune, if not extremely ſingular, doth not greatly move our pity: the perſon who ſuffers, being innocent, is freed from the greateſt of all torments, that anguiſh of mind which is occaſioned by remorſe:

Poco é funeſta
L'altrui fortuna
Quando non reſta
Ragione alcuna
Ne di pentirſi, né darroſir.

Metaſtaſio.

former before the latter, as dramatic poets. Corneille would have figured better in an heroic poem.

* Part 4.

An atrocious criminal, on the other hand, who brings misfortunes upon himſelf, excites little pity, for a different reaſon: his remorſe, it is true, aggravates his diſtreſs, and ſwells the firſt emotions of pity; but theſe are immediately blunted by our hatred of him as a criminal. Misfortunes that are not innocent, nor highly criminal, partake the advantages of each extreme: they are attended with remorſe to embitter the diſtreſs, which raiſes our pity to a height; and the ſlight indignation we have at a venial fault, detracts not ſenſibly from our pity. The happieſt of all ſubjects accordingly for raiſing pity, is where a man of integrity falls into a great misfortune by doing an action that is innocent, but which, by ſome ſingular means, is conceived by him to be criminal: his remorſe aggravates his diſtreſs; and our compaſſion, unreſtrained by indignation, knows no bounds. Pity comes thus to be the ruling paſſion of a pathetic tragedy; and by proper repreſentation, may be raiſed to a height ſcarce exceeded by any thing felt in real life. A moral tragedy takes in a larger field; as it not only exerciſes our pity, but raiſes another paſſion, which, tho' ſelfiſh, deſerves to be cheriſhed equally with the ſocial affection. The paſſion I have in view is fear or terror; for when a misfortune is the natural conſequence of ſome wrong bias in the temper, every ſpectator who is conſcious of ſuch a bias in himſelf, takes the alarm, and dreads his falling in-

to the ſame misfortune: and by the emotion of fear or terror, frequently reiterated in a variety of moral tragedies, the ſpectators are put upon their guard againſt the diſorders of paſſion.

The commentators upon Ariſtotle, and other critics, have been much gravelled about the account given of tragedy by that author: "That, "by means of pity and terror, it refines or puri- "fies in us all ſorts of paſſion." But no one who has a clear conception of the end and effects of a good tragedy, can have any difficulty about Ariſtotle's meaning: our pity is engaged for the perſons repreſented; and our terror is upon our own account. Pity indeed is here made to ſtand for all the ſympathetic emotions, becauſe of theſe it is the capital. There can be no doubt that our ſympathetic emotions are refined or improved by daily exerciſe; and in what manner our other paſſions are refined by terror, I have juſt now ſaid. One thing is certain, that no other meaning can juſtly be given to the foregoing doctrine than that now mentioned; and that it was really Ariſtotle's meaning, appears from his 13th chapter, where he delivers ſeveral propoſitions conformable to the doctrine as here explained. Theſe, at the ſame time, I take liberty to mention; becauſe, as far as authority can go, they confirm the foregoing reaſoning about ſubjects proper for tragedy. The firſt propoſition is, That it being the province of tragedy to excite pity and terror, an innocent

innocent perſon falling into adverſity ought never to be the ſubject. This propoſition is a neceſſary conſequence of his doctrine as explained: a ſubject of that nature may indeed excite pity and terror; but in the former in an inferior degree, and the latter no degree for moral inſtruction. The ſecond propoſition is, That the hiſtory of a wicked perſon in a change from miſery to happineſs, ought not to be repreſented. It excites neither terror nor compaſſion, nor is agreeable in any reſpect. The third is, That the misfortunes of a wicked perſon ought not to be repreſented. Such repreſentation may be agreeable in ſome meaſure upon a principle of juſtice: but it will not move our pity; nor any degree of terror, except in thoſe of the ſame vicious diſpoſition with the perſon repreſented. The laſt propoſition is, That the only character fit for repreſentation lies in the middle, neither eminently good nor eminently bad; where the misfortune is not the effect of deliberate vice, but of ſome involuntary fault, as our author expreſſes it *. The only objection I find to Ariſtotle's account of tragedy, is, that he confines it within too narrow bounds, by refuſing admittance to the pathetic kind: for if terror be eſ-

* If any one can be amuſed with a grave diſcourſe which promiſeth much and performs nothing, I refer to Brumoy in his *Theatre Grec*, Preliminary diſcourſe on the origin of tragedy.

ſential to tragedy, no repreſentation deſerves that name but the moral kind, where the misfortunes exhibited are cauſed by a wrong balance of mind or ſome diſorder in the internal conſtitution: ſuch misfortunes always ſuggeſt moral inſtruction; and by ſuch misfortunes only, can terror be excited for our improvement.

Thus Ariſtotle's four propoſitions above mentioned, relate ſolely to tragedies of the moral kind. Thoſe of the pathetic kind, are not confined within ſo narrow limits: ſubjects fitted for the theatre, are not in ſuch plenty as to make us reject innocent misfortunes which rouſe our ſympathy, tho' they inculcate no moral. With reſpect indeed to ſubjects of that kind, it may be doubted, whether the concluſion ought not always to be fortunate. Where a perſon of integrity is repreſented as ſuffering to the end under misfortunes purely accidental, we depart diſcontented, and with ſome obſcure ſenſe of injuſtice: for ſeldom is man ſo ſubmiſſive to Providence, as not to revolt againſt the tyranny and vexations of blind chance; he will be tempted to ſay, This ought not to be. Chance, giving an impreſſion of anarchy and miſrule, produces always a damp upon the mind. I give for an example the *Romeo and Juliet* of Shakeſpear, where the fatal cataſtrophe is occaſioned by Friar Laurence's coming to the monument a minute too late: we are vexed at the unlucky chance, and go away diſſatisfied. Such impreſſions,

ſions, which ought not to be cheriſhed, are a ſufficient reaſon for excluding ſtories of that kind from the theatre. The misfortunes of a virtuous perſon, ariſing from neceſſary cauſes or from a chain of unavoidable circumſtances, are conſidered in a different light. A regular chain of cauſes and effects directed by the general laws of nature, never fails to ſuggeſt the hand of Providence; to which we ſubmit without reſentment, being conſcious that ſubmiſſion is our duty*. For that reaſon, we are not diſguſted with the diſtreſſes of Voltaire's *Mariamne*, though redoubled on her till her death, without the leaſt fault or failing on her part: her misfortunes are owing to a cauſe extremely natural, and not unfrequent, the jealouſy of a barbarous huſband. The fate of Deſdemona, in the *Moor of Venice*, affects us in the ſame manner. We are not ſo eaſily reconciled to the fate of Cordelia in *King Lear*: the cauſes of her misfortune are by no means ſo evident, as to exclude the gloomy notion of chance. In ſhort, a perfect character ſuffering under misfortunes, is qualified for being the ſubject of a pathetic tragedy, provided chance be excluded. Nor is a perfect character altogether inconſiſtent with a moral tragedy: it may ſucceſsfully be introduced in an under-part, if the chief

* See Eſſays on the Principles of Morality, edit. 2. p. 291.

place be occupied by an imperfect character, from which a moral can be drawn. This is the caſe of Deſdemona and Mariamne juſt mentioned; and it is the caſe of Monimia and Belvidera, in Otway's two tragedies, *The Orphan*, and *Venice Preſerv'd*.

I had an early opportunity to unfold a curious doctrine, That fable operates on our paſſions, by repreſenting its events as paſſing in our ſight, and by deluding us into a conviction of reality *. Hence, in epic and dramatic compoſitions, every circumſtance ought to be employ'd that may promote the deluſion; ſuch as the borrowing from hiſtory ſome noted event, with the addition of circumſtances that may anſwer the author's purpoſe: the principal facts are known to be true; and we are diſpoſed to extend our belief to every circumſtance. But in chooſing a ſubject that makes a figure in hiſtory, greater precaution is neceſſary than where the whole is a fiction. In the latter caſe there is full ſcope for invention: the author is under no reſtraint other than that the characters and incidents be juſt copies of nature. But where the ſtory is founded on truth, no circumſtances muſt be added, but ſuch as connect naturally with what are known to be true; hiſtory may be ſupplied, but muſt not be contradicted: further the ſubject choſen muſt be diſtant in time, or at leaſt

* Chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 7.

leaſt in place; for the familiarity of recent perſons and events ought to be avoided. Familiarity ought more eſpecially to be avoided in an epic poem, the peculiar character of which is dignity and elevation: modern manners make no figure in ſuch a poem *.

After Voltaire, no writer, it is probable, will think of rearing an epic poem upon a recent event in the hiſtory of his own country. But an event of that kind is perhaps not altogether unqualified for tragedy: it was admitted in Greece; and Shakeſpear has employ'd it ſucceſsfully in ſeveral of his pieces. One advantage it poſſeſſes above fiction, that of more readily engaging our belief, which tends above any other circumſtance to raiſe our ſympathy. The ſcene of comedy is generally laid at home: familiarity is no objection; and we are peculiarly ſenſible of the ridicule of our own manners.

After a proper ſubject is choſen, the dividing it into parts requires ſome art. The concluſion of a book in an epic poem, or of an act in a play, can-

* I would not from this obſervation be thought to undervalue modern manners. The roughneſs and impetuoſity of ancient manners, may be better fitted for an epic poem, without being better fitted for ſociety. But without regard to that circumſtance, it is the familiarity of modern manners that unqualifies them for a lofty ſubject. The dignity of our preſent manners, will be better underſtood in future ages, when they are no longer familiar.

not be altogether arbitrary; nor be intended for ſo ſlight a purpoſe as to make the parts of equal length. The ſuppoſed pauſe at the end of every book, and the real pauſe at the end of every act, ought always to coincide with ſome pauſe in the action. In this reſpect, a dramatic or epic poem ought to reſemble a ſentence or period in language, divided into members that are diſtinguiſhed from each other by proper pauſes; or it ought to reſemble a piece of muſic, having a full cloſe at the end, preceded by imperfect cloſes that contribute to the melody. Every act in a dramatic poem ought therefore to cloſe with ſome incident that makes a pauſe in the action; for otherwiſe there can be no pretext for interrupting the repreſentation: it would be abſurd to break off in the very heat of action; againſt which every one would exclaim: the abſurdity ſtill remains where the action relents, if it be not actually ſuſpended for ſome time. This rule is alſo applicable to an epic poem: though in it a deviation from the rule is leſs remarkable; becauſe it is in the reader's power to hide the abſurdity, by proceeding inſtantly to another book. The firſt book of *Paradiſe Loſt* ends without any cloſe, perfect or imperfect: it breaks off abruptly, where Satan, ſeated on his throne, is prepared to harangue the convocated hoſt of the fallen angels; and the ſecond book begins with the ſpeech. Milton ſeems to have copied the *Æneid*, of which the two firſt books

books are divided much in the ſame manner. Neither is there any proper pauſe at the end of the fifth book of the *Æneid*. There is no proper pauſe at the end of the ſeventh book of *Paradiſe Loſt*, nor at the end of the eleventh. In the Iliad little attention is given to this rule.

This branch of the ſubject ſhall be cloſed with a general rule, That action being the fundamental part of every compoſition whether epic or dramatic, the ſentiments and tone of language ought to be ſubſervient to the action, ſo as to appear natural, and proper for the occaſion. The application of this rule to our modern plays, would reduce the bulk of them to a ſkeleton *.

After

* En général il y a beaucoup de diſcours et peu d'action ſur la ſcene Françoiſe. Quelqu'un diſoit en ſortant d'une piece de Denis le Tiran, Je n'ai rien vu, mais j'ai entendu force paroles. Voila ce qu'on peut dire en ſortant des pieces Françoiſes. Racine et Corneille avec tout leur génie ne ſont eux-mêmes que des parleurs; et leur ſucceſſeur eſt le premier qui, à l'imitation des Anglois, ait oſé mettre quelquefois la ſcene en repréſentation. Communément tout ſe paſſe en beaux dialogues bien agencés, bien ronflans, où l'on voit d'abord que le premier ſoin de chaque interlocuteur eſt toujours celui de briller. Preſque tout s'enonce en maximes générales. Quelque agités qu'ils puiſſent être, ils ſongent toujours plus au public qu'à eux mêmes; une ſentence leur coute moins qu'un ſentiment; les pieces de Racine et de Moliere exceptées, le *je* eſt preſque auſſi ſcrupuleuſement banni de la ſcene Françoiſe que des écrits de Port-Royal; et les paſſions humaines, auſſi modeſtes que l'humilité Chrétienne,

After carrying on together epic and dramatic compoſitions, I ſhall mention circumſtances peculiar to each; beginning with the epic kind. In a theatrical entertainment, which employs both the eye and the ear, it would be a groſs abſurdity, to introduce upon the ſtage ſuperior beings in a viſible ſhape. There is no place for ſuch objection in an epic poem; and Boileau *, with many other critics, declares ſtrongly for that ſort of machinery in an epic poem. But waving authority, which is apt to impoſe upon the judgment, let us draw what light we can from reaſon. I begin with a preliminary remark, That this matter is but indiſtinctly handled by critics: the poetical privilege of animating inſenſible objects for enlivening a deſcription,

tienne, n'y parlent jamais que par *on*. Il y a encore une certaine dignité manierée dans la geſte et dans le propos, qui ne permet jamais à la paſſion de parler exactement ſon langage, ni à l'auteur de revetir ſon perſonage, et de ſe tranſporter au lieu de la ſcene; mais le tient toujours enchainé ſur le théatre, et ſous les yeux des ſpectateurs. Auſſi les ſituations les plus vives ne lui font-elles jamais oublier un bel arrangement de phraſes, ni des attitudes élégantes; et ſi le deſeſpoir lui plonge un poignard dans le cœur, non content d'obſerver la décence en tombant comme Polixene, il ne tombe point; la décence le maintient debout après ſa mort, et tous ceux qui viennent d'expirer s'en retournent l'inſtant d'après ſur leurs jambes. *Rouſſeau.*

* Third part of his art of poetry.

ſcription, is very different from what is termed *machinery*, where deities, angels, devils, or other ſupernatural powers, are introduced as real perſonages, mixing in the action, and contributing to the cataſtrophe; and yet theſe are conſtantly jumbled together in the reaſoning. The former is founded on a natural principle *; but can the latter claim the ſame authority? far from it; nothing is more unnatural. Its effects, at the ſame time, are deplorable. Firſt, it gives an air of fiction to the whole; and prevents that impreſſion of reality, which is requiſite to intereſt our affections, and to move our paſſions †. This of itſelf is ſufficient to explode machinery, whatever entertainment it may afford to readers of a fantaſtic taſte or irregular imagination. And, next, were it poſſible, by diſguiſing the fiction, to delude us into a notion of reality, which I think can hardly be; an inſuperable objection would ſtill remain, that the aim or end of an epic poem can never be attained in any perfection, where machinery is introduced; for an evident reaſon, that virtuous emotions cannot be raiſed ſucceſsfully, but by the actions of thoſe who are endued with paſſions and affections like our own, that is, by human actions: and as for moral inſtruction, it is clear, that none can be drawn from beings

* Chap. 20. ſect. 1.

† See chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 7.

beings who act not upon the ſame principles with us. A fable in Æſop's manner is no objection to this reaſoning: his lions, bulls, and goats, are truly men in diſguiſe: they act and feel in every reſpect as human beings; and the moral we draw is founded on that ſuppoſition. Homer, it is true, introduces the gods into his fable: but the religion of his country authoriſed that liberty; it being an article in the Grecian creed, that the gods often interpoſe viſibly and bodily in human affairs. I muſt however obſerve, that Homer's deities do no honour to his poems: fictions that tranſgreſs the bounds of nature, ſeldom have a good effect; they may inflame the imagination for a moment, but will not be reliſhed by any perſon of a correct taſte. They may be of ſome uſe to the lower rank of writers; but an author of genius has much finer materials of Nature's production, for elevating his ſubject, and making it intereſting.

One would be apt to think, that Boileau, declaring for the Heathen deities as above, intended them only for embelliſhing the diction: but unluckily he baniſhes angels and devils, who undoubtedly make a figure in poetic language, equal to the Heathen deities. Boileau, therefore, by pleading for the latter in oppoſition to the former, certainly meant, if he had any diſtinct meaning, that the Heathen deities may be introduced as actors. And, in fact, he himſelf is guilty of that glaring

glaring abſurdity, where it is not ſo pardonable as in an epic poem. In his ode upon the taking of Namur he demands with a moſt ſerious countenance, whether the walls were built by Apollo or Neptune? and in relating the paſſage of the Rhine, *anno* 1672, he deſcribes the god of that river as fighting with all his might to oppoſe the French monarch; which is confounding fiction with reality at a ſtrange rate. The French writers in general run into this error: wonderful the effect of cuſtom, to hide from them how ridiculous ſuch fictions are!

That this is a capital error in the *Gieruſalemme liberata*, Taſſo's greateſt admirers muſt acknowledge: a ſituation can never be intricate, nor the reader ever in pain about the cataſtrophe, as long as there is an angel, devil, or magician, to lend a helping hand. Voltaire, in his eſſay upon epic poetry, talking of the *Pharſalia*, obſerves judiciouſly, "That the proximity of time, the notoriety of events, the character of the age, enlightened and political, joined with the ſolidity of Lucan's ſubject, deprived him of poetical fiction." Is it not amazing, that a critic who reaſons ſo juſtly with reſpect to others, can be ſo blind with reſpect to himſelf? Voltaire, not ſatisfied to enrich his language with images drawn from inviſible and ſuperior beings, introduces them into the action: in the ſixth canto of the *Henriade*, St Louis appears in perſon, and terrifies

fies the ſoldiers; in the ſeventh canto, St Louis ſends the god of Sleep to Henry; and, in the tenth, the demons of Diſcord, Fanaticiſm, War, &c. aſſiſt Aumale in a ſingle combat with Turenne, and are driven away by a good angel brandiſhing the ſword of God. To blend ſuch fictitious perſonages in the ſame action with mortals, makes a bad figure at any rate; and is intolerable in a hiſtory ſo recent as that of Henry IV. But perfection is not the lot of man *.

I have tried ſerious reaſonings upon this ſubject; but ridicule, I ſuppoſe, will be found a more ſucceſsful weapon, which Addiſon has applied in an elegant manner: "Whereas the time of a gene-

" ral

* When I commenced author, my aim was to amuſe, and perhaps to inſtruct, but never to give pain. I accordingly avoided every living author, till the Henriade occurred to me as the beſt inſtance I could find for illuſtrating the doctrine in the text; and I yielded to the temptation, judging that my ſlight criticiſms would never reach M. de Voltaire. They have however reached him; and have, as I am informed, ſtirred up ſome reſentment. I am afflicted at this information; for what title have I to wound the mind more than the body? It would beſide ſhow ingratitude to a celebrated writer, who is highly entertaining, and who has beſtowed on me many a delicious morſel. My only excuſe for giving offence is, that it was undeſigned; for to plead that the cenſure is juſt, is no excuſe. As the offence was public, I take this opportunity to make the apology equally ſo. I hope it will be ſatisfactory: perhaps not.—I owe it however to my own character.

" ral peace is, in all appearance, drawing near;
" being informed that there are ſeveral ingenious
" perſons who intend to ſhow their talents on ſo
" happy an occaſion, and being willing, as much
" as in me lies, to prevent that effuſion of non-
" ſenſe, which we have good cauſe to apprehend;
" I do hereby ſtrictly require every perſon who
" ſhall write on this ſubject, to remember that he
" is a Chriſtian, and not to ſacrifice his catechiſm
" to his poetry. In order to it, I do expect of
" him, in the firſt place, to make his own poem,
" without depending upon Phœbus for any part
" of it, or calling out for aid upon any of the
" muſes by name. I do likewiſe poſitively forbid
" the ſending of Mercury with any particular
" meſſage or diſpatch relating to the peace; and
" ſhall by no means ſuffer Minerva to take upon
" her the ſhape of any plenipotentiary concerned
" in this great work. I do farther declare, that
" I ſhall not allow the deſtinies to have had an
" hand in the deaths of the ſeveral thouſands who
" have been ſlain in the late war; being of opini-
" on that all ſuch deaths may be well accounted
" for by the Chriſtian ſyſtem of powder and ball.
" I do therefore ſtrictly forbid the fates to cut
" the thread of man's life upon any pretence
" whatſoever, unleſs it be for the ſake of the
" rhyme. And whereas I have good reaſon to
" fear, that Neptune will have a great deal of bu-
" ſineſs on his hands in ſeveral poems which we
" may

" may now ſuppoſe are upon the anvil, I do alſo
" prohibit his appearance, unleſs it be done in
" metaphor, ſimile, or any very ſhort alluſion;
" and that even here he may not be permitted to
" enter, but with great caution and circumſpec-
" tion. I deſire that the ſame rule may be ex-
" tended to his whole fraternity of Heathen gods;
" it being my deſign, to condemn every poem to
" the flames in which Jupiter thunders, or exer-
" ciſes any other act of authority which does not
" belong to him. In ſhort, I expect that no Pa-
" gan agent ſhall be introduced, or any fact rela-
" ted which a man cannot give credit to with a
" good conſcience. Provided always, that no-
" thing herein contained ſhall extend, or be con-
" ſtrued to extend, to ſeveral of the female poets
" in this nation, who ſhall ſtill be left in full poſ-
" ſeſſion of their gods and goddeſſes, in the ſame
" manner as if this paper had never been writ-
" ten *."

The marvellous is indeed ſo much promoted by machinery, that it is not wonderful to find it embraced by the plurality of writers, and perhaps of readers. If indulged at all, it is generally indulged to exceſs. Homer introduceth his deities with no greater ceremony than as mortals; and Virgil has ſtill leſs moderation: a pilot ſpent with watching cannot fall aſleep, and drop into the ſea by natural

* Spectator, N° 523.

tural means: one bed cannot receive the two lovers, Æneas and Dido, without the immediate interpoſition of ſuperior powers. The ridiculous in ſuch fictions, muſt appear even through the thickeſt vail of gravity and ſolemnity.

Angels and devils ſerve equally with Heathen deities as materials for figurative language; perhaps better among Chriſtians, becauſe we believe in them, and not in Heathen deities. But every one is ſenſible, as well as Boileau, that the inviſible powers in our creed make a much worſe figure as actors in a modern poem, than the inviſible powers in the Heathen creed did in ancient poems; the cauſe of which is not far to ſeek. The Heathen deities, in the opinion of their votaries, were beings elevated one ſtep only above mankind, ſubject to the ſame paſſions, and directed by the ſame motives; therefore not altogether improper to mix with men in an important action. In our creed, ſuperior beings are placed at ſuch a mighty diſtance from us, and are of a nature ſo different, that with no propriety can we appear with them upon the ſame ſtage: man, a creature much inferior, loſes all dignity in the compariſon.

There can be no doubt, that an hiſtorical poem admits the embelliſhment of allegory, as well as of metaphor, ſimile, or other figure. Moral truth, in particular, is finely illuſtrated in the allegorical manner: it amuſes the fancy to find abſtract terms, by a ſort of magic, metamorphos'd into active be-

ings; and it is highly pleaſing to diſcover a general propoſition in a pictured event. But allegorical beings ſhould be confined within their own ſphere, and never be admitted to mix in the principal action, nor to co-operate in retarding or advancing the cataſtrophe. This would have a ſtill worſe effect than inviſible powers; and I am ready to aſſign the reaſon. The impreſſion of real exiſtence, eſſential to an epic poem, is inconſiſtent with that figurative exiſtence which is eſſential to an allegory *; and therefore no means can more effectually prevent the impreſſion of reality, than to introduce allegorical beings co-operating with thoſe whom we conceive to be really exiſting. The love-epiſode, in the *Henriade* †, inſufferable by the diſcordant mixture of allegory with real life, is copied from that of Rinaldo and Armida, in the *Gieruſalemme liberata*, which hath no merit to intitle it to be copied. An allegorical object, ſuch as Fame in the *Æneid*, and the Temple of Love in the *Henriade*, may find place in a deſcription: But to introduce Diſcord as a real perſonage, imploring the aſſiſtance of Love, as another real perſonage, to enervate the courage of the hero, is making theſe figurative beings act beyond their ſphere, and creating a ſtrange jumble of truth and fiction. The allegory of Sin and Death in the *Paradiſe Loſt*, is, I preſume, not generally reliſhed,

* See chap. 20. ſect. 6. † Canto 9.

ed, though it is not entirely of the ſame nature with what I have been condemning: in a work comprehending the achievements of ſuperior beings, there is more room for fancy than where it is confined to human actions.

What is the true notion of an epiſode? or how is it to be diſtinguiſhed from the principal action? Every incident that promotes or retards the cataſtrophe, muſt be part of the principal action. This clears the nature of an epiſode; which may be defined, "An incident connected with the "principal action, but contributing neither to ad- "vance nor to retard it." The deſcent of Æneas into hell doth not advance nor retard the cataſtrophe, and therefore is an epiſode. The ſtory of Niſus and Euryalus, producing an alteration in the affairs of the contending parties, is a part of the principal action. The family ſcene in the ſixth book of the *Iliad* is of the ſame nature; for by Hector's retiring from the field of battle to viſit his wife, the Grecians had opportunity to breathe, and even to turn upon the Trojans. The unavoidable effect of an epiſode, according to this definition, muſt be, to break the unity of action; and therefore it ought never to be indulged, unleſs to unbend the mind after the fatigue of a long narration. An epiſode, when ſuch is its purpoſe, requires the following conditions: it ought to be well connected with the principal action: it ought to be lively and intereſting: it ought to be ſhort:

and a time ought to be choſen when the principal action relents *.

In the following beautiful epiſode, which cloſes the ſecond book of Fingal, all theſe conditions are united.

Comal was a ſon of Albion; the chief of an hundred hills. His deer drank of a thouſand ſtreams; and a thouſand rocks replied to the voice of his dogs. His face was the mildneſs of youth; but his hand the death of heroes. One was his love, and fair was ſhe! the daughter of mighty Conloch. She appeared like a ſun-beam among women, and her hair was like the wing of the raven. Her ſoul was fixed on Comal, and ſhe was his companion in the chace. Often met their eyes of love, and happy were their words in ſecret. But Gormal loved the maid, the chief of gloomy Ardven. He watched her lone ſteps on the heath, the foe of unhappy Comal.

One day tired of the chace, when the miſt had concealed their friends, Comal and the daughter of Conloch met in the cave of Ronan. It was the wonted haunt of Comal. Its ſides were hung with his arms; a hundred ſhields of thongs were there, a hundred helms of ſounding ſteel. Reſt here, ſaid he, my love Galvina, thou light of the cave of Ronan: a deer appears on Mora's brow; I go, but ſoon will return. I fear,

* Homer's deſcription of the ſhield of Achilles is properly introduced at a time when the action relents, and the reader can bear an interruption. But the author of Telemachus deſcribes the ſhield of that young hero in the heat of battle: a very improper time for an interruption.

fear, ſaid ſhe, dark Gormal my foe: I will reſt here; but ſoon return, my love.

He went to the deer of Mora. The daughter of Conloch, to try his love, cloathed her white ſide with his armour, and ſtrode from the cave of Ronan. Thinking her his foe, his heart beat high, and his colour changed. He drew the bow: the arrow flew: Galvina fell in blood. He ran to the cave with haſty ſteps, and called the daughter of Conloch. Where art thou, my love? but no anſwer.———He marked, at length, her heaving heart beating againſt the mortal arrow. O Conloch's daughter, is it thou! he ſunk upon her breaſt.

The hunters found the hapleſs pair. Many and ſilent were his ſteps round the dark dwelling of his love. The fleet of the ocean came: he fought, and the ſtrangers fell: he ſearched for death over the field; but who could kill the mighty Comal? Throwing away his ſhield, an arrow found his manly breaſt. He ſleeps with his Galvina: their green tombs are ſeen by the mariner, when he bounds on the waves of the north.

Next, upon the peculiarities of a dramatic poem. And the firſt I ſhall mention is a double plot; one of which muſt reſemble an epiſode in an epic poem; for it would diſtract the ſpectator, inſtead of entertaining him, if he were forc'd to attend, at the ſame time, to two capital plots equally intereſting. And even ſuppoſing it an under-plot like an epiſode, it ſeldom hath a good effect in tragedy, of which ſimplicity is a chief property; for an

intereſting ſubject that engages our affections, occupies our whole attention, and leaves no room for any ſeparate concern *. Variety is more tolerable in comedy, which pretends only to amuſe, without totally occupying the mind. But even there,

* Racine, in his preface to the tragedy of *Berenice*, is ſenſible that ſimplicity is a great beauty in tragedy, but miſtakes the cauſe. "Nothing (ſays he) but veriſimilitude pleaſes "in tragedy: but where is the veriſimilitude, that within the "compaſs of a day, events ſhould be crowded which com-"monly are extended through months?" This is miſtaking the accuracy of imitation for the probability or improbability of future events. I explain myſelf. The veriſimilitude required in tragedy is, that the actions correſpond to the manners, and the manners to nature. When this reſemblance is preſerved, the imitation is juſt, becauſe it is a true copy of nature. But I deny that the veriſimilitude of future events, meaning the probability of future events, is any rule in tragedy. A number of extraordinary events, are, it is true, ſeldom crowded within the compaſs of a day: but what ſeldom happens may happen; and when ſuch events fall out, they appear no leſs natural than the moſt ordinary accidents. To make veriſimilitude in the ſenſe of probability a governing rule in tragedy, would annihilate that ſort of writing altogether; for it would exclude all extraordinary events, in which the life of tragedy conſiſts. It is very improbable or unlikely, pitching upon any man at random, that he will ſacrifice his life and fortune for his miſtreſs or for his country: yet when that event happens, ſuppoſing it conformable to the character, we recogniſe the veriſimilitude as to nature, whatever want of veriſimilitude or of probability there was *a priori* that ſuch would be the event.

there, to make a double plot agreeable, is no ſlight effort of art: the under-plot ought not to vary greatly in its tone from the principal; for diſcordant emotions are unpleaſant when jumbled together; which, by the way, is an inſuperable objection to tragi-comedy. Upon that account, the *Provok'd Huſband* deſerves cenſure: all the ſcenes that bring the family of the Wrongheads into action, being ludicrous and farcical, are in a very different tone from the principal ſcenes, diſplaying ſevere and bitter expoſtulations between Lord Townley and his lady. The ſame objection touches not the double plot of the *Careleſs Huſband;* the different ſubjects being ſweetly connected, and having only ſo much variety as to reſemble ſhades of colours harmoniouſly mixed. But this is not all. The under-plot ought to be connected with that which is principal, ſo much at leaſt as to employ the ſame perſons: the under-plot ought to occupy the intervals or pauſes of the principal action; and both ought to be concluded together. This is the caſe of the *Merry Wives of Windſor.*

Violent action ought never to be repreſented on the ſtage. While the dialogue goes on, a thouſand particulars concur to delude us into an impreſſion of reality; genuine ſentiments, paſſionate language, and perſuaſive geſture: the ſpectator once engaged, is willing to be deceived, loſes ſight of himſelf, and without ſcruple enjoys the ſpec-

tacle as a reality. From this abſent ſtate, he is rouſed by violent action: he awakes as from a pleaſing dream, and gathering his ſenſes about him, finds all to be a fiction. Horace delivers the ſame rule, and founds it upon the ſame reaſon:

> Ne pueros coram populo Medea trucidet;
> Aut humana palam coquat exta nefarius Atreus;
> Aut in avem Progne vertatur, Cadmus in anguem:
> Quodcumque oſtendis mihi ſic, incredulus odi.

The French critics join with Horace in excluding blood from the ſtage; but overlooking the moſt ſubſtantial objection, they urge only, that it is barbarous, and ſhocking to a polite audience. The Greeks had no notion of ſuch delicacy, or rather effeminacy: witneſs the murder of Clytemneſtra by her ſon Oreſtes, paſſing behind the ſcene as repreſented by Sophocles: her voice is heard calling out for mercy, bitter expoſtulations on his part, loud ſhrieks upon her being ſtabb'd, and then a deep ſilence. I appeal to every perſon of feeling, whether this ſcene be not more horrible than if the deed had been committed in ſight of the ſpectators upon a ſudden guſt of paſſion. If Corneille, in repreſenting the affair between Horatius and his ſiſter, upon which murder enſues behind the ſcene, had no other view but to remove from the ſpectators a ſhocking action, he was guilty of a capital miſtake: for murder in cold blood,

blood, which in ſome meaſure was the caſe as repreſented, is more ſhocking to a polite audience, even where the concluſive ſtab is not ſeen, than the ſame act performed in their preſence by violent and unpremeditated paſſion, as ſuddenly repented of as committed. I heartily agree with Addiſon *, that no part of this incident ought to have been repreſented, but reſerved for a narrative, with every alleviating circumſtance in favour of the hero.

A few words upon the dialogue; which ought to be ſo conducted as to be a true repreſentation of nature. I talk not here of the ſentiments, nor of the language; for theſe come under different heads: I talk of what properly belongs to dialogue-writing; where every ſingle ſpeech, ſhort or long, ought to ariſe from what is ſaid by the former ſpeaker, and furniſh matter for what comes after, till the end of the ſcene. In this view, all the ſpeeches, from firſt to laſt, repreſent ſo many links of one continued chain. No author, ancient or modern, poſſeſſes the art of dialogue equal to Shakeſpear. Dryden, in that particular, may juſtly be placed as his oppoſite: he frequently introduces three or four perſons ſpeaking upon the ſame ſubject, each throwing out his own notions ſeparately, without regarding what is ſaid by the reſt;

* Spectator, No. 44.

reſt: take for an example the firſt ſcene of *Aurenzebe*. Sometimes he makes a number club in relating an event, not to a ſtranger, ſuppoſed ignorant of it; but to one another, for the ſake merely of ſpeaking: of which notable ſort of dialogue, we have a ſpecimen in the firſt ſcene of the firſt part of the *Conqueſt of Granada*. In the ſecond part of the ſame tragedy, ſcene ſecond, the King, Abenamar, and Zulema, make their ſeparate obſervations, like ſo many ſoliloquies, upon the fluctuating temper of the mob. A dialogue ſo uncouth, puts one in mind of two ſhepherds in a paſtoral, excited by a prize to pronounce verſes alternately, each in praiſe of his own miſtreſs.

This manner of dialogue-writing, beſide an unnatural air, has another bad effect: it ſtays the courſe of the action, becauſe it is not productive of any conſequence. In Congreve's comedies, the action is often ſuſpended to make way for a play of wit. But of this more particularly in the chapter immediately following.

No fault is more common among writers, than to prolong a ſpeech after the impatience of the perſon to whom it is addreſſed ought to prompt him or her to break in. Conſider only how the impatient actor is to behave in the mean time. To expreſs his impatience in violent action without interrupting, would be unnatural; and yet to diſſemble his impatience, by appearing cool where he

he ought to be highly inflamed, would be no leſs ſo.

Rhyme being unnatural and diſguſtful in dialogue, is happily baniſhed from our theatre: the only wonder is that it ever found admittance, eſpecially among a people accuſtomed to the more manly freedom of Shakeſpear's dialogue. By baniſhing rhyme, we have gained ſo much, as never once to dream of any further improvement. And yet, however ſuitable blank verſe may be to elevated characters and warm paſſions, it muſt appear improper and affected in the mouths of the lower ſort. Why then ſhould it be a rule, That every ſcene in tragedy muſt be in blank verſe? Shakeſpear, with great judgment, has followed a different rule; which is, to intermix proſe with verſe, and only to employ the latter where it is required by the importance or dignity of the ſubject. Familiar thoughts and ordinary facts ought to be expreſſed in plain language: to hear, for example, a footman deliver a ſimple meſſage in blank verſe, muſt appear ridiculous to every one who is not blaſſed by cuſtom. In ſhort, that variety of characters and of ſituations, which is the life of a play, requires not only a ſuitable variety in the ſentiments, but alſo in the diction.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

The Three Unities.

IN the firſt chapter is explained the pleaſure we have in a chain of connected facts. In hiſtories of the world, of a country, of a people, this pleaſure is faint; becauſe the connections are ſlight or obſcure. We find more entertainment in biography; becauſe the incidents are connected by their relation to a perſon who makes a figure, and commands our attention. But the greateſt entertainment is in the hiſtory of a ſingle event, ſuppoſing it intereſting; and the reaſon is, that the facts and circumſtances are connected by the ſtrongeſt of all relations, that of cauſe and effect: a number of facts that give birth to each other form a delightful train; and we have great mental enjoyment in our progreſs from the beginning to the end.

But this ſubject merits a more particular diſcuſſion. When we conſider the chain of cauſes and effects in the material world, independent of purpoſe, deſign, or thought, we find a number of incidents in ſucceſſion, without beginning, middle, or end: every thing that happens is both a cauſe and an effect; being the effect of what goes before,

fore, and the cauſe of what follows: one incident may affect us more, another leſs; but all of them are links in the univerſal chain: the mind, in viewing theſe incidents, cannot reſt or ſettle ultimately upon any one; but is carried along in the train without any cloſe.

But when the intellectual world is taken under view, in conjunction with the material, the ſcene is varied. Man acts with deliberation, will, and choice: he aims at ſome end, glory, for example, or riches, or conqueſt, the procuring happineſs to individuals, or to his country in general: he propoſes means, and lays plans to attain the end purpoſed. Here are a number of facts or incidents leading to the end in view, the whole compoſing one chain by the relation of cauſe and effect. In running over a ſeries of ſuch facts or incidents, we cannot reſt upon any one; becauſe they are preſented to us as means only, leading to ſome end: but we reſt with ſatisfaction upon the end or ultimate event; becauſe there the purpoſe or aim of the chief perſon or perſons is accompliſhed. This indicates the beginning, the middle, and the end, of what Ariſtotle calls *an entire action* *. The ſtory naturally begins with deſcribing thoſe circumſtances which move the principal perſon to form a plan, in order to compaſs ſome deſired event: the proſecution of that plan and the obſtructions,

* Poet. cap. 6. See alſo cap. 7.

obſtructions, carry the reader into the heat of action: the middle is properly where the action is the moſt involved; and the end is where the event is brought about, and the plan accompliſhed.

A plan thus happily accompliſhed after many obſtructions, affords wonderful delight to the reader; to produce which, a principle mentioned above * mainly contributes, the ſame that diſpoſes the mind to complete every work commenced, and in general to carry every thing to a concluſion.

I have given the foregoing example of a plan crowned with ſucceſs, becauſe it affords the cleareſt conception of a beginning, a middle, and an end, in which conſiſts *unity* of action; and indeed ſtricter unity cannot be imagined than in that caſe. But an action may have unity, or a beginning, middle, and end, without ſo intimate a relation of parts; as where the cataſtrophe is different from what is intended or deſired, which frequently happens in our beſt tragedies. In the *Æneid*, the hero, after many obſtructions, makes his plan effectual. The *Iliad* is formed upon a different model: it begins with the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon; goes on to deſcribe the ſeveral effects produced by that cauſe; and ends in a reconciliation. Here is unity of action,

* Chap. 8.

tion, no doubt, a beginning, a middle, and an end; but inferior to that of the *Æneid*, which will thus appear. The mind hath a propenſity to go forward in the chain of hiſtory: it keeps always in view the expected event; and when the incidents or under-parts are connected by their relation to the event, the mind runs ſweetly and eaſily along them. This pleaſure we have in the *Æneid*. It is not altogether ſo pleaſant, as in the *Iliad*, to connect effects by their common cauſe; for ſuch connection forces the mind to a continual retroſpect: looking back is like walking backward.

Homer's plan is ſtill more defective, upon another account, That the events deſcribed are but imperfectly connected with the wrath of Achilles, their cauſe: his wrath did not exert itſelf in action; and the misfortunes of his countrymen were but negatively the effects of his wrath, by depriving them of his aſſiſtance.

If unity of action be a capital beauty in a fable imitative of human affairs, a plurality of unconnected fables muſt be a capital deformity. For the ſake of variety, we indulge an under-plot that is connected with the principal: but two unconnected events are extremely unpleaſant, even where the ſame actors are engaged in both. Arioſto is quite licentious in that particular: he carries on at the ſame time a plurality of unconnected ſtories. His only excuſe is, that his plan is perfectly well adjuſted

adjuſted to his ſubject; for every thing in the *Orlando Furioſo* is wild and extravagant.

Tho' to ſtate facts in the order of time is natural, yet that order may be varied for the ſake of conſpicuous beauties *. If, for example, a noted ſtory, cold and ſimple in its firſt movements, be made the ſubject of an epic poem, the reader may be hurried into the heat of action; reſerving the preliminaries for a converſation-piece, if thought neceſſary; and that method, at the ſame time, hath a peculiar beauty from being dramatic †. But a privilege that deviates from nature ought to be ſparingly indulged; and yet romance-writers make no difficulty of preſenting to the reader, without the leaſt preparation, unknown perſons engaged in ſome arduous adventure equally unknown. In *Caſſandra*, two perſonages, who afterward are diſcovered to be the heroes of the fable, ſtart up completely armed upon the banks of the Euphrates, and engage in a ſingle combat ‡.

A play analyſed, is a chain of connected facts, of

* See chap. 1. † See chap. 21.

‡ I am ſenſible that a commencement of this ſort is much reliſhed by readers diſpoſed to the marvellous. Their curioſity is raiſed, and they are much tickled in its gratification. But curioſity is at an end with the firſt reading, becauſe the perſonages are no longer unknown; and therefore at the ſecond reading, a commencement ſo artificial loſes its power even over the vulgar. A writer of genius prefers laſting beauties.

of which each ſcene makes a link. Each ſcene, accordingly, ought to produce ſome incident relative to the cataſtrophe or ultimate event, by advancing or retarding it. A ſcene that produceth no incident, and for that reaſon may be termed *barren*, ought not to be indulged, becauſe it breaks the unity of action: a barren ſcene can never be intitled to a place, becauſe the chain is complete without it. In the *Old Bachelor*, the 3d ſcene of act 2. and all that follow to the end of that act, are mere converſation-pieces, productive of no conſequence. The 10th and 11th ſcenes, act 3. *Double Dealer*, the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th ſcenes, act 1. *Love for Love*, are of the ſame kind. Neither is *The way of the World* entirely guiltleſs of ſuch ſcenes. It will be no juſtification, that they help to diſplay characters: it were better, like Dryden, in his *dramatis perſonæ*, to deſcribe characters beforehand, which would not break the chain of action. But a writer of genius has no occaſion for ſuch artifice: he can diſplay the characters of his perſonages much more to the life in ſentiment and action. How ſucceſsfully is this done by Shakeſpear! in whoſe works there is not to be found a ſingle barren ſcene.

Upon the whole, it appears, that all the facts in an hiſtorical fable, ought to have a mutual connection, by their common relation to the grand event or cataſtrophe. And this relation, in which the *unity* of action conſiſts, is equally eſſential to epic and dramatic compoſitions.

In handling unity of action, it ought not to eſcape obſervation, that the mind is ſatisfied with ſlighter unity in a picture than in a poem; becauſe the perceptions of the former are more lively than the ideas of the latter. In *Hogarth's Enraged Muſician*, we have a collection of every grating ſound in nature, without any mutual connection except that of place. But the horror they give to the delicate ear of an Italian fidler, who is repreſented almoſt in convulſions, beſtows unity upon the piece, with which the mind is ſatisfied.

How far the unities of time and of place are eſſential, is a queſtion of greater intricacy. Theſe unities were ſtrictly obſerved in the Greek and Roman theatres; and they are inculcated by the French and Engliſh critics, as eſſential to every dramatic compoſition. They are alſo acknowledged by our beſt poets, though in practice they make frequent deviation, which they pretend not to juſtify, againſt the practice of the Greeks and Romans, and againſt the ſolemn deciſion of their own countrymen. But in the courſe of this inquiry it will be made evident, that in this article we are under no neceſſity to copy the ancients; and that our critics are guilty of a miſtake, in admitting no greater latitude of place and time than was admitted in Greece and Rome.

Suffer me only to premiſe, that the unities of place and time, are not, by the moſt rigid critics, required

required in a narrative poem. In ſuch a compoſition, if it pretend to copy nature, theſe unities would be abſurd; becauſe real events are ſeldom confined within narrow limits either of place or of time. And yet we can follow hiſtory, or an hiſtorical fable, through all its changes, with the greateſt facility: we never once think of meaſuring the real time by what is taken in reading; nor of forming any connection between the place of action and that which we occupy.

I am ſenſible, that the drama differs ſo far from the epic, as to admit different rules. It will be obſerved, "That an hiſtorical fable, intended for "reading ſolely, is under no limitation of time "nor of place, more than a genuine hiſtory; but "that a dramatic compoſition cannot be accurately "repreſented, unleſs it be limited, as its repre-"ſentation is, to one place and to a few hours; "and therefore that it can admit no fable but "what has theſe properties; becauſe it would be "abſurd to compoſe a piece for repreſentation "that cannot be juſtly repreſented." This argument, I acknowledge, has at leaſt a plauſible appearance; and yet one is apt to ſuſpect ſome fallacy, conſidering that no critic, however ſtrict, has ventured to confine the unities of place and of time within ſo narrow bounds *.

* Boſſu, after obſerving, with wondrous critical ſagacity, that winter is an improper ſeaſon for an epic poem, and night

no

A view of the Grecian drama, compared with our own, may perhaps relieve us from this dilemma: if they be differently conſtructed, as ſhall be made evident, it is poſſible that the foregoing reaſoning may not be equally applicable to both. This is an article that, with relation to the preſent ſubject, has not been examined by any writer.

All authors agree, that tragedy in Greece was derived from the hymns in praiſe of Bacchus, which were ſung in parts by a chorus. Theſpis, to relieve the ſingers and for the ſake of variety, introduced one actor; whoſe province it was to explain hiſtorically the ſubject of the ſong, and who occaſionally repreſented one or other perſonage. Eſchylus, introducing a ſecond actor, formed the dialogue, by which the performance became dramatic; and the actors were multiplied when the ſubject repreſented made it neceſſary. But ſtill, the chorus, which gave a beginning to tragedy, was conſidered as an eſſential part. The firſt ſcene, generally, unfolds the preliminary circumſtances that lead to the grand event: and this ſcene

no leſs improper for tragedy; admits however, that an epic poem may be ſpread through the whole ſummer months, and a tragedy through the whole ſunſhine hours of the longeſt ſummer-day. *Du poeme epique, l. 3. chap.* 12. At that rate an Engliſh tragedy may be longer than a French tragedy; and in Nova Zembla the time of a tragedy and of an epic poem may be the ſame.

ſcene is by Ariſtotle termed the *prologue*. In the ſecond ſcene, where the action properly begins, the chorus is introduced, which, as originally, continues upon the ſtage during the whole performance: the chorus frequently makes one in the dialogue; and when the dialogue happens to be ſuſpended, the chorus, during the interval, is employ'd in ſinging. Sophocles adheres to this plan religiouſly. Euripides is not altogether ſo correct. In ſome of his pieces, it becomes neceſſary to remove the chorus for a little time. But when that unuſual ſtep is riſked, matters are ſo ordered as not to interrupt the repreſentation: the chorus never leave the ſtage of their own accord, but at the command of ſome principal perſonage, who conſtantly waits their return.

Thus the Grecian drama is a continued repreſentation without interruption; a circumſtance that merits attention. A continued repreſentation without a pauſe, affords not opportunity to vary the place of action, nor to prolong the time of the action beyond that of the repreſentation. To a repreſentation ſo confined in place and time, the foregoing reaſoning is ſtrictly applicable: a real or feigned action that is brought to a concluſion after conſiderable intervals of time and frequent changes of place, cannot accurately be copied in a repreſentation that admits no latitude in either. Hence it is, that the unities of place and of time, were, or ought to have been, ſtrictly obſerved in the Greek

tragedies; which is made neceſſary by the very conſtitution of their drama, for it is abſurd to compoſe a tragedy that cannot be juſtly repreſented.

Modern critics, who for our drama pretend to eſtabliſh rules founded on the practice of the Greeks, are guilty of an egregious blunder. The unities of place and of time were in Greece, as we ſee, a matter of neceſſity, not of choice; and I am now ready to ſhow, that if we ſubmit to ſuch fetters, it muſt be from choice, not neceſſity. This will be evident upon taking a view of the conſtitution of our drama, which differs widely from that of Greece; whether more or leſs perfect, is a different point, to be handled afterward. By dropping the chorus, opportunity is afforded to divide the repreſentation by intervals of time, during which the ſtage is evacuated and the ſpectacle ſuſpended. This qualifies our drama for ſubjects ſpread thro' a wide ſpace both of time and of place: the time ſuppoſed to paſs during the ſuſpenſion of the repreſentation, is not meaſured by the time of the ſuſpenſion; and any place may be ſuppoſed when the repreſentation is renewed, with as much facility as when it commenced: by which means, many ſubjects can be juſtly repreſented in our theatres, that were excluded from thoſe of ancient Greece. This doctrine may be illuſtrated, by comparing a modern play to a ſet of hiſtorical pictures; let us ſuppoſe them five in number, and the reſemblance will be complete. Each of the pictures

reſembles

reſembles an act in one of our plays: there muſt neceſſarily be the ſtricteſt unity of place and of time in each picture; and the ſame neceſſity requires theſe two unities during each act of a play, becauſe during an act there is no interruption in the ſpectacle. Now, when we view in ſucceſſion a number of ſuch hiſtorical pictures, let it be, for example, the hiſtory of Alexander by Le Brun, we have no difficulty to conceive, that months or years have paſſed between the events exhibited in two different pictures, though the interruption is imperceptible in paſſing our eye from the one to the other; and we have as little difficulty to conceive a change of place, however great. In which view, there is truly no difference between five acts of a modern play, and five ſuch pictures. Where the repreſentation is ſuſpended, we can with the greateſt facility ſuppoſe any length of time or any change of place: the ſpectator, it is true, may be conſcious that the real time and place are not the ſame with what are employed in the repreſentation: but this is a work of reflection; and by the ſame reflection he may alſo be conſcious, that Garrick is not King Lear, that the playhouſe is not Dover cliffs, nor the noiſe he hears thunder and lightning. In a word, after an interruption of the repreſentation, it is no more difficult for a ſpectator to imagine a new place, or a different time, than at the commencement of the play, to imagine himſelf at Rome, or in a period of time two thou-

ſand years back. And indeed, it is abundantly ridiculous, that a critic, who is willing to hold candle-light for ſun-ſhine, and ſome painted canvaſſes for a palace or a priſon, ſhould be ſo ſcrupulous about admitting any latitude of place or of time in the fable, beyond what is neceſſary in the repreſentation.

There are, I acknowledge, ſome effects of great latitude in time that ought never to be indulged in a compoſition for the theatre: nothing can be more abſurd, than at the cloſe to exhibit a full-grown perſon who appears a child at the beginning: the mind rejects, as contrary to all probability, ſuch latitude of time as is requiſite for a change ſo remarkable. The greateſt change from place to place hath not altogether the ſame bad effect. In the bulk of human affairs place is not material; and the mind, when occupied with an intereſting event, is little regardful of minute circumſtances: theſe may be varied at will, becauſe they ſcarce make any impreſſion.

But though I have taken arms to reſcue modern poets from the deſpotiſm of modern critics, I would not be underſtood to juſtify liberty without any reſerve. An unbounded licence with relation to place and time, is faulty for a reaſon that ſeems to have been overlooked, which is, that it ſeldom fails to break the unity of action. In the ordinary courſe of human affairs, ſingle events, ſuch as are fit to be repreſented on the ſtage, are confined to a narrow

narrow ſpot, and commonly employ no great extent of time: we accordingly ſeldom find ſtrict unity of action in a dramatic compoſition, where any remarkable latitude is indulged in theſe particulars. I ſay further, that a compoſition which employs but one place, and requires not a greater length of time than is neceſſary for the repreſentation, is ſo much the more perfect: becauſe the confining an event within ſo narrow bounds, contributes to the unity of action; and alſo prevents that labour, however ſlight, which the mind muſt undergo in imagining frequent changes of place and many intervals of time. But ſtill I muſt inſiſt, that ſuch limitation of place and time as was neceſſary in the Grecian drama, is no rule to us; and therefore, that though ſuch limitation adds one beauty more to the compoſition, it is at beſt but a refinement, which may juſtly give place to a thouſand beauties more ſubſtantial. And I may add, that it is extremely difficult, I was about to ſay impracticable, to contract within the Grecian limits, any fable ſo fruitful of incidents in number and variety, as to give full ſcope to the fluctuation of paſſion.

It may now appear, that critics who put the unities of place and of time upon the ſame footing with the unity of action, making them all equally eſſential, have not attended to the nature and conſtitution of the modern drama. If they admit an interrupted repreſentation, with which no writer finds

finds fault, it is abſurd to reject its greateſt advantage, that of repreſenting many intereſting ſubjects excluded from the Grecian ſtage. If there needs muſt be a reformation, why not reſtore the ancient chorus and the ancient continuity of action? There is certainly no medium: for to admit an interruption without relaxing from the ſtrict unities of place and of time, is in effect to load us with all the inconveniences of the ancient drama, and at the ſame time to with-hold from us its advantages.

The only proper queſtion, therefore, is, Whether our model be or be not a real improvement? This indeed may fairly be called in queſtion; and in order to a comparative trial, ſome particulars muſt be premiſed. When a play begins, we have no difficulty to adjuſt our imagination to the ſcene of action, however diſtant it be in time or in place; becauſe we know that the play is a repreſentation only. The caſe is very different after we are engaged: it is the perfection of repreſentation to hide itſelf, to impoſe on the ſpectator, and to produce in him an impreſſion of reality, as if he were a ſpectator of a real event *; but any interruption annihilates that impreſſion, by rouſing him out of his waking dream, and unhappily reſtoring him to his ſenſes. So difficult it is to ſupport the impreſſion of reality, that much ſlighter interruptions

* Chap. 2. part 1. ſect. 7.

interruptions than the interval between two acts, are ſufficient to diſſolve the charm: in the 5th act of the *Mourning Bride*, the three firſt ſcenes are in a room of ſtate, the fourth in a priſon; and the change is operated by ſhifting the ſcene, which is done in a trice: but however quick the tranſition may be, it is impracticable to impoſe upon the ſpectators, ſo as to make them conceive that they are actually carried from the palace to the priſon; they immediately reflect, that the palace and priſon are imaginary, and that the whole is a fiction.

From theſe premiſes, one will naturally be led, at firſt view, to pronounce the frequent interruptions in the modern drama to be an imperfection. It will occur, "That every interruption muſt have "the effect to baniſh the dream of reality, and "with it to baniſh our concern, which cannot "ſubſiſt while we are conſcious that all is a fic-"tion; and therefore, that in the modern drama "ſufficient time is not afforded for fluctuation and "ſwelling of paſſion, like what is afforded in that "of Greece, where there is no interruption." This reaſoning, it muſt be owned, has a ſpecious appearance: but we muſt not become faint-hearted upon the firſt repulſe; let us rally our troops for a ſecond engagement.

Conſidering attentively the ancient drama, we find, that though the repreſentation is never interrupted, the principal action is ſuſpended not leſs fre-

frequently than in the modern drama: there are five acts in each; and the only difference is, that in the former, when the action is ſuſpended as it is at the end of every act, opportunity is taken of the interval to employ the chorus in ſinging. Hence it appears, that the Grecian continuity of repreſentation cannot have the effect to prolong the impreſſion of reality: to baniſh that impreſſion, a pauſe in the action while the chorus is employ'd in ſinging, is no leſs effectual than a total ſuſpenſion of the repreſentation.

But to open a larger view, I am ready to ſhow, that a repreſentation with proper pauſes, is better qualified for making a deep impreſſion, than a continued repreſentation without a pauſe. This will be evident from the following conſiderations. Repreſentation cannot very long ſupport an impreſſion of reality; for when the ſpirits are exhauſted by cloſe attention and by the agitation of paſſion, an uneaſineſs enſues, which never fails to baniſh the waking dream. Now ſuppoſing the time that a man can employ with ſtrict attention without wandering, to be no greater than is requiſite for a ſingle act, a ſuppoſition that cannot be far from truth; it follows, that a continued repreſentation of longer endurance than an act, inſtead of giving ſcope to fluctuation and ſwelling of paſſion, would overſtrain the attention, and produce a total abſence of mind. In that reſpect, the four pauſes have a fine effect; for by affording to the audience

a ſeaſonable reſpite when the impreſſion of reality is gone, and while nothing material is in agitation, they relieve the mind from its fatigue; and conſequently prevent a wandering of thought at the very time poſſibly of the moſt intereſting ſcenes.

In one article, indeed, the Grecian model has greatly the advantage: its chorus during an interval not only preſerves alive the impreſſions made upon the audience, but alſo prepares their hearts finely for new impreſſions. In our theatres, on the contrary, the audience, at the end of every act, being left to trifle time away, loſe every warm impreſſion; and they begin the next act cool and unconcerned, as at the commencement of the repreſentation. This is a groſs malady in our theatrical repreſentations; but a malady that luckily is not incurable. To revive the Grecian chorus, would be to revive the Grecian ſlavery of place and time; but I can figure a detached chorus coinciding with a pauſe in the repreſentation, as the ancient chorus did with a pauſe in the principal action. What objection, for example, can there lie againſt muſic between the acts, vocal and inſtrumental, adapted to the ſubject? Such detached chorus, without putting us under any limitation of time or place, would recruit the ſpirits, and would preſerve entire the tone, if not the tide of paſſion: the muſic, after an act ſhould commence in the tone of the preceding paſſion, and be gradually varied till it accord with the tone of the paſſion

paſſion that is to ſucceed in the next act. The muſic and the repreſentation would both of them be gainers by their conjunction; which will thus appear. Muſic that accords with the preſent tone of mind, is, on that account, doubly agreeable; and accordingly, though muſic ſingly hath not power to raiſe a paſſion, it tends greatly to ſupport a paſſion already raiſed. Further, muſic prepares us for the paſſion that follows, by making chearful, tender, melancholy, or animated impreſſions, as the ſubject requires. Take for an example the firſt ſcene of the *Mourning Bride*, where ſoft muſic, in a melancholy ſtrain, prepares us for Almeria's deep diſtreſs. In this manner, muſic and repreſentation ſupport each other delightfully: the impreſſion made upon the audience by the repreſentation, is a fine preparation for the muſic that ſucceeds; and the impreſſion made by the muſic, is a fine preparation for the repreſentation that ſucceeds. It appears to me evident, that, by ſome ſuch contrivance, the modern drama may be improved, ſo as to enjoy the advantage of the ancient chorus without its ſlaviſh limitation of place and time. And as to muſic in particular, I cannot figure any means that would tend more to its improvement: compoſers, thoſe for the ſtage at leaſt, would be reduced to the happy neceſſity of ſtudying and imitating nature; inſtead of deviating, according to the preſent mode, into wild, fantaſtic, and unnatural conceits. But we muſt return to our ſubject,

ject, and finiſh the compariſon between the ancient and the modern drama.

The numberleſs improprieties forced upon the Greek dramatic poets by the conſtitution of their drama, may be ſufficient, one ſhould think, to make us prefer the modern drama, even abſtracting from the improvement propoſed. To prepare the reader for this article, it muſt be premiſed, that as in the ancient drama the place of action never varies, a place neceſſarily muſt be choſen, to which every perſon may have acceſs without any improbability. This confines the ſcene to ſome open place, generally the court or area before a palace; which excludes from the Grecian theatre tranſactions within doors, though theſe commonly are the moſt important. Such cruel reſtraint is of itſelf ſufficient to cramp the moſt pregnant invention; and accordingly Greek writers, in order to preſerve unity of place, are reduced to woful improprieties. In the *Hippolytus* of Euripides *, Phædra diſtreſſed in mind and body, is carried without any pretext from her palace to the place of action: is there laid upon a couch, unable to ſupport herſelf upon her limbs, and made to utter many things improper to be heard by a number of women who form the chorus: and what is ſtill more improper, her female attendant uſes the ſtrongeſt intreaties to make her reveal the ſecret cauſe

* Act 1. ſc. 6.

cauſe of her anguiſh; which at laſt Phedra, contrary to decency and probability, is prevailed upon to do in preſence of that very chorus *. *Alceſtes*, in Euripides, at the point of death, is brought from the palace to the place of action, groaning, and lamenting her untimely fate †. In the *Trachiniens* of Sophocles ‡, a ſecret is imparted to Dejanira, the wife of Hercules, in preſence of the chorus. In the tragedy of *Iphigenia*, the meſſenger employ'd to inform Clitemneſtra that Iphigenia was ſacrificed, ſtops ſhort at the place of action, and with a loud voice calls the Queen from her palace to hear the news. Again, in the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, the neceſſary preſence of the chorus forces Euripides into a groſs abſurdity, which is to form a ſecret in their hearing §; and to diſguiſe the abſurdity, much court is paid to the chorus, not one woman but a number, to engage them to ſecrecy. In the *Medea* of Euripides, that princeſs makes no difficulty, in preſence of the chorus, to plot the death of her huſband, of his miſtreſs, and of her father the King of Corinth, all by poiſon. It was neceſſary to bring Medea upon the ſtage, and there is but one place of action, which is always occupied by the chorus. This ſcene cloſes the ſecond act: and in the end of the third, ſhe frankly makes the chorus her confidents

* Act 2. ſc. 2.
† Act 2. ſc. 1.
‡ Act 2.
§ Act 4. at the cloſe.

confidents in plotting the murder of her own children. Terence, by identity of place, is often forced to make a converſation within doors be heard on the open ſtreet: the cries of a woman in labour are there heard diſtinctly.

The Greek poets are not leſs hampered by unity of time than by that of place. In the *Hippolytus* of Euripides, that prince is baniſhed at the end of the fourth act; and in the firſt ſcene of the following act, a meſſenger relates to Theſeus the whole particulars of the death of Hippolytus by the ſea-monſter: that remarkable event muſt have occupied many hours; and yet in the repreſentation, it is confined to the time employed by the chorus upon the ſong at the end of the 4th act. The inconſiſtency is ſtill greater in the *Iphigenia in Tauris**: the ſong could not exhauſt half an hour; and yet the incidents ſuppoſed to have happened during that time, could not naturally have been tranſacted in leſs than half a day.

The Greek artiſts are forced, no leſs frequently, to tranſgreſs another rule, derived alſo from a continued repreſentation. The rule is, that as a vacuity, however momentary, interrupts the repreſentation, it is neceſſary that the place of action be conſtantly occupied. Sophocles, with regard to that rule as well as to others, is generally correct. But Euripides cannot bear ſuch reſtraint:

* Act 5. ſc. 4.

he often evacuates the ſtage, and leaves it empty for others. *Iphigenia in Tauris*, after pronouncing a ſoliloquy in the firſt ſcene, leaves the place of action, and is ſucceeded by Oreſtes and Pylades: they, after ſome converſation, walk off; and Iphigenia re-enters, accompanied with the chorus. In the *Alceſtes*, which is of the ſame author, the place of action is void at the end of the third act. It is true, that to cover the irregularity, and to preſerve the repreſentation in motion, Euripides is careful to fill the ſtage without loſs of time: but this ſtill is an interruption, and a link of the chain broken; for during the change of the actors, there muſt be a ſpace of time, during which the ſtage is occupied by neither ſet. It makes indeed a more remarkable interruption, to change the place of action as well as the actors; but that was not practicable upon the Grecian ſtage.

It is hard to ſay upon what model Terence has formed his plays. Having no chorus, there is a pauſe in the repreſentation at the end of every act. But advantage is not taken of the ceſſation, even to vary the place of action: for the ſtreet is always choſen, where every thing paſſing may be ſeen by every perſon; and by that choice, the moſt ſprightly and intereſting parts of the action, which commonly paſs within doors, are excluded; witneſs the laſt act of the *Eunuch*. He hath ſubmitted to the like ſlavery with reſpect to time. In a word, a play

play with a regular chorus, is not more confined in place and time than his plays are. Thus a zealous ſectary follows implicitly ancient forms and ceremonies, without once conſidering whether their introductive cauſe be ſtill ſubſiſting. Plautus, of a bolder genius than Terence, makes good uſe of the liberty afforded by an interrupted repreſentation: he varies the place of action upon all occaſions, when the variation ſuits his purpoſe.

The intelligent reader will by this time underſtand, that I plead for no change of place in our plays but after an interval, nor for any latitude in point of time but what falls in with an interval. The unities of place and time ought to be ſtrictly obſerved during each act; for during the repreſentation, there is no opportunity for the ſmalleſt deviation from either. Hence it is an eſſential requiſite, that during an act the ſtage be always occupied; for even a momentary vacuity makes an interval or interruption. Another rule is no leſs eſſential: it would be a groſs breach of the unity of action, to exhibit upon the ſtage two ſeparate actions at the ſame time; and therefore, to preſerve that unity, it is neceſſary that each perſonage introduced during an act, be linked to thoſe in poſſeſſion of the ſtage, ſo as to join all in one action. Theſe things follow from the very conception of an act, which admits not the ſlighteſt interruption: the moment the repreſentation is intermitted, there is an end of that act; and we

have no notion of a new act, but where, after a pauſe or interval, the repreſentation is again put in motion. French writers, generally ſpeaking, are correct in this particular. The Engliſh, on the contrary, are ſo irregular, as ſcarce to deſerve a criticiſm. Actors, during the ſame act, not only ſucceed each other in the ſame place without connection, but what is ſtill leſs excuſable, they frequently ſucceed each other in different places. This change of place in the ſame act, ought never to be indulged; for, beſide breaking the unity of the act, it has a diſagreeable effect. After an interval, the imagination readily adapts itſelf to any place that is neceſſary, as readily as at the commencement of the play; but during the repreſentation, we reject change of place. From the foregoing cenſure muſt be excepted the *Mourning Bride* of Congreve, where regularity concurs with the beauty of ſentiment and of language, to make it one of the moſt complete pieces England has to boaſt of. I muſt acknowledge, however, that in point of regularity, this elegant performance is not altogether unexceptionable. In the four firſt acts, the unities of place and time are ſtrictly obſerved: but in the laſt act, there is a capital error with reſpect to unity of place; for in the three firſt ſcenes of that act, the place of action is a room of ſtate, which is changed to a priſon in the fourth ſcene: the chain alſo of the actors is broken; as the perſons introduced in the priſon, are different from

thoſe

thoſe who made their appearance in the room of ſtate. This remarkable interruption of the repreſentation, makes in effect two acts inſtead of one: and therefore, if it be a rule that a play ought not to conſiſt of more acts than five, this performance is ſo far defective in point of regularity. I may add, that even admitting ſix acts, the irregularity would not be altogether removed, without a longer pauſe in the repreſentation than is allowed in the acting; for more than a momentary interruption is requiſite for enabling the imagination readily to fall in with a new place, or with a wide ſpace of time. In *The Way of the World*, of the ſame author, unity of place is preſerved during every act, and a ſtricter unity of time during the whole play, than is neceſſary.

CHAP. XXIV.

Gardening and Architecture.

THE books we have upon architecture and upon embelliſhing ground, abound in practical inſtruction, neceſſary for a mechanic: but in vain ſhould we rummage them for rational principles to improve our taſte. In a general ſyſtem, it might be thought ſufficient to have unfolded the principles that govern theſe and other fine arts, leaving the application to the reader: but as I would neglect no opportunity of ſhowing the extenſive influence of theſe principles, the purpoſe of the preſent chapter is to apply them to gardening and architecture; but without intending any regular plan of theſe favourite arts, which would be unſuitable not only to the nature of this work, but to the experience of its author.

Gardening was at firſt an uſeful art: in the garden of Alcinous, deſcribed by Homer, we find nothing done for pleaſure merely. But gardening is now improved into a fine art; and when we talk of a garden without any epithet, a pleaſure garden, by way of eminence, is underſtood. The garden of Alcinous, in modern language, was but a kitchen-garden. Architecture has run the ſame

ſame courſe: it continued many ages an uſeful art merely, without aſpiring to be claſſed with the fine arts. Architecture, therefore, and gardening, being uſeful arts as well as fine arts, afford two different views. The reader, however, will not here expect rules for improving any work of art in point of utility; it being no part of my plan to treat of any uſeful art as ſuch: but there is a beauty in utility; and in diſcourſing of beauty, that of utility muſt not be neglected. This leads us to conſider gardens and buildings in different views: they may be deſtined for uſe ſolely, for beauty ſolely, or for both. Such variety of deſtination, beſtows upon theſe arts a great command of beauties, complex no leſs than various. Hence the difficulty of forming an accurate taſte in gardening and architecture: and hence that difference and wavering of taſte in theſe arts, greater than in any art that has but a ſingle deſtination.

Architecture and gardening cannot otherwiſe entertain the mind, but by raiſing certain agreeable emotions or feelings; with which we muſt begin, as the true foundation of all the rules of criticiſm that govern theſe arts. Poetry, as to its power of raiſing emotions, poſſeſſes juſtly the firſt place among the fine arts; for ſcarce any one emotion of human nature is beyond its reach. Painting and ſculpture are more circumſcribed, having the command of no emotions but of what are raiſed by ſight: they are peculiarly ſucceſsful in ex-

preſſing painful paſſions, which are diſplayed by external ſigns extremely legible*. Gardening, beſide the emotions of beauty from regularity, order, proportion, colour, and utility, can raiſe emotions of grandeur, of ſweetneſs, of gaiety, of melancholy, of wildneſs, and even of ſurpriſe or wonder. In architecture, the beauties of regularity, order, and proportion, are ſtill more conſpicuous than in gardening; but as to the beauty of colour, architecture is far inferior. Grandeur can be expreſſed in a building, perhaps more ſucceſsfully than in a garden; but as to the other emotions above mentioned, architecture hitherto has not been brought to the perfection of expreſſing them diſtinctly. To balance that defect, architecture can diſplay the beauty of utility in the higheſt perfection.

Gardening indeed poſſeſſes one advantage, never to be equalled in the other art: in various ſcenes, it can raiſe ſucceſſively all the different emotions above mentioned. But to produce that delicious effect, the garden muſt be extenſive, ſo as to admit a ſlow ſucceſſion: for a ſmall garden, comprehended at one view, ought to be confined to one expreſſion†; it may be gay, it may be ſweet, it may be gloomy; but an attempt to mix theſe, would create a jumble of emotions not a little

* See chap. 15. † See chap. 8.

little unpleaſant *. For the ſame reaſon, a building, even the moſt magnificent, is neceſſarily confined to one expreſſion.

Architecture, conſidered as a fine art, inſtead of being a rival to gardening in its progreſs, ſeems not far advanced beyond its infant ſtate. To bring it to maturity, two things mainly are wanted. Firſt, a greater variety of parts and ornaments than at preſent it ſeems provided with. Gardening here has greatly the advantage: it is provided with plenty of materials for raiſing ſcenes without end, affecting the ſpectator with variety of emotions. In architecture, on the contrary, materials are ſo ſcanty, that artiſts hitherto have not been ſucceſsful in raiſing any emotions but of beauty and grandeur; with reſpect to the former, there are indeed plenty of means, regularity, order, ſymmetry, ſimplicity, utility; and with reſpect to the latter, the addition of ſize is ſufficient. But though it is evident, that every building ought to have a certain character or expreſſion ſuited to its deſtination; yet this refinement has ſcarce been attempted by any artiſt. A death's head and bones employed in monumental buildings, will indeed produce

* "The citizen, who in his villa has but an acre for a gar-
" den, muſt have it diverſified with every object that is ſuited
" to an extenſive garden. There muſt be woods, ſtreams,
" lawns, ſtatues, and temples to every goddeſs as well as to
" Cloacina."

produce an emotion of gloom and melancholy; but ſuch ornaments, if theſe can be termed ſo, ought to be rejected, becauſe they are in themſelves diſagreeable. The other thing wanted to bring the art to perfection, is, to aſcertain the preciſe impreſſion made by every ſingle part and ornament, cupolas, ſpires, columns, carvings, ſtatues, vaſes, *&c.*: for in vain will an artiſt attempt rules for employing theſe, either ſingly or in combination, until the different emotions they produce be diſtinctly explained. Gardening in that particular alſo, hath the advantage: the ſeveral emotions raiſed by trees, rivers, caſcades, plains, eminencies, and its other materials, are underſtood; and each emotion can be deſcribed with ſome degree of preciſion, which is attempted occaſionally in the foregoing parts of this work.

In gardening as well as in architecture, ſimplicity ought to be a ruling principle. Profuſe ornament hath no better effect than to confound the eye, and to prevent the object from making an impreſſion as one entire whole. An artiſt deſtitute of genius for capital beauties, is naturally prompted to ſupply the defect by crowding his plan with ſlight embelliſhments: hence in a garden, triumphal arches, Chineſe houſes, temples, obeliſks, caſcades, fountains, without end; and in a building, pillars, vaſes, ſtatues, and a profuſion of carved work. Thus ſome women defective in taſte, are apt to overcharge every part of their dreſs

dreſs with ornament. Superfluity of decoration hath another bad effect: it gives the object a diminutive look: an iſland in a wide extended lake makes it appear larger; but an artificial lake, which is always little, appears ſtill leſs by making an iſland in it *.

In forming plans for embelliſhing a field, an artiſt without taſte employs ſtraight lines, circles, ſquares; becauſe theſe look beſt upon paper. He perceives not, that to humour and adorn nature, is the perfection of his art; and that nature, neglecting regularity, diſtributes her objects in great variety with a bold hand. A large field laid out with ſtrict regularity, is ſtiff and artificial †. Nature indeed, in organized bodies comprehended under one view, ſtudies regularity, which, for the ſame reaſon, ought to be ſtudied in architecture: but in large objects, which cannot otherwiſe be ſurveyed but in parts and by ſucceſſion, regularity and uniformity would be uſeleſs properties, becauſe they cannot be diſcovered by the eye ‡. Nature therefore, in her large works, neglects

* See appendix to part 5. chap. 2.

† In France and Italy, a garden is diſpoſed like the human body, alleys, like legs and arms, anſwering each other; the great walk in the middle repreſenting the trunk of the body. Thus an artiſt void of taſte carries ſelf along into every operation.

‡ A ſquare field appears not ſuch to the eye when viewed

glects theſe properties; and in copying nature, the artiſt ought to neglect them.

Having thus far carried on a compariſon between gardening and architecture; rules peculiar to each come next in order, beginning with gardening. The ſimpleſt plan of a garden, is that of a ſpot embelliſhed with a number of natural objects, trees, walks, poliſhed parterres, flowers, ſtreams, *&c.* One more complex comprehends ſtatues and buildings, that nature and art may be mutually ornamental. A third, approaching nearer perfection, is of objects aſſembled together in order to produce, not only an emotion of beauty, but alſo ſome other particular emotion, grandeur, for example, gaiety, or any other above mentioned. The completeſt plan of a garden is an improvement upon the third, requiring the ſeveral parts to be ſo arranged, as to inſpire all the different emotions that can be raiſed by gardening. In this plan, the arrangement is an important circumſtance; for it has been ſhown, that ſome emotions figure beſt in conjunction, and that others ought always to appear in ſucceſſion, and never in conjunction. It is mentioned above *, that

ed from any part of it; and the centre is the only place where a circular field preſerves in appearance its regular figure.

* Chap. 8.

that when the moſt oppoſite emotions, ſuch as gloomineſs and gaiety, ſtillneſs and activity, follow each other in ſucceſſion, the pleaſure, on the whole, will be the greateſt; but that ſuch emotions ought not to be united, becauſe they produce an unpleaſant mixture *. For this reaſon, a ruin affording a ſort of melancholy pleaſure, ought not to be ſeen from a flower-parterre which is gay and cheerful †. But to paſs from an exhilarating object to a ruin, has a fine effect; for each of the emotions is the more ſenſibly felt by being contraſted with the other. Similar emotions, on the other hand, ſuch as gaiety and ſweetneſs, ſtillneſs and gloomineſs, motion and grandeur, ought to be raiſed together; for their effects upon the mind are greatly heightened by their conjunction.

Kent's method of embelliſhing a field, is admirable; which is to repleniſh it with beautiful objects, natural and artificial, diſpoſed as they ought to be upon a canvas in painting. It requires indeed more genius to paint in the gardening way: in forming a landſcape upon a canvas, no more is required but to adjuſt the figures to each other: an artiſt who would form a garden in Kent's manner, has an additional taſk; which is, to adjuſt his figures to the ſeveral varieties of the field.

A ſingle garden muſt be diſtinguiſhed from a plurality;

* Chap. 2. part 4.

† See the place immediately above cited.

plurality; and yet it is not obvious in what the unity of a garden conſiſts. We have indeed ſome notion of unity in a garden ſurrounding a palace, with views from each window, and walks leading to every corner: but there may be a garden without a houſe; in which caſe, it is the unity of deſign that makes it one garden; as where a ſpot of ground is ſo artfully dreſſed as to make the ſeveral portions appear to be parts of one whole. The gardens of Verſailles, properly expreſſed in the plural number, being no fewer than ſixteen, are indeed all of them connected with the palace, but have ſcarce any mutual connection: they appear not like parts of one whole, but rather like ſmall gardens in contiguity. A greater diſtance between theſe gardens would produce a better effect: their junction breeds confuſion of ideas, and upon the whole gives leſs pleaſure than would be felt in a flower ſucceſſion.

Regularity is required in that part of a garden which is adjacent to the dwelling-houſe; becauſe an immediate acceſſory ought to partake the regularity of the principal object *: but in proportion to

* The influence of this connection ſurpaſſing all bounds, is ſtill viſible in many gardens, formed of horizontal plains forc'd with great labour and expence, perpendicular faces of earth ſupported by maſſy ſtone walls, terrace-walks in ſtages one above another, regular ponds and canals without the leaſt motion, and the whole ſurrounded, like a priſon, with high walls

to the diſtance from the houſe conſidered as the centre, regularity ought leſs and leſs to be ſtudied; for in an extenſive plan, it hath a fine effect to lead the mind inſenſibly from regularity to a bold variety. Such arrangement tends to make an impreſſion of grandeur: and grandeur ought to be ſtudied as much as poſſible, even in a more confined plan, by avoiding a multiplicity of ſmall parts *. A ſmall garden, on the other hand, which admits not grandeur, ought to be ſtrictly regular.

Milton, deſcribing the garden of Eden, prefers juſtly grandeur before regularity:

Flowers worthy of paradiſe, which not nice art
In beds and curious knots, but Nature boon
Pour'd

walls excluding every external object. At firſt view it may puzzle one to account for a taſte ſo oppoſite to nature in every particular. But nothing happens without a cauſe. Perfect regularity and uniformity are required in a houſe; and this idea is extended to its acceſſory the garden, eſpecially if it be a ſmall ſpot incapable of grandeur or of much variety: the houſe is regular, ſo muſt the garden be; the floors of the houſe are horizontal, and the garden muſt have the ſame poſition; in the houſe we are protected from every intruding eye, ſo muſt we be in the garden. This, it muſt be confeſſed, is carrying the notion of reſemblance very far: but where reaſon and taſte are laid aſleep, nothing is more common than to carry reſemblance beyond proper bounds.

* See chap. 4.

Pour'd forth profuſe on hill, and dale, and plain;
Both where the morning-ſun firſt warmly ſmote
The open field, and where the unpierc'd ſhade
Imbrown'd the noontide bow'rs.

Paradiſe Loſt, *b.* 4.

A hill covered with trees, appears more beautiful as well as more lofty than when naked. To diſtribute trees in a plain requires more art: near the dwelling-houſe they ought to be ſcattered ſo diſtant from each other, as not to break the unity of the field; and even at the greateſt diſtance of diſtinct viſion, they ought never to be ſo crowded as to hide any beautiful object.

In the manner of planting a wood or thicket, much art may be diſplayed. A common centre of walks, termed *a ſtar*, from whence are ſeen remarkable objects, appears too artificial, and conſequently too ſtiff and formal, to be agreeable: the crowding withal ſo many objects together, leſſens the pleaſure that would be felt in a ſlower ſucceſſion. Abandoning therefore the ſtar, let us try to ſubſtitute ſome form more natural, that will diſplay all the remarkable objects in the neighbourhood. This may be done by various apertures in the wood, purpoſely contrived to lay open ſucceſſively every ſuch object; ſometimes a ſingle object, ſometimes a plurality in a line, and ſometimes a rapid ſucceſſion of them: the mind at intervals is rouſed and cheered by agreeable objects; and

and by ſurpriſe, upon viewing objects of which it had no expectation.

Attending to the influence of contraſt, explained in the eighth chapter, we diſcover why the lowneſs of the ceiling increaſes in appearance the ſize of a large room, and why a long room appears ſtill longer by being very narrow, as is remarkable in a gallery: by the ſame means, an object terminating a narrow opening in a wood, appears at a double diſtance. This ſuggeſts another rule for diſtributing trees in ſome quarter near the dwelling-houſe; which is to place a number of thickets in a line, with an opening in each, directing the eye from one to another; which will make them appear more diſtant from each other than they are in reality, and in appearance enlarge the ſize of the whole field. To give this plan its utmoſt effect, the ſpace between the thickets ought to be conſiderable: and in order that each may be ſeen diſtinctly, the opening neareſt the eye ought to be wider than the ſecond, the ſecond wider than the third, and ſo on to the end *.

* An object will appear more diſtant than it really is, if different coloured evergreens be planted between it and the eye. Suppoſe holly and laurel, and the holly which is of the deeper colour, nearer the eye: the degradation of colour in the laurel, makes it appear at a great diſtance from the holly, and conſequently removes the object, in appearance, to a greater diſtance than it really is.

By a judicious diſtribution of trees, other beauties may be produced. A landſcape ſo rich as to ingroſs the whole attention, and ſo limited as ſweetly to be comprehended under a ſingle view, has a much finer effect than the moſt extenſive landſcape that requires a wandering of the eye through ſucceſſive ſcenes. This obſervation ſuggeſts a capital rule in laying out a field; which is, never at any one ſtation to admit a larger proſpect than can eaſily be taken in at once. A field ſo happily ſituated as to command a great extent of proſpect, is a delightful ſubject for applying this rule: let the proſpect be ſplit into proper parts by means of trees; ſtudying at the ſame time to introduce all the variety poſſible. A plan of this kind executed with taſte will produce charming effects: the beautiful proſpects are multiplied: each of them is much more agreeable than the entire proſpect was originally: and, to crown the whole, the ſcenery is greatly diverſified.

As gardening is not an inventive art, but an imitation of nature, or rather nature itſelf ornamented; it follows neceſſarily, that every thing unnatural ought to be rejected with diſdain. Statues of wild beaſts vomiting water, a common ornament in gardens, prevail in thoſe of Verſailles. Is that ornament in a good taſte? A *jet d'eau*, being purely artificial, may, without diſguſt, be tortured into a thouſand ſhapes: but a repreſentation of what really exiſts in nature, admits not any unnatural

natural circumſtance. In the ſtatues of Verſailles the artiſt has diſplayed his vicious taſte without the leaſt colour or diſguiſe. A lifeleſs ſtatue of an animal pouring out water, may be endured without much diſguſt: but here the lions and wolves are put in violent action, each has ſeized its prey, a deer or a lamb, in act to devour; and yet, as by hocus-pocus, the whole is converted into a different ſcene: the lion, forgetting his prey, pours out water plentifully; and the deer, forgetting its danger, performs the ſame work: a repreſentation no leſs abſurd than that in the opera, where Alexander the Great, after mounting the wall of a town beſieged, turns his back to the enemy, and entertains his army with a ſong *.

In gardening, every lively exhibition of what is beautiful in nature has a fine effect: on the other hand, diſtant and faint imitations are diſpleaſing to every one of taſte. The cutting evergreens in the ſhape of animals, is very ancient; as appears from the epiſtles of Pliny, who ſeems to be a

* Ulloa, a Spaniſh writer, deſcribing the city of Lima, ſays, that the great ſquare is finely ornamented. "In the "centre is a fountain, equally remarkable for its grandeur "and capacity. Raiſed above the fountain is a bronze ſta- "tue of Fame, and four ſmall baſons on the angles. The "water iſſues from the trumpet of the ſtatue, and from the "mouths of eight lions ſurrounding it, which (in his opinion) "greatly heighten the beauty of the whole."

great admirer of the conceit. The propenſity to imitation gave birth to that practice; and has ſupported it wonderfully long, conſidering how faint and inſipid the imitation is. But the vulgar, great and ſmall, are entertained with the oddneſs and ſingularity of a reſemblance, however diſtant, between a tree and an animal. An attempt in the gardens of Verſailles to imitate a grove of trees by a group of *jets d'eau*, appears, for the ſame reaſon, no leſs childiſh.

In deſigning a garden, every thing trivial or whimſical ought to be avoided. Is a labyrinth then to be juſtified? It is a mere conceit, like that of compoſing verſes in the ſhape of an axe or an egg: the walks and hedges may be agreeable; but in the form of a labyrinth, they ſerve to no end but to puzzle: a riddle is a conceit not ſo mean; becauſe the ſolution is proof of ſagacity, which affords no aid in tracing a labyrinth.

The gardens of Verſailles, executed with boundleſs expence by the beſt artiſts of that age, are a laſting monument of a taſte the moſt depraved: the faults above mentioned, inſtead of being avoided, are choſen as beauties, and multiplied without end. Nature, it would ſeem, was deemed too vulgar to be imitated in the works of a magnificent monarch: and for that reaſon preference was given to things unnatural, which probably were miſtaken for ſupernatural. I have often amuſed myſelf with a fanciful reſemblance between theſe gardens

gardens and the Arabian tales: each of them is a performance intended for the amuſement of a great king: in the ſixteen gardens of Verſailles there is no unity of deſign, more than in the thouſand and one Arabian tales: and, laſtly, they are equally unnatural; groves of *jets d'eau*, ſtatues of animals converſing in the manner of Æſop, water iſſuing out of the mouths of wild beaſts, give an impreſſion of fairy-land and witchcraft, no leſs than diamond-palaces, inviſible rings, ſpells and incantations.

A ſtraight road is the moſt agreeable, becauſe it ſhortens the journey. But in an embelliſhed field, a ſtraight walk has an air of formality and confinement: and at any rate is leſs agreeable than a winding or waving walk; for in ſurveying the beauties of an ornamented field, we love to roam from place to place at freedom. Winding walks have another advantage: at every ſtep they open new views. In ſhort, the walks in pleaſure-ground ought not to have any appearance of a road: my intention is not to make a journey, but to feaſt my eye on the beauties of art and nature. This rule excludes not openings directing the eye to diſtant objects. Such openings, beſide variety, are agreeable in various reſpects: firſt, as obſerved above, they extend in appearance the ſize of the field: next, an object, at whatever diſtance, continues the opening, and deludes the ſpectator into a conviction, that the trees which confine the view

are continued till they join the object. Straight walks in receſſes do well: they vary the ſcenery, and are favourable to meditation.

Avoid a ſtraight avenue directed upon a dwelling-houſe; better far an oblique approach in a waving line, with ſingle trees and other ſcattered objects interpoſed. In a direct approach, the firſt appearance is continued to the end: we ſee a houſe at a diſtance, and we ſee it all along in the ſame ſpot without any variety. In an oblique approach, the interpoſed objects put the houſe ſeemingly in motion: it moves with the paſſenger, and appears to direct its courſe ſo as hoſpitably to intercept him. An oblique approach contributes alſo to variety: the houſe, ſeen ſucceſſively in different directions, aſſumes at each ſtep a new figure.

A garden on a flat ought to be highly and variouſly ornamented, in order to occupy the mind, and prevent our regretting the inſipidity of an uniform plain. Artificial mounts in that view are common: but no perſon has thought of an artificial walk elevated high above the plain. Such a walk is airy, and tends to elevate the mind: it extends and varies the proſpect; and it makes the plain, ſeen from a height, appear more agreeable.

Whether ſhould a ruin be in the Gothic or Grecian form? In the former, I think; becauſe it exhibits the triumph of time over ſtrength; a melancholy, but not unpleaſant thought: a Grecian

cian ruin ſuggeſts rather the triumph of barbarity over taſte; a gloomy and diſcouraging thought.

There are not many fountains in a good taſte. Statues of animals vomiting water, which prevail every where, ſtand condemned as unnatural. A ſtatue of a whale ſpouting water upward from its head is in one ſenſe natural, as certain whales have that power; but it is a ſufficient objection, that its ſingularity would make it appear unnatural; there is another reaſon againſt it, that the figure of a whale is in itſelf not agreeable. In many Roman fountains, ſtatues of fiſhes are employed to ſupport a large baſon of water. This unnatural conceit is not accountable, unleſs from the connection that water hath with the fiſh that ſwim in it; which by the way ſhows the influence of even the ſlighter relations. The beſt deſign for a fountain I have met with, is what follows. In an artificial rock, rugged and abrupt, there is a cavity out of ſight at the top: the water, conveyed to it by a pipe, pours or trickles down the broken parts of the rock, and is collected into a baſon at the foot: it is ſo contrived, as to make the water fall in ſheets or in rills at pleaſure.

Hitherto a garden has been treated as a work intended ſolely for pleaſure, or, in other words, for giving impreſſions of intrinſic beauty. What comes next in order, is the beauty of a garden deſtined for uſe, termed *relative beauty* *; and

* See theſe terms defined, chap. 3.

this branch ſhall be diſpatched in a few words. In gardening, luckily relative beauty need never ſtand in oppoſition to intrinſic beauty: all the ground that can be requiſite for uſe, makes but a ſmall proportion of an ornamented field; and may be put in any corner without obſtructing the diſpoſition of the capital parts. At the ſame time, a kitchen-garden or an orchard is ſuſceptible of intrinſic beauty; and may be ſo artfully diſpoſed among the other parts, as by variety and contraſt to contribute to the beauty of the whole. In this reſpect, architecture requires a greater ſtretch of art, as will be ſeen immediately; for as intrinſic and relative beauty muſt often be blended in the ſame building, it becomes a difficult taſk to attain both in any perfection.

In a hot country it is a capital object to have what may be termed a *ſummer-garden*; that is, a ſpot of ground diſpoſed by art and by nature to exclude the ſun, but to give free acceſs to the air. In a cold country, the capital object ſhould be a *winter-garden*, open to the ſun, ſheltered from wind, dry under foot, and taking on the appearance of ſummer by variety of evergreens. The reliſh of a country-life, totally extinct in France, is decaying faſt in Britain. But as ſtill many people of faſhion, and ſome of taſte, paſs the winter, or part of it, in the country, it is amazing that winter-gardens ſhould be overlooked. During ſummer, every field is a garden; but during half

half of the year, the weather is ſeldom ſo good in Britain as to afford comfort in the open air without ſhelter; and yet ſeldom ſo bad as not to afford comfort with ſhelter. I ſay more, that beſide providing for exerciſe and health, a winter-garden may be made ſubſervient to education, by introducing a habit of thinking. In youth, lively ſpirits give too great a propenſity to pleaſure and amuſement, making us averſe to ſerious occupation. That untoward bias may be corrected in ſome degree by a winter-garden, which produces in the mind a calm ſatisfaction, free from agitation of paſſion, whether gay or gloomy; a fine tone of mind for meditation and reaſoning *.

Gardening

* A correſpondent, whoſe name I hitherto have concealed, that I might not be thought vain, and which I can no longer conceal (*a*), writes to me as follows: "In life we generally "lay our account with proſperity, and ſeldom, very ſeldom, "prepare for adverſity. We carry that propenſity even in- "to the ſtructure of our gardens: we cultivate the gay or- "naments of ſummer, reliſhing no plants but what flouriſh "by mild dews and gracious ſunſhine: we baniſh from our "thoughts ghaſtly winter, when the benign influences of the "ſun cheering us no more, are doubly regretted by yielding "to the piercing north wind and nipping froſt. Sage is the "gardener, in the metaphorical as well as literal ſenſe, who "procures a friendly ſhelter to protect us from December "ſtorms, and cultivates the plants that adorn and enliven "that

(*a*) Mrs Montagu.

Gardening being in China brought to greater perfection than in any other known country, we ſhall cloſe our preſent ſubject with a ſlight view of Chineſe gardens, which are found entirely obſequious to the principles that govern every one of the fine arts. In general, it is an indiſpenſable law there, never to deviate from nature: but in order to produce that degree of variety which is pleaſing, every method conſiſtent with nature is put in practice. Nature is ſtrictly imitated in the banks of their artificial lakes and rivers; which ſometimes are bare and gravelly, ſometimes covered with wood quite to the brink of the water. To flat ſpots adorned with flowers and ſhrubs, are oppoſed others ſteep and rocky. We ſee meadows covered with cattle; rice-grounds that run into lakes; groves into which enter navigable creeks and rivulets: theſe generally conduct to ſome intereſting object, a magnificent building, terraces cut in a mountain, a caſcade, a grotto, an artificial rock. Their artificial rivers are generally ſerpentine; ſometimes narrow, noiſy, and rapid; ſometimes deep, broad, and ſlow: and to make the ſcene ſtill more active, mills and other moving

" that dreary ſeaſon. He is no philoſopher who cannot re-
" tire into the Stoic's walk, when the gardens of Epicurus
" are out of bloom: he is too much a philoſopher who will
" rigidly proſcribe the flowers and aromatics of ſummer, to
" ſit conſtantly under the cypreſs-ſhade."

moving machines are often erected. In the lakes are interſperſed iſlands; ſome barren, ſurrounded with rocks and ſhoals; others enriched with every thing that art and nature can furniſh. Even in their caſcades they avoid regularity, as forcing nature out of its courſe: the waters are ſeen burſting from the caverns and windings of the artificial rocks, here a roaring cataract, there many gentle falls; and the ſtream often impeded by trees and ſtones, that ſeem brought down by the violence of the current. Straight lines are ſometimes indulged, in order to keep in view ſome intereſting object at a diſtance.

Senſible of the influence of contraſt, the Chineſe artiſts deal in ſudden tranſitions, and in oppoſing to each other, forms, colours, and ſhades. The eye is conducted, from limited to extenſive views, and from lakes and rivers to plains, hills, and woods: to dark and gloomy colours, are oppoſed the more brilliant: the different maſſes of light and ſhade are diſpoſed in ſuch a manner, as to render the compoſition diſtinct in its parts, and ſtriking on the whole. In plantations, the trees are artfully mixed according to their ſhape and colour; thoſe of ſpreading branches with the pyramidal, and the light green with the deep green. They even introduce decayed trees, ſome erect, and ſome half out of the ground *. In order to heighten

* Taſte has ſuggeſted to Kent the ſame artifice. A decayed

heighten contraſt, much bolder ſtrokes are riſked: they ſometimes introduce rough rocks, dark caverns, trees ill formed, and ſeemingly rent by tempeſts, or blaſted by lightning; a building in ruins, or half conſumed by fire. But to relieve the mind from the harſhneſs of ſuch objects, the ſweeteſt and moſt beautiful ſcenes always ſucceed.

The Chineſe ſtudy to give play to the imagination: they hide the termination of their lakes; and commonly interrupt the view of a caſcade by trees, through which are ſeen obſcurely the waters as they fall. The imagination once rouſed, is diſpoſed to magnify every object.

Nothing is more ſtudied in Chineſe gardens than to raiſe wonder or ſurpriſe. In ſcenes calculated for that end, every thing appears like fairy-land; a torrent, for example, conveyed under ground, puzzles a ſtranger by its uncommon ſound to gueſs what it may be; and to multiply ſuch uncommon ſounds, the rocks and buildings are contrived with cavities and interſtices. Sometimes one is led inſenſibly into a dark cavern, terminating unexpectedly in a landſcape enriched with all that nature affords the moſt delicious. At other times, beautiful walks inſenſibly conduct to a rough uncultivated field, where buſhes, briers, and ſtones

cayed tree placed properly, contributes to contraſt; and alſo in a penſive or ſedate ſtate of mind produces a ſort of pity, grounded on an imaginary perſonification.

ſtones interrupt the paſſage: looking about for an outlet, ſome rich proſpect unexpectedly opens to view. Another artifice is, to obſcure ſome capital part by trees, or other interpoſed objects: our curioſity is raiſed to know what lies beyond; and after a few ſteps, we are greatly ſurpriſed with ſome ſcene totally different from what was expected.

Theſe curſory obſervations upon gardening, ſhall be cloſed with ſome reflections that muſt touch every reader. Rough uncultivated ground, diſmal to the eye, inſpires peeviſhneſs and diſcontent: may not this be one cauſe of the harſh manners of ſavages? A field richly ornamented, containing beautiful objects of various kinds, diſplays in full luſtre the goodneſs of the Deity, and the ample proviſion he has made for our happineſs. Ought not the ſpectator to be filled with gratitude to his Maker, and with benevolence to his fellow-creatures? Other fine arts may be perverted to excite irregular, and even vicious, emotions: but gardening, which inſpires the pureſt and moſt refined pleaſures, cannot fail to promote every good affection. The gaiety and harmony of mind it produceth, inclining the ſpectator to communicate his ſatisfaction to others, and to make them happy as he is himſelf, tend naturally to eſtabliſh in him a habit of humanity and benevolence *.

It

* The manufactures of ſilk, flax, and cotton, in their preſent advance toward perfection, may be held as inferior branches

It is not eaſy to ſuppreſs a degree of enthuſiaſm, when we reflect on the advantages of gardening with reſpect to virtuous education. In the beginning of life the deepeſt impreſſions are made; and it is a ſad truth, that the young ſtudent, familiarized to the dirtineſs and diſorder of many colleges pent within narrow bounds in populous cities, is rendered in a meaſure inſenſible to the elegant beauties of art and nature. Is there no man of fortune ſufficiently patriotic to think of reforming this evil? It ſeems to me far from an exaggeration, that good profeſſors are not more eſſential to a college, than a ſpacious garden ſweetly ornamented, but without any thing glaring or fantaſtic, ſo as upon the whole to inſpire our youth with a taſte no leſs for ſimplicity than for elegance. In that reſpect, the univerſity of Oxford may juſtly be deemed a model.

Having finiſhed what occurred on gardening, I proceed to rules and obſervations that more peculiarly concern architecture. Architecture, being an uſeful as well as a fine art, leads us to diſtinguiſh buildings and parts of buildings into three kinds, namely, what are intended for utility ſolely, what for ornament ſolely, and what for both.

Buildings

branches of the fine arts; becauſe their productions in dreſs and in furniture inſpire, like them, gay and kindly emotions favourable to morality.

Buildings intended for utility ſolely, ſuch as detached offices, ought in every part to correſpond preciſely to that intention; the ſlighteſt deviation from the end in view will by every perſon of taſte be thought a blemiſh. In general, it is the perfection of every work of art, that it fulfils the purpoſe for which it is intended; and every other beauty, in oppoſition, is improper. But in things intended for ornament, ſuch as pillars, obeliſks, triumphal arches, beauty ought alone to be regarded. A Heathen temple muſt be conſidered as merely ornamental; for being dedicated to ſome deity, and not intended for habitation, it is ſuſceptible of any figure and any embelliſhment that fancy can ſuggeſt and beauty admit. The great difficulty of contrivance, reſpects buildings that are intended to be uſeful as well as ornamental. Theſe ends, employing different and often oppoſite means, are ſeldom united in perfection; and the only practicable method in ſuch buildings is, to favour ornament leſs or more according to the character of the building: in palaces, and other edifices ſufficiently extenſive to admit a variety of uſeful contrivance, regularity juſtly takes the lead; but in dwelling-houſes that are too ſmall for variety of contrivance, utility ought to prevail, neglecting regularity as far as it ſtands in oppoſition to convenience *.

Intrinſic

* A building muſt be large to produce any ſenſible emotion

Intrinſic and relative beauty being founded on different principles, muſt be handled ſeparately. I begin with relative beauty, as of the greater importance.

The proportions of a door are determined by the uſe to which it is deſtined. The door of a dwelling-houſe, which ought to correſpond to the human ſize, is confined to ſeven or eight feet in height, and three or four in breadth. The proportions proper for the door of a barn or coach-houſe, are widely different. Another conſideration enters. To ſtudy intrinſic beauty in a coach-houſe or barn, intended merely for uſe, is obviouſly improper. But a dwelling-houſe may admit ornaments; and the principal door of a palace demands all the grandeur that is conſiſtent with the foregoing proportions dictated by utility: it ought to be elevated, and approached by ſteps; and it may be adorned with pillars ſupporting an architrave, or in any other beautiful manner. The door of a church ought to be wide, in order to afford an eaſy paſſage for a multitude: the width, at the ſame time, regulates the height, as will appear by and by. The ſize of windows ought to be proportioned to that of the room they illuminate; for if the apertures be not ſufficiently large to

tion of regularity, proportion, or beauty; which is an additional reaſon for minding convenience only in a dwelling-houſe of ſmall ſize.

to convey light to every corner, the room is unequally lighted, which is a great deformity. The ſteps of a ſtair ought to be accommodated to the human figure, without regarding any other proportion: they are accordingly the ſame in large and in ſmall buildings, becauſe both are inhabited by men of the ſame ſize.

I proceed to conſider intrinſic beauty blended with that which is relative. Though a cube in itſelf is more agreeable than a parallelopipedon, yet a large parallelopipedon ſet on its ſmaller baſe, is by its elevation more agreeable; and hence the beauty of a Gothic tower. But ſuppoſing this figure to be deſtined for a dwelling-houſe, to make way for relative beauty, we immediately perceive that utility ought chiefly to be regarded, and that the figure, inconvenient by its height, ought to be ſet upon its larger baſe: the loftineſs is gone; but that loſs is more than compenſated by additional convenience; for which reaſon, a figure ſpread more upon the ground than raiſed in height, is always preferred for a dwelling-houſe, without excepting even the moſt ſuperb palace.

As to the diviſions within, utility requires that the rooms be rectangular; for otherwiſe void ſpaces will be left, which are of no uſe. A hexagonal figure leaves no void ſpaces; but it determines the rooms to be all of one ſize, which is inconvenient. A room of a moderate ſize may be a ſquare; but in very large rooms this figure muſt,

for the moſt part, give place to a parallelogram, which can more eaſily be adjuſted, than a ſquare, to the ſmaller rooms contrived entirely for convenience. A parallelogram, at the ſame time, is the beſt calculated for receiving light; becauſe, to avoid croſs lights, all the windows ought to be in one wall; and the oppoſite wall muſt be ſo near as to be fully lighted, otherwiſe the room will be obſcure. The height of a room exceeding nine or ten feet, has little or no relation to utility; and therefore proportion is the only rule for determining a greater height.

As all artiſts who love what is beautiful, are prone to entertain the eye, they have opportunity to exert their taſte upon palaces and ſumptuous buildings, where, as above obſerved, intrinſic beauty ought to have the aſcendant over that which is relative. But ſuch propenſity is unhappy with reſpect to dwelling-houſes of moderate ſize; becauſe in theſe, intrinſic beauty cannot be diſplayed in any perfection, without wounding relative beauty: a ſmall houſe admits not much variety of form; and in ſuch houſes there is no inſtance of internal convenience being accurately adjuſted to external regularity: I am apt to believe that it is beyond the reach of art. And yet architects never give over attempting to reconcile theſe two incompatibles: how otherwiſe ſhould it happen, that of the endleſs variety of private dwelling-houſes, there is ſcarce an inſtance of any one being choſen

choſen for a pattern? The unwearied propenſity to make a houſe regular as well as convenient, forces the architect, in ſome articles, to ſacrifice convenience to regularity, and in others, regularity to convenience; and the houſe, which turns out neither regular nor convenient, never fails to diſpleaſe: the faults are obvious; and the difficulty of doing better is known to the artiſt only *.

Nothing can be more evident, than that the form of a dwelling-houſe ought to be ſuited to the climate: and yet no error is more common, than to copy in Britain the form of Italian houſes; not forgetting even thoſe parts that are purpoſely contrived for air, and for excluding the ſun. I ſhall give one or two inſtances. A colonnade along the front of a building, hath a fine effect in Greece and Italy, by producing coolneſs and obſcurity, agreeable properties in warm and luminous climates: but the cold climate of Britain is altogether averſe to that ornament; and therefore, a colonnade can never be proper in this country, unleſs for a portico, or to communicate with a detached building. Again, a logio laying the houſe open to the north, contrived in Italy for gathering cool air, is, if poſſible, ſtill more improper for

* "Houſes are built to live in, and not to look on; there-
"fore let uſe be preferred before uniformity, except where
"both may be had." *Lord Verulam, eſſay* 45.

this climate: ſcarce endurable in ſummer, it, in winter, expoſes the houſe to the bitter blaſts of the north, and to every ſhower of ſnow and rain.

Having ſaid what appeared neceſſary upon relative beauty, the next ſtep is, to view architecture as one of the fine arts; which will lead us to the examination of ſuch buildings, and parts of buildings, as are calculated ſolely to pleaſe the eye. In the works of Nature, rich and magnificent, variety prevails; and in works of Art that are contrived to imitate Nature, the great art is to hide every appearance of art; which is done by avoiding regularity, and indulging variety. But in works of art that are original, and not imitative, the timid hand is guided by rule and compaſs; and accordingly in architecture ſtrict regularity and uniformity are ſtudied, as far as conſiſtent with utility.

Proportion is no leſs agreeable than regularity and uniformity; and therefore in buildings intended to pleaſe the eye, they are all equally eſſential. By many writers it is taken for granted, that in buildings there are certain proportions that pleaſe the eye, as in ſounds there are certain proportions that pleaſe the ear; and that in both equally the ſlighteſt deviation from the preciſe proportion is diſagreeable. Others ſeem to reliſh more a compariſon between proportion in numbers and proportion in quantity; and hold that the ſame proportions

portions are agreeable in both. The proportions, for example, of the numbers 16, 24, and 36, are agreeable; and ſo, ſay they, are the proportions of a room, the height of which is 16 feet, the breadth 24, and the length 36. May I hope from the reader, that he will patiently accompany me in examining this point, which is uſeful as well as curious. To refute the notion of a reſemblance between muſical proportions and thoſe of architecture, it might be ſufficient to obſerve in general, that the one is addreſſed to the ear, the other to the eye; and that objects of different ſenſes have no reſemblance, nor indeed any relation to each other. But more particularly, what pleaſes the ear in harmony, is not proportion among the ſtrings of the inſtrument, but among the ſounds that theſe ſtrings produce. In architecture, on the contrary, it is the proportion of different quantities that pleaſe the eye, without the leaſt relation to ſound. Were quantity to be the ground of compariſon, we have no reaſon to preſume, that there is any natural analogy between the proportions that pleaſe in a building, and the proportions of ſtrings that produce concordant ſounds. Let us take for example an octave, produced by two ſimilar ſtrings, the one double of the other in length: this is the moſt perfect of all concords; and yet I know not that the proportion of one to two is agreeable in any two parts of a building. I add, that concordant notes are pro-

duced by wind-inſtruments, which, as to proportion, appear not to have even the ſlighteſt reſemblance to a building.

With reſpect to the other notion, namely a compariſon between proportion in numbers and proportion in quantity; I urge, that number and quantity are ſo different, as to afford no probability of any natural relation between them. Quantity is a real quality of every body; number is not a real quality, but merely an idea that ariſes upon viewing a plurality of things, whether conjunctly or in ſucceſſion. An arithmetical proportion is agreeable in numbers; but have we any reaſon to infer that it muſt alſo be agreeable in quantity? At that rate, a geometrical proportion, and many others which are agreeable in numbers, ought alſo to be agreeable in quantity. In an endleſs variety of proportions, it would be wonderful, if there never ſhould happen a coincidence of any one agreeable proportion in both. One example is given in the numbers 16, 24, and 36; but to be convinced that this agreeable coincidence is merely accidental, we need only reflect, that the ſame proportions are not applicable to the external figure of a houſe, and far leſs to a column.

That we are framed by nature to reliſh proportion as well as regularity, is indiſputable; but that agreeable proportion ſhould, like concord in ſounds, be confined to certain preciſe meaſures, is not warranted by experience: on the contrary, we learn

from experience, that proportion admits more and leſs; that ſeveral proportions are each of them agreeable; and that we are not ſenſible of diſproportion, till the difference between the quantities compared become the moſt ſtriking circumſtance. Columns evidently admit different proportions, equally agreeable; and ſo do houſes, rooms, and other parts of a building. This leads to an intereſting reflection: the foregoing difference between concord and proportion, is an additional inſtance of that admirable harmony which ſubſiſts among the ſeveral branches of the human frame. The ear is an accurate judge of ſounds, and of their ſmalleſt differences; and that concord in ſounds ſhould be regulated by accurate meaſures, is perfectly well ſuited to this accuracy of perception: the eye is more uncertain about the ſize of a large object, than of one that is ſmall; and at a diſtance an object appears leſs than at hand. Delicacy of perception, therefore, with reſpect to proportion in quantities, would be an uſeleſs quality; and it is much better ordered, that there ſhould be ſuch a latitude with reſpect to agreeable proportions, as to correſpond to the uncertainty of the eye with reſpect to quantity.

But all the beauties of this ſubject are not yet diſplayed; and it is too intereſting to be paſſed over in a curſory view. I proceed to obſerve, that to make the eye as delicate with reſpect to proportion as the ear is with reſpect to concord, would

not only be an uſeleſs quality, but be the ſource of continual pain and uneaſineſs. I need go no farther for a proof than the very room I occupy at preſent; for every ſtep I take varies to me, in appearance, the proportion of length to breadth: at that rate, I ſhould not be happy but in one preciſe ſpot, where the proportion appears agreeable. Let me further obſerve, that it would be ſingular indeed to find, in the nature of man, any two principles in perpetual oppoſition to each other: and yet this would be the caſe, if proportion were circumſcribed like concord; for it would exclude all but one of thoſe proportions that utility requires in different buildings, and in different parts of the ſame building.

It provokes a ſmile to find writers acknowledging the neceſſity of accurate proportions, and yet differing widely about them. Laying aſide reaſoning and philoſophy, one fact univerſally allowed ought to have undeceived them, that the ſame proportions which are agreeable in a model, are not agreeable in a large building: a room 40 feet in length and 24 in breadth and height, is well proportioned; but a room 12 feet wide and high and 24 long, approaches to a gallery.

Perrault, in his compariſon of the ancients and moderns *, is the only author who runs to the oppoſite extreme; maintaining, that the different proportions

* Page 94.

proportions aſſigned to each order of columns are arbitrary, and that the beauty of theſe proportions is entirely the effect of cuſtom. This betrays ignorance of human nature, which evidently delights in proportion as well as in regularity, order, and propriety. But without any acquaintance with human nature, a ſingle reflection might have convinced him of his error, That if theſe proportions had not originally been agreeable, they could not have been eſtabliſhed by cuſtom.

To illuſtrate the preſent point, I ſhall add a few examples of the agreeableneſs of different proportions. In a ſumptuous edifice, the capital rooms ought to be large, for otherwiſe they will not be proportioned to the ſize of the building: and for the ſame reaſon, a very large room is improper in a ſmall houſe. But in things thus related, the mind requires not a preciſe or ſingle proportion, rejecting all others; on the contrary, many different proportions are made equally welcome. In all buildings accordingly, we find rooms of different proportions equally agreeable, even where the proportion is not influenced by utility. With reſpect to the height of a room, the proportion it ought to bear to the length and breadth, is arbitrary; and it cannot be otherwiſe, conſidering the uncertainty of the eye as to the height of a room, when it exceeds 17 or 18 feet. In columns again, even architects muſt confeſs, that the proportion

of

of height and thickneſs varies betwixt 8 diameters and 10, and that every proportion between theſe extremes is agreeable. But this is not all. There muſt certainly be a farther variation of proportion, depending on the ſize of the column: a row of columns 10 feet high, and a row twice that height, require different proportions: the intercolumniations muſt alſo differ according to the height of the row.

Proportion of parts is not only itſelf a beauty, but is inſeparably connected with a beauty of the higheſt reliſh, that of concord or harmony; which will be plain from what follows. A room of which the parts are all finely adjuſted to each other, ſtrikes us with the beauty of proportion. It ſtrikes us at the ſame time with a pleaſure far ſuperior: the length, the breadth, the height, the windows, raiſe each of them ſeparately an emotion: theſe emotions are ſimilar; and though faint when felt ſeparately, they produce in conjunction the emotion of concord or harmony, which is extremely pleaſant*. On the other hand, where the length of a room far exceeds the breadth, the mind, comparing together parts ſo intimately connected, immediately perceives a diſagreement or diſproportion which diſguſts. But this is not all: viewing them ſeparately, different emotions are produced, that

* Chap. 2. part 4.

that of grandeur from the great length, and that of meanneſs or littleneſs from the ſmall breadth, which in union are diſagreeable by their diſcordance. Hence it is, that a long gallery, however convenient for exerciſe, is not an agreeable figure of a room: we conſider it, like a ſtable, as deſtined for uſe, and expect not that in any other reſpect it ſhould be agreeable *.

Regularity and proportion are eſſential in buildings deſtined chiefly or ſolely to pleaſe the eye, becauſe they produce intrinſic beauty. But a ſkilful artiſt will not confine his view to regularity and proportion: he will alſo ſtudy congruity, which is perceived when the form and ornaments of a ſtructure are ſuited to the purpoſe for which it is intended. The ſenſe of congruity dictates the following rule, That every building have an expreſſion correſponding to its deſtination: A palace ought to be ſumptuous and grand; a private dwelling, neat and modeſt; a play-houſe, gay and ſplendid; and a monument, gloomy and melancholy †. A Heathen temple has a double deſtination:

* A covered paſſage connecting a winter-garden with the dwelling-houſe, would anſwer the purpoſe of walking in bad weather much better than a gallery. A ſlight roof ſupported by ſlender pillars, whether of wood or ſtone, would be ſufficient; filling up the ſpaces between the pillars with evergreens, ſo as to give verdure and exclude wind.

† A houſe for the poor ought to have an appearance ſuited

tion: It is conſidered chiefly as a houſe dedicated to ſome divinity; and in that reſpect it ought to be grand, elevated, and magnificent: it is conſidered alſo as a place of worſhip; and in that reſpect it ought to be ſomewhat dark or gloomy, becauſe dimneſs produces that tone of mind which is ſuited to humility and devotion. A Chriſtian church is not conſidered to be a houſe for the Deity, but merely a place of worſhip: it ought therefore to be decent and plain, without much ornament: a ſituation ought to be choſen low and retired; becauſe the congregation during worſhip, ought to be humble and diſengaged from the world. Columns, beſide their chief ſervice of being ſupports, may contribute to that peculiar expreſſion which the deſtination of a building requires: columns of different proportions, ſerve to expreſs loftineſs, lightneſs, &c. as well as ſtrength. Situation alſo may contribute to expreſſion: conveniency regulates the ſituation of a private dwelling-houſe; but, as I have had occaſion to obſerve,

ſuited to its deſtination. The new hoſpital in Paris for foundlings, errs againſt this rule; for it has more the air of a palace than of an hoſpital. Propriety and convenience ought to be ſtudied in lodging the indigent; but in ſuch houſes ſplendor and magnificence are out of all rule. For the ſame reaſon, a naked ſtatue or picture, ſcarce decent any where, is in a church intolerable. A ſumptuous charity-ſchool, beſide its impropriety, gives the children an unhappy taſte for high living.

ſerve *, the ſituation of a palace ought to be lofty.

And this leads to a queſtion, Whether the ſituation, where there happens to be no choice, ought, in any meaſure, to regulate the form of the edifice? The connection between a large houſe and the neighbouring fields, though not intimate, demands however ſome congruity. It would, for example, diſpleaſe us to find an elegant building thrown away upon a wild uncultivated country: congruity requires a poliſhed field for ſuch a building; and beſide the pleaſure of congruity, the ſpectator is ſenſible of the pleaſure of concordance from the ſimilarity of the emotions produced by the two objects. The old Gothic form of building, ſeems well ſuited to the rough uncultivated regions where it was invented: the only miſtake was, the transferring this form to the fine plains of France and Italy, better fitted for buildings in the Grecian taſte; but by refining upon the Gothic form, every thing poſſible has been done to reconcile it to its new ſituation. The profuſe variety of wild and grand objects about Inverary, demanded a houſe in the Gothic form; and every one muſt approve the taſte of the proprietor, in adjuſting ſo finely the appearance of his houſe to that of the country where it is placed.

The external ſtructure of a great houſe, leads naturally

* Chap. 10.

naturally to its internal ſtructure. A ſpacious room, which is the firſt that commonly receives us, ſeems a bad contrivance in ſeveral reſpects. In the firſt place, when immediately from the open air we ſtep into ſuch a room, its ſize in appearance is diminiſhed by contraſt: it looks little compared with that great canopy the ſky. In the next place, when it recovers its grandeur, as it ſoon doth, it gives a diminutive appearance to the reſt of the houſe: paſſing from it, every apartment looks little. This room therefore may be aptly compared to the ſwoln commencement of an epic poem,

Bella per Emathios pluſquam civilia campos.

In the third place, by its ſituation it ſerves only for a waiting-room, and a paſſage to the principal apartments; inſtead of being reſerved, as it ought to be, for entertaining company: a great room, which enlarges the mind and gives a certain elevation to the ſpirits, is deſtined by nature for converſation. Rejecting therefore this form, I take a hint from the climax in writing for another form that appears more ſuitable: a handſome portico, proportioned to the ſize and faſhion of the front, leads into a waiting-room of a larger ſize, and that to the great room; all by a progreſſion from ſmall to great. If the houſe be very large, there may be ſpace for the following ſuit of rooms: firſt, a portico; ſecond, a paſſage within the houſe, bounded

bounded by a double row of columns connected by arcades; third, an octagon room, or of any other figure, about the centre of the building; and, laſtly, the great room.

A double row of windows muſt be diſagreeable by diſtributing the light unequally: the ſpace in particular between the rows is always gloomy. For that reaſon, a room of greater height than can be conveniently ſerved by a ſingle row, ought regularly to be lighted from the roof. Artiſts have generally an inclination to form the great room into a double cube, even with the inconvenience of a double row of windows: they are pleaſed with the regularity, overlooking that it is mental only, and not viſible to the eye, which ſeldom can diſtinguiſh between the height of 24 feet and that of 30 *.

Of all the emotions that can be raiſed by architecture, grandeur is that which has the greateſt influence on the mind; and it ought therefore to be the chief ſtudy of the artiſt, to raiſe this emotion in great buildings deſtined to pleaſe the eye. But as grandeur depends partly on ſize, it ſeems ſo

* One who has not given peculiar attention will ſcarce imagine how imperfect our judgment is about diſtances, without experience. Our looks being generally directed to objects upon the ground around us, we judge tolerably of horizontal diſtances: but ſeldom having occaſion to look upward in a perpendicular line, we ſcarce can form any judgment of diſtances in that direction.

ſo far unlucky for architecture, that it is governed by regularity and proportion, which never deceive the eye by making objects appear larger than they are in reality: ſuch deception, as above obſerved, is never found but with ſome remarkable diſproportion of parts. But though regularity and proportion contribute nothing to grandeur as far as that emotion depends on ſize, they in a different reſpect contribute greatly to it, as has been explained above *.

Next of ornaments, which contribute to give buildings a peculiar expreſſion. It has been doubted whether a building can regularly admit any ornament but what is uſeful, or at leaſt has that appearance. But conſidering the different purpoſes of architecture, a fine as well as an uſeful art, there is no good reaſon why ornaments may not be added to pleaſe the eye without any relation to uſe. This liberty is allowed in poetry, painting, and gardening, and why not in architecture conſidered as a fine art? A private dwelling-houſe, it is true, and other edifices where uſe is the chief aim, admit not regularly any ornament but what has the appearance, at leaſt, of uſe: but temples, triumphal arches, and other buildings intended chiefly or ſolely for ſhow, admit every ſort of ornament.

A thing intended merely as an ornament, may be

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be of any figure and of any kind that fancy can ſuggeſt; if it pleaſe the ſpectator, the artiſt gains his end. Statues, vaſes, ſculpture upon ſtone, whether baſſo or alto relievo, are beautiful ornaments, reliſhed in all civilized countries. The placing ſuch ornaments ſo as to produce the beſt effect, is the only nicety. A ſtatue in perfection is an enchanting work; and we naturally require that it ſhould be ſeen in every direction and at different diſtances; for which reaſon, ſtatues employed as ornaments are proper to adorn the great ſtair-caſe that leads to the principal door of a palace, or to occupy the void between pillars. But a niche in the external front is not a proper place for a ſtatue: and ſtatues upon the roof, or upon the top of a wall, would give pain by ſeeming to be in danger of tumbling. To adorn the top of a wall with a row of vaſes is an unhappy conceit, by placing things apparently of uſe where they cannot be of any uſe. As to baſſo and alto relievo, I obſerve, that in architecture as well as in gardening, contradictory expreſſions ought to be avoided: for which reaſon, the lightneſs and delicacy of carved work ſuits ill with the firmneſs and ſolidity of a pedeſtal: upon the pedeſtal, whether of a ſtatue or a column, the ancients never ventured any bolder ornament than the baſſo relievo.

One at firſt view will naturally take it for granted, that in the ornaments under conſideration beauty is indiſpenſable. It goes a great way un-

doubtedly; but, upon trial, we find many things eſteemed as highly ornamental that have little or no beauty. There are various circumſtances, beſide beauty, that tend to make an agreeable impreſſion. For inſtance, the reverence we have for the ancients is a fruitful ſource of ornaments. Amalthea's horn has always been a favourite ornament, becauſe of its connection with a lady who was honoured with the care of Jupiter in his infancy. A fat old fellow and a goat are ſurely not graceful forms; and yet Selinus and his companions are every where faſhionable ornaments. What elſe but our fondneſs for antiquity can make the horrid form of a Sphinx ſo much as endurable? Original deſtination is another circumſtance that has influence to add dignity to things in themſelves abundantly trivial. In the ſculpture of a marble chimney-piece, inſtruments of a Grecian or Roman ſacrifice are beheld with pleaſure; original deſtination rendering them venerable as well as their antiquity. Let ſome modern cutlery ware be ſubſtituted, though not leſs beautiful; the artiſt will be thought whimſical, if not abſurd. Triumphal arches, pyramids, obeliſks, are beautiful forms; but the nobleneſs of their original deſtination has greatly enhanced the pleaſure we take in them. A ſtatue, ſuppoſed to be an Apollo, will with an antiquary loſe much of its grace when diſcovered to have been done for a barber's apprentice. Long robes appear noble, not ſingly for their flowing lines,

lines, but for their being the habit of magiſtrates; and a ſcarf acquires an air of dignity by being the badge of a ſuperior order of churchmen. Theſe examples may be thought ſufficient for a ſpecimen: a diligent inquiry into human nature will diſcover other influencing principles; and hence it is, that of all ſubjects ornaments admit the greateſt variety in point of taſte.

Things merely ornamental appear more gay and ſhowy than things that take on the appearance of uſe. A knot of diamonds in the hair is ſplendid; but diamonds have a more modeſt appearance when uſed as claſps or buttons. The former are more proper for a young beauty, the latter after marriage.

And this leads to ornaments having relation to uſe. Ornaments of that kind are governed by a different principle, which is, That they ought to be of a form ſuited to their real or apparent deſtination. This rule is applicable as well to ornaments that make a component part of the ſubject, as to ornaments that are only acceſſory. With relation to the former, it never can proceed from a good taſte to make a tea-ſpoon reſemble the leaf of a tree; for ſuch a form is inconſiſtent with the deſtination of a tea-ſpoon. An eagle's paw is an ornament no leſs improper for the foot of a chair or table: becauſe it gives it the appearance of weakneſs, inconſiſtent with its deſtination of bearing weight. Blind windows are ſometimes intro-

duced to preſerve the appearance of regularity: in which caſe the deceit ought carefully to be concealed: if viſible, it marks the irregularity in the cleareſt manner, ſignifying, that real windows ought to have been there, could they have been made conſiſtent with the internal ſtructure. A pilaſter is another example of the ſame ſort of ornament; and the greateſt error againſt its ſeeming deſtination of a ſupport, is to ſink it ſo far into the wall as to make it loſe that ſeeming. A compoſition repreſenting leaves and branches, with birds perching upon them, has been long in faſhion for a candleſtick; but none of theſe particulars is in any degree ſuited to that deſtination.

A large marble baſon ſupported by fiſhes, is a conceit much reliſhed in fountains. This is an example of acceſſory ornaments in a bad taſte; for fiſhes here are unſuitable to their apparent deſtination. No leſs ſo are the ſupports of a coach, carved in the figure of Dolphins or Tritons: for what have theſe marine beings to do on dry land? and what ſupport can they be to a coach?

In a column we have an example of both kinds of ornament. Where columns are employed in the front of a building to ſupport an entablature, they belong to the firſt kind: where employed to connect with detached offices, they are rather of the other kind. As a column is a capital ornament

ment in Grecian architecture, it well deſerves to be handled at large.

With reſpect to the form of this ornament, I obſerve, that a circle is a more agreeable figure than a ſquare, a globe than a cube, and a cylinder than a parallelopipedon. This laſt, in the language of architecture, is ſaying that a column is a more agreeable figure than a pilaſter; and for that reaſon, it ought to be preferred, all other circumſtances being equal. Another reaſon concurs, that a column connected with a wall, which is a plain ſurface, makes a greater variety than a pilaſter. There is an additional reaſon for rejecting pilaſters in the external front of a building, ariſing from a principle unfolded above *, namely, a tendency in man, to advance every thing to its perfection, and to its concluſion. If, for example, I ſee a thing obſcurely in a dim light and by disjointed parts, that tendency prompts me to connect the disjointed parts into a whole: I ſuppoſed it to be, for example, a horſe; and my eye-ſight being obedient to the conjecture, I immediately perceive a horſe, almoſt as diſtinctly as in day-light. This principle is applicable to the caſe in hand. The moſt ſuperb front, at a great diſtance, appears a plain ſurface: approaching gradually, we begin firſt to perceive inequalities, and then pillars; but whether round or ſquare,

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we are uncertain: our curioſity anticipating our progreſs, cannot reſt in ſuſpenſe: being prompted, by the tendency mentioned, to ſuppoſe the moſt complete pillar, or that which is the moſt agreeable to the eye, we immediately perceive, or ſeem to perceive, a number of columns: if upon a near approach we find pilaſters only, the diſappointment makes theſe pilaſters appear diſagreeable; when abſtracted from that circumſtance, they would only have appeared ſomewhat leſs agreeable. But as this deception cannot happen in the inner front incloſing a court, I ſee no reaſon for excluding pilaſters from ſuch a front, when there is any cauſe for preferring them before columns.

With reſpect now to the parts of a column, a bare uniform cylinder without a capital, appears naked; and without a baſe, appears too tickliſhly placed to ſtand firm *: it ought therefore to have ſome finiſhing at the top and at the bottom. Hence the three chief parts of a column, the ſhaft, the baſe, and the capital. Nature undoubtedly requires proportion among theſe parts, but it admits variety of proportion. I ſuſpect that the proportions in uſe have been influenced in ſome degree by the human figure; the capital being conceived

* A column without a baſe is diſagreeable, becauſe it ſeems in a tottering condition; yet a tree without a baſe is agreeable; and the reaſon is, that we know it to be firmly rooted. This obſervation ſhows how much taſte is influenced by reflection.

ceived as the head, the baſe as the feet. With reſpect to the baſe, indeed, the principle of utility interpoſes to vary it from the human figure: the baſe muſt be ſo proportioned to the whole, as to give the column the appearance of ſtability.

We find three orders of columns among the Greeks, the Doric, the Ionic, and the Corinthian, diſtinguiſhed from each other by their deſtination as well as by their ornaments. It has been warmly diſputed, whether any new order can be added to theſe: ſome hold the affirmative, and give for inſtances the Tuſcan and Compoſite: others deny, and maintain that theſe properly are not diſtinct orders, but only the original orders with ſome ſlight variations. Among writers who do not agree upon any ſtandard for diſtinguiſhing the different orders from each other, the diſpute can never have an end. What occurs to me on this ſubject is what follows.

The only circumſtances that can ſerve to diſtinguiſh one order from another, are the form of the column, and its deſtination. To make the firſt a diſtinguiſhing mark, without regard to the other, would multiply theſe orders without end; for a colour is not more ſuſceptible of different ſhades, than a column is of different forms. Deſtination is more limited, as it leads to diſtinguiſh columns into three kinds or orders; one plain and ſtrong, for the purpoſe of ſupporting

plain and maſſy buildings; one delicate and graceful, for ſupporting buildings of that character; and between theſe, one for ſupporting buildings of a middle character. This diſtinction, which regards the different purpoſes of a column, is not naturally liable to any objection, conſidering that it tends alſo to regulate the form, and in ſome meaſure the ornaments, of a column. To enlarge the diviſion by taking in a greater variety of purpoſes, would be of little uſe, and, if admitted, would have no end; for from the very nature of the foregoing diviſion, there can be no good reaſon for adding a fourth order, more than a fifth, a ſixth, *&c.* without any poſſible circumſcription.

To illuſtrate this doctrine, I make the following obſervation. If we regard deſtination only, the Tuſcan is of the ſame order with the Doric, and the Compoſite with the Corinthian; but if we regard form merely, they are of different orders.

The ornaments of theſe three orders ought to be ſo contrived as to make them look like what they are intended for. Plain and ruſtic ornaments would be not a little diſcordant with the elegance of the Corinthian order; and ornaments ſweet and delicate no leſs ſo, with the ſtrength of the Doric. For that reaſon, I am not altogether ſatisfied with the ornaments of the laſt mentioned order: if they be not too delicate, they are at leaſt too numerous for a pillar in which the character of utility prevails over that of beauty. The crowding of

ornaments

ornaments would be more ſufferable in a column of an oppoſite character. But this is a ſlight objection, and I wiſh I could think the ſame of what follows. The Corinthian order has been the favourite of two thouſand years, and yet I cannot force myſelf to reliſh its capital. The invention of this florid capital is aſcribed to the ſculptor Callimachus, who took a hint from the plant *Acanthus*, growing round a baſket placed accidentally upon it; and in fact the capital under conſideration repreſents pretty accurately a baſket ſo ornamented. This object, or its imitation in ſtone, placed upon a pillar, may look well; but to make it the capital of a pillar intended to ſupport a building, muſt give the pillar an appearance inconſiſtent with its deſtination: an Acanthus, or any tender plant, may require ſupport, but is altogether inſufficient to ſupport any thing heavier than a bee or a butterfly. This capital muſt alſo bear the weight of another objection: to repreſent a vine wreathing round a column with its root ſeemingly in the ground, is natural; but to repreſent an Acanthus, or any plant, as growing on the top of a column, is unnatural. The elegance of this capital did probably at firſt draw a vail over its impropriety; and now by long uſe it has gained an eſtabliſhment, reſpected by every artiſt. Such is the force of cuſtom, even in contradiction to nature!

It

It will not be gaining much ground to urge, that the baſket, or vaſe, is underſtood to be the capital, and that the ſtems and leaves of the plant are to be conſidered as ornaments merely; for, excepting a plant, nothing can be a more improper ſupport for a great building than a baſket or vaſe even of the firmeſt texture.

With reſpect to buildings of every ſort, one rule, dictated by utility, is, that they be firm and ſtable. Another rule, dictated by beauty, is, that they alſo appear ſo: for what appears tottering and in hazard of tumbling, produceth in the ſpectator the painful emotion of fear, inſtead of the pleaſant emotion of beauty; and, accordingly, it is the great care of the artiſt, that every part of his edifice appear to be well ſupported. Procopius, deſcribing the church of St Sophia in Conſtantinople, one of the wonders of the world, mentions with applauſe a part of the fabric placed above the eaſt front in form of a half-moon, ſo contrived as to inſpire both fear and admiration: for though, ſays he, it is perfectly well ſupported, yet it is ſuſpended in ſuch a manner as if it were to tumble down the next moment. This conceit is a ſort of falſe wit in architecture, which men were fond of in the infancy of the fine arts. A turret jutting out from an angle in the uppermoſt ſtory of a Gothic tower, is a witticiſm of the ſame kind.

To ſucceed in allegorical or emblematic ornaments,

ments, is no ſlight effort of genius; for it is extremely difficult to diſpoſe them ſo in a building as to produce any good effect. The mixing them with realities, makes a miſerable jumble of truth and fiction*. In a baſſo-relievo on Antonine's pillar, rain obtained by the prayers of a Chriſtian legion, is expreſſed by joining to the group of ſoldiers a rainy Jupiter, with water in abundance falling from his head and beard. De Piles, fond of the conceit, carefully informs his reader, that he muſt not take this for a real Jupiter, but for a ſymbol which among the Pagans ſignified rain: he never once conſiders, that a ſymbol or emblem ought not to make part of a group repreſenting real objects or real events; but be ſo detached, as even at firſt view to appear an emblem. But this is not all, nor the chief point: every emblem ought to be rejected that is not clearly expreſſive of its meaning; for if it be in any degree obſcure, it puzzles, and doth not pleaſe. The temples of Ancient and Modern Virtue in the gardens of Stow, appear not at firſt view emblematical; and when we are informed that they are ſo, it is not eaſy to gather their meaning: the ſpectator ſees one temple entire, another in ruins; but without an explanatory inſcription, he may gueſs, but cannot be certain, that the former being dedicated to Ancient Virtue, the latter to Modern Virtue, are intended

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* See chap. 20. ſect. 5.

a ſatire upon the preſent times. On the other hand, a trite emblem, like a trite ſimile, is diſguſtful *. Nor ought an emblem more than a ſimile to be founded on low or familiar objects; for if theſe be not agreeable as well as their meaning, the emblem upon the whole will not be reliſhed. A room in a dwelling-houſe containing a monument to a deceaſed friend, is dedicated to Melancholy: it has a clock that ſtrikes every minute, to ſignify how ſwiftly time paſſes—upon the monument, weeping figures and other hackney'd ornaments commonly found upon tombſtones, with a ſtuffed raven in a corner—verſes on death, and other ſerious ſubjects, inſcribed all around. The objects are too familiar, and the artifice too apparent, to produce the intended effect †.

The ſtatue of Moſes ſtriking a rock from which water actually iſſues, is alſo in a falſe taſte; for it is mixing reality with repreſentation. Moſes himſelf may bring water out of the rock, but this miracle is too much for his ſtatue. The ſame objection

* See chap. 8.

† In the city of Mexico, there was a palace termed *the houſe of affliction*, where Montezuma retired upon loſing any of his friends, or upon any public calamity. This houſe was better adjuſted to its deſtination: it inſpired a ſort of horror: all was black and diſmal: ſmall windows ſhut up with grates, ſcarce allowing paſſage to the light.

tion lies againſt a caſcade where the ſtatue of a water-god pours out of his urn real water.

I am more doubtful whether the ſame objection lies againſt the employing ſtatues of animals as ſupports, that of a Negro, for example, ſupporting a dial, ſtatues of fiſh ſupporting a baſon of water, *Termes* ſupporting a chimney-piece; for when a ſtone is uſed as a ſupport, where is the incongruity, it will be ſaid, to cut it into the form of an animal? But leaving this doubtful, another objection occurs, That ſuch deſigns muſt in ſome meaſure be diſagreeable, by the appearance of giving pain to a ſenſitive being.

It is obſerved above of gardening, that it contributes to rectitude of manners, by inſpiring gaiety and benevolence. I add another obſervation, That both gardening and architecture contribute to the ſame end, by inſpiring a taſte for neatneſs and elegance. In Scotland, the regularity and poliſh even of a turnpike-road has ſome influence of this kind upon the low people in the neighbourhood. They become fond of regularity and neatneſs; which is diſplayed, firſt upon their yards and little incloſures, and next within doors. A taſte for regularity and neatneſs thus acquired, is extended by degrees to dreſs, and even to behaviour and manners. The author of a hiſtory of Switzerland, deſcribing the fierce manners of the plebeians of Bern three or four centuries ago, continually inured to ſucceſs in war, which made them

inſolently

insolently aim at a change of government in order to establish a pure democracy, observes, that no circumstance tended more to sweeten their manners, and to make them fond of peace, than the public buildings carried on by the senate for ornamenting their capital; particularly a fine town-house, and a magnificent church, which to this day, says our author, stands its ground as one of the finest in Europe.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

Standard of Taste.

"THAT there is no diſputing about taſte," meaning taſte in its figurative as well as proper ſenſe, is a ſaying ſo generally received as to have become a proverb. One thing even at firſt view is evident, that if the proverb hold true with reſpect to taſte in its proper meaning, it muſt hold equally true with reſpect to our other external ſenſes: if the pleaſures of the palate diſdain a comparative trial, and reject all criticiſm, the pleaſures of touch, of ſmell, of ſound, and even of ſight, muſt be equally privileged. At that rate, a man is not within the reach of cenſure, even where he prefers the Saracen's head upon a ſign-poſt before the beſt tablature of Raphael, or a rude Gothic tower before the fineſt Grecian building; or where he prefers the ſmell of a rotten carcaſs before that of the moſt odoriferous flower, or diſcords before the moſt exquiſite harmony.

But we cannot ſtop here. If the pleaſures of external ſenſe be exempted from criticiſm, why not every one of our pleaſures, from whatever ſource derived? if taſte in its proper ſenſe cannot be

be diſputed, there is little room for diſputing it in its figurative ſenſe. The proverb accordingly comprehends both; and in that large ſenſe may be reſolved into the following general propoſition, That with reſpect to the perceptions of ſenſe, by which ſome objects appear agreeable, ſome diſagreeable, there is not ſuch a thing as a *good* or a *bad*, a *right* or a *wrong*; that every man's taſte is to himſelf an ultimate ſtandard without appeal; and conſequently that there is no ground of cenſure againſt any one, if ſuch a one there be, who prefers Blackmore before Homer, ſelfiſhneſs before benevolence, or cowardice before magnanimity.

The proverb in the foregoing examples is indeed carried very far: it ſeems difficult, however, to ſap its foundation, or with ſucceſs to attack it from any quarter: for is not every man equally a judge of what ought to be agreeable or diſagreeable to himſelf? doth it not ſeem whimſical, and perhaps abſurd, to aſſert, that a man *ought not* to be pleaſed when he is, or that he *ought* to be pleaſed when he is not?

This reaſoning may perplex, but will never afford conviction: every one of taſte will reject it as falſe, however unqualified to detect the fallacy. At the ſame time, though no man of taſte will aſſent to the proverb as holding true in every caſe, no man will affirm that it holds true in no caſe: objects there are, undoubtedly, that we may like or diſlike

diſlike indifferently, without any imputation upon our taſte. Were a philoſopher to make a ſcale for human pleaſures, he would not think of making diviſions without end; but would rank together many pleaſures ariſing perhaps from different objects, either as equally conducing to happineſs, or differing ſo imperceptibly as to make a ſeparation unneceſſary. Nature hath taken this courſe, at leaſt it appears ſo to the generality of mankind. There may be ſubdiviſions without end; but we are only ſenſible of the groſſer diviſions, comprehending each of them various pleaſures equally affecting; to theſe the proverb is applicable in the ſtricteſt ſenſe; for with reſpect to pleaſures of the ſame rank, what ground can there be for preferring one before another? if a preference in fact be given by any individual, it cannot proceed from taſte, but from cuſtom, imitation, or ſome peculiarity of mind.

Nature, in her ſcale of pleaſures, has been ſparing of diviſions: ſhe hath wiſely and benevolently filled every diviſion with many pleaſures; in order that individuals may be contented with their own lot, without envying that of others. Many hands muſt be employed to procure us the conveniences of life; and it is neceſſary that the different branches of buſineſs, whether more or leſs agreeable, be filled with hands: a taſte too refined would obſtruct that plan; for it would croud ſome employments, leaving others, no leſs uſeful, to-

tally neglected. In our preſent condition, lucky it is that the plurality are not delicate in their choice, but fall in readily with the occupations, pleaſures, food and company, that fortune throws in their way; and if at firſt there be any diſpleaſing circumſtance, cuſtom ſoon makes it eaſy.

The proverb will hold true as to the particulars now explained; but when applied in general to every ſubject of taſte, the difficulties to be encountered are inſuperable. We need only to mention the difficulty that ariſes from human nature itſelf; do we not talk of a good and a bad taſte? of a right and a wrong taſte? and upon that ſuppoſition, do we not, with great confidence, cenſure writers, painters, architects, and every one who deals in the fine arts? Are ſuch criticiſms abſurd, and void of common ſenſe? have the foregoing expreſſions, familiar in all languages and among all people, no ſort of meaning? This can hardly be; for what is univerſal, muſt have a foundation in nature. If we can reach that foundation, the ſtandard of taſte will no longer be a ſecret.

We have a ſenſe or conviction of a common nature, not only in our own ſpecies, but in every ſpecies of animals: and our conviction is verified by experience; for there appears a remarkable uniformity among creatures of the ſame kind, and a deformity no leſs remarkable among creatures of different kinds. This common nature is conceived

ceived to be a model or ſtandard for each individual that belongs to the kind. Hence it is a wonder to find an individual deviating from the common nature of the ſpecies, whether in its internal or external conſtruction: a child born with averſion to its mother's milk, is a wonder, no leſs than if born without a mouth, or with more than one *. This conviction of a common nature in every ſpecies, paves the way finely for diſtributing things into *genera* and *ſpecies*; to which we are extremely prone, not only with regard to animals and vegetables, where nature has led the way; but alſo with regard to many other things, where there is no ground for ſuch diſtribution, but fancy merely.

With reſpect to the common nature of man in particular, we have a conviction that it is invariable not leſs than univerſal; that it will be the ſame hereafter as at preſent, and as it was in time paſt; the ſame among all nations and in all corners of the earth. Nor are we deceived; becauſe, giving allowance for the difference of culture and gradual refinement of manners, the fact correſponds to our conviction.

We are ſo conſtituted, as to conceive this common nature, to be not only invariable, but alſo *perfect* or *right*; and conſequently that indivi-

* See Eſſays on Morality and Natural Religion, part 1. eſſay 2. ch. 1.

duals *ought* to be made conformable to it. Every remarkable deviation from the ſtandard, makes accordingly an impreſſion upon us of imperfection, irregularity, or diſorder: it is diſagreeable, and raiſes in us a painful emotion: monſtrous births, exciting the curioſity of a philoſopher, fail not at the ſame time to excite a ſort of horror.

This conviction of a common nature or ſtandard and of its perfection, accounts clearly for that remarkable conception we have, of a right and a wrong ſenſe or taſte in morals. It accounts not leſs clearly for the conception we have of a right and a wrong ſenſe or taſte in the fine arts. A man who, avoiding objects generally agreeable, delights in objects generally diſagreeable, is condemned as a monſter: we diſapprove his taſte as bad or wrong, becauſe we have a clear conception that he deviates from the common ſtandard. If man were ſo framed as not to have any notion of a common ſtandard, the proverb mentioned in the beginning would hold univerſally, not only in the fine arts, but in morals: upon that ſuppoſition, the taſte of every man, with reſpect to both, would to himſelf be an ultimate ſtandard. But as the conviction of a common ſtandard is univerſal and a branch of our nature, we intuitively conceive a taſte to be right or good if conformable to the common ſtandard, and wrong or bad if diſconformable.

No particular in human nature is more univerſal,

ſal, than the uneaſineſs a man feels when in mat-
ters of importance his opinions are rejected by
others: why ſhould difference in opinion create
uneaſineſs, more than difference in ſtature, in
countenance, or in dreſs? The conviction of a
common ſtandard explains the myſtery: every
man, generally ſpeaking, taking it for granted
that his opinions agree with the common ſenſe of
mankind, is therefore diſguſted with thoſe who
think differently, not as differing from him, but as
differing from the common ſtandard: hence in all
diſputes, we find the parties, each of them equally
appealing conſtantly to the common ſenſe of man-
kind as the ultimate rule or ſtandard. With re-
ſpect to points arbitrary or indifferent, which are
not ſuppoſed to be regulated by any ſtandard, in-
dividuals are permitted to think for themſelves
with impunity: the ſame liberty is not indulged
with reſpect to points that are reckoned of mo-
ment; for what reaſon, other than that the ſtand-
ard by which theſe are regulated, ought, as we
judge, to produce an uniformity of opinion in all
men? In a word, to this conviction of a common
ſtandard muſt be wholly attributed, the pleaſure
we take in thoſe who eſpouſe the ſame principles
and opinions with ourſelves, as well as the averſion
we have at thoſe who differ from us. In matters
left indifferent by the ſtandard, we find nothing of
the ſame pleaſure or pain: a bookiſh man, unleſs
ſwayed by convenience, reliſheth not the contem-

plative man more than the active; his friends and companions are choſen indifferently out of either claſs: a painter conſorts with a poet or muſician, as readily as with thoſe of his own art; and one is not the more agreeable to me for loving beef, as I do, nor the leſs agreeable for preferring mutton.

I have ventured to ſay, that my diſguſt is raiſed, not by differing from me, but by differing from what I judge to be the common ſtandard. This point, being of importance, ought to be firmly eſtabliſhed. Men, it is true, are prone to flatter themſelves, by taking it for granted that their opinions and their taſte are in all reſpects conformable to the common ſtandard; but there may be exceptions, and experience ſhows there are ſome: there are inſtances without number, of perſons who are addicted to the groſſer amuſements of gaming, eating, drinking, without having any reliſh for more elegant pleaſures, ſuch, for example, as are afforded by the fine arts; yet theſe very perſons, talking the ſame language with the reſt of mankind, pronounce in favour of the more elegant pleaſures, and they invariably approve thoſe who have a more refined taſte, being aſhamed of their own as low and ſenſual. It is in vain to think of giving a reaſon for this ſingular impartiality, other than the authority of the common ſtandard with reſpect to the dignity of human nature *:

* See chap. 11.

and

and from the inſtances now given, we diſcover that the authority of that ſtandard, even upon the moſt grovelling ſouls, is ſo vigorous, as to prevail over ſelf-partiality, and to make them deſpiſe their own taſte compared with the more elevated taſte of others.

Uniformity of taſte and ſentiment reſulting from our conviction of a common ſtandard, leads to two important final cauſes; the one reſpecting our duty, the other our paſtime. Barely to mention the firſt ſhall be ſufficient, becauſe it does not properly belong to the preſent undertaking. Unhappy it would be for us did not uniformity prevail in morals: that our actions ſhould uniformly be directed to what is good and againſt what is ill, is the greateſt bleſſing in ſociety; and in order to uniformity of action, uniformity of opinion and ſentiment is indiſpenſable.

With reſpect to paſtime in general, and the fine arts in particular, the final cauſe of uniformity is illuſtrious. Uniformity of taſte gives opportunity for ſumptuous and elegant buildings, for fine gardens, and extenſive embelliſhments, which pleaſe univerſally; and the reaſon is, that without uniformity of taſte, there could not be any ſuitable reward, either of profit or honour, to encourage men of genius to labour in ſuch works, and to advance them toward perfection. The ſame uniformity of taſte is equally neceſſary to perfect the art of muſic, ſculpture, and painting, and to ſup-

port the expence they require after they are brought to perfection. Nature is in every particular, conſiſtent with herſelf: we are framed by Nature to have a high reliſh for the fine arts, which are a great ſource of happineſs, and friendly in a high degree to virtue: we are, at the ſame time, framed with uniformity of taſte, to furniſh proper objects for that high reliſh; and if uniformity did not prevail, the fine arts could never have made any figure.

And this ſuggeſts another final cauſe no leſs illuſtrious. The ſeparation of men into different claſſes, by birth, office, or occupation, however neceſſary, tends to relax the connection that ought to be among members of the ſame ſtate; which bad effect is in ſome meaſure prevented by the acceſs all ranks of people have to public ſpectacles, and to amuſements that are beſt enjoyed in company. Such meetings, where every one partakes of the ſame pleaſures in common, are no ſlight ſupport to the ſocial affections.

Thus, upon a conviction common to the ſpecies is erected a ſtandard of taſte, which without heſitation is applied to the taſte of every individual. That ſtandard, aſcertaining what actions are right what wrong, what proper what improper, hath enabled moraliſts to eſtabliſh rules for our conduct, from which no perſon is permitted to ſwerve. We have the ſame ſtandard for aſcertaining in all the fine arts, what is beautiful or ugly, high or low,

proper

proper or improper, proportioned or diſproportioned: and here, as in morals, we juſtly condemn every taſte that deviates from what is thus aſcertained by the common ſtandard.

That there exiſts a rule or ſtandard in nature for trying the taſte of individuals, in the fine arts as well as in morals, is a diſcovery; but is not ſufficient to complete the taſk undertaken. A branch ſtill more important remains upon hand; which is, to aſcertain what is truly the ſtandard of nature, that we may not lie open to have a falſe ſtandard impoſed on us. But what means ſhall be employed for bringing to light this natural ſtandard? This is not obvious: for when we have recourſe to general opinion and general practice, we are betrayed into endleſs perplexities. Hiſtory informs us, that nothing is more variable than taſte in the fine arts: judging by numbers, the Gothic taſte of architecture muſt be preferred before that of Greece, and the Chineſe taſte probably before either. It would be endleſs to recount the various taſtes that have prevailed in different ages with reſpect to gardening, and ſtill prevail in different countries. Deſpiſing the modeſt colouring of nature, women of faſhion in France daub their cheeks with a red powder; nay, an unnatural ſwelling in the neck, peculiar to the inhabitants of the Alps, is reliſhed by that people. But we ought not to be diſcouraged by ſuch untoward inſtances, when we find as great variety in moral opinions:

opinions: was it not among ſome nations held lawful for a man to ſell his children for ſlaves, to expoſe them in their infancy to wild beaſts, and to puniſh them for the crime of their parents? was any thing more common than to murder an enemy in cold blood? nay more, did not law once authoriſe the abominable practice of human ſacrifices, no leſs impious than immoral? Such aberrations from the rules of morality prove only, that men, originally ſavage and brutal, acquire not rationality nor delicacy of taſte till they be long diſciplined in ſociety. To aſcertain the rules of morality, we appeal not to the common ſenſe of ſavages, but of men in their more perfect ſtate: and we make the ſame appeal in forming the rules that ought to govern the fine arts: in neither can we ſafely rely on a local or tranſitory taſte; but on what is the moſt general and the moſt laſting among polite nations.

In this very manner, a ſtandard for morals has been aſcertained with a good deal of accuracy, and is daily applied by able judges with general ſatisfaction. The ſtandard of taſte in the fine arts, is not yet brought to ſuch perfection; and we can account for its ſlower progreſs: the ſenſe of right and wrong in actions is vivid and diſtinct, becauſe its objects are clearly diſtinguiſhable from each other; whereas the ſenſe of right and wrong in the fine arts is faint and wavering, becauſe its objects are commonly not ſo clearly diſtinguiſhable from each

each other, and there appears to me a ſtriking final cauſe in thus diſtinguiſhing the moral ſenſe from the ſenſe of right and wrong in the fine arts. The former, as a rule of conduct, and as a law we ought to obey, muſt be clear and authoritative. The latter is not entitled to the ſame privilege, becauſe it contributes to our pleaſure and amuſement only: were it ſtrong and lively, it would uſurp upon our duty, and call off the attention from matters of greater moment: were it clear and authoritative, it would baniſh all difference of taſte, leaving no diſtinction between a refined taſte and one that is not ſo: which would put an end to rivalſhip, and conſequently to all improvement.

But to return to our ſubject. However languid and cloudy the common ſenſe of mankind may be as to the fine arts, it is notwithſtanding the only ſtandard in theſe as well as in morals. True it is indeed, that in gathering the common ſenſe of mankind, more circumſpection is requiſite with reſpect to the fine arts than with reſpect to morals: upon the latter, any perſon may be conſulted: but in the former, a wary choice is neceſſary, for to collect votes indifferently would certainly miſlead us. Thoſe who depend for food on bodily labour, are totally void of taſte; of ſuch a taſte at leaſt as can be of uſe in the fine arts. This conſideration bars the greater part of mankind; and of the remaining part, many by a corrupted taſte are unqualified for voting. The common ſenſe of mankind

mankind muſt then be confined to the few that fall not under theſe exceptions. But as ſuch ſelection ſeems to throw matters again into uncertainty, we muſt be more explicit upon this branch of our ſubject.

Nothing tends more than voluptuouſneſs to corrupt the whole internal frame, and to vitiate our taſte, not only in the fine arts, but even in morals: Voluptuouſneſs never fails, in courſe of time, to extinguiſh all the ſympathetic affections, and to bring on a beaſtly ſelfiſhneſs, which leaves nothing of man but the ſhape: about excluding ſuch perſons there will be no diſpute. Let us next bring under trial, the opulent who delight in expence: the appetite for ſuperiority and reſpect, inflamed by riches, is vented upon coſtly furniture, numerous attendants, a princely dwelling, ſumptuous feaſts, every thing ſuperb and gorgeous, to amaze and humble all beholders: ſimplicity, elegance, propriety, and things natural, ſweet, or amiable, are deſpiſed or neglected: for theſe are not appropriated to the rich, nor make a figure in the public eye: in a word, nothing is reliſhed, but what ſerves to gratify pride, by an imaginary exaltation of the poſſeſſor above thoſe who ſurround him. Such ſentiments contract the heart, and make every principle give way to ſelf-love: benevolence and public ſpirit, with all their refined emotions, are little felt, and leſs regarded; and if theſe be excluded

cluded, there can be no place for the faint and delicate emotions of the fine arts.

The excluſion of claſſes ſo many and numerous, reduces within a narrow compaſs thoſe who are qualified to be judges in the fine arts. Many circumſtances are neceſſary to form ſuch a judge: There muſt be a good natural taſte; that is, a taſte approaching, at leaſt in ſome degree, to the delicacy of taſte above deſcribed *: that taſte muſt be improved by education, reflection, and experience †: it muſt be preſerved in vigour by living regularly, by uſing the goods of fortune with moderation

* Chap. 2. part 2.

† That theſe particulars are uſeful, it may be ſaid neceſſary, for acquiring a diſcerning taſte in the fine arts, will appear from the following facts, which ſhow the influence of experience ſingly. Thoſe who live in the world and in good company, are quick-ſighted with reſpect to every defect or irregularity in behaviour: the very ſlighteſt ſingularity in motion, in ſpeech, or in dreſs, which to a peaſant would be inviſible, eſcapes not their obſervation. The moſt minute differences in the human countenance, ſo minute as to be far beyond the reach of words, are diſtinctly perceived by the plaineſt perſon; while at the ſame time, the generality have very little diſcernment in the faces of other animals to which they are leſs accuſtomed: Sheep, for example, appear to have all the ſame face, except to the ſhepherd, who knows every individual in his flock as he does his relations and neighbours. The very populace in Athens were critics in language, in pronunciation, and even in eloquence, harrangues being their daily

deration, and by following the dictates of improved nature, which give welcome to every rational pleaſure whithout indulging any exceſs. This is the tenor of life which of all contributes the moſt to refinement of taſte; and the ſame tenor of life contributes the moſt to happineſs in general.

If there appear much uncertainty in a ſtandard that requires ſo painful and intricate a ſelection, we may poſſibly be reconciled to it by the following conſideration, That, with reſpect to the fine arts, there is leſs difference of taſte than is commonly imagined. Nature hath marked all her works with indelible characters of high or low, plain or elegant, ſtrong or weak: theſe, if at all perceived, are ſeldom miſapprehended; and the ſame marks are equally perceptible in works of art. A defective taſte is incurable; and it hurts none but the poſſeſſor, becauſe it carries no authority to impoſe upon others. I know not if there

daily entertainment. In Rome, at preſent, the moſt illiterate ſhopkeeper is a better judge of ſtatues and of pictures, than perſons of refined education in London. Theſe facts afford convincing evidence, that a diſcerning taſte depends ſtill more on experience than on nature. But theſe facts merit peculiar regard for another reaſon, that they open to us a ſure method of improving our taſte in the fine arts; which, with thoſe who have leiſure for improvements, ought to be a powerful incitement to cultivate a taſte in theſe arts: an occupation that cannot fail to embelliſh their manners, and to ſweeten ſociety.

there be ſuch a thing as a taſte naturally bad or wrong; a taſte for example, that prefers a groveling pleaſure before one that is high and elegant: groveling pleaſures are never preferred; they are only made welcome by thoſe who know no better. Differences about objects of taſte, it is true, are endleſs; but they generally concern trifles, or poſſibly matters of equal rank, where preference may be given either way with impunity: if, on any occaſion, perſons differ where they ought not, a depraved taſte will readily be diſcovered on one or other ſide, occaſioned by imitation, cuſtom, or corrupted manners, ſuch as are deſcribed above. And conſidering that every individual partakes of a common nature, what is there that ſhould occaſion any wide difference in taſte or ſentiment? By the priciples that conſtitute the ſenſative part of our nature, a wonderful uniformity is preſerved in the emotions and feelings of the different races of men; the ſame object making upon every perſon the ſame impreſſion, the ſame in kind, if not in degree. There have been, as above obſerved, aberrations from theſe principles; but ſoon or late they prevail, and reſtore the wanderer to the right tract.

I know but of one other means for aſcertaining the common ſenſe of mankind; which I mention, not in deſpair, but in great confidence of ſucceſs. As the taſte of every individual ought to be governed by the principles above mentioned, an appeal

peal to theſe principles muſt neceſſarily be deciſive of every controverſy that can ariſe upon matters of taſte. In general, every doubt with relation to the common ſenſe of man, or ſtandard of taſte, may be cleared by the ſame appeal; and to unfold theſe prlnciples is the declared purpoſe of the preſent undertaking.

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APPENDIX.

TERMS DEFINED OR EXPLAINED.

1. EVERY thing we perceive or are conſcious of, whether a being or a quality, a paſſion or an action, is with reſpect to the percipient termed an *object*. Some objects appear to be internal, or within the mind; paſſion, for example, thinking, volition: Some external; ſuch as every object of ſight, of hearing, of ſmell, of touch, of taſte.

2. That act of the mind which makes known to me an external object, is termed *perception*. That act of the mind which makes known to me an internal object, is termed *conſciouſneſs*. The power or faculty from which conſciouſneſs proceeds, is termed an *internal ſenſe*. The power or faculty from which perception proceeds, is termed an *external ſenſe*. This diſtinction refers to the objects of our knowledge; for the ſenſes, whether external or internal, are all of them powers or faculties of the mind *.

3. But

* I have complied with all who have gone before me in deſcribing the ſenſes internal and external to be powers or faculties; and yet, after much attention, I have not diſcovered any thing active in their operations to entitle them to that character.

3. But as ſelf is an object that cannot be termed either external or internal, the faculty by which I have knowledge of myſelf, is a ſenſe that cannot properly be termed either internal or external.

4. By the eye we perceive figure, colour, motion, &c.: by the ear we perceive the different qualities of ſound, high, low, loud, ſoft: by touch we perceive rough, ſmooth, hot, cold, &c.: by taſte we perceive ſweet, ſour, bitter, &c.: by ſmell we perceive fragrant, fetid, &c. Theſe qualities partake the common nature of all qualities, that they are not capable of an independent exiſtence, but muſt belong to ſome being of which they

racter. The following chain of thought has led me to heſitate. One being operates on another: the firſt is active, the other paſſive. If the firſt act, it muſt have a power to act: if an effect be produced on the other, it muſt have a *capacity* to have that effect produced upon it. Fire melts wax, *ergo* fire has a power to produce that effect; and wax muſt be capable to have that effect produced in it. Now as to the ſenſes. A tree in flouriſh makes an impreſſion on me, and by that means I ſee the tree. But in this operation I do not find that the mind is active; ſeeing the tree is only an effect produced on it by intervention of the rays of light. What ſeems to have led us into an error is the word *ſeeing*, which, under the form of an active verb, has a paſſive ſignification. *I feel* is a ſimilar example; for to feel is certainly not to act, but the effect of being acted upon: the feeling pleaſure is the effect produced in my mind when a beautiful object is preſented. Perception accordingly is not an action, but an effect produced in the mind. Senſation is another effect: it is the pleaſure I feel upon perceiving what is agreeable.

are

are properties or attributes. A being with reſpect to its properties or attributes is termed a *ſubject*, or *ſubſtratum*. Every ſubſtratum of viſible qualities, is termed *ſubſtance;* and of tangible qualities, *body*.

5. Subſtance and ſound are perceived as exiſting at a diſtance from the organ; often at a conſiderable diſtance. But ſmell, touch, and taſte, are perceived as exiſting at the organ of ſenſe.

6. The objects of external ſenſe are various. Subſtances are perceived by the eye; bodies by the touch. Sounds, taſtes, and ſmells, paſſing commonly under the name of ſecondary qualities, require more explanation than there is room for here. All the objects of internal ſenſe are attributes: witneſs deliberation, reaſoning, reſolution, willing, conſenting, which are internal actions. Paſſions and emotions, which are internal agitations, are alſo attributes. With regard to the former, I am conſcious of being active; with regard to the latter, I am conſcious of being paſſive.

7. Again, we are conſcious of internal action as in the head; of paſſions and emotions as in the heart.

8. Many actions may be exerted internally, and many effects produced, of which we are unconſcious: when we inveſtigate the ultimate cauſe of the motion of the blood, and of other internal motions upon which life depends, it is the moſt probable opinion that ſome internal power is the cauſe; and if ſo, we are unconſcious of the operations of

that power. But conſciouſneſs being implied in the very meaning of deliberating, reaſoning, reſolving, willing, conſenting, ſuch operations cannot eſcape our knowledge. The ſame is the caſe of paſſions and emotions; for no internal agitation is denominated a paſſion or emotion, but what we are conſcious of.

9. The mind is not always the ſame: by turns it is cheerful, melancholy, calm, peeviſh, &c. Theſe differences may not improperly be denominated *tones*.

10. Perception and ſenſation are commonly reckoned ſynonimous terms, ſignifying that internal act by which external objects are made known to us. But they ought to be diſtinguiſhed. *Perceiving* is a general term for hearing, ſeeing, taſting, touching, ſmelling; and therefore *perception* ſignifies every internal act by which we are made acquainted with external objects: thus we are ſaid to perceive a certain animal, a certain colour, ſound, taſte, ſmell, &c. *Senſation* properly ſignifies that internal act by which we are made conſcious of pleaſure or pain felt at the organ of ſenſe: thus we have a ſenſation of the pleaſure ariſing from warmth, from a fragrant ſmell, from a ſweet taſte; and of the pain ariſing from a wound, from a fetid ſmell, from a diſagreeable taſte. In perception, my attention is directed to the external object: in ſenſation, it is directed to the pleaſure or pain I feel.

The

The terms *perception* and *ſenſation* are ſometimes employed to ſignify the objects of perception and ſenſation. Perception in that ſenſe is a general term for every external thing we perceive; and ſenſation a general term for every pleaſure and pain felt at the organ of ſenſe.

11. Conception is different from perception. The latter includes a conviction of the reality of its object: the former does not; for I can conceive the moſt extravagant ſtories told in a romance, without having any conviction of their reality. Conception differs alſo from imagination. By the power of fancy I can imagine a golden mountain, or an ebony ſhip with ſails and ropes of ſilk. When I deſcribe a picture of that kind to another, the idea he forms of it is termed a *conception*. Imagination is active, conception is paſſive.

12. Feeling, beſide denoting one of the external ſenſes, is a general term, ſignifying that internal act by which we are made conſcious of our pleaſures and our pains; for it is not limited, as ſenſation is, to any one ſort. Thus, feeling being the genus of which ſenſation is a ſpecies, their meaning is the ſame when applied to pleaſure and pain felt at the organ of ſenſe: and accordingly we ſay indifferently, "I feel pleaſure from heat, "and pain from cold," or, "I have a ſenſation "of pleaſure from heat, and of pain from cold." But the meaning of feeling, as is ſaid, is much

more extenſive: It is proper to ſay, I feel pleaſure in a ſumptuous building, in love, in friendſhip; and pain in loſing a child, in revenge, in envy: ſenſation is not properly applied to any of theſe.

The term *feeling* is frequently uſed in a leſs proper ſenſe, to ſignify what we feel or are conſcious of; and in that ſenſe it is a general term for all our paſſions and emotions, and for all our other pleaſures and pains.

13. That we cannot perceive an external object till an impreſſion is made upon our body, is probable from reaſon, and is aſcertained by experience. But it is not neceſſary that we be made ſenſible of the impreſſion: in touching, in taſting, and in ſmelling, we are ſenſible of the impreſſion; but not in ſeeing and hearing. We know indeed from experiments, that before we perceive a viſible object, its image is ſpread upon the *retina tunica*; and that before we perceive a ſound, an impreſſion is made upon the drum of the ear: but we are not conſcious either of the organic image or of the organic impreſſion; nor are we conſcious of any other operation preparatory to the act of perception: all we can ſay, is, that we ſee that river, or hear that trumpet *.

14. Objects

* Yet a ſingular opinion that impreſſions are the only objects of perception, has been eſpouſed by ſome philoſophers of no mean rank; not attending to the foregoing peculiarity in

14. Objects once perceived may be recalled to the mind by the power of memory. When I recal an object of ſight in that manner, it appears to me preciſely the ſame as in the original ſurvey, only leſs diſtinct. For example, having ſeen yeſterday a ſpreading oak growing on the brink of a river, I endeavour to recal theſe objects to my mind. How is this operation performed? Do I endeavour to form in my mind a picture of them or repreſentative image? Not ſo. I tranſport myſelf ideally to the place where I ſaw the tree and river yeſterday; upon which I have a perception of theſe objects, ſimilar in all reſpects to the perception I had when I viewed them with my eyes, only leſs diſtinct. And in this recollection, I am not conſcious of a picture or repreſentative image, more than in the original ſurvey: the perception is of the tree and river themſelves, as at firſt. I confirm this by another experiment. After attentively ſurveying a fine ſtatue, I cloſe my eyes. What follows? The ſame object continues, with-

in the ſenſes of ſeeing and hearing, that we perceive objects without being conſcious of an organic impreſſion, or of any impreſſion. See the Treatiſe upon Human Nature: where we find the following paſſage, book 1. p. 4. ſect. 2. "Properly ſpeaking, it is not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs and members; ſo that the aſcribing a real and corporeal exiſtence to theſe impreſſions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, &c."

out any difference but that it is leſs diſtinct than formerly*. This indiſtinct ſecondary perception of an object, is termed an *idea*. And therefore the

* This experiment, which every one may reiterate till entire ſatisfaction be obtained, is of greater importance than at firſt view may appear; for it ſtrikes at the root of a celebrated doctrine, which for more than two thouſand years has miſled many philoſophers. This doctrine as delivered by Ariſtotle is in ſubſtance, "That of every object of thought "there muſt be in the mind ſome form, phantaſm, or ſpe- "cies; that things ſenſible are perceived and remembered "by means of ſenſible phantaſms, and things intelligible by "intelligible phantaſms; and that theſe phantaſms have the "form of the object without the matter, as the impreſſion "of a ſeal upon wax has the form of a ſeal without its "matter." The followers of Ariſtotle add, "That the "ſenſible and intelligible forms of things, are ſent forth "from the things themſelves, and make impreſſions upon the "paſſive intellect, which impreſſions are perceived by the "active intellect" This notion differs very little from that of Epicurus, which is, "That all things ſend forth con- "ſtantly and in every direction, ſlender ghoſts or films of "themſelves, (*tenuia ſimulacra*, as expreſſed by his commen- "tator Lucretius); which ſtriking upon the mind, are "the means of perception, dreaming," *&c.* Des Cartes, bent to oppoſe Ariſtotle, rejects the doctrine of ſenſible and intelligible phantaſms; maintaining however the ſame doctrine in effect, namely, That we perceive nothing external but by means of ſome image either in the brain or in the mind: and theſe images he terms *ideas*. According to theſe philoſophers, we perceive nothing immediately but phantaſms

the preciſe and accurate definition of an idea in contradiſtinction to an original perception, is, "That perception of a real object which is raiſed "in

taſms or ideas; and from theſe we infer, by reaſoning, the exiſtence of external objects. Locke, adopting this doctrine, employs almoſt the whole of his book about ideas. He holds, that we cannot perceive, remember, nor imagine, any thing, but by having an idea or image of it in the mind. He agrees with Des Cartes, that we can have no knowledge of things external, but what we acquire by reaſoning upon their ideas or images in the mind; taking it for granted, that we are conſcious of theſe ideas or images, and of nothing elſe. Thoſe who talk the moſt intelligibly explain the doctrine thus: When I ſee in a mirror a man ſtanding behind me, the immediate object of my ſight is his image, without which I could not ſee him: in like manner, when I ſee a tree or a houſe, there muſt be an image of theſe objects in my brain or in my mind; which image is the immediate object of my perception; and by means of that image I perceive the external object.

One would not readily ſuſpect any harm in this ideal ſyſtem, other than the leading us into a labyrinth of metaphyſical errors, in order to account for our knowledge of external objects, which is more truly and more ſimply accounted for by direct perception. And yet ſome late writers have been able to extract from it death and deſtruction to the whole world, levelling all down to a mere chaos of ideas. Dr Berkeley, upon authority of the philoſophers named, taking for granted that we cannot perceive any object but what is in the mind, diſcovered, that the reaſoning employed by Des Cartes and Locke to infer the exiſtence

of

" in the mind by the power of memory." Every thing we have any knowledge of, whether internal

of external objects, is inconclusive; and upon that discovery ventured, against common sense, to annihilate totally the material world. And a later writer, discovering that Berkeley's arguments might with equal success be applied against immaterial beings, ventures still more boldly to reject by the lump the immaterial world as well as the material; leaving nothing in nature but images or ideas floating *in vacuo*, without affording them a single mind for shelter or support.

When such wild and extravagant consequences can be drawn from the ideal system, it might have been expected, that no man who is not crazy would have ventured to erect such a superstructure, till he should first be certain beyond all doubt of a solid foundation. And yet upon inquiry, we find the foundation of this terrible doctrine to be no better than a shallow metaphysical argument, *namely*, " That no being can act but where it is; and, consequently, " that it cannot act upon any subject at a distance." This argument possesses indeed one eminent advantage, that its obscurity, like that of an oracle, is apt to impose upon the reader, who is willing to consider it as a demonstration, because he does not clearly see the fallacy. The best way to give it a fair trial, is to draw it out of its obscurity, and to state it in a clear light, as follows. " No subject can be " perceived unless it act upon the mind, but no distant sub- " ject can act upon the mind, because no being can act " but where it is: and, therefore, the immediate object " of perception must be something united to the mind, so " as to be able to act upon it." Here the argument is completed in all its parts; and from it is derived the supposed

nal or external, paſſions, emotions, thinking, reſolving, willing, heat, cold, &c. as well as external

poſed neceſſity of phantaſms or ideas united to the mind, as the only objects of perception. It is ſingularly unlucky, that this argument concludes directly againſt the very ſyſtem of which it is the only foundation; for how can phantaſms or ideas be raiſed in the mind by things at a diſtance, if things at a diſtance cannot act upon the mind? I ſay more, that it aſſumes a propoſition as true, without evidence, *namely*, That no diſtant ſubject can act upon the mind. This propoſition undoubtedly requires evidence, for it is not intuitively certain. And, therefore, till the propoſition be demonſtrated, every man without ſcruple may rely upon the conviction of his ſenſes, that he hears and ſees things at a diſtance.

But I venture a bolder ſtep, which is, to ſhow that the propoſition is falſe. Admitting that no being can act but where it is, is there any thing more ſimple or more common, than the acting upon ſubjects at a diſtance by intermediate means? This holds in fact with reſpect both to ſeeing and hearing. When I ſee a tree, for example, rays of light are reflected from the tree to my eye, forming a picture upon the *retina tunica*; but the object perceived is the tree itſelf, not the rays of light, nor the picture. In this manner diſtant objects are perceived, without any action of the object upon the mind, or of the mind upon the object. Hearing is in a ſimilar caſe: the ear, put in motion by thunder, makes an impreſſion upon the drum of the ear; but this impreſſion is not what I hear, it is the thunder itſelf by means of that impreſſion.

With reſpect to viſion in particular, we are profoundly ignorant by what means and in what manner the picture on the

retina

ternal objects, may be recalled as above, by the power of memory *.

15. External objects are diſtinguiſhable into ſimple

retina tunica contributes to produce a ſight of the object. One thing only is clear, that as we have no knowledge of that picture, it is as natural to conceive that it ſhould be made the inſtrument of diſcovering the external object, and not itſelf, as of diſcovering itſelf only, and not the external object.

Upon the chimerical conſequences drawn from the ideal ſyſtem, I ſhall make but a ſingle reflection. Nature determines us neceſſarily to rely on the veracity of our ſenſes; and upon their evidence the exiſtence of external objects is to us a matter of intuitive knowledge and abſolute certainty. Vain therefore is the attempt of Dr Berkeley and of his followers, to deceive us, by a metaphyſical ſubtilty, into a diſbelief of what we cannot entertain even the ſlighteſt doubt.

* From this definition of an idea, the following propoſition muſt be evident, That there can be no ſuch thing as an innate idea. If the original perception of an object be not innate, which is obvious; it is not leſs obvious, that the idea or ſecondary perception of that object cannot be innate. And yet, to prove this ſelf-evident propoſition, Locke has beſtowed a whole book of his Treatiſe upon Human Underſtanding. So neceſſary it is to give accurate definitions, and ſo preventive of diſpute are definitions when accurate. Dr Berkeley has taken great pains to prove another propoſition equally evident, That there can be no ſuch thing as a general idea: all our original perceptions are of particular objects, and our ſecondary perceptions or ideas muſt be equally ſo.

ſimple and complex. Certain ſounds are ſo ſimple as not to be reſolvable into parts; and ſo are certain taſtes and ſmells. Objects of touch are for the moſt part complex: they are not only hard or ſoft, but alſo ſmooth or rough, hot or cold. Of all external objects, viſible objects are commonly the moſt complex: a tree is compoſed of a trunk, branches, leaves: it has colour, figure, ſize. But as an action is not reſolvable into parts, a perception, being an act of ſenſe, is always ſimple. The colour, figure, umbrage of a ſpreading oak, raiſe not different perceptions: the perception is one, that of a tree, coloured, figured, &c. A quality is never perceived ſeparately from the ſubject; nor a part from the whole. There is a mental power of abſtraction, of which afterward; but the eye never abſtracts, nor any other external ſenſe.

16. Many particulars beſide thoſe mentioned enter into the perception of viſible objects, motion, reſt, place, ſpace, time, number, &c. Theſe, all of them, denote ſimple ideas, and for that reaſon admit not of a definition. All that can be done, is to point out how they are acquired. The ideas of motion and of reſt, are familiar even to a child, from ſeeing its nurſe ſometimes walking, ſometimes ſitting: the former it is taught to call *motion*; the latter, *reſt*. Place enters into every perception of a viſible object: the object is perceived to exiſt, and

and to exiſt ſomewhere, on the right hand or on the left, and where it exiſts is termed *place*. Aſk a child where its mother is, or in what place: it will anſwer readily, ſhe is in the garden. Space is connected with ſize or bulk: every piece of matter occupies *room* or *ſpace* in proportion to its bulk. A child perceives that when its little box is filled with playthings, there is no room or ſpace for more. Space is alſo applied to ſignify the diſtance of viſible objects from each other; and ſuch ſpace accordingly can be meaſured. Dinner comes after breakfaſt, and ſupper after dinner: a child perceives an interval, and that interval it learns to call *time*. A child ſometimes is alone with its nurſe: its mother is ſometimes in the room; and ſometimes alſo its brothers and ſiſters. It perceives a difference between many and few; and that difference it is taught to call *number*.

17. The primary perception of a viſible object, is more complete, lively and diſtinct, than that of any other object. And for that reaſon, an idea or ſecondary perception of a viſible object, is alſo more complete, lively, and diſtinct, than that of any other object. A fine paſſage in muſic, may, for a moment, be recalled to the mind with tolerable accuracy; but, after the ſhorteſt interval, it becomes no leſs obſcure than the ideas of the other objects mentioned.

18. As the range of an individual is commonly within

within a narrow ſpace, it rarely happens, that every thing neceſſary to be known comes under our own perceptions. Language is an admirable contrivance for ſupplying that deficiency; for by language every man's perceptions may be communicated to all: and the ſame may be done by painting and other imitative arts. The facility of communication depends on the livelineſs of the ideas; eſpecially in language, which hitherto has not arrived at greater perfection than to expreſs clear ideas: hence it is, that poets and orators, who are extremely ſucceſsful in deſcribing objects of ſight, find objects of the other ſenſes too faint and obſcure for language. An idea thus acquired of an object at ſecond hand, ought to be diſtinguiſhed from an idea of memory, though their reſemblance has occaſioned the ſame term *idea* to be applied to both; which is to be regretted, becauſe ambiguity in the ſignification of words is a great obſtruction to accuracy of conception. Thus Nature hath furniſhed the means of multiplying ideas without end, and of providing every individual with a ſufficient ſtock to anſwer, not only the neceſſities, but even the elegancies of life.

19. Further, man is endued with a ſort of creative power: he can fabricate images of things that have no exiſtence. The materials employed in this operation, are ideas of ſight, which he can take to pieces and combine into new forms at pleaſure:

pleaſure: their complexity and vivacity make them fit materials: But a man hath no ſuch power over any of his other ideas, whether of the external or internal ſenſes: he cannot, after the utmoſt effort, combine theſe into new forms, being too obſcure for that operation. An image thus fabricated cannot be called a ſecondary perception, not being derived from an original perception: the poverty of language, however, as in the caſe immediately above mentioned, has occaſioned the ſame term *idea* to be applied to all. This ſingular power of fabricating images without any foundation in reality, is diſtinguiſhed by the name *imagination.*

20. As ideas are the chief materials employed in reaſoning and reflecting, it is of conſequence that their nature and differences be underſtood. It appears now, that ideas may be diſtinguiſhed into three kinds: firſt, Ideas derived from original perceptions, properly termed *ideas of memory*; ſecond, Ideas communicated by language or other ſigns; and, third, Ideas of imagination. Theſe ideas differ from each other in many reſpects; but chiefly in reſpect of their proceeding from different cauſes: The firſt kind is derived from real exiſtences that have been objects of our ſenſes: language is the cauſe of the ſecond, or any other ſign that has the ſame power with language: and a man's imagination is to himſelf the cauſe of the third. It is ſcarce neceſſary to add, that an idea, originally of ima-

imagination, being conveyed to others by language or any other vehicle, becomes in their mind an idea of the ſecond kind; and again, that an idea of this kind, being afterward recalled to the mind, becomes in that circumſtance an idea of memory.

21. We are not ſo conſtituted as to perceive objects with indifference: theſe, with very few exceptions, appear agreeable or diſagreeable; and at the ſame time raiſe in us pleaſant or painful emotions. With reſpect to external objects in particular, we diſtinguiſh thoſe which produce organic impreſſions, from thoſe which affect us from a diſtance. When we touch a ſoft and ſmooth body, we have a pleaſant feeling as at the place of contact; which feeling we diſtinguiſh not, at leaſt not accurately, from the agreeableneſs of the body itſelf; and the ſame holds in general with regard to all organic impreſſions. It is otherwiſe in hearing and ſeeing: a ſound is perceived as in itſelf agreeable, and raiſes in the hearer a pleaſant emotion: an object of ſight appears in itſelf agreeable, and raiſes in the ſpectator a pleaſant emotion. Theſe are accurately diſtinguiſhed: the pleaſant emotion is felt as within the mind; the agreeableneſs of the object is placed upon the object, and is perceived as one of its qualities or properties. The agreeable appearance of an object of ſight is termed *beauty;* and the diſagreeable appearance of ſuch an object is termed *uglineſs.*

22. But though beauty and uglineſs, in their proper and genuine ſignification, are confined to objects of ſight; yet in a more lax and figurative ſignification, they are applied to objects of the other ſenſes: they are ſometimes applied even to abſtract terms: for it is not unuſual to ſay, *a beautiful theorem, a beautiful conſtitution of government.*

23. A line compoſed by a ſingle rule, is perceived and ſaid to be regular: a ſtraight line, a parabola, a hyperbola, the circumference of a circle, and of an ellipſe, are all of them regular lines. A figure compoſed by a ſingle rule, is perceived and ſaid to be regular: a circle, a ſquare, a hexagon, an equilateral triangle, are regular figures, being compoſed by a ſingle rule, that determines the form of each. When the form of a line or of a figure is aſcertained by a ſingle rule that leaves nothing arbitrary, the line and the figure are ſaid to be perfectly regular; which is the caſe of the figures now mentioned, and the caſe of a ſtraight line and of the circumference of a circle. A figure and a line that require more than one rule for their conſtruction, or that have any of their parts left arbitrary, are not perfectly regular: a parallelogram and a rhomb are leſs regular than a ſquare; the parallelogram being ſubjected to no rule as to the length of ſides, other than that the oppoſite ſides be equal; the rhomb being ſubjected to no rule as to its angles, other than that the oppoſite angles be equal: for the ſame reaſon, the cir-

circumference of an ellipſe, the form of which is ſuſceptible of much variety, is leſs regular than that of a circle.

24. Regularity, properly ſpeaking, belongs, like beauty, to objects of ſight; and, like beauty, it is alſo applied figuratively to other objects: thus we ſay, *a regular government*, *a regular compoſition of muſic*, and, *regular diſcipline*.

25. When two figures are compoſed of ſimilar parts, they are ſaid to be uniform. Perfect uniformity is where the conſtituent parts of two figures are equal: thus two cubes of the ſame dimenſions are perfectly uniform in all their parts. Uniformity leſs perfect is, where the parts mutually correſpond, but without being equal: the uniformity is imperfect between two ſquares or cubes of unequal dimenſions; and ſtill more ſo between a ſquare and a parallelogram.

26. Uniformity is alſo applicable to the conſtituent parts of the ſame figure. The conſtituent parts of a ſquare are perfectly uniform; its ſides are equal and its angles are equal. Wherein then differs regularity from uniformity? for a figure compoſed of uniform parts muſt undoubtedly be regular. Regularity is predicated of a figure conſidered as a whole compoſed of uniform parts: uniformity is predicated of theſe parts as related to each other by reſemblance: we ſay, a ſquare is a regular, not an uniform, figure; but with reſpect to the conſtituent parts of a ſquare, we ſay

not, that they are regular, but that they are uniform.

27. In things deſtined for the ſame uſe, as legs, arms, eyes, windows, ſpoons, we expect uniformity. Proportion ought to govern parts intended for different uſes: we require a certain proportion between a leg and an arm; in the baſe, the ſhaft, the capital of a pillar; and in the length, the breadth, the height of a room: ſome proportion is alſo required in different things intimately connected, as between a dwelling-houſe, the garden, and the ſtables; but we require no proportion among things ſlightly connected, as between the table a man writes on and the dog that follows him. Proportion and uniformity never coincide: things equal are uniform; but proportion is never applied to them: the four ſides and angles of a ſquare are equal and perfectly uniform; but we ſay not that they are proportional. Thus, proportion always implies inequality or difference; but then it implies it to a certain degree only: the moſt agreeable proportion reſembles a *maximum* in mathematics; a greater or leſs inequality or difference is leſs agreeable.

28. Order regards various particulars. Firſt, in tracing or ſurveying objects, we are directed by a ſenſe of order: we perceive it to be more orderly, that we ſhould paſs from a principle to its acceſſories, and from a whole to its parts, than in the contrary direction. Next, with reſpect to the poſition

poſition of things, a ſenſe of order directs us to place together things intimately connected. Thirdly, in placing things that have no natural connection, that order appears the moſt perfect, where the particulars are made to bear the ſtrongeſt relation to each other that poſition can give them. Thus paralleliſm is the ſtrongeſt relation that poſition can beſtow upon ſtraight lines: if they be ſo placed as by production to interſect, the relation is leſs perfect. A large body in the middle, and two equal bodies of leſs ſize, one on each ſide, is an order that produces the ſtrongeſt relation the bodies are ſuſceptible of by poſition: the relation between the two equal bodies would be ſtronger by juxtapoſition; but they would not both have the ſame relation to the third.

29. The beauty or agreeableneſs of a viſible object, is perceived as one of its qualities; which holds, not only in the primary perception, but alſo in the ſecondary perception or idea: and hence the pleaſure that ariſes from the idea of a beautiful object. An idea of imagination is alſo pleaſant, though in a lower degree than an idea of memory, where the objects are of the ſame kind; for an evident reaſon, that the former is more diſtinct and lively than the latter. But this inferiority in ideas of imagination, is more than compenſated by their greatneſs and variety, which are boundleſs; for by the imagination, exerted without controul, we can fabricate ideas of finer viſible ob-

jects, of more noble and heroic actions, of greater wickedneſs, of more ſurpriſing events, than ever in fact exiſted: and in communicating ſuch ideas by words, painting, ſculpture, &c. the influence of the imagination is no leſs extenſive than great.

30. In the nature of every man, there is ſomewhat original, which diſtinguiſhes him from others, which tends to form his character, and to make him meek or fiery, candid or deceitful, reſolute or timorous, cheerful or moroſe. This original bent, termed *diſpoſition*, muſt be diſtinguiſhed from a *principle*: the latter, ſignifying a law of human nature, makes part of the common nature of man; the former makes part of the nature of this or that man. *Propenſity* is a name common to both; for it ſignifies a principle as well as a diſpoſition.

31. *Affection*, ſignifying a ſettled bent of mind toward a particular being or thing, occupies a middle place between diſpoſition on the one hand, and paſſion on the other. It is clearly diſtinguiſhable from diſpoſition, which, being a branch of one's nature originally, muſt exiſt before there can be an opportunity to exert it upon any particular object; whereas affection can never be original, becauſe, having a ſpecial relation to a particular object, it cannot exiſt till the object have once at leaſt been preſented. It is no leſs clearly diſtinguiſhable from paſſion, which, depending on the real or ideal preſence of its object, vaniſhes with its object: whereas affection is a laſting connection;

nection; and, like other connections, ſubſiſts even when we do not think of the perſon. A familiar example will clear the whole. I have from nature a diſpoſition to gratitude, which, through want of an object, happens never to be exerted; and which therefore is unknown even to myſelf. Another who has the ſame diſpoſition, meets with a kindly office which makes him grateful to his benefactor: an intimate connection is formed between them, termed *affection*; which, like other connections, has a permanent exiſtence, though not always in view. The affection, for the moſt part, lies dormant, till an opportunity offer for exerting it: in that circumſtance, it is converted into the paſſion of gratitude; and the opportunity is greedily ſeized of teſtifying gratitude in the warmeſt manner.

32. *Averſion*, I think, is oppoſed to affection; not to deſire, as it commonly is. We have an affection to one perſon; we have an averſion to another: the former diſpoſes us to do good to its object, the latter to do ill.

33. What is a ſentiment? It is not a perception; for a perception ſignifies the act by which we become conſcious of external objects. It is not conſciouſneſs of an internal action, ſuch as thinking, ſuſpending thought, inclining, reſolving, willing, &c. Neither is it the conception of a relation among objects; a conception of that kind being termed *opinion*. The term *ſentiment* is ap-

propriated to ſuch thoughts as are prompted by paſſion.

34. *Attention* is that ſtate of mind which prepares one to receive impreſſions. According to the degree of attention, objects make a ſtrong or weak impreſſion *. Attention is requiſite even to the ſimple act of ſeeing: the eye can take in a conſiderable field at one look; but no object in the field is ſeen diſtinctly, but that ſingly which fixes the attention: in a profound reverie that totally occupies the attention, we ſcarce ſee what is directly before us. In a train of perceptions, the attention being divided among various objects, no particular object makes ſuch a figure as it would do ſingle and apart. Hence, the ſtillneſs of night contributes to terror, there being nothing to divert the attention:

Horror ubique animos, ſimul ipſa ſilentia terrent.
Æneid. ii.

Zara. Silence and ſolitude are ev'ry where!
Through all the gloomy ways and iron doors
That

* Bacon, in his Natural Hiſtory, makes the following obſervations. Sounds are meliorated by the intenſion of the ſenſe, where the common ſenſe is collected moſt to the particular ſenſe of hearing, and the ſight ſuſpended. Therefore ſounds are ſweeter, as well as greater, in the night than in the day; and I ſuppoſe they are ſweeter to blind men than to others: and it is manifeſt, that between ſleeping and waking, when all the ſenſes are bound and ſuſpended, muſic is far ſweeter than when one is fully waking.

That hither lead, nor human face nor voice
Is ſeen or heard. A dreadful din was wont
To grate the ſenſe, when enter'd here from groans
And howls of ſlaves condemn'd, from clink of chains,
And crash of ruſty bars and creaking hinges:
And ever and anon the ſight was daſh'd
With frightful faces and the meagre looks
Of grim and ghaſtly executioners.
Yet more this ſtillneſs terrifies my ſoul
Than did that ſcene of complicated horrors.

Mourning Bride, act 5. ſc. 8.

And hence it is, that an object ſeen at the termination of a confined view, is more agreeable than when ſeen in a group with the ſurrounding objects:

The crow doth ſing as ſweetly as the lark
When neither is attended; and, I think,
The nightingale, if ſhe ſhould ſing by day,
When ev'ry gooſe is cackling, would be thought
No better a muſician than the wren.

Merchant of Venice.

35. In matters of ſlight importance, attention is moſtly directed by will; and for that reaſon, it is our own fault if trifling objects make any deep impreſſion. Had we power equally to with-hold our attention from matters of importance, we might be proof againſt any deep impreſſion. But our power fails us here: an intereſting object ſeizes and fixes the attention beyond the poſſibility of controul; and

and while our attention is thus forcibly attached to one object, others may ſolicit for admittance; but in vain, for they will not be regarded. Thus a ſmall misfortune is ſcarce felt in preſence of a greater:

Lear. Thou think'ſt 'tis much, that this contentious ſtorm
Invades us to the ſkin; ſo 'tis to thee;
But where the greater malady is fix'd,
The leſſer is ſcarce felt. Thou'dſt ſhun a bear;
But if thy flight lay tow'rd the roaring ſea,
Thou'dſt meet the bear i' th' mouth. When the mind's free,
The body's delicate: the tempeſt in my mind
Doth from my ſenſes take all feeling elſe,
Save what beats there. *King Lear, act 3. ſc. 5.*

36. *Genus, ſpecies, modification,* are terms invented to diſtinguiſh beings from each other. Individuals are diſtinguiſhed by their qualities: a number of individuals conſidered with reſpect to qualities that diſtinguiſh them from others, is termed a *ſpecies:* a plurality of *ſpecies* conſidered with reſpect to their diſtinguiſhing qualities, is termed a *genus.* That quality which diſtinguiſheth one genus, one ſpecies, or even one individual, from another, is termed a *modification:* thus the ſame particular that is termed a *property* or *quality* when conſidered as belonging to an individual, or a claſs of individuals, is termed a *modification* when conſidered

dered as diſtinguiſhing the individual or the claſs from another: a black ſkin and ſoft curled hair, are properties of a negro: the ſame circumſtances conſidered as marks that diſtinguiſh a negro from a man of a different ſpecies, are denominated *modifications*.

37. Objects of ſight, being complex, are diſtinguiſhable into the ſeveral particulars that enter into the compoſition: theſe objects are all of them coloured; and they all have length, breadth, and thickneſs. When I behold a ſpreading oak, I diſtinguiſh in that object, ſize, figure, colour, and ſometimes motion: in a flowing river I diſtinguiſh colour, figure, and conſtant motion; a dye has colour, black ſpots, ſix plain ſurfaces, all equal and uniform. Objects of touch have all of them extenſion: ſome of them are felt rough, ſome ſmooth: ſome of them are hard, ſome ſoft. With reſpect to the other ſenſes, ſome of their objects are ſimple, ſome complex: a ſound, a taſte, a ſmell, may be ſo ſimple as not to be diſtinguiſhable into parts: others are perceived to be compounded of different ſounds, different taſtes, and different ſmells.

38. The eye at one look can graſp a number of objects, as of trees in a field, or men in a crowd: theſe objects having each a ſeparate and independent exiſtence, are diſtinguiſhable in the mind, as well as in reality; and there is nothing more eaſy than to abſtract from ſome and to confine our contemplation to others. A large oak with its ſpreading branches

branches fixes our attention upon itſelf, and abſtracts us from the ſhrubs that ſurround it. In the ſame manner, with reſpect to compound ſounds, taſtes, or ſmells, we can fix our thoughts upon any one of the component parts, abſtracting our attention from the reſt. The power of abſtraction is not confined to objects that are ſeparable in reality as well as mentally; but alſo takes place where there can be no real ſeparation: the ſize, the figure, the colour, of a tree, are inſeparably connected, and have no independent exiſtence; the ſame of length, breadth, and thickneſs: and yet we can mentally confine our obſervations to one of theſe, abſtracting from the reſt. Here abſtraction takes place where there cannot be a real ſeparation.

39. Space and time have occaſioned much metaphyſical jargon; but after the power of abſtraction is explained as above, there remains no difficulty about them. It is mentioned above, that ſpace as well as place enter into the perception of every viſible object: a tree is perceived as exiſting in a certain place, and as occupying a certain ſpace. Now, by the power of abſtraction, ſpace may be conſidered abſtractedly from the body that occupies it; and hence the abſtract term ſpace. In the ſame manner, exiſtence may be conſidered abſtractedly from any particular thing that exiſts; and place may be conſidered abſtractedly from any particular thing that may be in it. Every ſeries or ſucceſſion of things, ſuggeſts the idea of time; and

time

time may be conſidered abſtractedly from any ſeries of ſucceſſion. In the ſame manner, we acquire the abſtract term motion, reſt, number, and a thouſand other abſtract terms; an excellent contrivance for improving ſpeech, as without it ſpeech would be wofully imperfect. Brute animals may have ſome obſcure notion of theſe circumſtances, as connected with particular objects: an ox probably perceives that he takes longer time to go round a long ridge in the plough, than a ſhort one; and he probably perceives when he is one of four in the yoke, or only one of two. But the power of abſtraction is not beſtowed on brute animals; becauſe to them it would be altogether uſeleſs, as they are incapable of ſpeech.

40. This power of abſtraction is of great utility. A carpenter conſiders a log of wood with regard to hardneſs, firmneſs, colour, and texture: a philoſopher, neglecting theſe properties, makes the log undergo a chemical analyſis; and examines its taſte, its ſmell, and its component principles: the geometrician confines his reaſoning to the figure, the length, breadth, and thickneſs. In general, every artiſt, abſtracting from all other properties, confines his obſervations to thoſe which have a more immediate connection with his profeſſion.

41. It is obſerved above, p. 516. that there can be no ſuch thing as a general idea; that all our perceptions are of particular objects, and that our ſecondary perceptions or ideas muſt be equally ſo.

Pre-

Preciſely, for the ſame reaſon, there can be no ſuch thing as an abſtract idea. We cannot form an idea of a part without taking in the whole; nor of motion, colour, figure, independent of a body. No man will ſay that he can form any idea of beauty, till he think of a perſon endued with that quality; nor that he can form an idea of weight, till he takes under conſideration a body that is weighty. And when he takes under conſideration a body endued with one or other of the properties mentioned, the idea he forms is not an abſtract or general idea, but the idea of a particular body with its properties. But though a part and the whole, a ſubject and its attributes, an effect and its cauſe, are ſo intimately connected, as that an idea cannot be formed of the one independent of the other; yet we can reaſon upon the one abſtracting from the other.

This is done by words ſignifying the thing to which the reaſoning is confined; and ſuch words are denominated *abſtract terms*. The meaning and uſe of an abſtract term is well underſtood, though of itſelf, unleſs other particulars be taken in, it raiſes no image nor idea in the mind. In language it ſerves excellent purpoſe; by it different figures, different colours, can be compared, without the trouble of conceiving them as belonging to any particular ſubject; and they contribute with words ſignificant to raiſe images or ideas in the mind.

42.

42. The power of abſtraction is beſtowed on man, for the purpoſe ſolely of reaſoning. It tends greatly to the facility as well as clearneſs of any proceſs of reaſoning, that, laying aſide every other circumſtance, we can confine our attention to the ſingle property we deſire to inveſtigate.

43. Abſtract terms may be ſeparated into three different kinds, all equally ſubſervient to the reaſoning faculty. Individuals appear to have no end; and did we not poſſeſs the faculty of diſtributing them into claſſes, the mind would be loſt in an endleſs maze, and no progreſs be made in knowledge. It is by the faculty of abſtraction that we diſtribute beings into *genera* and *ſpecies*: finding a number of individuals connected by certain qualities common to all, we give a name to theſe individuals conſidered as thus connected, which name, by gathering them together into one claſs, ſerves to expreſs the whole of theſe individuals as diſtinct from others. Thus the word *animal* ſerves to denote every being that can move voluntarily; and the words *man*, *horſe*, *lion*, &c. anſwer ſimilar purpoſes. This is the firſt and moſt common ſort of abſtraction; and it is of the moſt extenſive uſe, by enabling us to comprehend in our reaſoning whole kinds and ſorts, inſtead of individuals without end. The next ſort of abſtract terms comprehends a number of individual objects, conſidered as connected by ſome occaſional relation. A great number of perſons collected in one place, without any

any other relation but merely that of contiguity, are denominated *a crowd:* in forming this term, we abſtract from ſex, from age, from condition, from dreſs, *&c.* A number of perſons connected by the ſame laws and by the ſame government, are termed *a nation:* and a number of men under the ſame military command, are termed *an army.* A third ſort of abſtraction is, where a ſingle property or part, which may be common to many individuals, is ſelected to be the ſubject of our contemplation; for example, whiteneſs, heat, beauty, length, roundneſs, head, arm.

44. Abſtract terms are a happy invention: it is by their means chiefly, that the particulars which make the ſubject of our reaſoning, are brought into cloſe union, and ſeparated from all others however naturally connected. Without the aid of ſuch terms, the mind could never be kept ſteady to its proper ſubject, but be perpetually in hazard of aſſuming foreign circumſtances, or neglecting what are eſſential. We can, without the aid of language, compare real objects by intuition, when theſe objects are preſent; and when abſent, we can compare them in idea. But when we advance farther, and attempt to make inferences and draw concluſions, we always employ abſtract terms, even in thinking; it would be as difficult to reaſon without them, as to perform operations in algebra without ſigns; for there is ſcarce any reaſoning without ſome degree of abſtraction

ſtraction, and we cannot eaſily abſtract without uſing abſtract terms. Hence it follows, that without language man would ſcarce be a rational being.

45. The ſame thing, in different reſpects, has different names. With reſpect to certain qualities, it is termed a *ſubſtance;* with reſpect to other qualities, a *body*; and with reſpect to qualities of all ſorts, a *ſubject*. It is termed a *paſſive ſubject* with reſpect to an action exerted upon it; an *object* with reſpect to a percipient; a *cauſe* with reſpect to the effect it produces; and an *effect* with reſpect to its cauſe.

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
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